




CORPORATE GOVERNANCE,  
INFORMATION INTERMEDIATION,  






zur Erlangung des Doktorgrades 
der Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakultät 



























Erstgutachter:  Prof. Dr. Jörg-Markus Hitz 
 






























































Based on four empirical studies, this thesis investigates the interrelation of corporate 
governance, information intermediation, and earnings management. First, the thesis 
complements the discussion initiated by the European Securities and Market Authorities 
about the role of proxy advisors at European shareholder meetings by providing empirical 
evidence on the influence and method consistency of these advisors for a European setting 
(Study 1). The respective findings are twofold; they indicate a significant correlation 
between negative proxy voting recommendations and voting dissent as well as a certain 
method consistency of these recommendations with respect to the employed governance 
perceptions. Second, the thesis augments prior work on the usefulness of commercial 
corporate governance ratings by shedding light on the incremental contribution of the rating 
vendor’s information processing activities (Study 2). The findings of this study suggest that 
governance rating vendors do not create value in the process of converting public data into 
aggregated ratings. Third, the thesis extends the perspective of prior research on proxy 
voting advisory and governance ratings by highlighting the role of corporate governance 
analysts (Study 3). In doing so, it provides empirical evidence on potential economic 
consequences of governance analyst coverage. The respective findings suggest that 
governance analysts serve as information intermediaries by enhancing the firm’s 
information environment and by promoting external monitoring to managers. Fourth and 
lastly, the thesis adds to research on the link between governance quality and earnings 
management by highlighting the setting-specific nature of this relationship (Study 4). 
Specifically, it examines whether the acquirer’s governance quality affects the acquirer’s 
earnings management behavior prior to share-based M&A transactions. The study’s findings 
suggest that – in contrast to common claims that strong governance constrains earnings 
management – acquirers with strong governance engage more aggressively in income-
increasing accruals manipulation than those with weak governance. Overall, the thesis 
contributes to prior literature by, first, providing insights into the economic role of corporate 
governance advisory on capital markets and, second, by highlighting the setting-specific 
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“Corporate governance is big business and,  
increasingly, front page news.”1
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Context of the Thesis 
Based on four empirical studies, this thesis addresses and extends research on the interrelation 
of corporate governance, information intermediation, and earnings management. Specifically, 
it contributes to two main literature streams. The first is research on corporate governance 
advisory. The second is research on the link between corporate governance quality and 
earnings management. Overall, this thesis provides novel insights into the economic role of 
corporate governance advisors on capital markets and highlights the setting-specific nature of 
the governance and earnings management relationship. 
 
Corporate Governance 
In the context of this thesis, the term corporate governance denotes control and incentive 
mechanisms which address agency costs within a firm. Based on the classical Principal-
Agent-Theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), agency costs result from interest divergences and 
information asymmetries between shareholders (principal) and management (agent) in firms 
with separated ownership and control.2
                                                 
1 Daines et al. (2008, p. 2). 
 Ideally, both contracting parties could negotiate a 
complete contract settling all tasks and duties of the agent to solve the agency conflict (Hart, 
1995). Since real world contracts are incomplete, e.g., owing to transaction costs, the 
principal has to delegate residual control rights to the agent (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In 
addition, in firms where ownership and control are separated, the principal is not able to fully 
oversee the actions of the agent, e.g., the agent’s discretionary allocation of the firm’s profit, 
due to information asymmetries. Consequently, the core task of corporate governance 
mechanisms is to overcome the agency conflict, and thus the agency costs, resulting from 
interest divergences and the asymmetrical distribution of information between the principal 
and the agent. In their seminal paper, Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p. 737) define corporate 
2 Following Jensen and Meckling (1976), agency costs are divided into three components: residual costs, 
monitoring costs, and bonding costs. Monitoring costs are essentially control and incentive expenditures borne 
by the principal. Bonding costs serve as signaling costs occurring when the agent signals her stewardship 
qualities. Given optimal monitoring and bonding, the residual costs occur as a (residual) loss in welfare because 






governance in more general terms as “the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations 
assure themselves of getting a return on their investment”.  
Besides this traditional, Anglo-Saxon ‘shareholder value’ perspective, the agency 
relationship might differ across jurisdictions depending on the respective institutional 
arrangements (e.g., Schillhofer, 2003, p. 7; or more generally, see, Schmidt and Weiß, 2003, 
pp. 115-118). The governance debate in continental Europe, for example, is dominated by a 
‘stakeholder value’ perspective considering agency costs induced by agency-conflicts 
between stakeholders (e.g., debt capital provides) and managers, or among different 
stakeholder groups (e.g., between minority shareholders and block holders).3
 
 Compared to the 
‘shareholder value’ perspective, the core task of corporate governance from a ‘stakeholder 
value’ perspective is still the alleviation of agency costs, though the configuration of the 
respective governance mechanisms might differ due to differences in the underlying agency 
conflict. In general, prior research on corporate governance focuses on mechanisms such as 
shareholder rights and shareholder activism features, the structure and the composition of 
boards (and board committees), executive compensation contracts, block holders, institutional 
investors, disclosure, transparency, the financial reporting system, or the market for corporate 
control (e.g., Bebchuk and Weisbach, 2010; Becht et al., 2005; for an overview, see 
Schillhofer, 2003, pp. 25-59). 
Earnings Management 
Among the various corporate governance mechanisms, the financial reporting process in 
general, and the accounting quality in particular, constitutes a specific governance 
mechanism. The quality of the financial reporting process can be seen both as an input as well 
as an output factor of the governance process (e.g., Sloan, 2001). High quality financial 
reporting, for example, promotes the governance process by reducing information 
asymmetries between the principals and the agents. In addition, corporate governance in turn 
is expected to increase the integrity and the reliability of the financial reporting process by 
implementing control and incentive mechanisms to mitigate opportunistic behavior. 
Specifically, corporate governance is expected to improve the financial reporting quality by 
constraining, among other things, earnings management.  
                                                 
3 Shleifer and Vishny (1997), however, consider debt capital providers (as suppliers of finance) in their 






Earnings management can be described as the managers’ opportunistic use of 
accounting discretion in the financial reporting process. Managers may have incentives to 
alter reporting outcomes to mislead stakeholders about the firms’ underlying performance or 
to influence contractual outcomes (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). Healy (1985), for example, 
shows empirically that compensation contracts induce incentives for managers to choose 
specific accounting procedures in order to maximize the present value of their bonus schemes. 
In addition, DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) present evidence showing that managers engage in 
earnings management in order to avoid debt covenant violations. Since earnings management 
activities potentially contrast the interests of the principal, e.g., in situations where the profit 
allocation between the principal and the agent is influenced by earnings manipulations, 
earnings management induces agency costs. As governance mechanisms are designed to 
alleviate agency costs within a firm, they are also expected to constrain the opportunistic use 
of accounting discretion. In a similar vein, Dechow et al. (1996, p. 4) posit that “[i]nternal 
governance processes are established to maintain the credibility of firms’ financial statements 
and safeguard against such behavior as earnings manipulation.” 
 
Governance Advisors as Information Intermediaries 
Given the potential importance of corporate governance, governance advisory firms have 
vastly spread throughout the last decade (e.g., Rose, 2007). Their core business consists of 
fee-based governance consultancy and risk assessments via, e.g., commercial corporate 
governance ratings or proxy voting recommendations to institutional shareholders or other 
capital market participants. From an economic perspective, governance advisory firms 
represent information intermediaries on capital markets. Following Healy and Palepu (2002, 
p. 4), “information intermediaries reduce transaction costs in the capital market by providing 
specialized services and gathering and disseminating information“. Specifically, governance 
advisory firms process, enhance, and disseminate governance-related information to capital 
market participants in order to alleviate transaction costs (e.g., Balling et al., 2005). To the 
extent that governance advisory firms are able to reduce capital market participants’ costs of 
making informed decisions (i.e., transaction costs), e.g., by providing (1) more accurate or 
less expensive evaluations of corporate governance quality or (2) more cost-efficient 
information on how to vote on shareholder meetings for a large set of portfolio firms, capital 
market participants potentially value the information provided by these advisors (e.g., Ertimur 






The Market of Governance Advisors 
These days, Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) is considered to be the world’s leading 
governance rating vendor and proxy advisor (ESMA, 2012). ISS markets commercial 
corporate governance ratings for more than 8,000 firms across 31 countries since 2002. These 
commercial corporate governance ratings – based on over 60 single governance provisions – 
are commonly available to institutional shareholders or other capital market participants via 
subscription packages which can result in fees of up to $ 100,000 per year (Coffin and 
Collinson, 2005). In addition, ISS provides proxy advisory services, i.e., governance-related 
advisory on how to vote on annual general meetings, for over 1,700 institutional investors 
managing $ 26 trillion in assets, including 24 of the top 25 mutual funds, 25 of the top 25 
assets managers, and 17 of the top 25 public pension funds (Daines et al., 2010).  
In the U.S., the business press and policy makers perceive governance advisors such as 
ISS as influential and powerful (Choi et al., 2010, p. 871). Delaware’s former Vice-
Chancellor Leo Strine Jr., for example, puts ISS’s influence into the following words: 
“[P]owerful CEOs come on bended knee to Rockville, Maryland, where ISS resides, to 
persuade the managers of ISS of the merits of their views about issues like proposed mergers, 
executive compensation, and poison pills. They do so because the CEOs recognize that some 
institutional investors will simply follow ISS’s advice rather than do any thinking of their 
own.” (Strine, 2005, p. 688) Although at a lower frequency and in a more recent time span, 
the business press, academia, and policy makers in Europe and Germany have joined the 
discussion on the role and influence of governance advisors as well. The German press, for 
example, has been expanding considerably its reporting on proxy advisors at German 
shareholder meetings throughout the last years. Some German commentators have recently 
described ISS as “Mächtige Aktionärsflüsterer”4 (powerful shareholder whisperers), 
“einflussreichste Schattenmacht der deutschen Konzerne”5 (the most influential ‘state within 
a state’ among German firms), or “Rebellenführer auf Hauptversammlungen”6
However, the fact that governance advisors like ISS also provide governance advisory 
directly to firms raises concerns about their independence (e.g., Koeng and Ueng, 2007, p. 61; 
 (rebel leader 
on shareholder meetings). 
                                                 
4 Wirtschaftswoche (25/01/2012), accessible under: http://www.wiwo.de/finanzen/boerse/aktionaere-die-
heimliche-macht-der-fonds/6088556.html, last accessed June 30, 2014.  
5 Spiegel Online (07/05/2013), accessible under: http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/unternehmen/lufthansa-
wusste-frueh-von-widerstand-grosser-aktionaere-gegen-mayrhuber-a-898595.html, last accessed June 30, 2014.  
6 Wirtschaftswoche (29/07/2010), accessible under: http://www.wiwo.de/finanzen/riskmetrics-rebellenfuehrer-






Rose, 2007, pp. 891, 906; Vo, 2008, p. 17). In two recent initiatives, the European Securities 
and Markets Authority (ESMA) as well as the European Commission (2011, p. 15) have 
shared these concerns outlining potential conflicts of interest in situations “when proxy 
advisors also act as corporate governance consultants to investee companies”. In March 2012, 
ESMA released the discussion paper – “An overview of the Proxy Advisory Industry: 
Considerations on Possible Policy Actions” – for consultation. The purpose of this discussion 
paper was threefold; (1) to outline the developments of the European proxy advisory industry, 
(2) to raise 12 key issues for consultation with respect to potential market failures within the 
proxy advisory business, and (3) to discuss potential policy options. As the consultation 
process neither provided clear examples of severe market failures related to the proxy 
advisory business nor benefits speaking in favor of an overall unregulated governance 
advisory business, ESMA decided not to consider any binding regulatory measures. Instead, 
ESMA mandated the proxy advisory business to develop a European wide code of conduct 
standard to increase integrity and transparency (ESMA, 2013, pp. 5-6).  
 
1.2 Objectives and Contribution of the Thesis 
Against the above outlined background, this thesis investigates the interrelation of corporate 
governance, information intermediation, and earnings management. As outlined in Figure 1 - 
1, I address and extend two general literature streams; the stream on corporate governance 
advisory (e.g., Daines et al., 2010; Ertimur et al., 2013), and the stream on accrual-based 
earnings management and corporate governance quality (e.g., Klein, 2002; Larcker et al., 
2007). The former stream of literature addresses issues such as the growth and impact of 
commercial corporate governance rating vendors (e.g., Rose, 2007), the role and regulation as 
well as the usefulness of proxy advisors (e.g., Ertimur et al., 2013; Larcker et al., 2013), or the 
usefulness of commercial governance ratings to investors (e.g., Daines et al., 2010). The 
majority of prior findings on the question whether proxy advisors or governance rating 
vendors are valuable for investors does not provide evidence in favor of the governance 
industry (e.g., Daines et al., 2010; Larcker et al., 2013). Thus, the economic vindication of 
these information intermediaries is still a question of debate. 
Extending the literature on corporate governance advisory, this thesis provides 
additional insights into the role of proxy voting advisors and corporate governance rating 
vendors (Study 1 & 2). Specifically, it adds to the growing but U.S. dominated literature on 






contributes to the current European debate on the regulation of proxy advisors (European 
Commission, 2011; ESMA, 2012). Given the discussion initiated by ESMA about the role of 
proxy advisors at European shareholder meetings, the thesis presents empirical evidence on 
the influence and method consistency of these advisors for a major European market (Study 
1). With respect to commercially available corporate governance ratings, the thesis further 
provides empirical evidence on the incremental usefulness of commercial governance ratings 
to investors (Study 2). It complements and augments prior work by directly addressing the 
economic vindication of commercial corporate governance ratings. Overall, the first objective 
of this thesis is to contrast the usefulness of governance advisory on capital markets. 
Figure 1 - 1: Contents of the Thesis 
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Apart from research on corporate governance advisory, a large body of finance, 
management, and accounting studies examines, among other things, the association between 
different corporate governance mechanisms (or overall governance ratings) and various firm-
level outcome variables, like operating performance, organizational performance, or financial 
reporting quality (e.g., Ahrens et al., 2009; Brown et al., 2011). Drawing on accounting 
research, previous studies have primarily focused on the relationship between corporate 
governance quality and financial reporting quality in general, and corporate governance 
quality and earnings management in particular (e.g., Dechow et al., 2010; Garcia-Meca et al., 
2009).7
Extending both – research on corporate governance advisory as well as research on the 
link between corporate governance quality and earnings management – the thesis investigates 
the role of corporate governance analysts in shaping firms’ information environment in 
general, and firms’ earnings management behavior in particular (Study 3). Prior studies on 
financial analysts suggest that external monitors – like financial analysts – are potentially 
more effective in constraining earnings management than internal governance mechanisms 
(Yu, 2008, p. 248; Bolton et al., 2005, p. 7). These studies argue that in most cases earnings 
management is driven by an agency conflict between current and future shareholders rather 
than a conflict between managers and shareholders. Empirical evidence appears to be 
consistent with this claim. Prior literature documents a negative relationship between the 
number of financial analysts following a firm (as well as the coverage by those analysts) and 
earnings management (e.g., Yu, 2008; Degeorge et al., 2013a). Besides having additional 
empirical evidence on the role of buy-side analysts and bond analysts (Cheng et al., 2006; De 
Franco et al., 2009), as well as on the (non-financial) information processing of financial 
analysts (Orens and Lybaert, 2010; Bhat et al., 2006; Byard et al., 2006; Asare et al., 2011), 
previous literature has been silent on the coverage effects of corporate governance analysts 
and their potential interactions with financial analysts, investors, or managers. Consequently, 
the second objective of this thesis is to highlight the role of (non-financial) corporate 
governance analysts. To that end, the thesis provides empirical evidence on the potential 
economic consequences of governance analyst coverage. 
 As outlined in section 1.1, prior accounting research assumes a constraining role of 
corporate governance on the opportunistic use of accounting discretion.  
                                                 
7 Typical dimensions of financial reporting quality are earnings quality (e.g., earnings timeliness and 
conservatism, earnings management, persistence, predictability, or value relevance), disclosure quality, or 






To explicitly address and extend research on earnings management and governance 
quality, the thesis finally examines in detail the link between corporate governance quality 
and accrual-based earnings management (Study 4). Although prior accounting research 
assumes – either explicitly or implicitly – a constraining role of corporate governance on 
accruals manipulation8
 
 (e.g., Dechow et al., 1996), the empirical evidence so far is rather 
mixed (e.g., Brown et al., 2011; Dechow et al., 2010; Larcker et al., 2007). Therefore, the 
third objective of the thesis is to provide a possible explanation for this inconclusive evidence 
by highlighting the setting specific-nature of the earnings management and corporate 
governance relationship. Specifically, the thesis provides empirical evidence on the 
relationship between accruals manipulation and corporate governance in a specific-setting, 
i.e., stock swap M&A transactions, in which prior literature documents income-increasing 
accruals manipulations, and in which invested shareholders of the acquiring firm might 
benefit from managerial discretion in the accrual process. 
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
As outlined in Figure 1 - 2, the thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 1 outlines the 
motivation and the structure of the thesis. The following four chapters, 2 to 5, present the four 
empirical studies. The last chapter concludes. 
Chapter 2. Does proxy voting advisory matter in a European context? Evidence from 
German annual meetings: The first study of the thesis investigates the influence and the 
consistency of proxy voting recommendations for a major European market (Study 1). To that 
end, it exploits a sample of 1,664 annual general meeting agenda items and the corresponding 
proxy voting recommendations issued by ISS for the German proxy season 2010. The results 
indicate that negative ISS voting recommendations coincide with an 8.5% reduction of 
shareholder support. This reduction is even more pronounced for firms with high free float, 
low voting turnout, and high ISS client base. With respect to the economic significance, ISS 
voting recommendations, however, potentially affect voting outcomes at a lower level as 
compared to prior U.S. evidence (e.g., 8.5% to 19% and 26% as documented by Cai et al., 
2009 and Ertimur et al., 2013, respectively). In addition and in contrast to recent U.S. 
                                                 
8 In essence, accruals are the difference between GAAP earnings and cash from operations. Discretionary 
accruals are in turn accrual components which are subject to the manager’s judgment due to accounting 
discretions (e.g., IAS 38.43, recognition of intangible assets: accounting discretion in the process of assessing the 
fulfillment of the recognition criteria in paragraph 38.57) or accounting choices (e.g., IAS 40.30, measurement 
after recognition for investment properties: accounting choice between the cost model or the fair value model) in 






findings, the results further suggest that ISS recommendations significantly correlate with 
ISS’s commercially available corporate governance ratings (GRId). Specifically, ISS’s 
recommendations against the election of supervisory board members (against the 
remuneration system) are significantly correlated with ISS’s evaluations of the corresponding 
board quality (of the remuneration system’s quality). These findings highlight potential 
method consistency with respect to ISS’s underlying governance perceptions. Overall, this 
study extends the growing but U.S. dominated literature on proxy voting advisory and 
contributes to the current European debate on the regulation of proxy advisors. Specifically, 
this study adds to the discussion initiated by ESMA about the role of proxy advisors at 
European shareholder meetings by providing empirical evidence on the influence and method 
consistency of those advisors for a major European market. 
Chapter 3. The usefulness of corporate governance ratings – insights from European 
settings: Extending the perspective of the first study, the second study of the thesis provides 
insights into the usefulness of governance advisory on capital markets (Study 2). Specifically, 
it investigates the power of corporate governance ratings in explaining firm value, and 
augments prior work by examining in detail the incremental value created by the rating 
agency’s activities of translating public and private information into commercial ratings. To 
that end, it is the first study to shed light on the incremental usefulness of a governance 
agency’s proprietary technology. Using data provided by ISS for the UK and the German 
markets, the analyses indicate that, in line with prior work, commercial ratings are positively 
associated with firm value. However, isolating the incremental contribution of the rating 
agency, the study finds no additional explanatory power relative to a naïve rating that is 
constructed from the observable, publicly available inputs which ISS uses. This suggests that 
the rating agency does not create value by assembling a rating from observable data using 
proprietary technology, and supplementing private information. These findings put into 
question the incremental usefulness of the rating agencies’ information processing activities, 
indicating that the core competitive advantage of these institutions rather lies in the activity of 
collecting publicly available governance data, creating transaction cost savings for investors, 
or other, hitherto unexplored factors. 
Chapter 4. Do corporate governance analysts matter? Evidence from a quasi-natural 
experiment: Addressing both – research on governance advisory as well as research on the 
relationship between governance and earnings management – the third study of the thesis 






environment in general, and firms’ earnings management behavior in particular (Study 3). 
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Specifically, this study examines potential economic consequences of governance 
analyst coverage by focusing on two different groups (financial analysts and investors) as 
well as on two firm-level mechanisms (corporate governance quality and earnings 
management) which are potentially affected by the presence of governance analysts. Using a 
quasi-natural experiment that exploits an exogenous shock in the UK governance analyst 
coverage, this study finds that an increase in governance analyst coverage results in increasing 
analyst following, weakly in increasing free float, in improvements in firm-level corporate 
governance, and weakly in decreasing accruals manipulations. These findings suggest that 
financial analysts, investors, and managers respond to changes in governance analyst 
coverage. Overall, the findings are consistent with the notion that governance analysts serve 
as economically meaningful information intermediaries by enhancing a firm’s information 
environment and by promoting external monitoring to managers 
Chapter 5. The role of corporate governance in shaping accruals manipulation prior to 
acquisitions: Extending the perspective of the third study, the last study of the thesis directly 
examines the relationship between corporate governance and earnings management (Study 4). 
In particular, it highlights the setting-specific nature of the earnings management and 
corporate governance relationship. In doing so, this study examines whether the acquirer’s 
corporate governance quality affects the acquirer’s earnings management behavior prior to 
share-based M&A transactions. As accruals manipulation prior to share deals is potentially in 
the interests of the acquirer’s shareholders, this setting offers – in contrast to the stated 
assumptions of prior literature – an alternative view on the effects of corporate governance, 
namely that good governance potentially promotes earnings management instead of 
constraining it. Using stock swap transactions with public acquirers originating from the UK 
between the years 1998 and 2011, the results confirm recent findings of Botsari and Meeks 
(2008) that acquirers on average manipulate accruals upward in the period leading up to the 
transactions. However, and contrary to common claims that strong corporate governance 
constrains accruals manipulation, the analyses of the period specific earnings management 
behavior prior to share deals suggest that acquirers with strong governance engage more 
aggressively in income-increasing accruals manipulation than those with weak governance. 
This finding is consistent with the notion that corporate governance incentivizes managerial 
actions in the interests of firms’ shareholders. 
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This paper addresses the role of proxy voting advisors for a major European market in two 
respects. First, it examines the influence of these advisors in shifting voting outcomes at 
German annual general meetings (AGM). Second, it investigates the consistency of their 
voting recommendations with respect to the employed governance perceptions. To that end, 
this paper extends the growing but U.S. focused literature on proxy voting advisory (e.g., Cai 
et al., 2009; Ertimur et al., 2013; Larcker et al., 2013) and contributes to the current European 
debate on the regulation of proxy advisors (European Commission, 2011; ESMA, 2012).  
Proxy advisors facilitate and support one of the key governance instruments of 
shareholders, namely the shareholders’ vote on AGMs (ESMA, 2012, p. 9). Specifically, they 
issue recommendations and research on how to vote on AGM agenda items. In the case of 
institutional investors with diversified portfolios covering firms from different countries with 
different governance traditions, proxy advisors are expected to improve the voting process of 
these investors by lowering potential information and monitoring costs (ESMA, 2012, p. 9).  
Prior U.S. research suggests that “vote against” recommendations issued by Institutional 
Shareholder Services (ISS) – the most influential advisor worldwide – correlate with a voting 
dissent of up to 26% of shareholder votes (e.g., Ertimur et al., 2013). Moreover, a recent U.S. 
study casts doubts on the method consistency of ISS by documenting that ISS’s voting 
recommendations are only weakly correlated with its commercially available governance 
ratings (Daines et al., 2010, pp. 455-460). However, whether these results translate to a 
continental European setting is an open question. In contrast to the U.S., the German market 
is characterized by a stakeholder model of corporate governance in which, among other 
things, codetermination, large shareholders, and banks play important roles (e.g., Goergen et 
al., 2008). Specifically, compared to the U.S., the German capital market exhibits a rather low 
degree of dispersed ownership and institutional (U.S.) holdings (e.g., Cziraki et al., 2010, p. 
748), and lacks experience with proxy voting advisory (ESMA, 2012, p. 16). Compared to the 
long-lasting public debate about the role and influence of proxy voting advisory in the U.S. 
(e.g., Center on Executive Compensation, 2011, pp. 14-21), similar issues have received 
rather little attention in Germany. In recent years, however, the business press, academia, and 
regulators in Germany as well as in continental Europe have been adding proxy voting 
advisory to their agendas. The German press, for example, has been expanding considerably 
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its reporting on proxy advisors at German shareholder meetings throughout the last years.11 
Some German commentators have recently described ISS as “Mächtige Aktionärsflüsterer”12 
(powerful shareholder whisperers), “einflussreichste Schattenmacht der deutschen 
Konzerne”13 (the most influential ‘state within a state’ among German firms), or 
“Rebellenführer auf Hauptversammlungen”14
In addition, the European Commission and the European Securities and Markets 
Authority (ESMA) have recently raised concerns about the role and influence of proxy voting 
advisors at European AGMs. In the consultation process of its discussion paper, ESMA 
(2012, p. 39), for example, has invited comments on the questions (1) whether proxy advisors 
have a significant impact on the voting results at European AGMs and (2) whether 
improvements should be made with respect to transparency and methodology to provide more 
reliable and independent voting recommendations. Overall, the feedback during the 
consultation period has highlighted that – despite anecdotal evidence – empirical evidence on 
the role and influence of proxy advisors at European AGMs is not available (ESMA, 2013). 
Accordingly, the main purpose of this study is to contribute to the discussion initiated by 
European regulators and to provide first descriptive evidence on the influence of proxy 
advisors as well as on the method consistency of their voting recommendations for a major 
European market. 
 (rebel leader on shareholder meetings). 
Based on a German sample of 1,664 AGM voting items (185 individual firms) and the 
corresponding proxy voting recommendations issued by ISS for the year 2010, I find that ISS 
proxy voting recommendations potentially affect voting outcomes. However, three factors 
appear to play a crucial role both at an economic and a statistical level: the client base of ISS, 
the voting turnout at AGMs, and the ownership concentration. Specifically, a “vote against” 
recommendation issued by ISS significantly correlates with on average 8.5% fewer supportive 
shareholder votes. This correlation is even more pronounced when considering voting items 
with high ISS client base (11.21%), with low voting turnout (11.59%), and high free float 
(11.44%). When examining a subsample of firms with high client base, negative ISS 
recommendations even correlate with 16.32% and 16.11% less supportive shareholder votes 
                                                 
11 See Appendix 2 - 2. 
12 Wirtschaftswoche (25/01/2012), accessible under: http://www.wiwo.de/finanzen/boerse/aktionaere-die-
heimliche-macht-der-fonds/6088556.html, last accessed June 30, 2014.  
13 Spiegel Online (07/05/2013), accessible under: http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/unternehmen/lufthansa-
wusste-frueh-von-widerstand-grosser-aktionaere-gegen-mayrhuber-a-898595.html, last accessed June 30, 2014.  
14 Wirtschaftswoche (29/07/2010), accessible under: http://www.wiwo.de/finanzen/riskmetrics-rebellenfuehrer-
auf-hauptversammlungen/5663966.html, last accessed June 30, 2014.  
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for voting items with low voting turnout and high free float, respectively. In addition, 
sensitivity analyses based on (1) a subsample of non-routine items15
To address – in a second step – the consistency of ISS voting recommendations, I 
follow Daines et al. (2010) and compare ISS voting recommendations with another product 
marketed by ISS, namely ISS’s commercial corporate governance ratings (GRId). To that 
end, I expect that high (low) correlations between the two commercially available products 
indicate a rather high (low) consistency with respect to the governance standards employed by 
ISS. High method consistency might in turn increase accountability and transparency of the 
advisory services. Since ISS governance ratings (GRId ratings) are not available for all 
sample firms, I base the analysis on a subsample of firms (918 recommendations based on 92 
individual firms). My results suggest that ISS voting recommendations are significantly 
correlated with ISS commercial corporate governance ratings. Specifically, ISS’s recommen-
dations against the election of supervisory board members (against compensation issues) are 
significantly correlated with ISS’s evaluations of the corresponding board quality (the 
remuneration system’s quality). For example, the predicted probability of receiving a “vote 
against” recommendation by ISS on director election (compensation) proposals is 58.19% 
(66.98%) and 8.63% (1.29%) for firms with the lowest and the highest board (compensation) 
score, respectively. In addition, a “vote against” recommendation by ISS significantly 
correlates with ISS’s overall commercially available governance ratings. For an increase from 
the lowest to the highest rated firm, the probability of receiving a “vote against” 
recommendation by ISS on all management proposals is reduced by more than 20 percentage 
points. This is even more pronounced – with a reduction of over 50 percentage points – when 
considering only non-routine management proposals. 
 and (2) on a subsample 
which considers alternative voting recommendations issued by the second largest German 
association of shareholders as a benchmark of publicly available information support my 
original findings. 
In sum, my findings shed light on the influence as well as the consistency of ISS proxy 
voting recommendations at German AGMs. Specifically, they suggest that – despite 
differences in the institutional arrangement between the U.S. and Germany – proxy voting 
advisors might play an influential role at German AGMs as well. With respect to the 
                                                 
15 In contrast to routine items, opinions and best practice on how to vote on non-routine items, e.g., significant 
business decisions or remuneration packages, might differ among shareholders and proxy advisors (ESMA, 
2012, p. 19). 
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economic significance, ISS voting recommendations, however, correlate with voting 
outcomes at a lower level (e.g., 8.5% to 19% and 26% as documented by Cai et al., 2009 and 
Ertimur et al., 2013, respectively). In addition and in contrast to Daines et al. (2010), my 
findings reveal significant correlations between two different commercial products which are 
marketed by ISS, i.e., ISS proxy voting recommendations and ISS corporate governance 
ratings. These findings suggest that the employed governance perception of ISS is potentially 
consistent across its different commercially available products. Overall, the findings of this 
study contribute to the discussion initiated by European regulators and provide first 
descriptive evidence on the influence of proxy advisors as well as on the method consistency 
of their voting recommendations for a major European market. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2.2 provides background 
information on the European proxy advisory business and reviews the related literature. 
Section 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5 introduce the empirical predictions, the research design, and the 
results, respectively. The last section concludes.     
 
2.2 Background 
2.2.1 The Economic Role of Proxy Advisors 
Proxy voting advisors, such as ISS, provide advisory services to institutional investors. Most 
importantly, they issue recommendations on how to vote on AGMs’ agenda items. In 
addition, they offer a range of services, e.g., governance-related research, customized voting 
guidelines for investors, or the whole voting logistics. In some cases, they even exercise the 
voting decision in their own discretion on behalf of the investors (Choi et al., 2010, p. 871). 
From an economic perspective, proxy advisors facilitate and support one of the key 
governance instruments of shareholders, namely the shareholders’ vote on AGMs to exercise 
their ownership rights (ESMA, 2012, p. 9). Following Ertimur et al. (2013, p. 5), proxy 
advisors serve as information intermediaries that collect, process, and disseminate 
governance-related information in order to reduce the capital market participants’ costs of 
making informed decisions (i.e., transaction costs). Specifically, in the case of institutional 
investors with large and diversified portfolios covering hundreds of firms from different 
countries with different governance traditions, proxy advisors are expected to improve the 
voting process of these investors by lowering potential information and monitoring costs 
(ESMA, 2012, p. 9). 
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2.2.2 German Shareholder Meetings and Proxy Advisory 
In the German two-tier system, AGMs are usually convened by the management board (§ 121 
(2) AktG). In contrast to the U.S. system, management board and supervisory board together 
set the agenda of the AGM (§ 123 (1) AktG). In doing so, they pose so-called management 
proposals which must be publicly available at the firm’s website at least 30 days prior to the 
meeting (§ 124a AktG). If shareholders’ stakes in a firm exceed a specific quorum (5% or 
EUR 500,000.00 of the nominal share capital), they are entitled to convene a meeting or to 
submit own proposals to the agenda (§ 122 (2, 3) AktG). At the meeting, shareholders have 
the right to vote on management (and shareholder) proposals. According to the German Stock 
Corporation Law (AktG), shareholders have to vote, among other things, on proposals 
pertaining to the approval of dividends, the discharges of the management and supervisory 
board members, the nominations of supervisory board members, the appointment of the 
statutory auditor, the amendments of the articles of association, and capital-related issues such 
as the creation of capital pools or share repurchase programs (§ 119 AktG). Based on the 
agenda of the meeting, proxy voting advisors release different fee-based services (e.g., 
recommendations on how to vote on the respective proposals) to institutional investors or 
other capital market participants prior to the meeting. 
 
2.2.3 The European Proxy Advisory Business 
The first proxy advisory firms (i.e., ISS in the U.S. and PIRC in the UK) were established in 
the 1980s (ESMA, 2012, pp. 10-11). In subsequent years, and especially in the 2000s, many 
new proxy advisors have been established both in the U.S. (e.g., Glass Lewis, Proxy 
Governance, or Egan-Jones Proxy Services) and in Europe (e.g., Proxinvest in France, 
Manifest in the UK, or IVOX in Germany).16 Nowadays, ISS – a former subsidiary of 
RiskMetrics Group and MSCI – is considered as the leading proxy advisor in the world 
(ESMA, 2012, p. 10).17
                                                 
16 The increase in the US market in the 2000s is especially related to the 2003 SEC regulation on mutual funds 
voting practice (ESMA, 2012, p. 9). 
 According to Daines et al. (2010, p. 439), ISS provides proxy voting 
services for over 1,700 institutional investors managing $ 26 trillion in assets, including 24 of 
the top 25 mutual funds, 25 of the top 25 assets managers, and 17 of the top 25 public pension 
funds. In the U.S., the business press and policy makers perceive especially ISS and Glass 
17 In particular, U.S. market shares are distributed as follows: ISS (61%), Glass Lewis (36%), and remaining 
proxy advisors, like Proxy Governance or Egan-Jones Proxy Services (3%) (ESMA, 2012, p. 10).   
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Lewis (as the second largest U.S. proxy advisor) as influential and powerful (Choi et al., 
2010, p. 871).18
Table 2 - 1
 In contrast to the U.S., proxy advisory in Europe is small (in terms of 
coverage and turnover) and still developing (ESMA, 2012, p. 16). In recent years, however, 
the business press, academia, and policy makers in Europe and Germany have joined the 
discussion about the role and influence of proxy advisors. Based on the ESMA consultation 
paper (ESMA, 2012, pp. 9-15),  summarizes the main players in the market.  




ISS (U.S.) • Founded in 1985, ISS is a subsidiary of MSCI and considered as the leading proxy advisor in 
the world (with over 1,700 clients who have $ 26 trillion in assets under management). It 
provides a wide range of governance services, including global proxy voting advisory, 
commercial corporate governance ratings, and consulting services to corporate issuers. ISS is 
incorporated in Delaware and registered as an SEC regulated investment adviser. It has 16 
offices (and over 600 employees) around the world with European-based offices in London, 




• Founded in 2003, Glass Lewis is perceived as the second largest proxy advisor worldwide 
(with over 900 clients who have $ 15 trillion in assets under management). Glass Lewis is a 
portfolio firm of The Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan Board (OTPP) and Alberta Investment 
Management Corp. (AIMCo), which are also clients of Glass Lewis. It provides governance 
services, including proxy advisory and financial transactions / portfolio research, but 
excluding governance ratings and consulting services to corporate issuers. Glass Lewis is 
incorporated in Delaware but not registered as an SEC regulated investment adviser. It has 
five offices (with over 300 employees) around the world with a European-based office in 
Limerick, Ireland (since 2011).   
Proxinvest  
(FR) 
• Founded in 1995, Proxinvest provides proxy advisory services for all firms in the MSCI 
Europe Index and FTSE Eurofirst 300. It does not provide any consulting to corporate issuers. 
Since 2010, the Swiss pension funds foundation Ethos is a major shareholder of Proxinvest 
(with a stake of 20%). Proxinvest is a shareholder and founding member of Expert Corporate 
Governance Service (ECGS), which is a joint venture of different proxy advisors. 
PIRC (UK) • Founded in 1986, PIRC (Pension & Investment Research Consultants) provides governance 
services to institutional investors (who have over £ 1.5 trillion in assets under management). 
These governance services include proxy advisory, governance and CSR consultancy, but 
explicitly exclude any consulting services to corporate issuers. PIRC is regulated by the UK 
Financial Services Authority (FSA). 
Manifest  
(UK) 
• Founded in 1995, Manifest provides global proxy voting advisory (coverage of over 80 
markets) and governance services to institutional investors (who have over £ 3 trillion in 
assets under management). It has two offices (with over 40 employees), which are located in 
the UK and Australia. In 2014, Manifest joined ECGS.  
 
 
                                                 
18 Delaware’s former Vice-Chancellor Leo Strine Jr. (2005, p. 688), for example, describes this as follows: 
“[P]owerful CEOs come on bended knee to Rockville, Maryland, where ISS resides, to persuade the managers of 
ISS of the merits of their views about issues like proposed mergers, executive compensation, and poison pills. 
They do so because the CEOs recognize that some institutional investors will simply follow ISS’s advice rather 
than do any thinking of their own. ISS has been so successful that it now has a California rival, Glass Lewis.” 
19 Based on ESMA (2012, pp. 11-12), Center on Executive Compensation (2011, pp. 28-41), the advisors’ 
responses on the ESMA consultation, and the advisory firms’ websites. 
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Table 2 - 1: Proxy Advisors active in Europe (non-exhaustive list) (continued) 
ADVISORS BRIEF DESCRIPTION 
IVOX 
(GER) 
• Founded in 2006, IVOX provides proxy voting advisory and governance research (i.e., 
governance ratings) to over 35 clients / institutional investors (who have € 1.9 trillion in assets 
under management). It does not provide any consulting services to corporate issuers. IVOX 
has offices in Germany (headquarter in Karlsruhe), France, and England. IVOX is owned by 
its founders (among other things by its current director Alexander Juschus) and a Swiss 
foundation. As IVOX does not develop own proxy voting guidelines (their recommendations 
are always based on customized guidelines), “it is not unusual that IVOX provides five 
different recommendations for the same meeting.”20  
ECGS (FR) • Founded in 2001, ECGS (Expert Corporate Governance Service) is a joint venture of six 
European-based proxy advisors (i.e., DSW from Germany, Ethos from Switzerland, 
Shareholder Service from the Netherland, Frontis Governance from Italy, Manifest from UK, 
and Proxinvest from France) and two non European-based advisors (Groupe Investissement 
Responsable Inc. from Canada and SIRIS from Australia).21 ECGS provides proxy voting 
advisory and governance research to institutional investors. It does not provide any consulting 
services to corporate issuers. 
 
2.2.4 Regulatory Initiatives in Europe 
The proxy advisory industry in Europe is virtually unregulated (ESMA, 2012, p. 5).22
 
 As this 
industry is growing in influence and prominence in Europe due to increasing (foreign) 
institutional holdings and dispersed ownership among large and listed European firms, 
European regulators have been recently adding proxy voting advisory to their agendas. In 
particular, concerns arise, especially among issuers (reviewed firms), that only few proxy 
advisors dominate the business (with actually one dominant player, namely ISS), that these 
advisors operate in a virtually unregulated environment, and that some investors blindly 
follow the recommendations issued by them (ESMA, 2012, p. 9). In addition, potential 
conflicts of interests (e.g., in situation where proxy advisors also provide services to corporate 
issuers) and low transparency levels are seen critically by issuers and regulators (ESMA, 
2012, p. 9). 
                                                 
20 See, IVOX response on the ESMA 2012 discussion paper. 
21 See 2014 ECGS Guidelines for Public (accessible under: http://ecgs.com/node/66, last accessed June 30, 
2014). 
22 Specifically, there exist no European-wide regulatory measures which address directly proxy voting advisors. 
However, on member state level, there are some policy recommendations which address directly/indirectly the 
proxy advisory industry, e.g., the UK FRC Stewardship Code Principle 1 & 6 from 2012 and the French AMF 
Recommendation No. 2011-06 (ESMA, 2012, pp. 29-30). U.S. proxy advisors are normally regulated under the 
Investment Adviser Act from 1940 (ESMA, 2012, p. 27). Under this regulation, proxy advisors have to comply 
with certain fiduciary obligations and have to meet minimum disclosure standards. Depending on the services 
provided, not all advisors, however, are required to register as investment advisors under the Adviser Act. In 
2010, the SEC released a concept paper on the U.S. proxy voting system to review the role and influence of 
proxy advisors in the US and to discuss potential policy options. 
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• Green Paper “The EU corporate governance framework” released by the European 
Commission (public consultation period until July 22, 2011). 
22/03/2012 • Discussion Paper “An Overview of the Proxy Advisory Industry. Considerations on 
Possible Policy Actions” released by the European Securities and Market Authority 
(public consultation period until June 25, 2012).24
19/02/2013 
 
• Final Report “Feedback statement on the consultation regarding the role of the proxy 
advisory industry” released by the European Securities and Market Authority (based on 
64 responses) with the conclusion that ESMA encourages the proxy advisory industry to 
develop its own code-of-conduct principles.25
28/10/2013 
   
• First Draft “Public Consultation on Best Practice Principles for Governance Research 
Provides” released by BPP Group Consultation (public consultation period until 
December 20, 2013). 
March 2014 • Based on the results of the “Public Consultation on Best Practice Principles for 
Governance Research Provides” and the 44 received responses26
Sep / Oct 2014 
, BPP Group 
Consultation plans to ratify and publish a final set of code-of-conduct principles for 
governance research providers. 
• BPP Group Consultation plans to meet for a first review on the ratified principles. 
 
In a Green Paper in 2011, the European Commission has addressed issues such as the 
influence, the method consistency, and conflicts of interests of proxy advisors. In a separate 
initiative but based on responses to the Green Paper and further ‘fact-finding’ activities in 
2011, ESMA (2012) released a discussion paper on potential market failures related to the 
proxy advisory business for consultation. The purpose of this discussion paper was to outline 
the developments of the European proxy advisory industry, to raise 12 key issues for 
consultation with respect to potential market failures within the proxy advisory business, and 
to discuss potential policy options. As the consultation process did not provide clear examples 
of severe market failures related to the proxy advisory business, ESMA decided not to 
consider any binding regulatory measures. Instead, ESMA mandated the proxy advisory 
business to develop a European wide code of conduct standard to increase integrity and 
transparency (ESMA, 2013, pp. 5-6). Table 2 - 2 summarizes the regulatory initiatives at 
European level. 
                                                 
23 See EC (2011), ESMA (2012/2013), and BPP Group Consultation (2013). 
24 ESMA (2012, pp. 39-40) invited comments on the following issues: (1) the influence of proxy advisors in 
shifting voting outcomes (question 1 & 2), (2) the use of proxy advisors by investors to shift stewardship 
responsibilities (question 3), (3) conflicts of interests within proxy advisors (question 4 & 5), (4) the 
incorporation of local market trends into proxy recommendations (‘one-size-fits-all’ approach) (question 6), (4) 
transparency and accuracy of the methods underlying the voting process (question 7), and (5) potential policy 
options for future regulation (question  8 to 12). 
25 http://www.esma.europa.eu/consultation/Consultation-DP-Overview-Proxy-Advisory-Industry-
Considerations-Possible-Policy-Options, last accessed June 30, 2014.  
26 http://bppgrp.info/?page_id=111, last accessed June 30, 2014. 
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During the different consultation processes (i.e., EC, 2011; ESMA, 2012), two issues 
have been frequently raised; the influence of proxy advisors at European AGMs and the 
reliability of voting recommendations. ESMA (2012, p. 39), for example, has invited 
comments on the questions (1) whether proxy advisors have a significant impact on the voting 
results at European AGMs and (2) whether improvements should be made with respect to 
transparency and methodology to provide more reliable and independent voting 
recommendations. Overall, the feedback during the consultation period has highlighted that – 
despite anecdotal evidence – empirical evidence on the role and influence of proxy advisors at 
European AGMs is not available (ESMA, 2013).  
 
2.2.5 Related Literature 
This paper contributes to two related streams of literature. The first is research on the 
determinants of shareholder meetings’ voting outcomes (e.g., Cai et al., 2009; Choi et al., 
2010; Ertimur et al., 2013). While this literature suggests that ISS – as the most influential 
proxy advisor – potentially affects voting outcomes at U.S. shareholder meetings by a shift of 
up to 26% of shareholder votes, it has been silent on whether proxy advisors affect voting 
outcomes at shareholder meetings outside the U.S.27
Table 2 - 3
 The second strand of literature addresses 
the (governance-related) determinants of proxy voting recommendations (e.g., Choi et al., 
2009; Daines et al., 2010). So far, this literature provides rather mixed evidence on the link 
between proxy recommendations and governance ratings / governance provisions. While Choi 
et al. (2009) find significant correlations between ISS recommendations and governance-
related factors, Daines et al. (2010) show that ISS recommendations are only weakly 
correlated with ISS corporate governance ratings. However, none of the previous studies 
examines this link for a non-U.S. setting.  summarizes prior related literature. 
 
 
                                                 
27 In a recent survey paper on proxy advisors in France and Japan, Dubois (2012, p. 94) frames this as follows: 
“There has not yet been any empirical research regarding the influence of proxy advisors’ recommendations on 
voting results in countries outside the United States. Given the importance of foreign investors in France and 
Japan and the number of ISS’s client, it is safe to assume that their influence is important and gradually 
increasing, especially on foreign markets where investors are likely to rely on the opinion of a more 
knowledgeable third-party.” 
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Table 2 - 3: Prior Related Literature on Proxy Voting Advisory 
Authors Sample Main Findings 
Panel A. Proxy Voting Recommendations and Voting Outcomes 
Bethel and 
Gillan (2002) 
U.S. sample of 
1,321 management 
proposals for 1998 
Despite other significant determinants (e.g., broker vote, size, and 
ownership structure) negative ISS recommendations are associated 
with a drop of 13% in shareholder support. 
Cai et al. 
(2009) 
U.S. sample of 
13,384 director 
elections between 
2003 and 2005 
Negative ISS recommendations matter most and explain a statistically 
and economically significant part of shareholder votes. Specifically, a 
“vote against” recommendation by ISS on average results in 19% 
fewer supportive shareholder votes. 
Choi et al. 
(2010) 
U.S. sample of over 
12,000 director 
elections between 
2005 and 2006 
ISS issued withhold recommendations for 6.8% of all covered 
director elections, whereas Glass Lewis recommended the same for 
18.8%. ISS recommendations shift on average 13% of the 
corresponding shareholder votes, whereas Glass Lewis (as the second 
most influential advisor) affects on average ‘only’ 3.6% of the 
shareholder votes. 
Ertimur et al. 
(2009) 
U.S. sample of 
1,332 shareholder 
initiateves from 
1997 to 2007 
ISS recommendations to vote for the shareholder initiative (i.e., 
shareholder proposals or vote-no campaigns) are associated with an 
increase of up to 25% of votes casted for the shareholder initiative. 
Ertimur et al. 
(2011) 
U.S. sample of over 
180 firms with 
option backdating 
(2006-2007) 
Negative ISS recommendations related to the option backdating 
investigation significantly affect the shareholder voting. Supportive 
shareholder votes of directors drop by 27% if those directors receive a 
“vote against” recommendation by ISS which is related to the option 
backdating investigation. 
Ertimur et al. 
(2013) 
1,275 U.S. firms in 
the S&P 1500 with 
‘say on pay’ votes 
during 2011 
Although both ISS and Glass Lewis consider poor firm performance, 
high levels of CEO pay, and weak ‘pay for performance’ when 
releasing “vote against” recommendations, the overlap between both 
recommendations is limited. The release of negative ISS 
recommendations induces small but significantly negative market 
reactions (negative mean abnormal returns between -0.5% and -0.7%) 
in cases where those recommendations were less expected. Negative 
recommendations issued by ISS (Glass Lewis) correlate with a drop 
of 24.7% (12.9%) in votes casted in favor of the compensation plans. 
This is even more pronounced – with a drop of 38.3% – when both 
advisors recommend to vote against the compensation plan at the 
same time. Firms receiving low shareholder support and especially 
negative ISS recommendations on their compensation plans are more 
likely to change their compensation plans, but markets do not react on 
the announcement of those changes. 
Panel B. Proxy Voting Recommendations and Corporate Governance Ratings 
Choi et al. 
(2009) 
U.S. sample of over 
12,000 director 
elections between 
2005 and 2006 
ISS considers especially governance-related factors (i.e., board and 
compensation issues), whereas Proxy Governance and Glass Lewis 
focus rather on compensation-related factors and audit / disclosure-
related factors, respectively. 
Daines et al. 
(2010) 
U.S. sample of 
34,761 ISS recom-
mendations for 
2005 to 2007 
Weak evidence exists for a link between ISS recommendations and 
ISS governance ratings. A one-standard-deviation increase in ISS 
governance ratings (i.e., an increase of 28.5 points) only correlates 
with a 6.3 percentage points higher probability in receiving 
supportive ISS recommendations. Despite positive correlations 
between ISS recommendations and voting outcomes (association of 
around 16%), CGQ ratings are negatively correlated with voting 
outcomes. 
DOES PROXY VOTING ADVISORY MATTER IN A EUROPEAN CONTEXT? 





Proxy Voting Recommendations and Voting Outcomes 
One of the first studies addressing determinants of AGM voting outcomes was conducted by 
Bethel and Gillan (2002). For a sample of 1,321 voting items (based on S&P Super-
Composite firms) for the proxy season 1998, they examine the influence of ISS recommen-
dations on voting outcomes. Their results suggest that despite other significant determinants 
(e.g., broker vote, size, and ownership structure) ISS’s recommendations to vote against 
management proposals are associated with a drop of 13% in votes casted for the management 
proposal. Two recent studies, Cai et al. (2009) and Choi et al. (2010), provide evidence on the 
influence of proxy advisors for large U.S. samples of director election voting items. In 
particular, for a U.S. sample of 13,384 director elections (and 2,483 shareholder meetings) 
between 2003 and 2005, Cai et al. (2009) show that a “vote against” recommendation by ISS 
correlates with on average 19% fewer supportive shareholder votes. Based on a U.S. sample 
of over 12,000 director elections between 2005 and 2006, Choi et al. (2010) present evidence 
that ISS’s recommendations shift on average 13% of the corresponding shareholder votes, 
whereas Glass Lewis (as the second most influential advisor) affects on average 3.6% of the 
shareholder votes.28
In the most recent study, Ertimur et al. (2013) examine the economic role of two proxy 
advisors (ISS and Glass, Lewis & Co.) in the context of non-binding U.S. ‘say on pay’ votes. 
Based on recommendations of both proxy advisors for 1,275 U.S. firms in the S&P 1500 
during 2011, Ertimur et al. (2013) analyze the market reaction to the release of voting 
recommendations, the influence of these recommendations on shareholder votes, the firms’ 
response to the vote, and subsequent effects on firm value. In particular, their results reveal 
small but significantly negative market reactions (negative mean abnormal returns between 
-0.5% and -0.7%) only for negative ISS recommendations. With respect to voting outcomes, 
their results suggest that negative recommendations issued by ISS (Glass Lewis) correlate 
with a drop of 24.7% (12.9%) in votes casted in favor of the compensation plans. This is even 
more pronounced – with a drop of 38.3% – when both advisors recommend to vote against 
 In addition, Choi et al. (2010) point out that the coverage rates of four 
different proxy advisors (ISS, Glass Lewis, Egan Jones, and Proxy Governance) as well as the 
frequency to issue withhold recommendations differ in a substantial way. ISS, for example, 
issued withhold recommendations for 6.8% of all covered director elections, whereas Glass 
Lewis recommended the same for 18.8% of all covered elections.  
                                                 
28 Choi et al. (2010) emphasize that their results on the proxy advisors’ influence are sensitive to the applied 
econometric modeling (correlations varies between 6% and 13% depending on the model).  
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the compensation plan at the same time. Finally, their results indicate that firms receiving low 
shareholder support and especially negative ISS recommendations on their compensation 
plans are more likely to change their compensation plans, but that markets do not react to the 
announcement of these changes.29
 
  
Proxy Voting Recommendations and Corporate Governance Ratings 
Based on a U.S. sample with over 12,000 director elections between 2005 and 2006, Choi et 
al. (2009) provide first empirical evidence on governance-related determinants of four 
different proxy advisors (ISS, Glass Lewis, Egan Jones, and Proxy Governance). Specifically, 
they find that all four proxy advisors base their recommendations, among other things, on 
firm-level governance factors. However, the individual voting recommendations as well as 
the underlying governance criteria differ. ISS, for example, considers especially governance-
related factors (i.e., board and compensation issues), whereas Proxy Governance and Glass 
Lewis rather focus on compensation-related factors and audit / disclosure-related factors, 
respectively (Choi et al., 2009, pp. 649, 675).  
In contrast to Choi et al. (2009), Daines et al. (2010) examine directly the relation 
between ISS voting recommendations, ISS governance ratings (Corporate Governance 
Quotient, CGQ), and voting results. Based on 34,761 voting recommendations released by 
ISS for the U.S. proxy seasons 2005, 2006, and 2007, they find only weak evidence for a link 
between ISS recommendations and ISS governance ratings.30
                                                 
29 Other studies, examining issues related to voting outcomes, present direct or indirect evidence on the influence 
of proxy advisors. For a U.S. sample of 1,332 shareholder initiatives (1,198 shareholder proposals and 134 vote-
no campaigns) related to compensation issues for the period between 1997 and 2007, Ertimur et al. (2009, p. 23) 
provide evidence that ISS recommendations to vote for the shareholder initiative are associated with an increase 
of up to 25% of votes casted for the shareholder initiative. Based on a U.S. sample of over 180 firms that 
announced an option backdating investigation between 2006 and 2007, and the corresponding ISS 
recommendations on director elections, Ertimur et al. (2011) show that negative ISS recommendations related to 
the option backdating investigation significantly affect shareholder voting. Specifically, shareholder support 
drops by 27% if directors receive a negative ISS recommendation which relates to the option backdating 
investigation. 
 In addition, their results further 
suggest that despite positive correlations between ISS recommendations and voting outcomes 
(association of around 16%), CGQ ratings are negatively correlated with voting outcomes. 
Overall, their findings provide only low correlations between ISS recommendations and ISS 
governance ratings suggesting a rather low degree of method consistency between both 
products with respect to the employed governance perception. 
30 Their results suggest that a one-standard-deviation increase in ISS governance ratings correlates with a 6.3 
percentage points higher probability in receiving supportive ISS recommendations. 
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2.3 Empirical Predictions 
Proxy Voting Recommendations and Voting Outcomes 
Prior U.S. findings suggest that ISS voting recommendations affect voting outcomes at AGMs 
(e.g., up to 26% as documented by Ertimur et al., 2013). However, taking the distinct different 
institutional setup into account, it becomes less clear whether and to what extent ISS voting 
recommendations affect voting outcomes in Germany. In contrast to the U.S., the German 
market is characterized by a stakeholder model of corporate governance in which, among 
other things, codetermination, large shareholders, and banks play important roles (e.g., 
Goergen et al., 2008). Specifically, compared to the U.S., the German capital market exhibits 
a rather low degree of dispersed ownership and institutional (U.S.) holdings (e.g., Cziraki et 
al., 2010, p. 748), and lacks experience with proxy voting advisory.  
ESMA (2012), for example, summarizes the differences between the European and the 
U.S. proxy advisory industry as follows. Although at different levels, proxy voting advisory 
in Europe is a relatively recent phenomenon and still developing. In contrast to the established 
U.S. market, the proxy advisory market in Europe is small in terms of coverage and turnover. 
Nevertheless, ESMA (2012, p. 16) expects that “proxy advisory is growing in prominence and 
investors are increasingly using proxy advisor services for the purposes of voting and carrying 
out their stewardship responsibilities in general”. 
Although ESMA acknowledged the extent of prior U.S. evidence on the influence of 
proxy advisors, it invited – as outlined in section 2.2 – comments on the question whether and 
to what extent proxy advisors affect voting outcomes at a European level (ESMA, 2012, p. 
17-19). Based on the results of the ESMA consultation process in 2012, anecdotal evidence 
suggests that proxy advisors are considered as influential and able to causally affect voting 
outcomes at European AGMs (ESMA, 2013, p. 13). However, some respondents (notably 
investors) argued that especially domestic shareholder concentration and the degree of the 
institutional shareholder’s investment potential affect the influence of proxy advisors (ESMA, 
2013, p. 12). As outlined in section 2.2, prior U.S. evidence supports this. On a more general 
level, Bethel and Gillan (2002), for example, predict and find evidence that firm and AGM 
characteristics, like size, performance, and ownership structure, affect voting results. More 
directly, Ertimur et al. (2013) provide evidence that especially ownership concentration and 
the rationale behind the recommendations moderate the relationship between proxy 
recommendations and voting outcomes.  
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Thus, I expect to find a significant correlation between ISS recommendations and 
voting outcomes, yet on a potentially lower level as compared to the correlations documented 
for the U.S. market. Moreover, I expect significant variations in the cross-section. In 
particular, I expect that the correlation between ISS recommendations and voting outcomes is, 
among other things, moderated by ownership, client level (i.e., number of clients receiving / 
following ISS recommendations), and voting turnout (i.e. voting presence at the AGM). 
Specifically, I assume that high free float, high client level, and low voting presence increase 
the association between ISS recommendations and voting outcomes.  
 
Proxy Voting Recommendations and Governance Ratings 
To address the consistency of ISS voting recommendations, I follow Daines et al. (2010) and 
compare the ISS voting recommendations with another product marketed by ISS, namely ISS 
corporate governance ratings. Following Daines et al. (2010, p. 455), there are several reasons 
to expect a relation between ISS’s recommendations and its governance ratings. In particular, 
ISS’s selling strategy (both products are often sold as bundled products) implies that ISS 
governance ratings are relevant to voting decisions. In addition, inputs for both ISS products 
are to some extent similar (e.g., criteria for board structure and independence). ISS (2010, p. 
7), for example, states that it ensures “alignment of its Ratings Criteria in CGQ with ISS’s 
Voting Policy […] to encourage companies to adopt best practices in Corporate Governance.” 
Thus, if both products consistently provide useful information to shareholders with respect to 
governance issues, it is plausible to assume a certain degree of correlation between both.  
Consequently, I expect that high (low) correlations between the two commercially 
available products indicate a rather high (low) consistency with respect to the governance 
standards employed by ISS. High method consistency might reflect accountability and 
transparency of the advisory services, which in turn serve the interests of clients / investors. In 
the course of the ESMA (2012, p. 17) consultation process, institutional investors have been 
highlighting that “the accuracy, independence and reliability of a proxy advisor’s research and 
advice are the most important priorities when selecting proxy advisor services.” As outlined 
in section 2.2, U.S. evidence on the link between proxy recommendations and governance 
ratings / provisions is rather mixed. While Choi et al. (2009) find significant correlations 
between ISS’s recommendations and governance-related factors, Daines et al. (2010) show 
that ISS’s recommendations are only weakly correlated with ISS’s corporate governance 
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ratings. For my European setting, I thus leave it as an empirical question whether and to what 
extent both products marketed by ISS are consistent in terms of the employed governance 
perceptions. 
 
2.4 Regression Models 
Proxy Voting Recommendations and Voting Outcomes 
To address the question of whether and to what extent proxy recommendations correlate with 
voting outcomes, I use the following basic regression model: 
VOTING_RESULTiv =  α + γ1ISS_AGAINSTiv + γ2MODERATORiv 
+γ3ISS_AGAINST × MODERATORiv + ε 
(1) 
The dependent variable VOTING_RESULTiv stands for the voting result (in %) casted 
in favor of a specific voting item (management proposal) of firm i and AGM voting item v.31 
ISS_AGAINST is a dummy variable indicating with 1 that ISS recommends to vote against a 
specific AGM voting item, and zero otherwise.32
                                                 
31 To ease the interpretation of the regression results, I follow Ertimur et al. (2009, p. 20) and use voting results 
in percent as the dependent variable. However, as this dependent variable is a percentage with a fixed range 
between 0 and 100, I challenge my main findings. I re-estimate the regressions with a logit-transformed 
dependent variable. In line with Bethel and Gillan (2002, p. 48), I employ the following transformation: 
log[%voting result / (100 – %voting results)]. Untabulated results based on the logit transformed dependent 
variable are in line with my original findings. 
 MODERATOR stands for different 
variables which are expected to moderate the relationship between ISS “vote against” 
recommendations and voting results. Specifically, I consider the following dummy variables 
as moderators: FREE FLOAT (with 1 if the firm’s free float is above average, and 0 
otherwise), and invTURNOUT (with 1 if the firm’s voting presence is below average, and 0 
otherwise). To consider the potential moderating effect of the number of clients receiving ISS 
recommendations (ISS’s CLIENT BASE), I use a dummy variable indicating whether ISS 
issues Long-Form (LF) reports or Short-Form (SF) reports (with 1 if the firm is covered by 
ISS LF-report, and 0 otherwise). Compared to SF- reports, LF-reports commonly contain a 
more comprehensive analysis of the individual AGM voting items and additional information 
32 Alternatively, I follow Ertimur et al. (2009, p. 23) and use residuals of ISS’s recommendations (obtained from 
regressing the variable ‘ISS_AGAINST’ on firm characteristics which are likely to explain the voting decision 
by ISS, like firm performance, size, ownership structure, analyst following, and blue chip index membership) to 
measure the influence of ISS recommendations on voting results. Untabulated results confirm my main findings. 
However, the drawback of using this approach is twofold: economic significance of regression results is hard to 
assess and firm-fixed effects are not applicable anymore in the main regression (unless one might find and 
include (firm) characteristics which vary at AGM voting item level). Especially due to the latter point, I do not 
use the residuals approach in the first place. 
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about the governance and ownership structure of the respective firm. For example, the 
average page numbers of LF-reports and SF-reports are 13.5 and 5.3, respectively. The two 
different levels of proxy reports basically reflect the aggregated institutional investors’ 
demand for the comprehensiveness of ISS reports. Thus, I expect that the differentiation 
between ISS LF- and SF-reports reflects to some extent the client base of ISS (i.e., LF-reports 
are followed by a larger client base than short form reports). 
The interaction term, ISS_AGAINST×MODERATOR, measures the moderating effect 
of the different moderators on ISS “vote against” recommendations. For example, when using 
invTURNOUT as the moderating variable, ISS_AGAINST×invTURNOUT measures the 
cross-sectional variation in the ISS “vote against” recommendations and voting results 
relationship with respect to the voting presence. Consistent with section 2.3, I expect in line 
with my first prediction that the coefficient estimates γ1 and γ2 become significant at 
conventional levels and obtain negative signs. To address heteroskedasticity and cross-
sectional dependence in the dataset, I use standard errors which are heteroskedasticity robust 
(White, 1980) and one-way clustered at AGM voting item level (Gow et al., 2010; Petersen, 
2009). To control for (observed / unobserved) firm characteristics which are likely to affect 
both the voting recommendations and the shareholder’s voting behavior, I employ firm-fixed 
effects in the regression model.33
 
 
Proxy Voting Recommendations and Governance Ratings 
To address the second prediction, I use the following basic probit regression model based on a 
sample of all firms covered by ISS LF-reports and the corresponding 918 voting items (GRId 
data is not available for firms covered by ISS SF-reports): 
ISS_AGAINSTiv =  α + γ1GRIdiv (� γ1GRId_SUBSCORESiv) + � γ2FIRM_CONTROLiv
+ � γ3INDUSTRYiv + ε 
(2) 
ISS_AGAINST is defined as for model (1). GRId (Governance Risk Indicator) stands 
for the commercial corporate governance rating marketed by ISS. Based on up to 80 single 
governance variables, ISS provides – since 2010 – GRId ratings for over 8,000 firms 
                                                 
33 OLS regressions with firm-level clustered standard errors and different control variables (i.e., size, ownership 
concentration, blue chip index membership, analyst following, and industry dummies) produce similar results. 
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worldwide (including 220 German firms).34
 
 Besides the overall GRId rating, GRId sub-scores 
are further available for the following four dimensions: board structure, compensation issues, 
shareholder rights, and audit issues (RiskMetrics Group, 2010). Thus, GRId_SUBSCORES 
reflects the different sub-scores of the commercial corporate governance rating (i.e., sub-
scores for board, compensation, shareholder rights, and audits). FIRM_CONTROL is a vector 
of different firm-level control variables. Specifically, I consider size as log of total assets, free 
float, and blue chip (HDAX) index membership to control for firm-level effects. To 
additionally control for industry differences, the regression model contains industry-fixed 
effects. To address heteroskedasticity and time-series dependence in the dataset, I use 
standard errors which are heteroskedasticity robust and one-way clustered at firm level.   
2.5 Results 
2.5.1 Sample Selection 
Table 2 - 4 presents the sample selection process. To obtain the final sample, I merge – in a 
first step – the German Worldscope firm universe with corresponding firm-level data on ISS 
proxy voting reports provided by Thomson Reuters Advanced Analytics (TRAA). Since the 
coverage of ISS proxy voting reports in TRAA is limited, i.e., most recent proxy voting 
reports are only available for the proxy season 2010, and firm disclosure on the voting results 
of past AGMs is incomplete, I base my analyses on the proxy season 2010. Overall, ISS 
covers 377 German firms during the proxy season 2010. However, TRAA only provides ISS 
voting reports for firms with shareholder meetings in the period between May 2010 and 
December 2010. This in turn results in a sample of 279 ISS reports (2,478 voting items on 
management proposals) which are available in TRAA for the proxy season 2010 (with AGMs 
between May 2010 and December 2010). These reports are divided in 104 Long-Form (LF) 
and 175 Short-Form (SF) ISS reports. As reflected in Table 2 - 5, investors seek 
comprehensive reports (i.e., LF-reports) especially for large and visible firms in the market. 
Worldscope provides relevant financial and accounting data for all 279 firms and ISS 
reports. However, final voting results are only available for 185 ISS reports (either on the 
company’s website or by request). Consequently, the final sample consists of 185 ISS reports 
(1,664 voting items) with 92 firms (918 voting items) covered by ISS LF-reports and 93 firms 
                                                 
34 ISS provided the Corporate Governance Quotient (CGQ) as the predecessor of the GRId rating until 2010. 
Following Larcker and Tayan (2011), both ratings are not materially different.  
DOES PROXY VOTING ADVISORY MATTER IN A EUROPEAN CONTEXT? 





(746 voting items) by ISS SF-reports. Potential sample selection problems due to restrictions 
in the TRAA coverage and in the availability of voting results are discussed in detail in 
section 2.5.4. 
Table 2 - 4: Sample Selection 
Selection Criteria  Firm Observations 
Voting 
Items 
Start (Worldscope GER Universe 2010, with ISIN available)  817  
ISS coverage (377 firms are covered by ISS) -440 377  
ISS reports not available in TRAA database -98 279 2,478 
- Firms with Long-Form (LF) ISS Report Coverage:  104 1,061 
- Firms with Short-Form (SF) ISS Report Coverage:  175 1,417 
Voting results not available35 -94  185 1,664 
Final sample (German Proxy Season 2010)  185 1,664 
- Firms with Long-Form (LF) ISS Report Coverage:  92 918 
- Firms with Short-Form (SF) ISS Report Coverage:  93 746 
 
2.5.2 Descriptive Analyses 
Table 2 - 5 presents descriptive statistics on AGM characteristics, ISS voting characteristics, 
and firm-level characteristics separately for firms covered by ISS LF-reports and SF-reports. 
To that end, the descriptive analysis provides insights into the two ISS’s coverage levels 
which not only differ with respect to the client base but also with respect to the 
comprehensiveness of ISS reports (e.g., LF-reports contain a more comprehensive analysis of 
the individual AGM voting items and additional information about the governance and 
ownership structure of the respective firm). Panel A of Table 2 - 5 shows that – given the 
overall sample size of 918 (746) voting items in the LF-sample (SF-sample) – the covered 
AGM agendas contain on average 9.97 voting items (8.02 voting items) with a substantial 
variation between 4 and 33 (3 and 28) voting items. In addition, the corresponding ISS LF-
reports (SF-reports) have on average 13.54 (5.29) pages and contain 1.15 (0.79) ISS “vote 
against” recommendations (i.e., ISS recommendations to vote against a specific voting item / 
management proposal). The latter finding corresponds to an ISS’s rejection rate of 11.54% 
(9.79%).36
                                                 
35 In 108 cases, I wrote an E-Mail to the respective firm / head of investor relations and requested the voting 
results. In 49 cases, the firms responded and provided the relevant data. Although the general disclosure quality 
improved following the transposition of the European Directive 2007/36/EC on shareholder rights in Germany 
(Gesetz zur Umsetzung der Aktionärsrichtlinie, 2009), especially smaller firms only provide – in line with the 
requirements of the law – the most recent voting result for download at their websites. 
 In comparison, Choi et al. (2010) and Ertimur et al. (2013) document for U.S. 
director elections and U.S. ‘say on pay’ votes a corresponding rate of 6.8% and 11.3%, 
respectively. However, ISS’s rejection rate appears to be higher in the German sample. 
36 Based on Panel A and B of Table 2 - 5: 11.54 = 106 / 918; 9.79 = 73 / 746. 
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Specifically, when considering only director elections (‘say on pay’ votes) in the German 
sample, ISS’s rejection rate goes up to 12.5% (43.1%).37
Table 2 - 5
 With respect to differences in the 
ISS coverage, Panel C of  shows that firms covered by LF-reports are on average 
larger, more profitable, more likely members of a German blue chip index, and have larger 
analyst following. However, both firm groups do not appear to differ with respect to free 
float. 
Table 2 - 5: Descriptive Analyses 
 
Long-Form (LF) Coverage 
 (based on 92 firms & 918 voting items) 
Short-Form (SF) Coverage 
(based on 93 firms & 746 voting items)  
Sum Mean Min. Max. Sum Mean Min. Max. 
Panel A. AGM – Characteristics 
Agenda items (non-voting/voting)  1046 11.37 5 34 865 9.30 4 29 
Mgt. Rec. (all voting items) 918 9.97 4 33 746 8.02 3 28 
Panel B. ISS – Voting Characteristics      
ISS Reports (Number of pages) 1246 13.54 7 30 492 5.29 3 12 
ISS “vote against” (Mgt. Rec.-level) 106 1.15 0 6 73 0.79 0 4 
Panel C. Firm Characteristics      
Size (log of TA) - 14.00 10.89 21.36 - 11.63 7.25 17.19 
BTM - 0.90 .04 5.31 - 1.21 -.65 41.14 
ROA - 0.07 -.45 .45 - -.04 -4.12 .95 
DAX 6 0.06 0 1 0 0 0 0 
MDAX 20 0.21 0 1 1 .01 0 1 
TecDAX 15 0.16 0 1 1 .01 0 1 
SDAX 22 0.23 0 1 2 .02 0 1 
Prime Standard (FWB) 87 0.90 0 1 50 .54 0 1 
General Standard (FWB) 5 0.05 0 1 21 .23 0 1 
Entry Standard (FWB) 0 0 0 0 9 .10 0 1 
Open Market (FWB) 0 0 0 0 3 .03 0 1 
Listed at Regional Stock Exchanges 0 0 0 0 10 .11 0 1 
Analyst Coverage (AC) 89 0.96 0 1 64 .74 0 1 
Analyst Following (AF) - 10.45 0 35 - 1.91 0 18 
GRId (ISS CG Score) - 9.04 5 12 - - - - 
Financial industry (SIC 60-69) 17 0.18 0 1 19 .22 0 1 
Free Float - 60.44 7 100 - 61.12 0 100 
Ownership of 3 largest shareholders - 45.76 3.68 93.46 - - - - 
Ownership of 3 largest inst. investors - 12.79 0 91.6 - - - - 
Notes: This table displays descriptive statistics of all variables used in this study. The overall sample consists of 
1,664 AGM voting items based on 185 individual firms (from the German proxy season 2010). For further 
information on the individual Mgt. Rec. items (routine vs. non-routine voting items), see Table 2 - 7. 
 
Complementing the descriptive statistics, Table 2 - 6 provides Spearman correlation 
coefficients between the main variables used in this study. In line with the paper’s first 
prediction, the correlation coefficient between the variables ‘Voting Results’ and ‘ISS 
Against’ is significantly negative suggesting that negative ISS recommendations correlate 
                                                 
37 For further details, see Table 2 - 7. 
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with less shareholder support. In addition, Table 2 - 6 further suggests that – pertaining to the 
paper’s second prediction – ISS “vote against” recommendations significantly and negatively 
correlate with ISS commercially available governance ratings (GRId). This implies that firms 
with high GRId ratings, which reflect higher governance quality, receive on average less 
negative ISS recommendations. 
Table 2 - 6: Correlation Analysis 
Sample 
(N=1,664) 
Non-parametric Spearman Correlations 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
VOTING RESULT 1 1          
            
ISS AGAINST 2 -0.33 1         
  (0.00)          
invTURNOUT 3 -0.21 -0.02 1        
 (0.00) (0.29)         
FREE FLOAT 4 -0.16 -0.03 0.43 1       
  (0.00) (0.19) (0.00)        
CLIENT BASE 5 -0.21 0.02 -0.12 -0.02 1      
  (0.00) (0.24) (0.00) (0.40)       
SIZE 6 -0.11 -0.01 -0.21 -0.05 0.66 1     
  (0.00) (0.74) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00)      
HDAX 7 -0.20 -0.01 -0.02 0.16 0.52 0.55 1    
  (0.00) (0.75) (0.33) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)     
AC 8 -0.09 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.31 0.06 0.21 1   
  (0.00) (0.02) (0.51) (0.06) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)    
AF 9 -0.19 0.03 -0.04 0.08 0.67 0.55 0.68 0.63 1  
  (0.00) (0.12) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   
GRIda 10 -0.02 -0.10 0.06 0.20 - 0.15 0.37 0.14 0.37 1 
  (0.58) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
Notes: This table reports non-parametric Spearman correlation coefficients. For detailed information and 
definitions of the variables, see Appendix 2 - 1. Reported values: coefficients (p-values). aGRId (ISS’s CG 
rating) correlations are based on a subsample of 918 voting items (all LF-voting items). GRId ratings are only 
available for all firms covered by ISS LF-reports. 
 
AGM Voting Characteristics  
Table 2 - 7 provides detailed information on the sample’s underlying voting items. It further 
introduces the distinction between routine and non-routine voting items.38
                                                 
38 However, there is no clear-cut definition available on the distinction between routine and non-routine AGM 
items. ESMA (2012, p. 19), for example, describes routine and non-routine items in more general terms as 
follows: “the appointment of auditors may be seen of less importance or concern to investors than more 
substantive issues like major business decisions or significant corporate governance matters such as director 
remuneration”. Consistent with this, ISS classifies especially the appointment of auditors as a routine item in the 
German context. 
 Routine items (e.g., 
the election of auditors or the discharge of the management or supervisory board) are often 
seen uncritical by investors and proxy advisors and receive on average lower shareholder 
dissent than non-routine items. For non-routine items (e.g., votes on significant business 
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decisions or remuneration packages), opinions about best practice might differ among 
shareholders and proxy advisors (ESMA, 2012, p. 19).  
Table 2 - 7: AGM Voting Characteristics 






Result Description of the AGM Items 
Panel A. Routine AGM Mgt. Rec. Items 
M0101 185 98.83 1 82.88 Ratify x as Auditors for Fiscal 
M0105 3 99.70   Accept Financial Statements and Statutory Reports for Fiscal 
M0106 1 99.99   Amend Articles Re: Editorial Changes 
M0111 4 98.07   Change Company Name to x AG 
M0115 1 100   Allow Electronic Distribution of Company Communications 
M0126 216 99.49   Amend Articles Re: [e.g., due to Law on Transposition of EU Shareholder's Rights Directive] 
M0152 117 99.43 4 95.40 Approve Allocation of Income and Dividends of EUR x per Share 
M0159 3 99.62   Change Location of Registered Office to xy 
M0260 207 98.31   Approve Discharge of Management Board for Fiscal 
M0261 224 98.19 3 89.24 Approve Discharge of Supervisory Board for Fiscal 
M0267 2 99.98   Approve Discharge of Personally Liable Partner for Fiscal 
M0417 1 98.65   Approve Change of Corporate Form to Societas Europaea (SE) 
M0459 40 99.45   Approve Affiliation Agreement with Subsidiary 
Total1 1004 98.8 8 91.5  
Panel B. Non-Routine AGM Mgt. Rec. Items 
M0122 2 99.81   Adopt New Articles of Association 
M0135 9 98.35 1 92.73 Amend Corporate Purpose 
M0137 5 97.02 2 92.65 Cancel Special Audit 
M0203 3 99.36   Approve Increase in Size of Supervisory Board 
M0204 2 99.98   Approve Decrease in Size of Supervisory Board 
M0212 2 98.45   Approve Director/Officer Liability and Indemnification 
M0219 41 94.31   Approve Remuneration of Supervisory Board 
M0227 23 97.98 4 94.41 Amend articles re: D&O insurance for supervisory board members 
M0228 3 96.64   Elect xy as Alternate Director to the Supervisory Board 
M0250 200 97.47 25 95.13 Elect supervisory board member xy 
M0275 2 97.99 2 97.99 Elect supervisory board members (Bundled) 
M0318 10 98.13 2 99.94 Authorize Share Repurchase via Other Channels than Stock Exchange or for trading purposes 
M0326 1 99.96   Approve Capitalization of Reserves 
M0329 7 97.86   Approve Creation of Pool of Capital with Preemptive Rights 
M0330 4 99.23   Approve Cancellation of Pool of Capital or Reduction of Conditional Capital 
M0331 48 90.92 32 88.91 Approve Creation of Pool of Capital without Preemptive Rights 
M0333 15 99.46   Approve Cancellation of Capital Authorization 
M0346 127 95.88 30 89.87 Authorize Share Repurchase Program and Reissuance or Cancellation of Repurchased Shares 
M0358 37 90.87 19 86.97 
Approve Issuance of Warrants/Bonds with Warrants Attached/Convertible Bonds 
with Partial Exclusion of Preemptive Rights; Approve Creation of Pool of Capital to 
Guarantee Conversion Rights 
M0374 3 98.87   Approve Reduction in Share Capital via Reverse Stock Split to Cover Losses 
M0377 1 99.97   Amend Articles Re: Profit Participation of New Shares 
M0379 14 92.78 6 91.86 Approve Creation of Capital Pool with Partial Exclusion of Preemptive Rights 
M0389 10 94.99 7 95.49 Authorize use of financial derivatives when repurchasing shares 
M0414 3 99.98   Approve Change of Personally Liable Partner / Approve Squeeze-Out of Minority Shareholders by Majority Shareholder 
M0451 1 99.42   Approve Merger by Absorption of x AG 
M0454 1 85.76   Approve Spin-Off Agreements 
M0501 12 92.16 1 98.67 Approve stock option plan for key employees; approve creation of capital pool of conditional capital to guarantee conversion rights 
M0503 1 99.92   Amend Stock Option Plan 
M0547 15 89.42 15 89.42 Authorize Management Board Not to Disclose Individualized Remuneration of its Members 
M0550 58 92.13 25 86.28 Approve Remuneration System for Management Board Members 
Total2 660 95.3 171 90.2         
T1+T2 1664 97.4 179 90.3         
Notes: M0xx values, such as M0101 (ratify auditor), are taken from ISS’s proxy voting reports and reflect ISS’s 
way to code and structure AGM items. 
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In line with the expectation that routine items are less controversial than non-routine 
items, Table 2 - 7 reveals a higher shareholder support for routine items than for non-routine 
items (98.8% vs. 95.3%). Likewise, only 8 out of 179 ISS “vote against” recommendations 
address routine items. The majority of negative ISS recommendations addresses non-routine 
issues like board elections (M0250), capital authorizations (M0331, M0346, M0358), and 
management compensation (M0547, M0550). Consistent with the paper’s first prediction, 
Table 2 - 7 presents further descriptive evidence on the potential influence of ISS 
recommendations. Specifically, the shareholder dissent for voting items with negative ISS 
recommendations is substantially higher compared to the overall voting dissent. For example, 
the average shareholder dissent for all non-routine items is 4.7% (100%-95.3%), whereas the 
dissent for non-routine items with negative ISS recommendations amounts to 9.8% (100%-
90.2%). 
 
Mean Analyses: Voting Result  
Table 2 - 8 provides mean analyses along the dimension of whether ISS recommends to vote 
for or against specific voting items. Across all different sample compositions (all different 
panels), the mean voting result is – in line with the paper’s first prediction – consistently 
lower for these voting items which receive negative ISS voting recommendations compared to 
these with positive recommendations. For example, the difference in the voting result – based 
on all voting items (1,664 voting items from 185 individual firms) – between voting items 
with positive and negative ISS recommendations amounts to 7.96% (Panel A, Table 2 - 8). In 
addition, voting turnout, free float, and client base appear to moderate the relationship 
between ISS recommendations and voting dissent. In all subsamples, the voting result for 
items with negative ISS recommendations decreases. Compared to 98.31% and 90.35% in the 
full sample (Panel A, Table 2 - 8), the mean voting result for voting items with above-average 
client base (i.e., voting items from LF-reports) and below-average voting turnout amounts to 
97.5% and 81.94% for voting items with positive and negative ISS recommendations, 
respectively (Panel F, Table 2 - 8). Although voting turnout, free float, and client base appear 
to moderate the relationship between ISS recommendations and voting results, they do not 
vary systematically between positive and negative ISS recommendations. This suggests that 
ISS’s decisions to issue “vote against” recommendations are not affected by voting turnout, 
free float, or client base. 
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Table 2 - 8: Mean Analyses 
 Total Mgt.  
Rec. 






 Mean N Mean N Mean N Coefficient p-value 
Panel A. All AGM items 
VOTING RESULTS 97.45 1664 98.31 1485 90.35 179 -7.96*** 0.000 
Turnout 59.29 1664 59.04 1485 61.35 179 2.30 0.193 
Free Float 62.57 1664 62.77 1485 60.87 179 -1.90 0.396 
CLIENT BASE .5516 1664 .5468 1485 .5921 179 .0453 0.249 
Panel B. All non-routine AGM items 
VOTING RESULTS 95.37 660 97.15 489 90.29 171 -6.85*** 0.000 
Turnout 60.08 660 59.58 489 61.51 171 1.92 0.298 
Free Float 63.77 660 64.60 489 61.40 171 -3.19 0.185 
CLIENT BASE .5787 660 .5746 489 .5906 171 .0160 0.715 
Panel C. All AGM items with below-average TURNOUT 
VOTING RESULTS 96.56 796 97.67 717 86.48 79 -11.19*** 0.000 
Turnout 39.78 796 39.65 717 40.98 79 1.33 0.418 
Free Float 76.17 796 76.53 717 72.88 79 -3.65 0.166 
CLIENT BASE .4886 796 .4853 717 .5189 79 .0336 0.570 
Panel D. All AGM items with above-average FREE FLOAT 
VOTING RESULTS 96.79 820 97.82 740 87.35 80 -10.46*** 0.000 
Turnout 49.03 820 48.81 740 51.09 80 2.28 0.367 
Free Float 87.74 820 87.68 740 88.35 80 .6675 0.657 
CLIENT BASE .5414 820 .5364 740 .5875 80 .0510 0.385 
Panel E. All AGM items with above-average CLIENT BASE (LF-reports) 
VOTING RESULTS 96.99 918 98.21 812 87.60 106 -10.60*** 0.000 
Turnout 60.50 918 60.24 812 62.43 106 2.18 0.319 
Free Float 61.78 918 61.81 812 61.53 106 -.2799 0.917 
CLIENT BASE 1 918 1 812 1 106 0 - 
GRId 9.13 918 9.18 812 8.69 106 -.4890*** 0.000 
Panel F. All AGM items with above-average CLIENT BASE (LF-reports) & below-average TURNOUT 
VOTING RESULTS 95.86 389 97.50 348 81.94 41 -15.56*** 0.000 
Turnout 39.62 389 39.37 348 41.69 41 2.32 0.271 
Free Float 79.50 389 79.98 348 75.41 41 -4.57 0.162 
CLIENT BASE 1 389 1 348 1 41 0 - 
GRId 9.21 389 9.24 348 75.41 41 -.244 0.184 
Panel G. All AGM items with above-average CLIENT BASE (LF-reports) & above-average FREE FLOAT 
VOTING RESULTS 96.14 444 97.63 397 83.54 47 -14.08*** 0.000 
Turnout 48.15 444 47.53 397 53.41 47 5.88** 0.040 
Free Float 85.18 444 84.93 397 87.25 47 2.32 0.251 
CLIENT BASE 1 444 1 397 1 47 0 - 
GRId 9.33 444 9.42 397 8.53 47 -.8962*** 0.000 
Panel H. All AGM items with below-average TURNOUT & above-average FREE FLOAT 
VOTING RESULTS 96.21 574 97.49 522 83.29 52 -14.20*** 0.000 
Turnout 37.72 574 37.77 522 37.22 52 -.5506 0.773 
Free Float 88.15 574 88.29 522 86.75 52 -1.54 0.370 
CLIENT BASE .5452 574 .5440 522 .5576 52 .0136 0.851 
Panel I. All AGM items with below-average TURNOUT & above-average FREE FLOAT & above-average 
CLIENT BASE (LF-reports) 
VOTING RESULTS 95.61 313 97.45 284 77.58 29 -19.86*** 0.000 
Turnout 38.76 313 38.69 284 39.49 29 .8058 0.733 
Free Float 87.51 313 87.58 284 86.82 29 -.7533 0.749 
CLIENT BASE 1 313 1 284 1 29 0 - 
GRId 9.29 313 9.30 284 9.17 29 -.1374 0.508 
Notes: This table presents distribution characteristics (mean, N) of VOTING RESULTS, Turnout, Free Float, 
and CLIENT BASE (and GRId only for LF-report samples) based on different sample compositions and along 
the dimension of whether or not ISS recommends to vote in favor of management proposals or not. For detailed 
descriptions of the variables, see Appendix 2 - 1. The significance tests are based on t-test statistics. *** (**) (*) 
indicates a significance level at 1% (5%) (10%), two-tailed. 
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With respect to the paper’s second prediction, Table 2 - 8 provides further descriptive 
evidence on ISS method consistency (i.e., the relation between ISS voting recommendations 
and ISS governance rating). As ISS governance ratings (GRId) are only available for firms 
which are covered by ISS LF-reports, mean values of GRId are only examined for the LF-
subsamples (Panel E, F, G, and I). In particular, ISS governance ratings (GRId) are 
consistently higher for voting items / firms with positive ISS recommendations across all 
analyzed subsamples. For example, based on the subsample of firms which are covered by 
ISS LF-reports (918 voting items from 92 individual firms), the GRId rating is on average 
higher – with 0.49 points – for voting items / firms with positive ISS recommendations 
compared to these with negative recommendations (Panel E, Table 2 - 8). However, the 
differences in the GRId rating are only significant in two out of four cases. 
Figure 2 - 1: Mean Analyses 



















(1) Full Sample (N=1664) (2) Subsample: Low TURNOUT (N=796)
(3) Subsample: High FREE FLOAT (N=820) (4) Subsample: High CLIENT BASE (N=918)
(5) Subsample: High CLIENT BASE & Low TURNOUT (N=389) (6) Subsample: High CLIENT BASE & High FREE FLOAT (N=444)













Graphs by ISS Rec. (ISS 'Against' Rec. vs. ISS 'For' Rec.)
Full Sample: 1,664 voting items based on 185 firms
ISS Recommendations and Voting Dissent
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Figure 2 - 1: Mean Analyses (continued) 
Panel B. ISS Recommendations and Firm Characteristics 
 
 
Figure 2 - 1 complements the mean analyses. It visualizes the increasing voting dissent 
for negative ISS recommendations along the different sample compositions (along the 
different subsamples with respect to voting turnout, free float, and client base). In contrast to 
this, the mean voting dissent for voting items with positive ISS recommendations remains 
rather constant at a level of around 2%. In addition, Panel B of Figure 2 - 1 highlights that the 
overall governance rating (GRId) as well as the different subscores (with respect to board, 
compensation, shareholder rights, and audit issues) are higher for voting items / firms with 
positive ISS voting recommendations compared to these with negative recommendations. 
 
2.5.3 Regression Results   
Proxy Voting Recommendations and Voting Outcomes 
Table 2 - 9 provides regression results. In line with the paper’s first prediction and consistent 
with the descriptive results discussed above, Model 1 shows that negative ISS 
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more pronounced when considering voting items with high client base (11.21%), low voting 
turnout (11.59%), and high free float (11.44%).39
Table 2 - 9
 In addition, when examining the subsample 
of firms which are covered by ISS LF-reports (i.e., firms with above-average client base), ISS 
recommendations correlate with 16.32% and 16.11% less supportive shareholder votes for 
voting items with below-average turnout and above average free float, respectively (Models 5 
and 6, Panel A, ).40
Table 2 - 9: Regression Results: Prediction 1 – Firm-Fixed-Effects Regressions 
 These results indicate that ISS voting recommendations 
significantly correlate with shareholder votes on a statistically as well as economically 
meaningful level. Overall, they suggest that – despite differences in the institutional 
arrangements between the U.S. and Germany – proxy voting advisors might play an 
influential role at German AGMs as well. In economic terms, however, ISS voting 
recommendations correlate with voting outcomes at a comparably lower level (8.5% to 19% 
and 26% as documented by Cai et al., 2009 and Ertimur et al., 2013, respectively). 
 Pred. Sign 
Dependent Variable: VOTING RESULT (in %) 
Full Sample 
(LF- and SF- ISS reports) 
 LF-Sample 
(N with high Client Base) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
MODERATOR - CLIENT BASE INVTURNOUT FREE FLOAT INVTURNOUT FREE FLOAT 
Intercept  98.370*** 98.376*** 98.278*** 98.373*** 98.242*** 98.302*** 
  (344.36) (350.16) (260.71) (347.37) (214.20) (293.31) 
ISS AGAINST - -8.471*** -4.623*** -5.830*** -6.114*** -7.943*** -7.569*** 
  (-9.35) (-6.13) (-9.84) (-9.01) (-6.88) (-6.62) 
MODERATOR    0.189  0.105  
    (0.55)  (0.20)  
ISS×MODERATOR -  -6.590*** -5.950*** -5.33*** -8.483*** -8.542*** 
   (-3.19) (-5.77) (-3.39) (-4.37) (-2.96) 
N  1664 1664 1664 1664 918 918 
Adj. R²  .3142 .3354 .3312 .3281 .4838 .4860 
Linear Prediction of Voting Result (in %) if       
(a) ISS=1 & Moderator=0   93.75 92.44 92.25 90.29 90.73 
(b) ISS=1 & Moderator=1  87.16 86.68 86.92 81.92 82.19 
Notes: Underlying regression model is:  
VOTING_RESULTiv =  α + γ1ISS_AIGAINSTiv + γ2MODERATORiv + γ3ISS_AGIANST × MODERATORiv + ε 
The dependent variable VOTING_RESULTiv stands for the voting result (in %) casted in favor of a specific 
voting item of firm i and AGM voting item v. ISS_AGAINST is a variable indicating with 1 if ISS recommends 
to vote against a specific AGM item, and zero otherwise. MODERATOR stands for different variables which are 
expected to moderate the relationship between ISS “vote against” recommendations and voting results, i.e., 
FREE FLOAT (with one if firm’s free float is above average, and zero otherwise), invTURNOUT (with one if 
firm’s voting presence is below average, and zero otherwise), and CLIENT BASE (with one if firm is covered by 
ISS LF-report, and zero otherwise). The regression models have robust standard errors which are one-way 
clustered at AGM voting item level. To control for (observed / unobserved) firm characteristics the regression 
models contain firm-fixed effects. For detailed descriptions of the variables, see Appendix 2 - 1 . Reported 
values: coefficient (t-value) *** (**) (*) indicates a significance level at 1% (5%) (10%), two-tailed. 
                                                 
39 Except for invTURNOUT, firm fixed-effects capture the main effects of FREE FLOAT and CLIENT BASE. 
40 To shed further light on the potential moderating effects of client base, free float, and voting turnout, I extend 
the basic regression model with twofold interaction terms. Untabulated results reveal that ISS voting 
recommendations correlate with 18.56% less supportive shareholder votes for voting items with high client base, 
low voting turnout, and high free float.   
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Proxy Voting Recommendations and Governance Ratings 
Table 2 - 10 addresses the paper’s second prediction and provides the results of the 
corresponding probit regressions. Across all different models, ISS governance ratings (GRId) 
significantly correlate with ISS decisions to issue negative voting recommendations. In 
contrast to this, two out of three control variables, i.e., ownership structure and blue chip 
index membership, remain insignificant across most models. Besides the statistical 
significance (p-values are consistently below 1%), the GRId correlations are economically 
meaningful. For example, an increase from the lowest to the highest rated firm (an increase 
from 5 to 12 in the GRId) reduces the probability of receiving a negative ISS recommendation 
by more than 20 percentage points (Model 1, Table 2 - 10).41
Table 2 - 10
 This is even more pronounced – 
with a reduction of over 50 percentage points – when considering a subsample of only non-
routine voting items (Model 2, ). In addition, Model 3 and 4 (Model 5 and 6) 
provide corresponding regression results on a subsample of voting items with respect to board 
elections (compensation issues). If ISS consistently evaluates the board quality as well as the 
quality of the remuneration system across its voting recommendations and its commercially 
available governance ratings, one might expect significant correlations especially for the 
respective subratings GRId_BOARD and GRId_COMP.  
Consistent with this, Model 4 (Model 6) shows that ISS recommendations against the 
election of supervisory board members (against compensation issues) are significantly 
correlated with ISS’s evaluations of the corresponding board quality (the remuneration 
system’s quality). For example, the predicted probability of receiving a “vote against” 
recommendation by ISS on director election (compensation) proposals is 58.19% (66.98%) 
and 8.63% (1.29%) for firms with the lowest and the highest board (compensation) score, 
respectively.42
One reason for the divergent results might rest upon the different time frames and the 
different employed ISS governance ratings. In contrast to the U.S. findings provided by 
Daines et al. (2010) which are based on ISS CGQ ratings, this study employs ISS GRId 
governance ratings. From 2002 until 2009, ISS’s governance ratings were marketed as 
 Overall, these findings contrast the U.S. results provided by Daines et al. 
(2010) and suggest that the employed governance perception of ISS is potentially consistent 
across its different commercially available products. 
                                                 
41 The final rating score, GRId score, ranges theoretically (empirically for my sample) between 0 (5) and 12 (12). 
Higher GRId scores indicate better governance quality.  
42 Both scores have numbers between 1 and 3, with higher scores reflecting better governance. 
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Corporate Governance Quotient (CGQ). In 2010, ISS re-launched the rating under the name 
Governance Risk Indicator (GRId). However, Larcker and Tayan (2011, p. 440) note that the 
GRId rating is not materially different to the CGQ rating. Nevertheless, the alignment 
between both, the methodology of ISS governance ratings and the underlying principles of 
ISS proxy voting policies, might have increased after 2010. Although ISS already attributes a 
general alignment between its governance ratings and its proxy voting guidelines prior to the 
re-launch in 2010 (ISS, 2007, p. 24), it explicitly highlights the alignment between both 
products afterwards. In particular, ISS / RiskMetrics Group (2010, p. 7) states that “GRId’s 
methodology for assessing risk is closely aligned with the principles underlying RiskMetrics’ 
benchmark proxy voting guidelines”.43
Table 2 - 10: Regression Results: Prediction 2 – Probit Regressions 
 In addition, it (2010, p. 7) further outlines that this 
alignment “will help [to] shape GRId, ensuing it is up-to-date, relevant, and tailored to 
address variations in governance practices across global capital markets”. 
 Pred. Sign 









Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Intercept  1.171* 3.300*** 5.324** 4.915** 5.524*** 4.349** 
  (1.65) (4.44) (2.17) (2.21) (3.01) (2.47) 
GRId  - -0.157*** -0.253*** -0.355***  -0.966***  
  (-3.24) (-4.52) (-3.84)  (-4.48)  
GRId_BOARD -    -0.834***  -0.852*** 
     (-2.95)  (-2.97) 
GRId_COMP -    0.110  -2.038*** 
     (0.37)  (-5.11) 
GRId_SR&AUDIT     -0.183  -0.666** 
     (-0.69)  (-2.31) 
SIZE (log of TA)  -0.073* -0.113** -0.191 -0.215 0.212* 0.298** 
  (-1.71) (-2.59) (-1.37) (-1.52) (1.86) (2.47) 
Free Float  -0.000 -0.001 -0.005 -0.005 -0.017** -0.023** 
  (-0.07) (-0.42) (-0.84) (-0.83) (-2.03) (-2.21) 
HDAX  0.111 0.124 0.422 0.546 0.994** 1.386*** 
  (0.78) (0.66) (1.25) (1.60) (2.27) (2.69) 
IND fixed-effects  Yes No No No No No 
N  918 382 117 117 75 75 
Pseudo R²  0.0275 0.0720 0.1517 0.2130 0.3466 0.4570 
Predictive Margins if       
(a) GRId = 5 .2824 .6509 .7489  .9940  
(b) GRId = 9.13 .1111 .2617 .2290  .3117  
(c) GRId = 12 .0476 .0881 .0422  .0026  
(d) GRId _Board = 1    .5819   
(e) GRId _Board = 2    .2818   
(f) GRId _Board = 3    .0863   
(g) GRId _Comp = 1      .6698 
(h) GRId _Comp = 2      .2099 
(i)  GRId _Comp = 3      .0129 
Notes: Underlying regression is:  
ISS_AGAINSTiv =  α + γ1GRIdiv (� γ1GRId_SUBSCORESiv) + � γ2FIRM_CONTROLiv + � γ3INDiv + ε 
                                                 
43 Until the acquisition by MSCI in 2010, ISS was a subsidiary of RiskMetrics Group. In April 2014, ISS was 
acquired by Vestar Capital Partners.    
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The dependent variable ISS AGAINST is a dummy variable indicating with 1 if ISS recommends to vote against 
a specific voting item, and 0 otherwise. GRId (Governance Risk Indicator) stands for ISS’s commercial 
corporate governance rating. GRId_SUBSCORES reflects the different subscores of the commercial corporate 
governance rating (i.e., subscores for board, compensation, shareholder rights, and audits). FIRM_CONTROL is 
a vector of different firm-level control variables (log of total assets, free float, and blue chip (HDAX) index 
membership). IND stands for industry-fixed effects. The regression models have standard errors which are 
heteroskedasticity robust and one-way clustered at firm level. For detailed descriptions of the variables, see 
Appendix 2 - 1. Reported values: coefficient (t-value) *** (**) (*) indicates a significance level at 1% (5%) 
(10%), two-tailed. 
 
2.5.4 Additional Analyses 
Sample Selection Bias 
I perform several analyses to test the robustness of my findings. First, I address potential 
sample selection problems due to the limited availability of ISS reports. As outlined in section 
2.5.1, the TRAA database only provides ISS voting reports for firms with shareholder 
meetings in the period between May and December 2010. Thus, my sample might be to some 
extent selected by smaller firms as these firms tend to have larger audit delays and 
consequently later shareholder meetings (e.g., Hitz et al., 2013). The descriptive results in 
Table 2 - 5 support this presumption. Specifically, they reveal that the final sample ‘only’ 
covers 6 out of 30 DAX firms, 21 out of 50 MDAX firms, and 16 out of 30 TecDAX firms. 
To shed light on this selection problem, I compare – in a first step and on a descriptive level – 
the sample’s voting characteristics with these of the largest German firms (with all DAX and 
MDAX firms). In a second step, I perform probit regressions to directly address the 
differences between my final selected sample and the corresponding ISS universe (i.e., the 
German firms which are covered by ISS during the proxy season 2010).44
Table 2 - 11
  
 presents the results. Especially, firms covered by ISS LF-reports do not 
appear to differ from DAX and MDAX firms with respect to AGM voting characteristics 
(Panel A of Table 2 - 11). For example, the average shareholders’ attendance rate (60.5% vs. 
60.5%) and the average voting dissent (3.2% vs. 3.01%) are fairly similar. Likewise, the 
average voting results are on a comparable level across the different voting items. With 
respect to firm-level characteristics, Panel B of Table 2 - 11 provides different probit 
regressions based on Worldscope and ISS firm universe. In particular, the first two models 
examine directly the selection of ISS reports in the TRAA database (N=279) with respect to 
the ISS (Model 1) and Worldscope (Model 2) firm universe.  
                                                 
44 To identify the ISS proxy voting universe, I use detailed coverage data provided directly by ISS. 
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Table 2 - 11: Sample Selection Bias 
Panel A. Sample Selection – Comparison with ISS 2010 Voting Report 






(92 firms and 918 
voting items) 
SF-Sample 
(93 firms and 746 
voting items) 
AGM Characteristics    
Shareholders’ attendance rate at AGMs 60.5% 60.5% 57.8% 
Average dissent at AGMs 3.2% 3.01% 1.96% 
Voting results for specific items    
(1) Dividend and profit allocation 99.6% 99.35% 99.55% 
(2) Discharge of the boards 98.3% 98.38% 98.11% 
(3) Nomination of new board members 97.2% 97.46% 97.47% 
(4) Auditor appointment 99.0% 99.08% 98.57% 
(5) Capital authorization 93.3% 90.58% 97.13% 
(6) Share repurchase programs 95.0% 95.29% 97.12% 
(7) Amendments of articles of association 99.0% 99.13% 99.65% 
(8) Remuneration proposals 92.4% 91.67% 95.88% 
Panel B. Sample Selection – Probit Regression 
  DV: Indicator Variable DV: Indicator Variable DV: Indicator Variable 
(ISS Reports available 
in TRAA) 







(N based on 
ISS Universe) 
Model 2 
(N based on 
WS Universe) 
Model 3 
(N based on 
ISS Universe) 
Model 4 
(N based on 
WS Universe) 
Model 5 
(N based on  
ISS Universe) 
Model 6 
(N based on 
ISS Universe) 
Intercept  3.840*** -2.266*** -0.148 -3.002*** -2.581*** 0.759 
  (4.85) (-6.01) (-0.24) (-7.34) (-3.96) (1.03) 
SIZE (log of TA) -0.172*** 0.181*** 0.011 0.196*** 0.115** -0.084 
 (-3.00) (7.19) (0.24) (7.16) (2.33) (-1.45) 
BTM 0.006 -0.003 0.024 -0.001 -0.021 0.038 
 (0.21) (-0.51) (1.08) (-0.26) (-0.85) (1.64) 
ROA -0.074 -0.104 0.111 -0.100 0.516 -0.010 
 (-0.28) (-1.48) (0.62) (-1.29) (1.53) (-0.06) 
HDAX 0.360 -0.127 0.268 0.017 0.588* -0.698* 
 (1.30) (-0.47) (0.98) (0.06) (1.89) (-1.70) 
AF -0.026* -0.018 -0.022 -0.010 -0.020 -0.052** 
 (-1.66) (-1.32) (-1.46) (-0.71) (-1.20) (-2.08) 
MEETING_JanJun -1.489***  -0.060  0.316 -0.186 
 (-4.35)  (-0.35)  (1.49) (-1.03) 
IND2 0.543 -0.050 -0.183 -0.134 -0.048 -0.292 
 (1.43) (-0.18) (-0.52) (-0.45) (-0.11) (-0.68) 
IND3 0.078 -0.072 -0.216 -0.020 0.046 -0.380 
 (0.22) (-0.28) (-0.66) (-0.07) (0.12) (-0.97) 
IND4 0.357 -0.363 0.017 -0.199 0.150 -0.228 
 (0.87) (-1.19) (0.04) (-0.61) (0.34) (-0.49) 
IND5 -0.120 -0.307 0.074 0.052 -0.001 0.197 
 (-0.28) (-0.92) (0.18) (0.15) (-0.00) (0.41) 
IND6 1.058** -0.400 0.236 -0.204 0.034 0.163 
 (2.54) (-1.52) (0.67) (-0.72) (0.08) (0.40) 
IND7 0.133 0.174 0.018 0.259 -0.090 -0.026 
 (0.34) (0.64) (0.05) (0.89) (-0.22) (-0.07) 
IND8 0.948* 0.193 0.888* 0.596* 0.454 0.624 
 (1.73) (0.62) (1.88) (1.82) (0.94) (1.28) 
N  371 776 371 776 371 371 
Pseudo R²  0.2463 0.0697 0.0357 0.0964 0.0881 0.1880 
                                                 
45 These results are based on all DAX30 and all MDAX50 (ISS, 2010, pp. 30-31). 
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Notes (Panel A): The voting items are described as follows: dividend and profit allocation (M0152), discharge of 
the boards (M0260, M0261), nomination of new board members (M0228, M0250, M0275), auditor appointment 
(M0101), capital authorization (M0326, M0329, M0330, M0331, M0333, M0379), share repurchase programs 
(M0318, M0346, M0389), amendments of articles of association (M0106, M0122, M0126, M0227, M0377), 
remuneration proposals (M0219, M0550). For information and definitions on the individual Mgt. Rec. items, see 
Table 2 - 7. 
Notes (Panel B): Underlying probit regression model is: 
Probit(ISSreport)iv =  α1 + � α2FIRM_CONTROLiv + ε 
Depending on the underlying model (Model 1 to Model 6), ISSreport as the dependent variable indicates (with 
one and zero) the availability of specific ISS reports. In particular, for Model 1 and Model 2, ISSreport reflects 
the availability of all ISS reports in TRAA database (independently of whether corresponding voting results are 
available or not). For Model 3 and Model 4, ISSreport stands for the availability of ISS reports in the final 
sample (the availability in the final sample is substantially lower as voting results of the 2010 proxy season is not 
available for all initial sample firms, see Table 2 - 4). Finally, for Model 5 (Model 6), ISSreport reflects the 
availability of all ISS LF-reports (SF-reports) in the final sample. FIRM_CONTROL is a vector of firm 
characteristics which are likely to reflect any sample selection problems. Specifically, I consider SIZE (as log of 
total assets), BTM (as book to market ratio), ROA (as return on assets), HDAX (as index membership in 
HDAX), AF (as the number of analyst following), MEETING_JanJun (as indicating whether the shareholder 
meeting takes place in the first six month of the 2010 proxy season), and IND (as different SIC industry 
segments). For detailed descriptions of the variables, see Appendix 2 - 1. As indicated for each of the models, the 
underlying sample varies. Models 1, 3, 5, and 6 (Models 2 and 4) are based on all firms covered by ISS proxy 
advisory (all firms available in the German Worldscope universe) in 2010. The regression models have standard 
errors which are heteroskedasticity robust and one-way clustered at firm level. Reported values: coefficient (t-
value) *** (**) (*) indicates a significance level at 1% (5%) (10%), two-tailed. 
   
Consistent with the restricted availability of ISS reports in TRAA (reports are only 
available for firms with meetings between May and December), the dummy variable 
MEETING_JanJun becomes significant with a negative sign suggesting that the TRAA 
sample contains less ISS reports for meetings in the first six months of the proxy season 2010 
(Model 1, Panel B of Table 2 - 11). In addition, SIZE and AF (analyst followings) become 
significant as well and indicate that the TRAA sample is selected by smaller firms. However, 
when examining the selection issue for the paper’s final sample (N=185), the selection 
problem seems to disappear. As outlined in section 2.5.1, the paper’s final sample is selected 
by the availability of 2010 voting results as well. Thus, it potentially selects – in the second 
step – larger firms with higher transparency and disclosure standards. As reflected in the 
results of Model 3 (Panel B, Table 2 - 11), the final sample does not differ statistically to the 
ISS firm universe (i.e., to the sample of firms which are covered by ISS during the 2010 
proxy season) with respect to size, analyst followings, blue chip index membership, or even 
with respect to the time dependent distribution of shareholder meetings. Consequently, the 
paper’s final sample appears to resemble the 2010 ISS firm universe fairly well. 
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Correlation vs. Causation 
As outlined in prior studies, a potential problem when analyzing the effects of proxy recom-
mendations on voting outcomes is the distinction between correlation and causation (Choi et 
al., 2010, p. 878; Cai et al., 2009, p. 2404). Correlation rather than causation (i.e., endogeneity 
concerns) occurs if proxy advisors simply anticipate shareholders’ voting behavior due to a 
similar underlying information set (e.g., firm-level information on performance or governance 
deficiencies). To address this problem in a first step, I include firm-fixed effects in the basic 
regression models and thus control for (observed / unobserved) firm characteristics, like poor 
financial performance or poor governance arrangements, which are likely to affect both the 
voting recommendations and the shareholder’s voting behavior. To complement this, I 
perform two additional tests. First, I examine non-routine voting items. Second, I use voting 
recommendations issued by a German association of shareholders as a benchmark of publicly 
available information. Table 2 - 12 provides the corresponding results of both tests. 
For most issues at AGMs, i.e., routine items (like the election of auditors), proxy 
recommendations are uncritical and follow internationally accepted best practice. In those 
instances, it is plausible to assume that proxy recommendations do not cause direct shifts in 
voting results but merely correlate with the latter (ESMA, 2012, p. 19). However, for some 
issues at AGMs, i.e., non-routine items (like votes on significant business decisions or 
remuneration packages), opinions about best practice might differ among shareholders and 
proxy advisors (ESMA, 2012, p. 19). This is also reflected in the circumstance that most 
advisory firms offer customized voting policies (ESMA, 2012, p. 13). IVOX, for example, 
states that “it is not unusual that IVOX provides five different recommendations for the same 
meeting.”46
Table 2 - 12
 In addition, ISS (2011, p. 8) outlines that almost 40% of its clients do not follow 
ISS general voting policy but receive voting recommendations based on customized voting 
policies. Thus, regression results based on non-routine items should mitigate to some extent 
the anticipation concerns stated above. Panel A of  supports my original findings. 
Although the average and the moderating effects are slightly smaller compared to the original 
findings provided in Table 2 - 9 (Models 1 to 4), the results are still economically meaningful 
(e.g., 7.71% vs. 8.5% less supportive votes in case of negative ISS recommendations). The 
results based on the LF-sample (Models 5 and 6) even reveal a similar economic significance 
compared to the original findings (13.69% vs. 16.32% and 16.38% vs. 16.11%). 
                                                 
46 IVOX response on ESMA 2012 discussion paper (http://www.esma.europa.eu/consultation/Consultation-DP-
Overview-Proxy-Advisory-Industry-Considerations-Possible-Policy-Options, last accessed June 30, 2014). 
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Table 2 - 12: Regression Results: Correlation vs. Causation 
Panel A. Prediction 1: Firm-Fixed-Effects Regressions: Non-Routine Voting Items 
 Pred. Sign 
Dependent Variable: VOTING RESULT (in %) 
Full Sample 
(LF- and SF- ISS reports) 
 LF-Sample 
(N with high Client Base) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
MODERATOR - CLIENT BASE INVTURNOUT FREE FLOAT INVTURNOUT FREE FLOAT 
Intercept  97.374*** 97.318*** 96.289*** 97.365*** 95.965*** 97.102*** 
  (379.47) (415.31) (88.52) (318.17) (91.52) (254.81) 
ISS AGAINST - -7.706*** -2.958*** -4.996*** -4.786*** -6.651*** -5.914*** 
  (-6.73) (-3.10) (-6.71) (-5.76) (-8.04) (-6.31) 
MODERATOR    2.278  2.764  
    (1.09)  (1.19)  
ISS×MODERATOR -  -7.672*** -5.864*** -6.325*** -9.803*** -10.463*** 
   (-3.38) (-4.86) (-3.34) (-4.79) (-3.48) 
N  660 660 660 660 382 382 
Adj. R²  .5829 .6117 .5998 .6033 0.704 0.711 
Linear Prediction of Voting Result (in %) if       
(a) ISS=1 & Moderator=0   94.35 91.29 92.57 89.31 91.18 
(b) ISS=1 & Moderator=1  86.68 87.70 86.25 82.27 80.72 
Panel B. Descriptive Analysis: SdK recommendations 
SdK-ISS Sample: SdK and ISS recommendations are available for 684 voting items 
SdK rejection rate: SdK recommends to vote against items with a rejection rate of 22.81% (156 negative 
recommendations out of 684); the corresponding ISS rejection rate is 12.13% (83 
negative recommendations out of 684) 
SdK-ISS overlap: SdK and ISS issue negative recommendations in 42 cases simultaneously 
Panel C. Prediction 1: Firm-Fixed-Effects Regressions: SdK Recommendations 
 Pred. Sign 
Dependent Variable: VOTING RESULT (in %) 
Full Sample 
(with SdK and ISS reports available) 
Subsample 
(without SdK ‘AGAINST’ rec.) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
MODERATOR - - - - TURNOUT FREE FLOAT 
Intercept  98.241*** 97.939*** 98.578*** 98.819*** 98.718*** 98.824*** 
  (264.85) (144.34) (242.84) (405.45) (285.92) (409.77) 
ISS AGAINST - -11.495***  -9.969*** -9.567*** -6.845*** -7.266*** 
  (-5.31)  (-4.78) (-5.10) (-12.90) (-6.99) 
SdK AGAINST   -4.791*** -1.770    
   (-3.80) (-1.61)    
ISS×SdK    -1.933    
    (-0.69)    
MODERATOR      0.276  
      (0.58)  
ISS×MODERTOR -     -12.173*** -6.090* 
      (-4.32) (-1.94) 
N  684 684 684 528 528 528 
Adj. R²  0.453 0.283 0.463 0.365 0.439 0.390 
Linear Prediction of Voting Result (in %) if       
(a) ISS=0 & SdK=1  96.80    
(b) ISS=1 & SdK / Moderator=0   88.60  91.87 91.55 
(c) ISS=1 & SdK / Moderator=1  84.90  79.97 85.46 
Notes: Underlying basic regression model is:  
VOTING_RESULTiv =  α + γ1ISS_AIGAINSTiv + γ2MODERATORiv + γ3ISS_AGIANST × MODERATORiv + ε 
The dependent variable VOTING_RESULTiv stands for the voting result (in %) casted in favor of a specific 
voting item (management proposal) of firm i and AGM voting item v. ISS_AGAINST is a dummy variable 
indicating with 1 if ISS recommends to vote against a specific AGM voting item, and zero otherwise. 
MODERATOR stands for different dummy variables which are expected to moderate the relationship between 
ISS “vote against” recommendations and voting results, i.e., FREE FLOAT (with one if firm’s free float is above 
average, and zero otherwise), and invTURNOUT (with one if firm’s voting presence is below average, and zero 
otherwise), and CLIENT BASE (with one if firm is covered by ISS LF-report, and zero otherwise). The 
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regression models have standard errors which are heteroskedasticity robust and one-way clustered at AGM 
voting item level. To control for (observed / unobserved) firm characteristics the regression models contain firm-
fixed effects. For detailed descriptions of the variables, see Appendix 2 - 1. Reported values: coefficient (t-value) 
*** (**) (*) indicates a significance level at 1% (5%) (10%), two-tailed. 
  
To address the endogeneity issue from a different perspective, I use voting 
recommendations issued by the second largest German association of shareholders (SdK) as a 
benchmark of publicly available information. Again, the purpose is to control for ‘a similar 
underlying information set’ (like firm-level information on performance or governance 
deficiencies) which is likely to affect both the voting recommendations and the shareholder’s 
voting behavior. SdK (Schutzgemeinschaft der Kapitalanleger e.V.) is a registered association 
and represents especially the interests of small and non-professional investors. Besides legal 
consultation and related legal services, SdK provides voting recommendations at no charge 
for a broad range of German AGMs (which are readily accessible on their website). Thus, 
SdK recommendations as benchmark information allow to identify a sample of voting items 
which are controversial from the shareholders’ perspective (this is presumably the case if ISS 
and SdK differ in their voting recommendations). Thus, if ISS voting recommendations 
simply anticipate shareholders’ voting behavior due to a similar underlying information set, 
they should not differ substantially from the recommendations issued by SdK. More 
importantly, if negative ISS recommendations only correlate with shareholder votes, they 
should have less impact on shareholder votes in situations which are controversial from the 
shareholders’ perspective. This might especially be the case in situations where no consensus 
exists among the recommendations issued by ISS and SdK. 
Based on a subsample of voting items for which both SdK and ISS recommendations 
are available (N=684 voting items), Panel B and Panel C of Table 2 - 12 provide the 
corresponding results. In particular, the descriptive results reveal substantial differences in the 
frequency of ISS and SdK to issue negative recommendations. SdK issues negative 
recommendations for 22.81% of all considered voting items in the sample, whereas ISS 
recommends the same for only 12.13%. Most interesting, the final overlap of agreement, i.e., 
the agreement rate between SdK and ISS in situations where at least one of them issues a 
negative recommendation, only amounts to 21.3%.47
Table 2 - 12
 In addition, the subsequent regression 
results confirm my original findings (Panel C, ). Specifically, the association 
                                                 
47 In 114 (41) cases, SdK (ISS) recommends to vote against a specific voting item, whereas ISS (SdK) provides 
the opposite recommendations. Only in 42 out of 197 controversial cases (cases with negative recommendations 
from at least one of both advisors), SdK and ISS agree in their advisory decision.  
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between ISS recommendations and shareholder votes is unaffected by the inclusion of SdK 
voting recommendations as an additional control variable (Model 3, Panel C, Table 2 - 12). 
Likewise, when considering a subsample of voting items which are controversial from the 
shareholders’ perspective (Model 4 to Model 6, Panel C, Table 2 - 12), negative ISS 
recommendations correlate with shareholder votes on a similar level as documented in Table 
2 - 9.48
 
 Overall, these findings suggest that ISS recommendations appear to affect voting 
outcomes beyond pure correlation. 
2.6 Conclusion 
Based on a German sample of 1,664 AGM voting items (185 individual firms) and the 
corresponding ISS voting recommendations for the proxy season 2010, my results suggest 
that proxy advisors potentially play an influential role at German AGMs. Specifically, 
negative ISS voting recommendations significantly correlate with 8.5% less supportive 
shareholder votes. This association is even more pronounced for firms with high free float 
(11.64%), low voting turnout (11.59%), and high ISS client base (11.21%). However, ISS 
recommendations correlate with voting outcomes at a lower level compared to results 
documented in prior U.S. studies. In addition, my results contrast prior U.S. findings provided 
by Daines et al. (2010) and reveal significant correlations between two different ISS products, 
i.e., ISS proxy voting recommendations and ISS corporate governance ratings (GRId). 
Specifically, ISS’s recommendations against the election of supervisory board members 
(against the remuneration system) are significantly correlated with ISS’s evaluations of the 
corresponding board quality (of the remuneration system’s quality). These findings highlight 
a potential method consistency with respect to ISS’s employed governance perceptions.  
Overall, this paper extends the growing but U.S. dominated literature on proxy voting 
advisory (e.g., Ertimur et al., 2013) and contributes to the current European debate on the 
regulation of proxy advisors. ESMA (2012, p. 33), for example, outlined that evidence on the 
influence of proxy advisors on voting outcomes is an important prerequisite before discussing 
potential market failures within the proxy advisory industry and evaluating potential policy 
options. Thus, the paper's findings might be relevant and informative for European regulators 
                                                 
48 Based on the selected sample (N=684 with only LF-ISS reports), the results are comparable to the original ISS 
LF-results (Model 5 to 6, Table 2 - 9). 
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as they provide first descriptive evidence on the influence and method consistency of proxy 
advisors for a major European market. 
However, the findings are subject to several limitations. Most importantly, the paper’s 
results do not allow for causal inferences. As outlined in prior studies, a potential problem 
when analyzing the effects of proxy voting recommendations on voting outcomes is the 
distinction between correlation and causation (Choi et al., 2010, p. 878; Cai et al., 2009, p. 
2404). Correlation rather than causation occurs if proxy advisors simply anticipate 
shareholders’ voting behavior due to a similar underlying information set. Although this paper 
employs a variety of tests (e.g., fixed-effect regressions or non-routine item regressions), it 
cannot ultimately rule out that the results are driven by a mere correlation between proxy 
recommendations and shareholder’s voting behavior. In addition, this paper only analyzes the 
role and influence of one specific proxy advisor, namely ISS. Thus, future research may 
investigate, for example, the comparative differences in how proxy advisors correlate with 
voting outcomes at European shareholder meetings. Another path would be to challenge the 
robustness of my findings by conducting the analyses for alternative time frames and different 
European settings. Specifically, it is plausible to assume that institutional features, like the 
ownership structure in general, and the degree of foreign institutional holdings in particular, 


















DOES PROXY VOTING ADVISORY MATTER IN A EUROPEAN CONTEXT? 






Appendix 2 - 1: Definition of Variables 
SHORT CUT VARIABLE DEFINITION 
Panel A. Additional Firm-level Control Variables  
SIZE Log of total assets SIZE if the natural logarithm of total assets (EURO) 
(xwc02999e) 
ROA Return on assets ROA is calculated as net income available to common 
shareholders (wc01751) divided by total assets (wc02999)  
BTM Book-to-market of 
equity ratio 
BTM = common equity (wc03501) deflated by market 
capitalization (wc05001*nosh) 
HDAX Blue chip index 
membership 
HDAX is a dummy variable indicating blue chip index 
membership (i.e., HDAX: DAX30, MDAX50, TecDAX30) 
AC Analyst coverage AC is a dummy variable indicating the coverage by financial 
analysts (based on f1ne) 
AF Analyst following AF is the number of analyst following (f1ne) 
Panel B. Moderating Variables 
CLIENT BASE Client base of ISS CLIENT BASE is a dummy variable with one if the firm is 
covered by ISS Long-Form reports, and zero otherwise (hand 
collected and based on ISS reports provided by TRAA 
database) 
invTURNOUT* Voting turnout / 
presence 
invTURNOUT is a dummy variable with one if the firm’s 
voting presence is below average, and zero otherwise 
(individual voting turnout is hand collected) 
FREE FLOAT* Free float FREE FLOAT is a dummy variable with one if the firm’s free 
float is above average, and zero otherwise (free float is based on 
wscope item noshff) 
Panel C. Main Interest Variables 
ISS AGAINST ISS against 
recommendations 
ISS AGAINST is a dummy variable indicating with one if ISS 
recommends to vote against a specific AGM voting item, and 
zero otherwise (ISS reports provided by TRAA database) 
GRId Governance Risk 
Indicator 
GRId is a corporate governance score provided by TRAA 
database (GRId subscores are provided by TRAA as well). 
GRId ranges (theoretically) between 0 and 12, whereas higher 
GRId scores indicate better governance quality. 
Panel D. Main Dependent Variable 
VOTING 
RESULT 
Voting result in % VOTING RESULT measures the votes in percentage casted in 
favour of a specific voting item (i.e., management proposal) 
* As indicated in the paper (i.e., Table 2 - 5, Table 2 - 8, Table 2 - 10), both variables are also used as continuous 
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Appendix 2 - 2: The German Business Press and ISS 
Panel A. Coverage of ISS in Handelsblatt / Wirtschaftswoche (1986 - 2013) 
 
Panel B. Selected Synonyms of ISS in German Business Press 
Manager Magazin, 
(19.07.2013) 
“Supernanny” (super nanny), “mächtiger Corporate-Governance-Wächter” (powerful 
corporate governance guard), “die stille Macht” (the silent power) 
Spiegel Online 
(07/05/2013) 
“einflussreichste Schattenmacht der deutschen Konzerne” (the most influential ‘state 
within a state’ among German firms) 
Handelsblatt 
(06/05/2013) 
“einflussreiche Aktionärsberater” (influential shareholder adviser) 
Handelsblatt 
(06/05/2013) 
“Übernahmen, die Gehälter der Vorstände, die Besetzung von Aufsichtsratsposten – 
wenn irgendwo auf der Welt bei einem Großkonzern eine wichtige Entscheidung 
ansteht, hat oft auch eine Firma aus Washington ein wichtiges Wort mitzureden: Die 
Aktionärsberater von Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS).” 
Wirtschaftswoche 
(25/01/2012) 
“Mächtige Aktionärsflüsterer” (powerful shareholder whisperer) 
Wirtschaftswoche 
(25/01/2012) 
„Viele Freunde hat Thomas von Oehsen nicht in den Top-Etagen der deutschen 
Wirtschaft. Wo der Deutschland-Chef des US-Aktionärsberaters Institutional 
Shareholder Services (ISS) auftaucht, gerät das Gebälk der Deutschland AG ins 
Wanken – denn der unauffällige, 39-jährige Jurist kann Vorstandskarrieren bremsen, 
Aufsichtsräte aus dem Amt kegeln und Kapitalerhöhungen blockieren.“ 
Wirtschaftswoche 
(29/07/2010) 
“Rebellenführer auf Hauptversammlungen” (rebel leader on shareholder meetings) 
Börsenzeitung Nr. 
49, S. 8 (10.03.2007) 
“ISS einer neuer ‘Guru’” (ISS as a new guru) 
Die Welt, Heft 121. 
S. 13 (26/05/2006) 
“einflußreiche US-Aktionärsvertetung” (influential U.S. proxy advisor) 
Mannesmann / Vodafone Deal (2000)
Class Action Suit against Daimler (Mr Schremmp) (2004)
Engelhard / BASF Deal (2006)
MSCI / RMG Deal (2010)
Lufthansa (Mayrhuber) board elections (2013)
Euronext / NYSE Deal (2006)
MetroPCS / Telekom Deal (2013)















Overall 98 hits between the years 1986 and 2013
Search words ("Institutional Shareholder Services" / "RiskMetrics")
"Handelsblatt & Wirtschaftswoche" online archive (01/01/1986 - 12/31/2013)
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3.1 Introduction  
This paper sheds light on the usefulness of corporate governance (CG) ratings. CG ratings are 
marketed by professional CG rating agencies. These information intermediaries collect and 
process publicly available information, which they translate into governance ratings based on 
a proprietary weighting technology and their available information sets. Therefore, while the 
inputs to the rating process are publicly observable and made explicit by rating agencies, the 
transformation process (rating technology) represents an undisclosed source of individual 
competitive advantage. Given the increased popularity of commercial CG ratings, especially 
in the wake of corporate scandals like Enron, WorldCom, or Parmalat, the literature so far has 
been surprisingly silent on whether these ratings are valuable to investors. For instance, 
Ertugrul and Hegde (2009, p. 139) note that “there is little systematic study of the value of 
these third-party governance ratings in assessing firm value”. Rather, prior studies in their 
majority investigate the association of commercial ratings and firm value, finding mixed 
evidence. Similarly, Daines et al. (2010) investigate the predictive ability of commercial 
governance ratings with respect to firm value and stock returns, accounting restatements, 
probability of litigation, and operating performance, finding only inconclusive or weak 
evidence of a positive role for governance rating vendors. Our study complements and 
augments prior work by directly addressing the economic vindication of commercial ratings 
and their vendors. 
Our paper complements prior literature by directly shedding light on the incremental 
usefulness of commercial governance ratings. We investigate the potential value created by 
rating agencies in constructing their ratings (rating technology) and therefore directly address 
the claim of rating vendors that their ratings represent “a reliable tool for 1) identifying 
portfolio risk related to governance and 2) leveraging governance to drive increased 
shareholder value” (RiskMetrics Group, 2009, p.1). To that end, we exploit a unique dataset 
that includes both the observable input to the rating process, publicly available governance 
information, and the output of this process, the ratings. This enables us to isolate the 
incremental intermediation contribution of the governance rating agencies’ rating technology, 
which we relate to firm value. 
Using governance panel data provided by Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) for its 
two major European markets, the United Kingdom (UK) and Germany, from 2003 to 2007, 
we perform two sets of tests. First, in line with prior literature, we relate the commercial CG 






rating to a measure of firm value, Tobin's Q. In a second step, we investigate the incremental 
usefulness of the commercial rating technology compared to the underlying publicly available 
governance data. To that end, we construct an equally weighted naïve rating based on the 
publicly available data that ISS reportedly uses in constructing its ratings. Because investors 
can access publicly available governance information without relying on the commercial 
rating vendor’s services, we conjecture that the incremental value of ISS’s proprietary 
technology is reflected in the incremental explanatory power of the commercial rating over 
the naïve rating. Therefore, we isolate the value generated by the firm’s proprietary rating 
technology by regressing the commercial rating on the naïve rating. The residuals of this 
regression reflect our proxy variable for ISS’s rating technology (TECHNOLOGY), which 
encompasses the rating firm’s weighting methodology, and its access to private information. 
Assuming a positive economic role of the rating process, we conjecture that the coefficient 
estimate on TECHNOLOGY is positively associated with firm value. This is consistent with 
the commercial CG rating outperforming the naïve CG rating in terms of statistical and 
economic significance. 
With respect to our first set of analyses, our results document a significantly positive 
relationship between the commercial CG rating and firm value. However, in our second set of 
analysis, our variable that captures the incremental contribution of the rating technology 
(TECHNOLOGY), does not turn out significant in the firm value regressions. Consistent with 
this, the commercial CGQ rating is not able to outperform our naïve equally-weighted rating 
in terms of statistical as well as economic significance. These results suggest that the rating 
agency’s processing and information enhancement activities do not result in more accurate 
assessments of governance quality. We then exploit the institutional diversity of the two 
European jurisdictions in our analyses, the UK and Germany. While the UK is conventionally 
regarded as a common-law country with a shareholder model of corporate governance, which 
is similar to the U.S. and focuses on resolving shareholder-manager conflicts (Bebchuk and 
Hamadani, 2009), Germany represents  a code-law country with a stakeholder model of 
corporate governance geared at resolving conflicts between majority and minority 
shareholders. We repeat our initial analyses separately for both jurisdictions, and are able to 
confirm our initial findings for both the UK and Germany. This demonstrates that the failure 
of professional ratings to incrementally explain firm value persists over different governance 
environments. Accordingly, we are able to rule out that our results are due to the rating 
vendor applying a ‘one-size-fits-all approach’ of US (UK) governance standards. 






This paper contributes to the extant literature by shedding light on the incremental 
usefulness of professional CG ratings and, ultimately, the economic role of governance rating 
firms. Our findings have at least two implications. First, we confirm the findings of Renders 
et al. (2010) by providing positive rating-valuation results for two major European capital 
markets. More importantly, while governance quality appears to matter in terms of firm value, 
we do not find support for the notion that the data processing and refining activities 
performed by one major governance rating vendor , ISS, provide incremental value, neither in 
a continental European setting, nor in the UK. This finding raises questions as to the 
economic vindication of rating vendors’ intermediation activities. 
The findings of this paper are important for investors and corporate managers as they 
suggest that high governance ratings to some extent may indicate higher corporate valuation. 
However, findings also suggest that the competitive edge of rating agencies may not lie in 
their information processing and enhancement activities, but rather in the services they 
provide via cost-efficient collection of publicly available governance data, and other 
activities. On a more general level, our findings are important for policy makers and corporate 
managers who implement and rely on national governance codes with 'comply-or-explain' 
principles, as results suggest that companies can improve their performance by complying 
with codes of good corporate governance. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 provides background 
information on commercial CG ratings and reviews the related empirical literature. Sections 
3.3 and 3.4 develop our empirical predictions and outline the model structure. Section 3.5 
presents the results and discusses the implications of our findings. Section 3.6 concludes. 
 
3.2 Background and Related Literature 
3.2.1 Commercial Corporate Governance Ratings 
Governance business has been vastly growing throughout the last decade, and commercial 
governance ratings have become increasingly popular and influential among investors and 
regulators (Ertugrul and Hegde, 2009; Epps and Cereola, 2008).  Rose (2007, p. 887) notes 
for the U.S. market that “the corporate governance industry influences [...] the votes of 
trillions of dollars of equity, and affects the governance policies and fortunes of thousands of 
companies through proxy voting recommendations and governance ratings.” Four firms 






dominate the U.S. market, Governance Metrics International (GMI), Institutional Shareholder 
Services (ISS), The Corporate Library (TCL), and Standard & Poor's (S&P) (Koehn and 
Ueng, 2007).51
The “most visible governance rating” (Daines et al., 2010, p. 440) is ISS’s CGQ, which 
was introduced in 2002 and, using underlying data points for up to 67 individual corporate 
governance variables, covers more than 8,000 companies across 31 countries (RiskMetrics, 
2007). In 2010, ISS revised its governance rating and launched a new Governance Risk 
Indicator (GRId), which is not materially different to the CGQ rating (Larcker and Tayan, 
2011). Similar ratings are marketed by the other four rating vendors, with differences in 
taxonomy and scope.
 Their business consists of (unsolicited) assessments of firms’ governance 
quality, proxy advisory to investors, i.e, recommendations on how to vote on annual general 
meetings, consulting companies how to improve their governance systems, and acting as think 
tanks especially in U.S. public discussions (Daines et al., 2010). Although still small in 
comparison, the governance business is growing in Europe as well. ISS, for example, 
acquired the Belgium firm Deminor Rating (a subsidiary of Deminor, which offers CG 
ratings) in 2005. Also, new market players evolve, such as IVOX in Germany (IVOX, 2012). 
52
From an economic point of view, proxy advisory and governance rating firms represent 
information intermediaries, i.e., institutions that “reduce transaction costs in the capital 
market by providing specialized services and gathering and disseminating information” 
(Healy and Palepu, 2002, p. 4). Rating firms collect publicly available information, process 
and enhance this information, and disseminate it to capital market participants. To the extent 
that this process creates more accurate or less expensive assessments of governance quality, it 
 
                                                 
51 ISS (as a subdivision of MSCI, and formerly of RiskMetrics Group) represents the dominant firm in the 
governance market (Rose, 2007). The majority of ISS turnover (around 65%) is generated in the proxy advisory 
business. ISS reportedly provides proxy services for over 1,700 institutional investors managing $ 26 trillion in 
assets, including 24 of the top 25 mutual funds, 25 of the top 25 assets managers, and 17 of the top 25 public 
pension funds (Belinfanti, 2009, p. 397 ff). ISS’s governance rating (GRId / CGQ) is available for institutional 
investors and corporations through a larger subscription package (Coffin and Collinson, 2005). Prior literature 
raises concerns with the vendors’ independence and their conflict of interests in assessing governance quality 
and providing proxy voting advisory (e.g., Koeng and Ueng, 2007, p. 61; Rose, 2007, pp. 891, 906; Vo, 2008, p. 
17). 
52 Since 2000, S&P has been assessing firms’ corporate governance quality. Its former governance rating 
provided a score with a range from one to ten, including four overall governance categories. In 2007, S&P 
revised its governance rating and launched the Standard & Poor’s Governance, Accountability, Management 
Metrics & Analysis’ (GAMMA) score, which also picks up - besides governance issues - risk and strategy issues 
(S&P, 2008). The GMI governance rating with a scoring scheme from one to ten covers almost 3,400 U.S. and 
international companies, and uses 600 underlying governance provisions based on seven categories (Derwall and 
Verwijmeren, 2007). The TCL rating covers over 2,000 U.S. companies and provides letter scoring ranging from 
A to F by using 120 variables based on six categories. In 2010, GMI and TCL announced their merger, and have 
since combined their products and services (Marketwire, 2010). 






is potentially valuable to investors in economic terms. 
Figure 3 - 1: Rating Process of Commercial CG Ratings 
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Figure 3 - 1 visualizes the process of commercial CG ratings. We distinguish five 
phases, which are associated with different sources of potential value generation. In phases 
one and two, respectively, governance rating vendors collect and aggregate publicly available 
data. These services are potentially valuable as they spare transaction costs on the investor 
level, creating cost savings. In phase three, the data is processed and translated into ratings. 
This process is based on the rating agency’s proprietary technology and draws from two 
sources, which both potentially constitute competitive advantages. For one thing, the rating 
firm uses a unique method to process and weigh governance information. ISS, for example, 
reportedly runs more than 4,000 statistical tests based on 16 variables of firm valuation / 
 
Rating Process 






performance and risk to assess the optimal weighting of the underlying governance criteria 
used in these analyses (Daines et al., 2010). Also, the rating methodology and weighting are 
adjusted periodically to capture current market trends (RiskMetrics, 2007). If this technology 
is superior or more accurate compared to investors’ assessments, it provides potentially 
valuable ratings. Second, in addition to processing publicly available information, rating firms 
may in this phase also factor into their ratings private information, which they gather, e.g., 
from informal ties and communication with the firms. Because only the output of the process, 
the rating, is observable (phase four), any incrementally valuable information contained 
therein may be attributed to the rating firm’s superior weighting technology, its private 
information, or both. Phase five involves regular updates of the rating, which pertain to all 
four prior phases. Throughout this whole process, rating agencies need to trade off protection 
of their proprietary technology or superior information sources against disclosing their 
processes and techniques to convey their expertise to market participants (Balling et al., 
2005).  
In this paper, we investigate in detail the incremental value generated by the rating 
agency’s proprietary rating technology, to glean insights into the sources of competitive 
advantage and the potential information value of commercial governance ratings. 
 
3.2.2 Related Literature 
Our paper speaks to two related streams of literature, the governance-performance and the 
governance rating literature. With respect to the former, early results for the U.S. market 
support the general notion that corporate governance is positively related to firm value (e.g., 
Gompers et al., 2003). Comparative corporate governance studies extend these results to 
cross-country settings, indicating that country-level institutional arrangements are related to 
corporate valuation (e.g., Klapper and Love, 2004). Various other studies examine the relation 
between specific governance features and firm performance, obtaining mixed results (e.g., 
Dalton et al., 2003 for shareholder structure; Kang and Stulz, 2000 for capital structure; De 
Andres et al., 2005 for boards; Core and Larcker, 2002 for incentive systems; Burkart and 
Panunzi, 2006 for the market for corporate control). More recent studies find no consistent 
evidence of a positive relation between governance quality and firm performance, which the 
authors attribute to biases in prior papers owing to time-specific irregularity, absence of 
learning effects, endogeneity, or specification errors in the model structure (e.g., Lehn et al., 






2006; Bebchuk et al., 2013; Gow et al., 2010). 
The second literature stream, papers on governance ratings, responds to the growing 
importance of CG rating services and proxy voting advisory. These papers address issues like 
the growth and influence of rating vendors (Rose, 2007; Vo, 2008), the necessity of 
governance rating and consulting services (Koehn and Ueng, 2007), the role and regulation of 
proxy advisors (Larcker et al., 2011), or the methodology of the rating process (Balling et al., 
2005). Table 3 - 1 provides an overview of those papers that directly address the question 
whether commercial CG ratings are indicative of firm-level governance quality. While two 
earlier U.S. studies present evidence in favor of commercial ratings using governance 
measures based on the vendor’s underlying database (Brown and Caylor, 2006/2009), recent 
U.S. and European papers directly investigate the rating scores, finding mixed evidence. For 
instance, Epps and Cereola (2008), using ISS ratings, do not reveal significant associations 
with operating firm performance for U.S. firms. In comparative studies, Daines et al. (2010) 
and Ertugrul and Hegde (2009) examine three ratings for the U.S. market, ISS, GMI, and 
TCL, and find that these summary scores have either a limited or no success at all in 
predicting firm performance / valuation. Bauer et al. (2004) find for a sample of European 
firms that high Deminor ratings are not associated with high firm performance, but are 
negatively correlated with operating performance.  
In contrast, Derwall and Verwijmeren (2007) and Spellman and Watson (2009) find 
significant evidence that GMI ratings for U.S. firms are valuable for investors by indicating 
among others lower implied cost of equity capital as well as higher shareholder and 
accounting returns. Vander Bauwhede (2009) relates a subset of the Deminor rating, criteria 
regarding the board structure, to operating firm performance, establishing an overall positive 
and significant relationship for a European sample. Renders et al. (2010) find that, after 
controlling for sample selection and endogeneity, Deminor ratings of European firms are 
positively and significantly associated with various proxies for firm performance (Tobin's Q, 
return on equity, and return on assets). The authors maintain that the lack of consistent results 
of prior studies is due to the absence of simultaneous control for sample selection and 
endogeneity.  
Taken together, research on the relation between governance quality, governance 
ratings, and firm performance is plentiful, yet still at a rather early stage, with little robust 
evidence. This owes to the complex relation between governance and firm performance, but 






also to methodological issues. Also, it remains an open empirical question whether and how 
governance rating agencies provide value to their customers and therefore play an 
economically meaningful role. We shed light on this very issue by investigating the 
incremental value of the information processing and enhancing activities of corporate 
governance rating vendors. 
Table 3 - 1: Prior Literature on Corporate Governance Ratings and Firm Value 
Authors Period [Sample] Rating Type Main Findings 
Brown & Caylor (2006) 2002 [U.S.] Adj. ISS Positive association between CG rating 
and firm value 
Brown & Caylor (2009) 2002 [U.S.] Adj. ISS Positive association between CG rating 
and firm operating performance 
Epps & Cereola (2008) ‘02-’04 [U.S.] ISS 
 
No sign. association between CG ratings 
and firm operating performance 
Daines et al. (2010) 2005 [U.S.] 
 
ISS/GMI/TCL No sign. association between CG ratings 
and future firm performance / value 
Ertugrul & Hedge (2009) ‘03-’06 [U.S.] ISS/GMI/TCL No sign. association between CG ratings 
and firm performance 
Bauer et al. (2004) ‘98-’02 [EU] Deminor No sign. association between CG ratings 
and future firm performance 
Derwall & Verwijmeren 
(2007) 
‘03-’05 [U.S.] GMI 
 
Negative association between CG rating 
and implied cost of equity capital 
Spellman & Watson (2009) ‘03-’08 [U.S.] GMI 
 
Positive association between CG rating 
and shareholder / accounting returns 
Vander Bauwhede (2009) ‘01-’02 [EU] Deminor Positive association between CG rating 
and firm operating performance 
Renders et al. (2010) ‘99-’03 [EU] Deminor Positive association between CG rating 
and firm value / operating performance 
Notes: The table summarizes 10 corporate governance studies which examine the performance impact of 
commercial corporate governance ratings. Rating types include ISS (Institutional Shareholder Services) rating; 
Adj. ISS (auxiliary rating based on the ISS single provisions); GMI (Governance Metrics International) rating; 
TCL (The Corporate Library) rating; Deminor rating. 
 
3.3 Empirical Predictions 
Corporate governance quality and firm value 
Our first prediction pertains to the relation between the quality of corporate governance, 
measured by the commercial CG rating, and firm value. A comprehensive theoretical and 
empirical literature, starting with Jensen and Meckling (1976), shows that the quality of a 
firm’s internal and external governance mechanisms is positively related to firm value. 
Accordingly, Drobetz (2002, p. 432) observes that “good corporate governance reduces the 
agency costs brought about by the separation of ownership and control, e.g., it allows 
investors to spend less time and resources on monitoring management teams”. If rating 
agencies are successful in collecting and aggregating information which is indicative of 
governance quality, we expect their ratings to show a positive association with firm value. 






Incremental value of corporate governance ratings 
As laid out in section 3.2.1, the existence of rating agencies and their ability to market 
commercial corporate governance ratings receives economic vindication if they create and 
sustain competitive advantage (1) by collecting information, and / or (2) by processing and 
refining this information, and / or (3) by accessing non-public information. The first source of 
competitive advantage creates savings of transaction costs for investors, who delegate costly 
collection of publicly available information about governance characteristics. The second 
source of competitive advantage is reflected by the agency’s technology for aggregating and 
weighting the information collected. Finally, the third source stems from superior 
informational channels and access to sources of private information.  
As noted, the weighting activities and the use of private information cannot be directly 
observed because the process of generating ratings is proprietary. However, as we have access 
to both the input to the rating process, the set of publicly available data the rating vendor uses, 
and to the output of the process, the governance ratings, we are able to isolate the rating 
vendors technology, which combines its aggregation skills and/or the potential access to and 
use of private information. If rating agencies create value by performing these activities, we 
expect their ratings to have explanatory power for firm value incremental to the underlying 
raw dataset of governance data, which is taken from public sources. Therefore, our second 
prediction is that the commercial corporate governance ratings vendor’s proprietary rating 
technology is incrementally positively associated with firm value, relative to the underlying 
publicly available data. 
 
Role of the underlying governance model 
As noted, the major governance rating firms are domiciled in the U.S. Therefore, despite 
adjustments performed in developing ratings for non-U.S. firms, commercial rating firms are 
likely to adopt a U.S. perspective on the factors that shape governance quality.53
                                                 
53 For example, the majority of firms covered by ISS are U.S. domiciled (5,200 U.S firms compared to 2,800 
international firms) (e.g., Koehn and Ueng, 2005). 
 For example, 
Bebchuk and Hamdani (2009) conduct a detailed analysis of the factors that ISS analyses and 
find that these are consistent with the U.S. model of dispersed ownership, while they do not 
fit well to firms with controlling shareholders, where the principal issue is to protect minority 
shareholder from expropriation by the controlling parties. On a broader level, U.S. domiciled 






rating vendors are likely to adopt a shareholder perspective of corporate governance, while in 
many jurisdictions, especially in continental Europe, governance issues relate to resolving 
conflicts and balancing demands from diverse stakeholders, including investors, creditors, and 
employees. Therefore, as a third prediction, we expect the incremental value of governance 
ratings to be sensitive to this institutional setting, and to turn out lower for settings that are 
substantially different from the U.S. In particular, we expect the incremental association 
between rating technology and firm value (prediction 2) to be lower in statistical terms for 
firms domiciled in a continental European, stakeholder oriented setting, compared to firms 
from a U.S. style shareholder environment. 
We address or third prediction by conducting our analyses for two institutional 
backgrounds, one with a shareholder value based model aimed at resolving problems in firms 
with dispersed ownership, and one with a stakeholder model with an emphasis on protecting 
minority shareholders. We use the UK and Germany, respectively, to proxy for these 
environments. The Anglo-Saxon UK and U.S. settings have many market and institutional 
features in common, whereas they differ in various aspects to continental European 
environments such as Germany, e.g., with respect to the legal tradition, firms’ access to 
external financing, or the importance of organized capital markets.54
 
 In particular, Anglo-
Saxon and continental European countries differ in the legal and factual governance 
mechanisms in place, and with respect to the prevailing perception of what governance 
mechanisms ought to achieve and what constitutes good governance. These differences are 
conventionally subsumed under the dichotomy of shareholder-oriented and stakeholder-
oriented governance perspectives. Goergen et al. (2008, pp. 37), for example, contrast the 
German governance system to the Anglo-Saxon system “by the important role that large 
shareholders and banks play, a two-tier board structure with labor participation on the 
supervisory board of large companies, the absence of hostile takeovers”, and the explicit 
focus on “stakeholder value maximization”, which is also reflected in the mandate for 
managers to promote the interest of the firm rather than shareholders’ interest (Baums and 
Scott, 2005). 
                                                 
54 A large body of research examines the differences in institutional settings and capital markets. In their seminal 
paper, La Porta et al. (1998, p. 1113), for example, find evidence that “common-law countries [like the U.S. or 
the UK] have the strongest, and French-civil-law countries the weakest, legal protection of investors, with 
German- and Scandinavian-civil-law countries located in the middle”. 






3.4 Research Design 
3.4.1 Basic Regression Models 
We address our first prediction using the following regression model: 









+ 𝜀 (1) 
The dependent variable VAL reflects firm value, which we measure in line with prior 
finance and governance studies by using Tobin's Q (e.g., Bebchuk et al., 2009). CGQ is our 
main test variable, the value of the commercial corporate governance rating. In line with our 
first prediction, we expect that the coefficient 𝛽 obtains a positive sign. CONTROL represents 
a vector of variables that capture firm characteristics which prior literature has demonstrated 
to affect firm value, including size, leverage, growth, free float, capital-intensity, and index 
membership (e.g., Gompers et al., 2003; Drobetz et al., 2004; Beiner et al., 2006; Brown and 
Caylor, 2006; Aggarwal et al., 2009; Bebchuk et al., 2009; Renders et al., 2010). We also 
control for year- and industry-fixed effects (e.g., Bebchuk et al., 2009; Bauer et al., 2004; 
Renders et al., 2010). To address time-series dependence in our panel dataset, we use standard 
errors which are heteroskedasticity robust (White, 1980) and one-way clustered55
We address our second prediction using the following regression model: 
 at the firm 
level (Gow et al., 2010; Petersen, 2009). In our robustness tests, we conduct several 
specification tests. 











The dependent variable VAL, the vector of control variables CONTROL, and the year 
and industry fixed effects are defined as for model (1). Again, we use standard errors which 
are heteroskedasticity robust and one-way clustered at the firm level. CGI and 
TECHNOLOGY are the main test variables. CGI is a naïve, self-constructed governance rating 
based on the CGQ raw dataset. TECHNOLOGY captures the incremental portion of the CGQ 
                                                 
55 Newey-West, Fama-MacBeth, and one-way clustered standard errors are common approaches in the literature. 
Following Gow et al. (2010), two-way clustered standard errors achieve on average more robust inferences than 
the other three methods. However, in cases where the sample contains many firm but only few time 
observations, two-way- and one-way- clustered standard errors are similarly efficient. 






rating that is generated by the rating agencies’ technology, i.e. its weighting technology and 
the use of non-public information. In line with our second prediction, we assume that the 
coefficient 𝛽2 obtains a positive sign. Consistent with this, we expect that the coefficient 
estimate of the commercial rating (𝛽 of model 1) yields higher statistical and economic 
significance levels than the coefficient estimate of our naïve CG rating (𝛽1 of model 2). 
Our third prediction that institutional factors or country of origin matters for the 
incremental value of the TECHNOLOGY variable is addressed by sampling UK and German 
firms, and then conducting our statistical tests (i) for the UK and (ii) the German sample 
separately, as well as (iii) for a joint sample with interaction terms between our governance 
variables and a UK indicator variable. As noted, we expect to observe higher statistical and 
economic significance levels of our governance variables in the UK sample compared to the 
German sample. For the joint sample, we expect positive and significant coefficient estimates 
on our interaction terms. These expectations, however, are conditional on the empirical 
content of our prior predictions one and two. 
 
3.4.2 Corporate Governance Variables 
We use all available ISS CGQ ‘Country Ranking’ scores for the UK and Germany from 2003 
through 2007 as our measure of the commercial CG rating (CGQ). As a relative measure, the 
CGQ variable indicates the governance quality of firms relative to other firms in their 
industry, in their index, or in their country. For example, a company’s ‘Country Ranking’ of 
69.5 expresses that the company’s total governance quality score was higher than 69.5% of 
the scores of all other rated companies in that country (RiskMetrics Group, 2007). 
To construct our naïve corporate governance (CGI) rating, we use the underlying raw 
dataset of the CGQ rating provided by ISS and the latest ‘Corporate Governance Quotient 
Indicator definition’ published by ISS in 2007 (RiskMetrics Group, 2007). ISS states that 
CGQ ratings for non-US companies are based on a maximum of 55 rating criteria. However, 
because some of those criteria are not applicable under the respective national law, the CGQ 
rating for UK and German firms is based on only 47 and 41 criteria, respectively. These rating 
criteria fall into eight categories: board issues, audit, charter & bylaws, anti-takeover, 
executive and director compensation, progressive practice, stock ownership, and education. 
For each criterion, compliance is established (and the variable takes a value of one) if the 
firm's governance standards are minimally acceptable according to the benchmark laid down 






in ISS’s ‘Corporate Governance Indicator definition’. 
Table 3 - 2: CGQ Rating Criteria, ISS Dimensions, and Compliance 
Panel A. CGQ Provisions and corresponding Compliance Rates: UK [GER] 
No Minimum governance standard ISS dimension 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
1 Board composition: 66.67% [50%] independent Board (1) 5 [0] 5 [2] 5 [45] 6 [65] 7 [70] 
2 Nominating committee: 100% independent Board (2) 17 [0] 26 [0] 25 [1] 23 [2] 27 [4] 
3 Compensation committee: 100% independent Board (3) 58 [0] 70 [0] 68 [3] 70 [2] 71 [2] 
4 Board structure: not classified Board (4) 3 [0] 3 [1] 7 [0] 77 [0] 12 [5] 
5 Governance committee in place Board (5) 1 [1] 1 [16] 3 [15] 2 [23] 2 [13] 
6 Board attendance of all directors: >= 75% Board (6) 9 [1] 50 [1] 73 [11] 85 [19] 93 [14] 
7 Governance guidelines are publicly disclosed Board (7) 99 [2] 70 [6] 63 [66] 95 [71] 99 [87] 
8 Boards by directors other than CEO <= 5 Board (8) 10 [3] 21 [95] 16 [100] 17 [100] 2 [100] 
9 CEO served on boards of public companies: <= 2  Board (9) 96 [46] 98 [49] 96 [56] 90 [77] 98 [78] 
10 No related-party transaction of the CEO Board (10) 97 [71] 96 [30] 93 [85] 87 [93] 94 [89] 
11 Board size is >=9 [6] and <=15 Board (11) 50 [90] 51 [89] 40 [85] 40 [83] 37 [86] 
12 No former CEO on the board Board (12) 80 [92] 80 [49] 87 [68] 88 [70] 87 [66] 
13 Chairman & CEO separated / lead director  Board (13) 97 [-] 99 [-] 97 [-] 98 [-] 97 [-] 
14 Right to vote on changes on board size  Board (15) 5 [-] 0 [-] 0 [-] 1 [-] 1 [-] 
15 Response to shareholder proposal Board (17) 100 [-] 100 [-] 100 [-] 100 [-] 100 [-] 
16 Audit committee: 100% independent Audit (1) 55 [0] 70 [0] 68 [4] 70 [4] 75 [2] 
17 Policy disclosed regarding auditor rotation Audit (2) 0 [4] 0 [0] 18 [100] 16 [100] 24 [98] 
18 Consulting fees are less than audit fees Audit (3) 1 [82] 0 [80] 61 [25] 63 [87] 62 [95] 
19 Majority vote requirement to approve mergers Charter (1) - [1] - [1] - [0] - [0] - [0] 
20 Majority vote requirement to amend bylaws Charter (2) - [1] - [1] - [13] - [1] - [1] 
21 Shareholder may act by written consent Charter (3) 0 [1] 1 [1] 0 [0] 0 [0] 1 [0] 
22 Single class, common, no blank check Charter (4) 97 [100] 100 [100] 99 [100] 99 [100] 100 [99] 
23 Opting out of any anti-takeover provisions Anti-take. (1) 0 [1] 99 [1] 98 [0] 96 [0] 99 [0] 
24 Control-share acquisition Anti-take. (2) 0 [-] 0 [-] 0 [-] 0 [-] 0 [-] 
25 Cash out statue Anti-take. (3) 0 [-] 0 [-] 0 [-] 0 [-] 0 [-] 
26 Freeze out statue Anti-take. (4) 0 [-] 0 [-] 0 [-] 0 [-] 0 [-] 
27 Fair Price provisions Anti-take. (5) 0 [-] 0 [-] 0 [-] 0 [-] 0 [-] 
28 Stakeholders laws Anti-take. (6) 0 [-] 0 [-] 0 [-] 0 [-] 0 [-] 
29 Poison pill endorsement Anti-take. (7) 0 [-] 0 [-] 0 [-] 0 [-] 0 [-] 
30 Option repricing prohibited Comp. (1) 2 [0] 2 [61] 2 [98] 89 [100] 12 [88] 
31 No firm loan to executives for exercising option Comp. (2) - [1] - [1] - [44] - [90] - [48] 
32 Company expenses options Comp. (3) 5 [2] 7 [25] 78 [73] 95 [98] 98 [92] 
33 No interlocks among comp. committee members Comp. (4) 6 [6] 2 [21] 91 [53] 12 [63] 1 [99] 
34 Option grant align with performance Comp. (5) 42 [12] 46 [29] 39 [44] 41 [43] 54 [39] 
35 Directors receive all / portion of fees in stock Comp. (6) 40 [33] 36 [13] 4 [3] 31 [1] 3 [1] 
36 ISS deemed option plan costs as reasonable Comp. (7) 72 [36] 87 [55] 85 [50] 83 [52] 98 [51] 
37 Stock incentive plan adopt with shareh. approval Comp. (8) 100 [83] 99 [63] 100 [61] 99 [63] 95 [49] 
38 No non-empl. directors with pension plan Comp. (9) 96 [83] 96 [34] 98 [99] 98 [99] 100 [100] 
39 No option repricing within the last three years Comp. (10) 10 [95] 98 [73] 100 [98] 99 [99] 100 [53] 
40 Outside directors meet without CEO and disclose Progressive (1) 1 [0] 12 [5] 28 [4] 17 [7] 22 [2] 
41 Outside advisor available to the board Progressive (2) 86 [0] 91 [9] 96 [4] 98 [4] 81 [6] 
42 Directors resign upon a job change Progressive (3) 0 [0] 0 [1] 0 [0] 0 [0] 0 [1] 
43 Board approved CEO succession plan  Progressive (4) 1 [1] 38 [23] 33 [34] 40 [73] 67 [12] 
44 Performance of the board is reviewed regularly Progressive (5) 6 [4] 61 [36] 81 [99] 90 [99] 92 [17] 
45 Retirement age / term limit for directors Progressive (6) 9 [5] 26 [15] 41 [79] 23 [47] 2 [24] 
46 Stock ownership guidelines for Directors Ownership (1) 3 [0] 7 [0] 3 [0] 2 [0] 4 [0] 
47 Stock ownership guidelines for Executives Ownership (2) 15 [0] 30 [1] 29 [1] 44 [1] 40 [1] 
48 Directors with > 1 year of service own stock Ownership (3) 60 [78] 64 [33] 61 [19] 58 [16] 54 [19] 
49 Officers & directors stock ownership Ownership (4) 20 [7] 19 [8] 39 [24] 42 [28] 37 [66] 
50 Directors participate in director educat. program Education (1) 0 [0] 0 [0] 0 [1] 0 [1] 0 [1] 
Panel B. CGQ Provisions and Descriptive Data: UK [GER] 
N Year: Sample Mean Median StD Min Max 
1677 [409] 2003-2007 44.2 [35.5] 44.7 [36.6] 8.1 [11.4] 19.1 [12.2] 61.7 [63.4] 
174 [83] 2003 30.9 [23.0] 31.9 [22.0] 4.8 [4.3] 19.1 [14.6] 46.8 [41.5] 
179 [80] 2004 39.8 [26.8] 38.3 [24.4] 7.0 [9.0] 21.3 [12.2] 59.6 [46.3] 
459 [80] 2005 45.3 [40.5] 44.7 [39.0] 6.9 [7.2] 23.4 [22.0] 61.7 [61.0] 
450 [83] 2006 48.7 [45.9] 48.9 [46.3] 6.2 [7.2] 23.4 [29.3] 61.7 [63.4] 
415 [83] 2007 45.7 [41.0] 46.8 [41.5] 5.5 [7.3] 25.5 [26.8] 61.7 [63.4] 
Notes: Compliance rates for the years 2003 to 2007 represent the percentage of firms with minimum governance 
standards. The minimum governance standards are based on RiskMetrics’ Corporate Governance Quotient - 
Indicator Definition for non-US companies (version 3.4.1) last updated December 2007. 
 






Table 3 - 2 reports the individual ISS rating criteria for the UK and Germany, and the 
corresponding benchmark values required as minimum governance standards, the resulting 
compliance rates over the five years panel and additional descriptive data for the sample 
compliance rates. Our data reveals a corresponding compliance rate of around 30.9% for UK 
firms and 23% for German firms in 2003, which underlines that the compliance levels in both 
countries are lower than in the U.S., for which Brown and Caylor (2009), using 2003 data, 
report an average compliance rate over all single ISS provisions of 44%. Although the 
compliance rate with ISS governance standards shows an upwards trend for our sample years 
2003-2007, with an increase in the average compliance rate of almost 15 percentage points for 
UK firms and 20 percentage points for German firms over five years (Table 3 - 2, Panel B, 
mean values), the overall compliance rates remain on a relatively low level. The highest rated 
UK firm (German firm) in 2003 exhibits a compliance rate of  46.8% (41.5%), whereas the 
highest rated firm in 2007 complies with 61.7% (63.4%) of all 47 CGQ criteria (41 CGQ 
criteria). 
Table 3 - 3: Isolation of the Incremental Contribution of CG Rating Agencies 
Panel A: Conceptual Level: Two-way decomposition of the CGQ rating  





   
Publicly available information 
underlying the CGQ rating (ISS 
rating criteria, see Table 3 - 2) 
 
All non-public information 
factors underlying the CGQ 
rating including weighting 
expertise and access to private 
information 
Panel B: Regression Level: Two-way decomposition of the CGQ rating  





   
Publicly available information is 
equally weighted and aggregated 
into our CGI score 
 
Residuals capture 
TECHNOLOGY as the non-
explained variation in CGQ 
Notes: TECHNOLOGY as the residuals from the cross sectional OLS regression (CGQi = β0 + β1CGIi + ε) 
represent the incremental usefulness of the CGQ through superior weighting technology and / or private 
information relative to our naïve CGI rating. To obtain the residuals for our five years sample, we estimate the 
cross sectional OLS regression (CGQi = β0 + β1CGIi + ε) separately for each country and each of our five sample 
years. The CGQ (ISS CGQ country ranking) is a relative measure of corporate governance quality that indicates 
the governance quality of firms relative to other firms in their country. To construct our naïve CGI rating, we 
rely on the underlying raw dataset of the CGQ rating provided by ISS and on the latest ‘Corporate Governance 
Quotient Indicator Definition’ published by ISS in 2007. We construct our naïve CGI rating similar to the CGQ 
rating as a relative measure of governance quality (relative to other firms in the same year and country) based on 
firm level compliance rates. The firm level compliance rates of the binary coded rating criteria are equally 
weighted and not adjusted for yearly trends. 
 






For each firm, we construct the naïve CGI score as an equally weighted score of all 
compliance rates for each firm with ISS’s governance criteria. The CGI variable is an 
indicator of the fraction of the CGQ rating which is based on processing publicly available 
information on firm’s governance structures. Consistent with the CGQ rating, a firm's CGI 
score of 66%, for example, indicates that the firm's compliance with ISS minimum 
requirements was higher than the compliance in 66% of all other rated firms in the same year 
and country.56
Table 3 - 3
 The potential additional explanatory power of the commercial rating over the 
naïve CGI score is captured by our measure of ISS’s rating technology, TECHNOLOGY. 
This measure indicates the incremental value added by the rating agency’s weighting 
technology, including potential private information. TECHNOLOGY is measured as the 
residuals from regressing the CGQ rating on the naive CGI score.  illustrates our 
approach to decomposing the CGQ rating. 
 
3.4.3 Firm Value and Control Variables 
We build on a literature of finance and governance studies that employ Tobin’s Q as a key 
measure of firm value that reflects growth opportunities and investment possibilities from a 
capital market perspective (e.g., Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Lang and 
Stulz, 1994; Daines, 2001; Gompers et al., 2003; Drobetz et al., 2004; Beiner et al., 2006; 
Brown and Caylor, 2006; Aggarwal et al., 2009; Bebchuk et al., 2009; Renders et al., 2010; 
Ammann et al., 2011). This literature frames Tobin’s Q as a comparably robust measure of 
firm value (Adam and Goyal, 2008). While we note that there are concerns with this measure, 
we follow prior literature and rely on Tobin's Q as our main measure of firm value.57 Tobin’s 
Q is computed as the market value of assets divided by book value of total assets, where the 
market value of assets is book value of assets plus the market value of common stock less the 
sum of book value of common stock. We winsorize58
                                                 
56 For computational details on our relative CGI score, see 
 Tobin’s Q by extreme percentiles to 
control for outliers (e.g., Brown and Caylor, 2006/2009), and use it in log form (e.g., Bebchuk 
Appendix 3 - 1.    
57 For example, Daines et al. (2010, p. 451) note that “Tobin’s Q, typically measured using some variant of the 
market-to-book ratio, is commonly used as an indicator of firm value in accounting and finance research.” 
Although they state some concerns about the practicability of such ratios to comprehensively measure firm 
value, they also examine Tobin’s Q due to “its continued popularity in academic corporate finance research”.  
58 Values less (greater) than the 1th (99th) percentile are set equal to the value of the 1th (99th) percentile. 







For our control variables, we follow prior literature and use (1) (the natural logarithm 
of) book value of total assets to measure size (e.g., Gompers et al., 2003; Brown and Caylor, 
2006; Drobetz et al., 2004), (2) three-year’s average growth in net sales to control for growth 
(e.g., Aggarwal et al., 2009; Beiner et al., 2006; Renders et al., 2010), (3) total debt to total 
assets to control for leverage (e.g., Aggarwal et al., 2009; Bebchuk et al., 2009; Drobetz et al., 
2004), (4) number of shares in free float divided by total shares outstanding to control for 
ownership (e.g., Aggarwal et al., 2009; Renders et al., 2010; Ammann et al., 2011), (5) ratio 
of property, plant & equipment (PPE) divided by total assets to control for capital-intensity 
(e.g., Aggarwal et al., 2009; Renders et al., 2010; Klapper and Love, 2004), and finally (6) 
membership in the FTSE100 or DAX index for UK and German firms, respectively, to 
identify blue chip firms (e.g., Gompers et al., 2003; Drobetz et al., 2004). In the robustness 
section we show that our results are unaffected by the inclusion of additional (frequently 
used) control variables and by applying stepwise regression technique to statistically select 
the set of control variables. Data for our firm value measure as well as our control variables is 




3.5.1 Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 - 4 reports descriptive statistics for all test and control variables used in our analyses 
for the three samples we use in our respective analyses, the full sample comprised of both UK 
and German firms, the UK firms sample, and the German firms sample. The full sample 
includes 1,677 UK firm-year (UK sample) and 409 German firm-year observations (German 
sample) over the time period 2003 - 2007. This sample choice reflects coverage of around 
84% of all UK CGQ country scores and of around 92% of all German CGQ country scores, 
and reflects one third (34%) of all non-U.S. CGQ ‘Country Scores’ marketed  by ISS during 
the 2003-2007 period under investigation. Because both the CGQ and the CGI rating 
represent relative measures of governance quality, we do not expect and do not find 
substantial differences in the distribution characteristics of the ratings between the UK and 
                                                 
59 The log form of Tobin’s Q is frequently used in the literature to proxy firm value (e.g., Daines, 2001; Bebchuk 
et al., 2009). We use the log form of Tobin’s Q as well to statistically correct for a highly left-skewed 
distribution of our firm value proxy. However, as documented in the robustness section, our main results are 
unaffected by both measurement transformations (winsorizing and using logarithms). 






Germany. The control variables, however, reflect the different institutional settings, as we 
document higher Tobin’s Q ratios, higher growth ratios, and higher capital intensity for UK 
firms compared to German firms. 
Table 3 - 4: Descriptive Data 
Panel A. Governance (CGQ & CGI) Variables (values pooled for 2003 to 2007) 
 Sample N Mean Median StD Min Max 
CGQ UK & GER 2086 50.6 50.7 29.07 0 100 
UK 1677 50.6 50.9 29.0 0 100 
GER 409 50.8 50.6 29.4 1.1 100 
CGI UK & GER 2086 44.7 41.2 29.0 0 100 
UK 1677 44.9 41.2 28.7 0 100 
GER 409 44.0 39.0 29.9 0 100 
Panel B. Valuation and Control Variables (values pooled for 2003 to 2007) 
 Sample N Mean Median StD Min Max 
Tobin's Q UK & GER 2086 1.77 1.42 1.19 .44 16.14 
UK 1677 1.84 1.50 1.24 .44 16.14 
GER 409 1.47 1.14 .92 .46 7.25 
Total Assets 
(in Billion €) 
UK & GER 2086 27.8 1.34 120 0.003 1,480 
UK 1677 20 1.04 106 0.003 1,480 
GER 409 59.7 5.6 162 0.012 1,120 
Leverage  
(in %) 
UK & GER 2086 23.4 21.7 19.5 0 167 
UK 1677 23.8 22.1 19.9 0 167 
GER 409 21.6 19.3 17.9 0 87.8 
Growth  
(in %) 
UK & GER 2086 13.1 6.8 74.3 -52.9 2,979 
UK 1677 14.4 7.7 81.7 -45.0 2,979 
GER 409 7.6 4.4 28.0 -52.9 319 
Freefloat 
(in %) 
UK & GER 2086 63.1 64 23.0 2 100 
UK 1677 62.8 63 22.2 10 100 




UK & GER 2086 26.8 18.6 25.8 0 99 
UK 1677 28.6 19.7 27.3 0 99 
GER 409 19.7 16.2 16.3 0 72.6 
Index 
Membership 
UK & GER 2086 .247 0 .431 0 1 
UK 1677 .224 0 .417 0 1 
GER 409 .344 0 .475 0 1 
Panel C. Exclusion Restrictions (values pooled for 2003 to 2007) 




UK & GER 2086 1.04 0 2.75 0 71 
UK 1677 1.26 0 2.97 0 71 
GER 409 0.15 0 1.32 0 13 
DPS UK & GER 2075 .325 .097 1.65 0 41.5 
UK 1667 .209 .082 1.57 0 41.5 
GER 408 .799 .500 1.89 0 34.8 
Notes: The table presents the descriptive statistics of all variables used in this study. CGQ stands for ISS’s 
Corporate Governance Quotient; CGI is our naïve corporate governance rating based on the CGQ raw dataset; 
Tobin’s Q is a measure of firm value; total assets is measured in EUR billion; leverage is total debt to total 
assets; growth is 3 years average growth in net sales; free float is number of shares as free float to total shares 
outstanding; capital-intensity is PPE to total assets; index membership indicates blue chip firms based on 
FTSE100 for UK firms and DAX30 for GER firms; pension funds holding is shares held by pension funds to 
total shares outstanding; DPS are dividend per share. 
 
 






Table 3 - 5: Correlation Matrix 
Panel A. Correlations between Governance Ratings and Valuation / Control Variables: UK & GER 
N=2086  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
CGQ 1 1         
CGI 2 0.78*** 1        
Tobin’s Q 3 0.03 0.06*** 1       
Size 4 0.28*** 0.28*** -0.42*** 1      
Leverage 5 0.14*** 0.14*** -0.20*** 0.35*** 1     
Growth 6 -0.07*** -0.03 0.14*** -0.08*** -0.08*** 1    
Freefloat 7 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.03 0.14*** 0.06*** 0.03 1   
Capital-Int. 8 0.09*** 0.09*** -0.04* 0.02 0.30*** -0.11*** -0.05** 1  
Index Memb. 9 0.18*** 0.18*** -0.09*** 0.58*** 0.10*** -0.01 0.14*** 0.07*** 1 
Panel B. Correlations between Governance Ratings and Valuation / Control Variables: UK 
N=1677  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
CGQ 1 1         
CGI 2 0.79*** 1        
Tobin’s Q 3 0.03 0.04 1       
Size 4 0.28*** 0.35*** -0.39*** 1      
Leverage 5 0.14*** 0.16*** -0.17*** 0.37*** 1     
Growth 6 -0.10*** -0.05** 0.09*** -0.03 -0.08*** 1    
Freefloat 7 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.09*** 0.13*** 0.04 0.05** 1   
Capital-Int. 8 0.08*** 0.09*** -0.07*** 0.05** 0.33*** -0.13*** -0.07*** 1  
Index Memb. 9 0.14*** 0.18*** -0.04* 0.57*** 0.09*** 0.04 0.08*** 0.06*** 1 
Panel C. Correlations between Governance Ratings and Valuation / Control Variables: GER 
N=409  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
CGQ 1 1         
CGI 2 0.75*** 1        
Tobin’s Q 3 0.03 0.11** 1       
Size 4 0.29*** 0.12*** -0.37*** 1      
Leverage 5 0.15*** 0.07 -0.41*** 0.46*** 1     
Growth 6 0.03 0.06 0.17*** -0.15*** -0.09* 1    
Freefloat 7 0.16*** 0.15*** -0.11** 0.17*** 0.15*** -0.03 1   
Capital-Int. 8 0.15*** 0.07 -0.04 -0.03 0.15*** -0.08 0.06 1  
Index Memb. 9 0.32*** 0.18*** -0.11** 0.60*** 0.17*** -0.10** 0.34*** 0.18*** 1 
Panel D. Correlations between CGQ and CGI Ratings per Year 
  Sample CGI '03 CGI '04 CGI '05 CGI '06 CGI '07 CGI '03-'07 
CGQ  UK & GER 0.77*** 0.82*** 0.82*** 0.76*** 0.75*** 0.78*** 
  UK 0.77*** 0.79*** 0.84*** 0.76*** 0.77*** 0.79*** 
  GER 0.76*** 0.89*** 0.72*** 0.71*** 0.66*** 0.75*** 
Panel E. Time-Series Correlations between two consecutive Ratings 
  Sample 2003/2004 2004/2005 2005/2006 2006/2007   
CGQ  UK & GER 0.37*** 0.42*** 0.57*** 0.47***   
  UK 0.40*** 0.49*** 0.58*** 0.46***   
  GER 0.29*** 0.30*** 0.47*** 0.49***   
CGI  UK & GER 0.39*** 0.37*** 0.59*** 0.54***   
  UK 0.49*** 0.43*** 0.60*** 0.56***   
  GER 0.23** 0.29** 0.57*** 0.46***   
Notes: This table reports non-parametric Spearman correlation coefficients. CGQ stands for ISS’s Corporate 
Governance Quotient; CGI is our naïve corporate governance rating based on the CGQ raw dataset; Tobin's Q is 
a measure of firm value (Q is winsorized at 1% level and is used in log form); total assets is measured in EUR 
billion (used in log form); leverage is total debt to total assets; growth is 3 years average growth in net sales; free 
float is number of shares as free float to total shares outstanding; capital-intensity is PPE to total assets; index 
membership indicates blue chip firms based on FTSE100 for UK firms and DAX30 for GER firms. The 
underlying samples is as indicated. *** (**) (*) indicates significance at 1% (5%) (10%), two-tailed level. 






For each of our three samples, panels A, B, and C of Table 3 - 5 respectively report 
Spearman correlations between the governance ratings, the main test variable (firm value), 
and the control variables. While no significant correlation between the CGQ rating and our 
measure of firm value can be observed, the CGI rating, in contrast, is significantly positively 
correlated with Tobin’s Q for the full sample and for the German sample. Also, most 
correlations between both governance ratings and the control variables are significant. . Panel 
D of Table 3 - 5 reports correlations between the CGQ rating and our naïve CGI rating over 
time, which range from 0.75 to 0.82 for the full sample. The variation of this correlation over 
time suggests that ISS most likely adjusts its CGQ rating methodology and weighting 
periodically. 
Panel E of Table 3 - 5 reports time-series correlations for both governance ratings 
across the respective samples. For our five years observation period, these correlations range 
from 0.40 to 0.58 (from 0.29 to 0.49) for the CGQ rating, and from 0.43 to 0.60 (from 0.23 to 
0.57) for the naïve CGI rating in the UK sample (German sample). This suggests a substantial 
degree of variation of governance quality over time, which is particularly pronounced for the 
German sample and stands in contrast to the maintained assumption in prior work that firm-
level governance characteristics are sticky (e.g., Brown et al., 2011; Bauer et al., 2004, 2008). 
For instance, Daines et al. (2010) report a relatively high time-series correlation of 0.85 
between two consecutive CGQ ratings in 2005 and 2006 for the U.S. One explanation for the 
low time-series correlation of both governance ratings is the increasing soft law and hard low 
regulation of governance practices, in particular in Germany. During our sample period, 
various legislative acts were passed in Germany (for an overview, see, e.g., Hopt, 2011; 
Cromme, 2005). A second, related explanation is that these developments were paralleled by 
increased disclosure of governance-related information, thus providing an improved 
informational basis for firms such as ISS. For example, since 2006 only, German listed firms 
have been mandated to report executive compensation individually for each member of the 
management board (Hitz and Werner, 2012). 
 
3.5.2 Regression Results 
Table 3 - 6 (Panel A and B) presents the results of estimating our two basic regression models 
for the three samples under investigation. The signs and significance levels for the control 
variables are broadly in line with prior findings (e.g., Brown and Caylor, 2006). The 






explanatory power of the regression models is also comparable to prior governance studies, 
with adjusted R²s ranging from 0.3162 to 0.3773 (e.g., Drobetz et al., 2004). As predicted, the 
coefficient estimate of the commercial CGQ rating obtains a positive sign but turns out 
significant only for the full sample and the UK sample (Model 1, Panel A, and Model 1 and 4, 
Panel B; Table 3 - 6). Therefore, we find evidence in support of our first prediction that 
governance quality, as reflected in the commercial CGQ rating, is positively associated with 
firm value, at least for the UK.  
The regression models based on the decomposed commercial rating yield positive and 
significant coefficients only for the naïve CGI rating, but not for the TECHNOLOGY variable 
(Model 3, Panel A, and Model 3 and 6, Panel B; Table 3 - 6). The coefficients for the naïve 
CGI rating are positive and significant for all three samples (at the 1 % and 5% level), 
whereas the coefficients of TECHNOLOGY obtain the predicted significant positive 
coefficient in none of different specifications. Other than expected, the rating agency’s  
proprietary technology (TECHNOLOGY), reflecting its weighting skill methodology and its 
access to private information does not appear to provide incremental positive explanatory 
power for firm value beyond the raw publicly available data captured by the naïve CGI rating. 
We therefore find no evidence in support of our second prediction. 
Finally, we find no evidence in support of our third prediction that the CGQ rating is 
comparatively more suited for capturing governance quality for the UK with its shareholder 
model of corporate governance. Panel A of Table 3 - 6 (Model 5 and 6) reports results from 
rerunning the initial regression for the full sample, augmented by interactions of the 
governance variables CGI and TECHNOLOGY with an indicator variable for UK firms. 
Although both interaction terms based on TECHNOLOGY and UK firms obtain positive 
signs, none of them is statistically (and economically) significant at conventional levels. This 
suggests that irrespective of the institutional background, CGQ ratings do not provide 
incremental power for explaining firm value. This in turn indicates that our findings that 
refute our second prediction cannot be attributed to a ‘one-size-fits-all’ applied by ISS in 
assessing governance quality.60
                                                 
60 Regressions of the CGQ (CGI) on an all six CGQ subcategories reveal that (i) board and audit (compensation) 
characteristics play a more (a less) important role in the UK CGQ compared to the German CGQ rating. 
Moreover, (ii) progressive practice and ownership characteristics play a less important role in the CGQ rating 
compared to our naïve CGI rating in both country settings (
 Rather, these results hint at a systematic deficiency of the 
rating process in capturing value-relevant information. 
Appendix 3 - 8). 






Table 3 - 6: Regression Results – Basic Model 
Panel A. Basic model for a combined UK & GER sample 
Independent Variables Pred. Sign 
Firm Value Measure: Tobin’s Q (dependent variable) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Intercept  2.2525*** 2.2973*** 2.2948*** 2.3009*** 2.2939*** 2.3000*** 
  (7.98) (8.14) (8.12) (8.00) (8.12) (8.00) 
CGQ + .0012***      
  (3.08)      
CGI +  .0016*** .0016*** .0015* .0016*** .0015* 
   (4.27) (4.26) (1.88) (4.27) (1.88) 
TECHNOLOGY +   -.0001 -.0001 -.0002 -.0002 
   (-0.16) (-0.16) (-0.16) (-0.15) 
UK×CGI +    .0001  .0001 
     (0.13)  (0.13) 
UK×TECHNOLOGY +     .0001 .0001 
      (0.08) (0.08) 
UK  .1023** .0986** .0988** .0930 .0988** .0931 
  (2.38) (2.30) (2.31) (1.51) (2.32) (1.51) 
SIZE  -.0992*** -.1016*** -.1015*** -.1016*** -.1015*** -.1016*** 
  (-7.74) (-7.95) (-7.92) (-7.90) (-7.92) (-7.90) 
LEVERAGE  .0975 .0984 .0986 .0986 .0987 .0986 
  (1.11) (1.12) (1.12) (1.12) (1.12) (1.12) 
GROWTH  .0156 .0154 .0154 .0155 .0154 .0155 
  (1.46) (1.49) (1.49) (1.50) (1.49) (1.50) 
FREEFLOAT  -.0003 -.0004 -.0004 -.0004 -.0004 -.0004 
  (-0.44) (-0.56) (-0.56) (-0.56) (-0.56) (-0.56) 
CAPITAL_INTENSITY -.3218*** -.3254*** -.3255*** -.3255*** -.3255*** -.3255*** 
  (-6.01) (-6.12) (-6.12) (-6.12) (-6.11) (-6.11) 
INDEX_MEMBER  .2628*** .2638*** .2637*** .2640*** .2639*** .2641*** 
  (5.65) (5.68) (5.68) (5.70) (5.68) (5.69) 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered (firm)  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R²  0.3162 0.3207 0.3204 0.3201 0.3201 0.3197 
Sample Size  2086 2086 2086 2086 2086 2086 
Panel B. Basic model separately for a UK & GER sample 
Independent Variables Pred. Sign 
Firm Value Measure: Tobin’s Q (dependent variable) 
UK Sample (M1-M3) GER Sample (M4-M6) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Intercept  2.7872*** 2.8682*** 2.8666*** .4911 .5025 .4761 
  (9.07) (9.34) (9.33) (1.13) (1.18) (1.10) 
CGQ + .0013***   .0009   
  (2.97)   (1.41)   
CGI +  .0019*** .0019***  .0015** .0015** 
   (4.20) (4.19)  (2.35) (2.30) 
TECHNOLOGY +   -.0001   -.0006 
   (-0.17)   (-0.69) 
SIZE  -.1247*** -.1291*** -.1290*** -.0186 -.0197 -.0186 
  (-8.31) (-8.59) (-8.58) (-0.95) (-1.03) (-0.97) 
LEVERAGE  .1925** .1913** .1914** -.5266*** -.5156*** -.5119*** 
  (2.03) (2.02) (2.02) (-2.77) (-2.76) (-2.75) 
GROWTH  .0104 .0102 .0102 .1824* .1750* .1800* 
  (1.22) (1.25) (1.25) (1.91) (1.87) (1.90) 
FREEFLOAT  .0020* .0018* .0018* -.0024** -.0025** -.0025** 
  (1.86) (1.75) (1.75) (-2.27) (-2.37) (-2.37) 
CAPITAL_INTENSITY -.3125*** -.3154*** -.3155*** -.3205* -.3304* -.3322* 
  (-5.55) (-5.64) (-5.64) (-1.71) (-1.81) (-1.82) 
INDEX_MEMBER  .3192*** .3203*** .3201*** .0719 .0740 .0783 
  (6.24) (6.28) (6.28) (0.79) (0.81) (0.86) 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered (firm)  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R²  0.3180 0.3235 0.3231 0.3699 0.3773 0.3765 
Sample Size  1677 1677 1677 409 409 409 
Notes: The underlying regression models are: Qit = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐺𝑄it + ∑𝛾CONTROLit + ∑𝛿𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 +∑𝜑𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡+ 𝜀, 
and Qit = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐺𝐼it + 𝛽2𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻𝑁𝑂𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑌it +∑𝛾CONTROLit + ∑𝛿𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 +∑𝜑𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡+ 𝜀, where 𝛼 represents 
the constant term, 𝛽1,𝛽2, 𝛾, 𝛿, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜑 are the coefficients of the explanatory variables, 𝜀 is the error term. The 
sample contains both UK and GER firms. Q stands for the valuation measure Tobin’s Q (Q is winsorized at 1% 






level and is used in log form), CGQ / CGI stands for the employed governance rating, and CONTROL is a set of 
control variables (Size is log of total assets, Leverage is total debt to total assets, Growth is 3 years average 
growth in net sales, free float is number of shares as free float to total shares outstanding, Capital-Intensity is 
PPE to total assets, Index Membership indicates blue chip firms based on FTSE100 for UK firms and DAX30 
for GER firms, UK dummy indicates UK firms). TECHNOLOGY as the residuals from cross sectional OLS 
regressions with the following format: CGQi = α + βCGIi + ε represents the incremental usefulness of the CGQ 
(through superior weighting technology and / or private information) relative to our naïve CGI rating. UK×CGI 
and UK×TECHNOLOGY are interaction terms between the UK dummy variable and the CGI score, as well as 
the UK dummy variable and the TECHNOLOGY score, respectively. The regression models contain year- and 
industry-fixed effects (based on first-digit SIC industry codes), and have standard errors which are 
heteroskedasticity robust (White, 1980) and one-way clustered at firm level (Gow et al., 2010; Petersen, 2009). 
Reported values: coefficient (t-stat). *** (**) (*) indicates significance at 1% (5%) (10%), two-tailed level. 
 
3.5.3 Discussion 
Commercial governance ratings and firm value 
Consistent with our first prediction, our results document that high (commercial) CG ratings 
on average imply higher corporate valuations. This is consistent with recent findings for 
Europe (e.g., Renders et al., 2010) and for the U.S. (Spellman and Watson, 2009). However, 
as outlined in section 3.2.2, some prior studies for Europe (Bauer et al., 2004) and the U.S. 
(e.g., Daines et al., 2010) present mixed or even insignificant results on this relationship. 
One explanation for these mixed results rests on the comparatively higher compliance 
rates for U.S. as opposed to UK and German firms with respect to the underlying governance 
criteria. Renders et al. (2010) note that stricter governance regulation increases compliance 
levels for all sample firms, and mechanically reduces sample variation for governance quality. 
Because our descriptive analysis reveals a rather low compliance rate of 30.9% (23%) in 2003 
for the UK sample (German sample), we can rule out that such an effect affects our regression 
results. In addition, stickiness of firm-level governance ratings, especially in panel data 
settings, weakens the robustness of the U.S. findings, because again, variation in the 
explanatory variable is lost, and with it, statistical power (Brown et al., 2011). Our findings, 
however, are not subject to this concern, given the low serial correlation of our governance 
ratings across both samples, documented in Panel E of Table 3 - 5.  
Another potential explanation for the contrasting results of prior studies is the respective 
time frame chosen. The three most recent U.S. studies, for example, which find mixed or even 
insignificant results (Epps and Cereola, 2008; Daines et al., 2010; Ertugrul and Hegde, 2009), 
examine commercially available CG ratings for different time frames between 2002 and 2006, 
a period of rising stock markets. Mitton (2002) provides empirical evidence that governance 
quality may play a stronger role for investment decisions of investors in times of economic 






downturn, because investors are inclined to ignore weaknesses in the governance structure of 
firms during times of prosperity. Our results do not support the notion of such an asymmetry 
in the underlying governance-valuation relationship, as we find positive associations for a 
period of on average rising stock markets, 2003 to 2007.61
 
 
Incremental usefulness of commercial rating technology 
With respect to our second prediction, our results shed light on the question whether or how 
commercially available CG ratings are potentially valuable for investors. Despite the overall 
positive relationship between the commercial CG rating and firm valuation, our findings 
suggest that in our setting, rating vendors do not create incremental value in the process of 
weighting and constructing their ratings and/or due to the vendor's access to non-public 
information. In all specifications of our analyses, the CGQ rating was not able to provide 
additional explanatory power relative to our naïve CGI rating as the coefficient estimate on 
TECHNOLOGY remained insignificant. Consistent with this, over all specifications, our 
naïve rating outperforms the commercial rating in terms of statistical significance. Thus, 
contrary to our second prediction, our naïve CGI rating, which is based on the same publicly 
available governance data as the CGQ rating, does not appear to be less accurate in picturing 
the governance structure of firms. Our results are robust, as our research design uses each 
firm as its own control and therefore controls for sample characteristics like the exceptional 
time frame, sample composition, or data quality. Moreover, and contrary to our third 
prediction, the fact that our findings hold for both the UK and the German sample leads us to 
rule out the possibility that our results are driven by a shareholder-based approach to 
governance quality adopted by the rating agency.  
Given the economic role of commercial governance ratings outlined in section 3.3.2, 
our findings lend themselves to at least three, non-exclusive explanations. First, assuming that 
the existence of rating agencies signifies their economic importance, our finding that no 
incremental value is created in the process of constructing and incrementally enhancing the 
rating suggests that the agency’s main competitive advantage may rather lie in its activities of 
                                                 
61 However, we cannot ultimately rule out such an effect. We re-run our analyses with a restricted sample that 
excludes all firm observations for the year 2003, which witnessed the most vigorous stock market surge, and find 
similar results. However, the significance levels for the CGQ and the CGI rating improve considerably, as 
coefficients now show t-values around 3 (in case of CGQ) and around 4 (in case of CGI) in the models across all 
three different sample compositions. 






efficiently collecting publicly available information on firms’ governance characteristics. 
Accordingly, the value created by rating agencies would be reflected by their competitive cost 
advantage in identifying and collecting information from financial reports and other publicly 
available sources. This would result in transaction cost savings for institutions that purchase 
the rating vendors’ products. Such an explanation receives support from interviews with 
institutional investors that Daines et al. (2010) report. Their interpretation with respect to the 
question why investors buy commercial CG ratings is that “purchasing the ratings is a cost-
effective way to obtain the underlying data.” (Daines et al., 2010, p. 461, footnote 34). 
 Our second explanation, in contrast, defies the economic vindication of governance 
ratings as commercial products, as they do not create value for investors. This would be a 
rather troublesome result, questioning both investor rationality as well as the expertise of 
rating agencies. Therefore, a third explanation is that our economic model does not fully 
capture the potential usefulness of investor ratings. For instance, investors may not only use 
the rating for purposes of firm valuation, but also in their proxy voting activities. Also, these 
ratings may play a role in investment managers’ vindication of their investment decisions, or 
may even be required for that purpose as they are deemed to reflect objective outside 
expertise. In any event, our findings suggest that these other potential factors deserve 
increased attention. 
Finally, we need to caution that our findings are subject to several limitations, which are 
inherent in our dataset. For instance, the results we document using the CGQ rating do not 
necessarily translate to other commercially available CG ratings. The findings of Daines et al. 
(2010) emphasize this point, as they reveal relatively low correlations among three 
commercial CG ratings (GMI, CGQ, TCL ratings) for the U.S. market. It may well be that 
different players in that market create value in different ways. Put differently, while ISS may 
mainly create value through its process of information gathering, other firms may be more 
adept at aggregating and weighting publicly available information, or infusing private 
knowledge into the ratings. Concerns relating to the statistical robustness of our results are 
addressed in the following sections, where we re-run our analyses by controlling 
simultaneously for endogeneity as well as sample selection and assess the robustness of our 
main regression findings in more detail. 
 






3.5.4 Endogeneity and Sample Selectivity 
Prior literature emphasizes the need to control for endogeneity of firm level governance 
quality (e.g., Bhagat and Bolton, 2008). In addition, in European or German settings with on 
average smaller samples compared to U.S. studies, the results are potentially prone to sample 
selectivity (e.g., Boersch-Supan and Koeke, 2002). To address both problems, we follow 
Renders et al. (2010), who apply a three-stage model that controls simultaneously for sample 
selectivity and endogeneity (Mroz, 1987). The first level of the model (Heckman regression) 
addresses the sample selection bias. The selection regression models the rating vendors’ 
selection process and adjusts the third-stage and the IV regression for the selection effect, 
including the inverse Mills ratio. We use pension funds holding and dividend per shares as 
exclusion restrictions of the selection model.62 The second level of the model (IV regression) 
controls for endogeneity by regressing the endogenous governance variable on the instrument 
variable (IV) and on all control variables (including the inverse Mills ratio). This yields 
predicted variables for the governance variables, which replace the original endogenous ones 
in the third-stage regression. Following prior literature, we use one-year lagged governance 
ratings (Renders et al., 2010) and industry-median governance ratings (Aggarwal et al., 2009; 
Jiraporn et al., 2011/2012) as our instruments.63
                                                 
62 Although the choice of exclusion restrictions is crucial for the validity of selection, Lennox et al. (2010, p. 
590, 592) note that a “surprising number of studies fail to have any exclusions, and other studies do not report 
the first stage model, making it impossible to determine if they imposed exclusion restrictions.” In the absence of 
prior research providing exclusion restrictions for the selection process of rating vendors, we use pension funds 
holding and dividends per share as our criteria. We conjecture that firms with high dividends and a high degree 
of pension funds holding are more likely covered by ISS. For one reason, institutional investors hire and pay 
governance analysts to provide governance ratings. Nevertheless, from a theoretical perspective, we are not able 
to rule out that our exclusion restrictions are unrelated to both the firm’s governance quality and its valuation. It 
is plausible to assume that governance choices might affect shareholders’ investment behavior and that dividends 
might reflect value relevant cash flow streams. Auxiliary regressions (Tobin’s Q / governance quality on both 
instruments and additional controls), however, support the choice of our exclusion restrictions. They suggest that 
dividends and pension funds holdings are uncorrelated to firm value and governance choices. In addition, 
splitting the three-stage model (Heckman and IV regressions separately, see 
 Finally, the third-stage regression includes 
Appendix 3 - 2) or following the 
approach proposed by Aggarwal et al. (2009, pp. 3164-3165) and using a probit regression (CGQ selection on 
total asset and number of employees) as an alternative first stage regression do not alter our inferences.      
63 The standard text book solution is to include instruments into the estimation equation. This method is 
appropriate as long as the instrument variables are correlated with the endogenous regressor, but uncorrelated 
with the error term in the estimation model. However, in most empirical setups it is difficult to find appropriate 
instruments (e.g., Larcker and Rusticus, 2010). In the absence of a ‘perfect’ instrument, we use two different 
instruments which are motivated by prior literature: one-year lagged governance ratings (e.g., Renders et al., 
2010) as well as industry-median governance ratings (e.g., Jiraporn et al., 2011). The former instrument is a so-
called semi-endogenous instrument correlating with both the endogenous variable and the error term. As our 
semi-endogenous instrument meets both criteria proposed by Larcker and Rusticus (2010, p. 191), i.e., (i) a 
reasonably high correlation with the endogenous variable (Table 3 - 7) and (ii) a potentially lower degree of 
endogeneity as the original endogenous variable, the corresponding 2SLS regression is preferable to OLS. In 
contrast to lagged governance ratings, the industry-median governance ratings are a so-called weak instrument. It 
is most likely exogenous (uncorrelated to the error term) but only weakly correlated with the endogenous 






the inverse Mills ratio from the selection regression and the predicted governance rating from 
the IV regression as additional explanatory variables. 
Table 3 - 7: First Stages (Selection) & Second Stages (Endogeneity) 
Variables 
First Stages (M1-M2) Second Stages (M3-M6)64 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Probit(CGQUK) Probit(CGQGER) CGQUK CGIUK CGQGER CGIGER 
Intercept -17.20*** -12.50*** 11.132 -15.10 -56.37 -124.84** 
(-16.35) (-8.35) (0.59) (-0.78) (-1.04) (-2.35) 
SIZE .7791*** .5591*** -.0593 1.0903 3.1437 5.6102*** 
(14.54) (8.42) (-0.07) (1.28) (1.47) (2.62) 
LEVERAGE -.4373* -.9184** 3.296 -.0595 8.3485 -3.0949 
(-1.83) (-2.43) (0.95) (-0.02) (0.81) (-0.30) 
GROWTH -.0414 -.1890** -.3077 -.1353 8.1470*** 5.3146* 
(-1.18) (-2.11) (-1.29) (-0.29) (2.81) (1.74) 
FREEFLOAT .0040** .0056** .1476*** .1478*** -.02052 .0276 
(2.07) (2.57) (3.15) (3.33) (-0.33) (0.44) 
CAPITAL_ 
INTENSITY 
-.2344* -1.1941** 1.6197 1.5858 6.4305 3.8395 
(-1.65) (-2.29) (0.59) (0.61) (0.65) (0.31) 
INDEX_ 
MEMBER 
-.2815 1.3498** .7708 -.1325 6.2110 1.3690 
(-1.23) (2.00) (0.34) (-0.06) (1.24) (0.29) 
TECHNOLOGY    -.1124***  -.1866** 
   (-3.18)  (-2.50) 
Pension Funds  .0249** .0918***     
  (2.34) (3.07)     
DPS .0261** -.0757**     
  (2.56) (-2.06)     
Inverse Mills 
Ratio 
  -8.5504*** -6.1881** -2.8128 2.1272 
  (-3.36) (-2.47) (-0.51) (0.39) 
Lag_CGQ   .3978***  .1952***  
  (12.85)  (4.00)  
Ind-Median_CGQ   .3345***  .5729***  
  (4.87)  (4.32)  
Lag_CGI    .4335***  .2485*** 
   (14.95)  (4.39) 
Ind-Median_CGI    .3029***  .6713*** 
   (4.34)  (5.35) 
Year fe  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fe  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster (firm)  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R²  .5691 .5204     
Centered R²    .3217 . 3719 .3394 . 2957 
Sample Size  5919 2858 1182 1182 314 314 
F-Test  - - 38.26 45.43 16.76 13.64 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test (10% = 19.93 / 15% = 11.59)    
• Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic  130.78 140.32 26.77 45.44 
Sargan-Hansen test (p-value) 0.2571 0.1000 0.7357 0.7282 
Notes: The underlying regression model for the selection process is: Probit(Sample)it = 𝛼 +∑𝛽CONTROLit + 
∑𝛾EXCLUit +∑𝛿𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡+∑𝜑𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡  + 𝜀, where 𝛼 represents the constant term, 𝛽, 𝛾, 𝛿, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜑 are the coefficients 
                                                                                                                                                        
variable (e.g., Renders et al., 2010, p. 92; Jiraporn et al., 2011, p. 266). Nevertheless, the choice of both 
instruments is supported by F-stats of the IV regressions, the Stock and Yogo (2005) test statistic for weak 
instruments, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity, and the Hansen’s J statistic for over-identification 
(see Table 3 - 8). 
64 With respect to all specifications of the Third-Stage regressions provided in Table 3 - 8, we report - for the 
sake of brevity - only four second stage regressions in Table 3 - 7. 






of the explanatory variables, 𝜀 is the error term. The selected sample consists of all UK and/or GER firms which 
received a governance rating by ISS (sample of the study). The UK and / or GER Worldscope Universe serves as 
the basic population for the selection process. Thus, the Probit(Sample) variable is one if the company received a 
rating score or zero otherwise. CONTROL is a set of control variables (size is log of total assets, leverage is total 
debt to total assets, growth is 3 years average growth in net sales, free float is number of shares as free float to 
total shares outstanding, capital-intensity is PPE to total assets, index membership indicates blue chip firms 
based on FTSE100 for UK firms and DAX30 for GER firms). EXCLU is a set of exclusion restrictions (Pension 
Funds is shares held by pension funds to total shares outstanding; DPS as dividend per share). The underlying 
regression model for the IV regression is: GOVit = 𝛼 +𝛽IVit + ∑𝛾CONTROLit + 
𝛿𝑀𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑖𝑡+∑𝜑𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡+∑𝜔𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀, where 𝛼 represents the constant term, 𝛽, 𝛾, 𝛿,𝜑, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜔 are the 
coefficients of the explanatory variables, 𝜀 is the error term. GOV is the employed governance rating (either 
CGQ or CGI). IV is either one-year lag of CGQ and industry-median CGQ or one-year lag of CGI and industry-
median CGI as the instrument variables. The IV choice is supported by fairly high Stock and Yogo (2005) test 
statistics and the F-test of the reduced form regression. MILLS is the inverse mills ratio from the selection 
regression. The regression models contain year- and industry-fixed effects (based on first-digit SIC industry 
codes), and have standard errors which are heteroskedasticity robust (White, 1980) and one-way clustered at firm 
level (Gow et al., 2010; Petersen, 2009). Stock-Yogo test based on the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 
(instead of Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic due to clustered standard errors; see Baum et al., 2007) rejects the null 
hypothesis of weak instruments for both ratings in both country samples. The Sargan-Hansen test statistic 
(respectively the Hansen’s J statistic due to clustered se) is an over-identification test of all instruments (p-values 
reported). Test Reported values: coefficient (t-statistics). *** (**) (*) indicates significance at 1% (5%) (10%), 
two-tailed level. 
 
Table 3 - 7 reports the results of the first (selection) and the second (endogeneity) stages 
of the three-stage model separately for the UK and German sample. Compared to Renders et 
al. (2010), who report a pseudo R² of 75 %, the pseudo R² for our first stages reveal that our 
selection equation models the selection process on a rather moderate level, with a pseudo R² 
ranging between 52 and 57 %. This possibly indicates that our sample is already diversified to 
some extent. Nevertheless, we observe that firms with higher total assets, lower leverage, 
higher free float, lower capital-intensity, higher dividend per shares, and higher pension funds 
holdings are more likely to be included into our final samples. The IV regressions model the 
endogeneity problem. Our instrument variables are highly significant for all four models. The 
F-test statistics across the models are fairly high (in all cases above the threshold of 10) and 
the instrument variables pass the Stock and Yogo (2005) test for weak instruments (at a 10% 
level) and the Sargan-Hansen test for over-identification. This suggests that the instruments 
are effective. 
Table 3 - 8 reports the results of the third stage regressions across the three different 
sample compositions. The signs and the significance levels of our control variables do not 
differ qualitatively from the basic OLS models. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) augmented 
regression test suggested by Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) reveals that both governance 






ratings are endogenous across the three samples.65
Table 3 - 8
 Our variable capturing the value generated 
through the rating process (TECHNOLOGY), however, appears to be exogenous. 
Complementing the DWH test, the significant coefficients of the inverse Mills ratio (Mills) in 
the combined sample and the UK sample ( , Panels A and B) indicate that the 
respective OLS regressions possibly suffer from a sample selection bias.  





Firm Value Measure: Tobin's Q (dependent variable) 
UK & GER Sample (M1-M3) UK Sample (M4-M6) GER Sample (M7-M9) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Intercept  1.398*** 1.502*** 1.429*** 1.258*** 1.368*** 1.295*** 1.210* 1.451* 1.345* 
  (3.18) (3.33) (3.23) (3.04) (3.26) (3.13) (1.66) (1.78) (1.69) 
CGQpred + .003***   .003***   .005***   
  (3.27)   (2.68)   (2.73)   
CGIpred +  .004***   .004***   .006***  
   (4.24)   (3.88)   (3.67)  
RSpred +   .002   .001   -.000 
    (0.95)   (0.61)   (-0.07) 
CGI +   .002***   .002***   .003*** 
    (5.15)   (4.20)   (3.90) 
RS +  .001   .001   .001  
   (1.19)   (0.80)   (1.09)  
UK  .192*** .185*** .194***       
  (2.94) (2.80) (2.95)       
SIZE  -.067*** -.072*** -.065*** -.061*** -.068*** -.060*** -.046 -.056* -.045 
  (-4.05) (-4.28) (-4.03) (-3.60) (-3.97) (-3.63) (-1.53) (-1.69) (-1.39) 
LEVERAGE  .098 .101 .102 .226** .222** .227** -.584*** -.511*** -.519** 
  (1.04) (1.06) (1.09) (2.34) (2.28) (2.34) (-3.00) (-2.78) (-2.59) 
GROWTH  .007 .007 .007 -.003 -.003 -.003 .167 .152 .215* 
  (0.78) (0.78) (0.77) (-0.39) (-0.42) (-0.46) (1.34) (1.34) (1.78) 
FREEFLOAT  -.000 -.001 -.000 .002* .002 .002* -.003*** -.004*** -.003*** 
  (-0.44) (-0.67) (-0.32) (1.71) (1.38) (1.82) (-3.12) (-3.18) (-3.06) 
CAPITAL_ 
INTENSITY 
-.317*** -.324*** -.317*** -.321*** -.319*** -.314*** -.318 -.304* -.294 
(-5.78) (-5.93) (-5.81) (-5.57) (-5.68) (-5.61) (-1.58) (-1.70) (-1.53) 
INDEX_ 
MEMBER 
.229*** .233*** .229*** .240*** .242*** .239 .005 .021 .045 
(4.97) (5.07) (5.03) (5.14) (5.21) (5.15) (0.06) (0.26) (0.56) 
INVERSE_ 
MILLS 
.177** .175** .169** .294*** .303*** .289*** -.047 -.070 -.082 
(2.43) (2.40) (2.29) (3.59) (3.67) (3.52) (-0.52) (-0.73) (-0.84) 
Year fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster (firm) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Centered R² .3339 .3340 .3437 .3544 .3508 .3623 .4327 .4188 .4707 
Sample Size 1496 1496 1496 1182 1182 1182 314 314 314 
DWH test (-2.03)** (-2.9)*** (0.35) (-1.81)* (-2.8)*** (0.17) (-1.67)* (-2.8)*** (0.58) 
F test (second stage) 37.17 42.63 9.71 38.26 45.43 9.98 16.76 13.64 9.00 
Kleibergen-Paap F 134.84 171.85 71.26 130.78 140.32 74.19 26.77 45.44 11.24 
Sargan-Hansen test 0.4402 0.1123 0.0962 0.2571 0.1000 0.2149 0.7357 0.7282 0.7157 
Notes: The underlying regression models for the third stage regressions are: Qit = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑it + 𝛽2𝑀𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑆it 
+ ∑𝛾CONTROLit + ∑𝛿𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 +∑𝜑𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡+ 𝜀, Qit = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐺𝐼𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑 it + 𝛽2𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻𝑁𝑂𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑌it + 𝛽3𝑀𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑆it 
+∑𝛾CONTROLit + ∑𝛿𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 +∑𝜑𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡+ 𝜀, and Qit = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐺𝐼it + 𝛽2𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻𝑁𝑂𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑌𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑it + 𝛽3𝑀𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑆it 
+∑𝛾CONTROLit + ∑𝛿𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 +∑𝜑𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡+ 𝜀,, where 𝛼 represents the constant term, 𝛽, 𝛾, 𝛿,𝜑, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜔 are the 
                                                 
65 The Durbin-Wu-Hausman augmented regression test suggested by Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) is 
performed by obtaining the residuals from the model of the endogenous (governance rating) right-hand side 
variable as a function of all exogenous variables, and including these residuals in a regression of the original 
model. If the coefficient of the included residuals is different from zero, the OLS estimates are not consistent due 
to endogeneity of the assumed endogenous (governance rating) variable (De Fraja et al., 2010, pp. 581, 582). 
This test-statistic underlines the necessity of applying the three-stage model because the coefficient estimates of 
the governance ratings in the OLS regressions are likely to be inconsistent (Beiner et al., 2006; Boersch-Supan 
and Koeke, 2002). Drobetz et al. (2004), for example, argue that differences in growth opportunities might be the 
primary source of endogeneity (the need for fresh capital and access to capital markets). This is particularly 
relevant for Tobin’s Q, which is regarded as a measure firm value via the perception of growth opportunities. 






coefficients of the explanatory variables, 𝜀 is the error term. The sample contains both UK and GER firms. Q 
stands for the valuation measure Tobin's Q (Q is winsorized at 1% level and is used in log form), and 
CONTROL is a set of control variables (size is log of total assets, leverage is total debt to total assets, growth is 
3 years average growth in net sales, free float is number of shares as free float to total shares outstanding, 
capital-intensity is PPE to total assets, index membership indicates blue chip firms based on FTSE100 for UK 
firms and DAX30 for GER firms, UK dummy indicates UK firms). GOVpred is the predicted governance 
variable from the second stage regressions (either for CGQ or CGI). MILLS is the inverse mills ratio from the 
first stage regression. TECHNOLOGYpred is the predicted variable TECHNOLOGY, which measures the 
incremental usefulness of the CGQ (through superior weighting technology and/or private information) relative 
to our naïve CGI rating. TECHNOLOGY is based on the residuals from cross sectional OLS regressions with the 
following format: CGQi = α + βCGIi + ε. The regression models contain year- and industry-fixed effects (based 
on first-digit SIC industry codes), and have standard errors which are heteroskedasticity robust (White, 1980) 
and one-way clustered at firm level (Gow et al., 2010; Petersen, 2009). The DWH test reports t-statistics of the 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) augmented regression test suggested by Davidson and MacKinnon (1993). The 
null hypothesis of DWH is that CGQ / CGI / TECHNOLOGY is exogenous. F test provides the F-statistic of the 
second stage regression of our three stage model (which is consistent with the F-stat of the first stage of the 
common 2SLS IV model). For the employed instrument variables (one-year lagged CGQ ratings / CGI scores / 
TECHNOLOGY, and industry-median CGQ ratings / CGI scores / TECHNOLOGY) the Stock-Yogo test 
statistic – based on the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic (instead of Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic due to 
clustered standard errors; see Baum et al., 2007) – tests the null hypothesis of weak instruments (with 
10%=19.93, and 15%=11.59). The Sargan-Hansen test statistic (respectively the Hansen’s J statistic due to 
clustered se) is an over-identification test of all instruments (p-values reported). Reported values: coefficient (z-
statistics). *** (**) (*) indicates significance at 1% (5%) (10%), two-tailed level. 
 
The third stage results show that, after controlling simultaneously for endogeneity and 
sample selectivity, the coefficient on the CGQ rating now takes the predicted positive sign 
and becomes significant across all three different sample compositions (Models 1, 4, 7; Table 
3 - 8). Thus, in line with the OLS results (Table 3 - 6), we now find strong support for our 
first prediction that governance quality, as measured by the commercial rating, is positively 
associated with firm value. With respect to our second prediction, the three-stage results 
corroborate our original OLS findings. The coefficient estimates of the variable 
TECHNOLOGY remain insignificant over all three different sample compositions, whereas 
the naïve CGI score still outperforms the CGQ rating in terms of statistical and economic 
significance (Models 2 - 3, 5 - 6, 8 - 9; Table 3 - 8). 
 
3.5.5 Robustness Tests 
Methodology 
We perform several tests to establish the robustness of our main findings. First, we control 
separately (instead of simultaneously) for endogeneity and sample selection and vary the 
sample size to assess the sensitivity of our methodology choice.  As an alternative to our 
three-stage approach (Table 3 - 8), we split the model and perform separately Two-Stage-
Least-Squares (2SLS) and Heckman (Selection) regressions. Untabulated results of both 






specifications are in line with our original findings.66
To assess whether our results are affected by a specific time frame during our 
observation period (2003-2007), we apply a 'stripping out' procedure (e.g., Goncharov and 
Jacob, 2012). We rerun our basic regression models using samples that each excludes 
observations for one of our sample years. To that end, we run 45 individual regressions based 
on all three different sample specifications with a restricted sample size. Untabulated results 
support the original findings as presented in 
 
Table 3 - 6. Specifically, in all cases the 
coefficient estimates on the variable TECHNOLOGY remain insignificant and the naïve CGI 
score outperforms the CGQ rating in terms of statistical significance. The magnitude of the 
governance coefficient's significance, however, varies over the different time specifications, 
suggesting heterogeneity in the governance-firm value relationship.67
In our original setup, we base our analyses on an unbalanced panel of UK and German 
firms over the years 2003 and 2007. This approach avoids a survivorship bias in our sample 
composition. A balanced panel sample including only firms which received ratings for the 
whole period, from 2003 to 2007, would systematically neglect governance ratings of firms 
which went bankrupt, merged or simply went dark during our sample period. Therefore, we 
rerun our main regressions using balanced panel samples. Because the coverage by ISS 
increases over the years in our sample period – especially in the UK with 179 firms rated by 
ISS in 2003 compared to 415 firms rated by ISS in 2007 – the balanced panel samples are 
much smaller than our original samples.
 
68
Table 3 - 6
 Untabulated results of our main regressions with 
(restricted) balanced panel samples are in line with our findings depicted in .69
  
 
Measurement of firm value 
We use alternative proxies for our firm value measure to assess the sensitivity of our left-hand 
side variable choice. First, we repeat all regressions with an unadjusted (pure) Tobin’s Q. 
Untabulated results of our main regressions (Table 3 - 6) confirm our initial findings.70
Second, we employ two alternative proxies of firm value which are frequently used in 
empirical finance and governance literature: market-to-book ratio of equity (e.g., Drobetz et 
 
                                                 
66 See Appendix 3 - 2. 
67 See Appendix 3 - 3. 
68 Combined UK and GER sample with N = 1,000; UK sample with N = 650; GER sample with N = 350. 
69 See Appendix 3 - 3. 
70 See Appendix 3 - 4. 






al., 2004; Beiner et al., 2006) and market-to-sales ratio (Renders et al., 2010).71 Untabulated 
results support our original findings. Based on the MTB specification, we obtain positive and 
significant coefficients on CGQ and CGI and insignificant coefficients on TECHNOLOGY. 
Based on the MTS specification, we obtain a positive and significant coefficient on CGQ in 
only one out of three possible cases (for the GER sample). The coefficient estimate on CGI, 
however, becomes significant with positive signs in all three cases (combined and separately 
for UK & GER firms), whereas the coefficient estimates on TECHNOLOGY remain either 
insignificant or become significant but with a negative signs.72
 
 
Measurement of the naïve governance rating 
Third, we use alternative coding and weighting methods for the CGI rating to assess the 
sensitivity of our right-hand side CGI variable choice. We repeat our auxiliary regression to 
estimate TECHNOLGY and our main regressions using a) relative CGI ratings which 
measure on a yearly base the firm's governance quality with respect to the firm's compliance 
with the underlying rating criteria, b) governance ratings based on six CGI sub-ratings (board, 
audit, charter, compensation, progressive practice, and director ownership) via Principal 
Component Analysis to proxy our initial CGI rating, and c) governance ratings estimated 
directly on all 47 / 41 ISS CGQ rating criteria via Principal Component Analysis to proxy our 
initial CGI rating. Untabulated results show that in support of our initial findings, all 
corresponding TECHNOLOGY variables remain insignificant. Moreover, each of the three 





To assess the sensitivity of our control variable choice, we use alternative as well as 
additional control variables which are frequently used in the empirical finance literature. 
                                                 
71 Since no consensus exists as to which measure best captures firm performance (Dalton et al., 1998) and prior 
governance literature questions the applicability of accounting-based performance measures in the performance-
governance context (e.g., Bauer et al., 2004), we rely solely on direct measures of firm value. Bauer et al. (2004), 
for example, argue that firms with low governance standards might be prone to earnings management and 
therefore report less conservative earnings. Recent empirical results on the relation between governance quality 
and earnings management support this (e.g., Renders and Vandenbogaerde, 2008). 
72 See Appendix 3 - 4. 
73 See Appendix 3 - 5. 






Moreover, we apply a statistical procedure (stepwise regressions) to select our independent 
variables based on the extended set of control variables. We additionally consider the 
following control variables: (1) R&D expenditures to total assets (e.g., Daines, 2001; 
Bebchuk et al., 2009), (2) current and past return on assets (e.g., Beiner et al., 2006; Bauer et 
al., 2004; Daines, 2001), (3) capital expenditures to total assets (e.g., Aggarwal et al., 2009; 
Bebchuk et al., 2009), (4) cash to total assets (e.g., Aggarwal et al., 2009), (5) firm age (e.g., 
Gompers et al., 2003; Drobetz et al., 2004), (6) risk as the yearly average standard deviation 
based on monthly stock returns (e.g., Beiner et al., 2006), and (7) indicator variables for 
negative earnings (loss) in the preceding fiscal period, for IFRS and US-GAAP accounting 
(e.g., Renders et al., 2010). After testing for multicollinearity, we first extend our main 
regression models (Table 3 - 6) by all above listed control variables and then perform 
stepwise regressions in four different versions (forward selection, forward stepwise, backward 
selection, and backward stepwise regression) to select the independent variables pursuant pre-
specified significance levels for removal (pr = 0.2) and / or for addition (pe = 0.10). 
Untabulated results of the extended main regression models are in line with our original 
findings as we obtain positive and significant coefficients on CGQ and CGI in almost all 





To shed light on the economic significance of our findings, we calculate for our main 
regression models (Table 3 - 6) the valuation effect of a one-percent-change, a one-sigma-
change, and a min-max-change in the governance ratings (Renders et al., 2010). As an 
alternative measure of economic significance, we also compute additional variance explained. 
Untabulated results indicate a substantially higher economic significance of the naïve CGI 
score as opposed to the commercial CGQ rating over all different measures and over all three 
samples. For example, for our full sample, an increase of one sigma in the CGI (CGQ) 
variable results in an average increase of 4.72% (3.39%) in Tobin’s Q. Using additional 
variance explained as an alternative indicator of economic significance yields equivalent 
results. Because we compare both ratings within identical settings, the increase or decrease of 
explained sum of squares to total sum of squares is a valid indicator of economic significance. 
                                                 
74 See Appendix 3 - 6. 






Therefore, we examine whether the adjusted R²s of our firm value regressions increase or 
decrease when using the CGI instead of the CGQ rating. Untabulated results for our basic 
regression models underline the higher economic significance of the CGI score compared to 
the commercial CGQ rating over all three different sample compositions. In particular, our 
naïve CGI score explains 1.43% (1.71%) [2.00%] additional variance in the Tobin’s Q 
specification for the combined sample of UK and German firms (for the sample of UK firms) 




This paper asks whether and how commercial governance ratings are potentially useful to 
investors. We investigate the power of those ratings in explaining firm value, and augment 
prior work by examining in detail the incremental value created by the rating agency’s 
activities of translating public and private information into commercial ratings. To our 
knowledge, this is the first paper to shed light on the incremental usefulness of a governance 
agency’s proprietary technology. Using data provided by ISS for the UK and the German 
market, our analyses indicate that, in line with prior work, commercial ratings are positively 
associated with firm value. However, isolating the incremental contribution of the rating 
agency’s technology, we find no additional explanatory power relative to a naïve rating that 
we construct from the observable, publicly available inputs which ISS uses. This suggests that 
the rating agency does not create value by assembling a rating from observable data using its 
proprietary weighting scheme, and supplementing private information. 
These results are robust to various different specifications, endogeneity and sample 
selectivity. In particular, they hold both for the UK and for the German setting, which rules 
out the explanation that U.S. domiciled rating agencies are more adept at rating firms located 
in shareholder-oriented governance systems. Our findings cast doubt on the incremental 
usefulness of the rating agencies’ information processing activities, and suggest that the core 
competitive advantage of these institutions may rather lay in the activity of collecting publicly 
available governance data, creating transaction cost savings for investors, or other, hitherto 
unexplored factors. 
The implications of our findings are manifold. We confirm prior findings from Europe 
                                                 
75 See Appendix 3 - 7. 






of a positive association of governance quality and firm value. These findings are important 
for corporate management and investors in Europe as they suggest that high governance 
scores imply to some extent higher firm valuation. Our analysis of the incremental usefulness 
of rating agencies intermediation activities provides novel insights into the economics of 
commercial CG rating agencies. These findings are important for investment managers and 
practitioners, as they indicate that CG rating vendors may at least not create value in the way 
that is widely assumed. 
Our results are subject to the limitation that we only analyze the rating of one particular 
firm, ISS, and that we are unable to incorporate into our models other potential sources of 
value creation by commercial rating vendors. This creates various research opportunities. 
Future research may investigate the comparative differences in how rating agencies create 
value. Another path would be to challenge the robustness of our findings by conducting our 
analyses for alternative time frames. Finally, future work should investigate more 
comprehensively the economic explanation of commercial rating agencies, to enable us to 



















Appendix 3 - 1: Definition of Variables 
SHORT CUT VARIABLE DEFINITION 
Corporate Governance Measures 
CGQ Corporate Governance 
Quotient  
CGQ is a commercial corporate governance rating from ISS. We 
employ for our study CGQ “Country Ranking” scores (final rating 
scores are provided by ISS). 
CGI Corporate Governance 
Indicator 
CGI is a naïve corporate governance score based on the same publicly 
available governance data as the CGQ rating. It is equally weighted, 
not adjusted for yearly trends, and reflects as a relative measure – 
similar to the CGQ “Country Ranking” scores – the governance 
quality relative to other firms in the same year and same country (raw 
data of the ISS CGQ provisions are provided by ISS).  
The CGI is defined as 𝐶𝐺𝐼𝑖𝑡𝑐 =
(𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑐−1)
(𝑚𝑡𝑐−1)
× 100, whereas 𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑐  equals 
the rank of firm i in year t from country c and 𝑚𝑡𝑐 the sum of all 
ranked firms in year t and country c. The rank is based on equally 
weighted scores of all compliance rates with ISS’s governance criteria 
for each firm i in year t and country c (47 CGQ criteria for the UK 
setting and 41 CGQ criteria for the German setting). For example, a 
German firm which complied with 17 ISS’s governance criteria in 
2007 (out of 41) received a rank of 43 (out of 86) and a corresponding 
CGI score of 49.41 ((43-1)/(86-1))*100). The CGI score of 49.41 
indicates that the firm’s compliance with ISS rating criteria was 
higher than the compliance of 49.41% of all other rated firms in the 
same year and country. 
TECHNOLOGY TECHNOLOGY measures the incremental contribution of the rating 
vendor’s weighting technology as well as the vendor’s ability to 
incorporate private information into the commercial rating. For 
computational issues, see Table 3 - 3. 
Firm Value Measures 
Q Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q measures firm valuation by average fiscal year’s market 
value (dwta + mv - dwse) deflated by average fiscal year’s total assets 
(dwta) 
Control Variables 
Size Log of total assets Size is log of average fiscal year’s total assets (dwta). 
Growth Growth in net sales Growth is three years average growth in net sales (wc01001). 
Leverage Total debt to total assets Leverage is total debt (wc03255) to total assets (wc02999). 








Blue chip index 
membership 
Index Membership is blue chip index membership based on FTSE100 
for UK firms and based on DAX30 for German firms (wc05661). 
Year  
dummies 
Year indicators Year dummies are based on date of fiscal year end (wc05350). 
Industry 
dummies 
Industry indicators Industry dummies are based on first-digit SIC industry segments 
(wc07021). 
Selection Criteria 
DPS Dividends per share DPS is dividend per share (wc05101). 
Pension 
Funds 
Pension funds holding Pension Funds is number of share in pension funds holding to total 
shares outstanding (noshpf). 
 






Appendix 3 - 1: Definition of Variables (continued) 
SHORT CUT VARIABLE DEFINITION 
Corporate Governance Measures (Robustness Section) 
CGI1 Corporate Governance 
Indicator1 
CGI1 is a relative CG rating which measures on a yearly base the 
firm’s governance quality with respect to the firm’s compliance with 
the underlying ISS CGQ rating criteria. 
CGI2 Corporate Governance 
Indicator2 
CGI2 is a CG rating which is estimated on six CGI sub-ratings 
(similar to the CGI rating, the sub-scores are naïve and additive 
constructed) – board, audit, charter, compensation, progressive 
practice, and director ownership – via Principal Component Analysis. 
CGI3 Corporate Governance 
Indicator3 
CGI3 is a CG rating which is estimated directly on all 47 ISS rating 
criteria in case of the UK sample and on all 41 ISS rating criteria in 
case of the German sample via Principal Component Analysis. 
Firm Value Measures (Robustness Section) 
MTB Market-to-Book ratio of 
equity 
MTB measures firm value and equals market value of equity (mv) 
divided by book value of equity (dwse). 
MTS Market-to-Sales ratio MTS measures firm value and equals market value of equity (mv) 
divided by net sales (dwsl). 
Control Variables (Robustness Section) 
Firm Age Log of firm age Firm Age is based on data of incorporation (wc18273) for UK firms 
and company founded data (wc18272) for German firms. 
Risk Standard deviation of 
stock returns 
Risk is measured as the yearly average standard deviation based on 
monthly stock returns (wc05015 - wc05070). 
R&D_TA R&D expenditures to 
total assets 
R&D_TA is measured as research & development expenses / 
expenditures (wc01201) to total assets (wc02999). 
ROAt Current period ROA ROAt is measured as net income before extraordinary items 
(wc04001) to total assets (wc02999). 
ROAt-1 Past period ROA ROAt-1 is measured as net income before extraordinary items 
(wc04001) to total assets (wc02999) for the preceding period. 
CAPEX Capital expenditures to 
total assets 
CAPEX is measured as capital expenditures (wc04601) to total assets 
(wc02999). 
CASH_TA Cash to total assets CASH_TA is measured as net cash flow from operations (wc04860) 
to total assets (wc02999). 
Loss Negative net income Loss is a dummy variable indicating negative net income (wc01751 < 
0). 
IFRS IFRS accounting IFRS is a dummy variable indicating IFRS accounting  
(wc07536 = ”IFRS”). 
USGAAP US-GAAP accounting USGAAP is a dummy variable indicating US-GAAP accounting  
















Appendix 3 - 2: Two-Stage-Least-Squares (2SLS) & Heckman Selection 




Firm Value Measure: Tobin’s Q (dependent variable) 
Independent Variables UK & GER Sample (M1-M3) UK Sample (M4-M6) GER Sample (M7-M9) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
CGQpred + .003***   .003***   .005***   
  (3.03)   (2.62)   (2.80)   
CGIpred +  .004***   .004***   .006***  
   (4.01)   (3.63)   (3.71)  
TECHpred +   .002   .002   .000 
    (0.84)   (0.80)   (0.15) 
CGI +   .002***   .002***   .003 
    (4.70)   (3.68)   (3.88) 
TECH +  .001   .000   .001  
   (0.85)   (0.57)   (1.06)  
Firm controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered (firm)  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R²  .3100 .3094 .3191 .3125 .3094 .3178 .3871 .3678 .4334 
Sample Size  1506 1506 1506 1191 1191 1191 315 315 315 




Firm Value Measure: Tobin’s Q (dependent variable) 
Independent Variables UK & GER Sample (M1-M3) UK Sample (M4-M6) GER Sample (M7-M9) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
CGQ + .001***   .001***   .001   
  (3.50)   (3.23)   (1.44)   
CGI +  .002*** .002***  .002*** .002***  .001** .001** 
   (4.73) (4.72)  (4.60) (4.59)  (2.35) (2.31) 
TECH +   -.000   -.000   -.001 
    (-0.01)   (-0.17)   (-0.60) 
INVERSE_MILLS  .152** .154** .154** .243*** .248*** .248*** -.082 -.080 -.082 
  (2.27) (2.29) (2.29) (3.09) (3.16) (3.16) (-0.84) (-0.83) (-0.85) 
Firm controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered (firm)  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R²  .3289 .3337 .3334 .3392 .3454 .3451 .3748 .3818 .3808 
Sample Size  2075 2075 2075 1667 1667 1667 408 408 408 
Notes: The underlying regression models for Panel A are: Qit = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑it + ∑𝛾CONTROLit + 
∑𝛿𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 +∑𝜑𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡+ 𝜀, Qit = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐺𝐼𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑it + 𝛽2𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻𝑁𝑂𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑌it +∑𝛾CONTROLit + ∑𝛿𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 
+∑𝜑𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡+ 𝜀, and Qit = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐺𝐼it + 𝛽2𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻𝑁𝑂𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑌𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑it +∑𝛾CONTROLit + ∑𝛿𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 +∑𝜑𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡+ 𝜀, 
where 𝛼 represents the constant term, 𝛽, 𝛾, 𝛿,𝜑, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜔 are the coefficients of the explanatory variables, 𝜀 is the 
error term. The underlying regression models for Panel B are: Qit = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑂𝑉it + 𝛽2𝑀𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑆it + ∑𝛾CONTROLit 
+ ∑𝛿𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 +∑𝜑𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡+ 𝜀, and Qit = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐺𝐼it + 𝛽2𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻𝑁𝑂𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑌it + 𝛽3𝑀𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑆it+∑𝛾CONTROLit + 
∑𝛿𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 +∑𝜑𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡+ 𝜀, where 𝛼 represents the constant term, 𝛽, 𝛾, 𝛿,𝜑, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜔 are the coefficients of the 
explanatory variables, 𝜀 is the error term. The sample contains both UK and GER firms. Q stands for the 
valuation measure Tobin’s Q (Q is winsorized at 1% level and is used in log form), and CONTROL is a set of 
control variables (Size is log of total assets, Leverage is total debt to total assets, Growth is 3 years average 
growth in net sales, free float is number of shares as free float to total shares outstanding, Capital-Intensity is 
PPE to total assets, Index Membership indicates blue chip firms based on FTSE100 for UK firms and DAX30 
for GER firms, UK dummy indicates UK firms). GOVpred is the predicted governance variable from the second 
stage regressions (either for CGQ or CGI). MILLS is the inverse mills ratio from the first stage regression. 
TECHNOLOGYpred (TECHpred) is the predicted measure of TECHNOLOGY (TECH), a measure of the 
incremental usefulness of the CGQ (through superior weighting technology and / or private information) relative 
to our naïve CGI rating. TECHNOLOGY is based on the residuals from cross sectional OLS regressions with the 
following format: CGQi = α + βCGIi + ε. The regression models contain year- and industry-fixed effects (based 
on first-digit SIC industry codes), and have standard errors which are heteroskedasticity robust (White, 1980) 
and one-way clustered at firm level (Gow et al., 2010; Petersen, 2009). Reported values: coefficient (z-statistics). 
*** (**) (*) indicates significance at 1% (5%) (10%), two-tailed level. 
 
 






Appendix 3 - 3: Basic OLS Model with restricted Sample Size 




Firm Value Measure: Tobin’s Q (dependent variable) 
Independent VAR UK & GER Sample (M1-M3) UK Sample (M4-M6) GER Sample (M7-M9) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
CGQ + .001***   .001***   .002***   
  (3.46)   (2.80)   (2.71)   
CGI +  .002*** .002***  .002*** .002***  .002*** .002*** 
   (4.44) (4.45)  (3.79) (3.78)  (3.28) (3.30) 
TECH +   .000   .000   .000 
    (0.33)   (0.06)   (0.31) 
Firm controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered (firm)  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R²  .3091 .3137 .3133 .3111 .3156 .3151 .4177 .4280 .4264 
Sample Size  1829 1829 1829 1503 1503 1503 326 326 326 




Firm Value Measure: Tobin’s Q (dependent variable) 
Independent VAR UK & GER Sample (M1-M3) UK Sample (M4-M6) GER Sample (M7-M9) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
CGQ + .001***   .001***   .000   
  (2.72)   (2.91)   (0.54)   
CGI +  .002*** .002***  .002*** .002***  .001 .001 
   (4.11) (4.08)  (4.27) (4.25)  (1.57) (1.53) 
TECH +   -.000   -.000   -.001 
    (-0.40)   (-0.26)   (-0.83) 
Firm controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered (firm)  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R²  .3084 .3135 .3132 .3115 .3177 .3173 .3480 .3538 .3534 
Sample Size  1827 1827 1827 1498 1498 1498 329 329 329 




Firm Value Measure: Tobin’s Q (dependent variable) 
Independent VAR UK & GER Sample (M1-M3) UK Sample (M1-M3) GER Sample (M1-M3) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
CGQ + .001***   .001***   .001   
  (3.28)   (3.05)   (1.43)   
CGI +  .002*** .002***  .002*** .002***  .001** .001** 
   (4.36) (4.36)  (4.18) (4.18)  (2.08) (2.06) 
TECH +   -.000   -.000   -.000 
    (-0.01)   (-0.05)   (-0.38) 
Firm controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered (firm)  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R²  .3213 .3262 .3257 .3227 .3287 .3281 .3615 .3675 .3657 



















Appendix 3 - 3: Basic OLS Model with restricted Sample Size (continued) 




Firm Value Measure: Tobin’s Q (dependent variable) 
Independent VAR UK & GER Sample (M1-M3) UK Sample (M4-M6) GER Sample (M7-M9) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
CGQ + .001**   .001**   .000   
  (2.32)   (2.58)   (0.76)   
CGI +  .001*** .001***  .002*** .002***  .001* .001* 
   (3.64) (3.60)  (4.03) (4.00)  (1.74) (1.69) 
TECH +   -.000   -.000   -.001 
    (-0.65)   (-0.56)   (-1.06) 
Firm controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered (firm)  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R²  .3149 .3192 .3190 .3216 .3279 .3276 .3342 .3396 .3396 
Sample Size  1553 1553 1553 1227 1227 1227 326 326 326 




Firm Value Measure: Tobin’s Q (dependent variable) 
Independent VAR UK & GER Sample (M1-M3) UK Sample (M4-M6) GER Sample (M7-M9) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
CGQ + .001***   .001***   .001   
  (2.68)   (2.69)   (1.29)   
CGI +  .002*** .002***  .002*** .002***  .001** .001** 
   (3.66) (3.65)  (3.72) (3.71)  (2.48) (2.42) 
TECH +   -.000   -.000   -.001 
    (-0.11)   (-0.05)   (-1.09) 
Firm controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ind fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered (firm)  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R²  .3228 .3266 .3262 .3190 .3236 .3231 .3803 .3888 .3889 
Sample Size  1588 1588 1588 1262 1262 1262 326 326 326 




Firm Value Measure: Tobin’s Q (dependent variable) 
Independent VAR UK & GER Sample (M1-M3) UK Sample (M4-M6) GER Sample (M7-M9) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
CGQ + 0.001**   0.001**   0.001**   
  (2.44)   (2.39)   (2.32)   
CGI +  0.002*** 0.002***  0.002** 0.002**  0.002*** 0.002*** 
   (2.99) (3.00)  (2.53) (2.58)  (2.85) (2.86) 
TECH +   0.000   0.001   0.000 
    (0.21)   (0.79)   (0.07) 
Firm controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ind fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered (firm)  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R²  .3504 .3544 .3538 .3935 .3949 .3947 .3979 .4046 .4028 
Sample Size  1000 1000 1000 650 650 650 350 350 350 
Notes: The underlying regression models are: Qit = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐺𝑄it + ∑𝛾CONTROLit + ∑𝛿𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 +∑𝜑𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡+ 𝜀, 
and Qit = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐺𝐼it + 𝛽2𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻𝑁𝑂𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑌it +∑𝛾CONTROLit + ∑𝛿𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 +∑𝜑𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡+ 𝜀, where 𝛼 represents 
the constant term, 𝛽1,𝛽2, 𝛾, 𝛿, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜑 are the coefficients of the explanatory variables, 𝜀 is the error term. The 
sample contains both UK and GER firms. Q stands for the valuation measure Tobin’s Q (Q is winsorized at 1% 
level and is used in log form), CGQ / CGI stands for the employed governance rating, and CONTROL is a set of 
control variables (Size is log of total assets, Leverage is total debt to total assets, Growth is 3 years average 
growth in net sales, free float is number of shares as free float to total shares outstanding, Capital-Intensity is 
PPE to total assets, Index Membership indicates blue chip firms based on FTSE100 for UK firms and DAX30 
for GER firms, UK dummy indicates UK firms). TECHNOLOGY (TECH) is the residuals from cross sectional 
OLS regressions with the following format: CGQi = α + βCGIi + ε, and represents the incremental usefulness of 
the CGQ (through superior weighting technology and / or private information) relative to our naïve CGI rating. 
The regression models contain year- and industry-fixed effects (based on first-digit SIC industry codes), and 
have standard errors which are heteroskedasticity robust (White, 1980) and one-way clustered at firm level (Gow 
et al., 2010; Petersen, 2009). Reported values: coefficient (t-stat). *** (**) (*) indicates significance at 1% (5%) 
(10%), two-tailed level. 






Appendix 3 - 4: Basic OLS Model with alternative Firm Value Measure 




Firm Value Measure: unadjusted Tobin’s Q (dependent variable) 
Independent VAR UK & GER Sample (M1-M3) UK Sample (M4-M6) GER Sample (M7-M9) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
CGQ + .002*   .002*   .001   
  (1.67)   (1.71)   (0.82)   
CGI +  .002** .002**  .003** .003**  .003* .003* 
   (2.37) (2.36)  (2.56) (2.55)  (1.84) (1.77) 
TECH +   -.000   -.000   -.002 
    (-0.09)   (-0.17)   (-0.96) 
Firm controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered (firm)  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R²  .2112 .2128 .2124 .2262 .2283 .2278 .3309 .3365 .3362 
Sample Size  2086 2086 2086 1677 1677 1677 409 409 409 




Firm Value Measure: MTB (dependent variable) 
Independent VAR UK & GER Sample (M1-M3) UK Sample (M4-M6) GER Sample (M7-M9) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
CGQ + .003***   .003***   .002*   
  (3.61)   (3.19)   (1.72)   
CGI +  .003*** .003***  .004*** .004***  .002** .002** 
   (5.02) (5.00)  (4.57) (4.56)  (2.04) (2.04) 
TECH +   -.000   -.000   .000 
    (-0.16)   (-0.18)   (0.12) 
Firm controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered (firm)  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R²  .1797 .1870 .1866 .1486 .1565 .1560 .2850 .2886 .2868 
Sample Size  2086 2086 2086 1677 1677 1677 409 409 409 




Firm Value Measure: MTS (dependent variable) 
Independent VAR UK & GER Sample (M1-M3) UK Sample (M4-M6) GER Sample (M7-M9) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
CGQ + .001   -.000   .004***   
  (0.84)   (-0.06)   (2.73)   
CGI +  .003*** .003***  .002* .002  .006*** .006*** 
   (3.03) (2.94)  (1.66) (1.61)  (3.89) (3.86) 
TECH +   -.003**   -.003**   -.002 
    (-2.42)   (-1.98)   (-0.91) 
Firm controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered (firm)  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R²  .2806 .2856 .2879 .2557 .2575 .2597 .4148 .4342 .4341 
Sample Size  2086 2086 2086 1677 1677 1677 409 409 409 
Notes: The underlying regression models are: PERFit = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐺𝑄it + ∑𝛾CONTROLit + ∑𝛿𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 
+∑𝜑𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡+ 𝜀, and Qit = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐺𝐼it + 𝛽2𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻𝑁𝑂𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑌it +∑𝛾CONTROLit + ∑𝛿𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 +∑𝜑𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡+ 𝜀, 
where 𝛼 represents the constant term, 𝛽1,𝛽2, 𝛾, 𝛿, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜑 are the coefficients of the explanatory variables, 𝜀 is the 
error term. The sample contains both UK and GER firms. PERF represents different firm value measures. Q*, 
MTB, and MTS. Q* stands for the valuation measure Tobin’s Q (unadjusted, i.e., without log transformation and 
winsorized extreme percentiles), MTB stands for the valuation measure Market-to-Book ratio of equity (MTB is 
winsorized at 1% level and is used in log form), and MTS stands for the valuation measure Market-to-Sales 
Ratio (MTS is winsorized at 1% level and is used in log form). CGQ / CGI stands for the employed governance 
rating, and CONTROL is a set of control variables (Size is log of total assets, Leverage is total debt to total 
assets, Growth is 3 years average growth in net sales, free float is number of shares as free float to total shares 
outstanding, Capital-Intensity is PPE to total assets, Index Membership indicates blue chip firms based on 
FTSE100 for UK firms and DAX30 for GER firms, UK dummy indicates UK firms). TECHNOLOGY (TECH) 
is the residuals from cross sectional OLS regressions with the following format: CGQi = α + βCGIi + ε, and 
represents the incremental usefulness of the CGQ (through superior weighting technology and / or private 
information) relative to our naïve CGI rating. The regression models contain year- and industry-fixed effects 






(based on first-digit SIC industry codes), and have standard errors which are heteroskedasticity robust (White, 
1980) and one-way clustered at firm level (Gow et al., 2010; Petersen, 2009). Reported values: coefficient (t-











































Appendix 3 - 5: Basic OLS Model with alternative CGI Score 




Firm Value Measure: Tobin’s Q (dependent variable) 
Independent VAR UK & GER Sample (M1-M3) UK Sample (M4-M6) GER Sample (M7-M9) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
CGQ + .001***   .001***   .001   
  (3.08)   (2.97)   (1.41)   
CGI1 +  .008*** .008***  .008*** .008***  .009*** .009*** 
   (4.53) (4.52)  (3.85) (3.84)  (3.33) (3.23) 
TECH1 +   -.000   -.000   -.001 
    (-0.31)   (-0.08)   (-1.16) 
Firm controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered (firm)  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R²  .3162 .3215 .3212 .3180 .3220 .3216 .3699 .3878 .3884 
Sample Size  2086 2086 2086 1677 1677 1677 409 409 409 




Firm Value Measure: Tobin’s Q (dependent variable) 
Independent VAR UK & GER Sample (M1-M3) UK Sample (M4-M6) GER Sample (M7-M9) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
CGQ + .001***   .001***   .001   
  (3.08)   (2.97)   (1.41)   
CGI2 +  .036*** .036***  .032*** .032***  .056*** .055*** 
   (4.06) (4.07)  (3.17) (3.19)  (3.48) (3.42) 
TECH2 +   .000   .001   -.001 
    (0.22)   (0.86)   (-1.23) 
Firm controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered (firm)  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R²  .3162 .3211 .3208 .3180 .3194 .3194 .3699 .4008 .4024 
Sample Size  2086 2086 2086 1677 1677 1677 409 409 409 




Firm Value Measure: Tobin’s Q (dependent variable) 
Independent VAR UK & GER Sample (M1-M3) UK Sample (M4-M6) GER Sample (M7-M9) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
CGQ + .001***   .001***   .001   
  (3.08)   (2.97)   (1.41)   
CGI3 +  .028*** .028***  .027*** .027***  .036** .035** 
   (4.19) (4.20)  (3.84) (3.86)  (2.57) (2.57) 
TECH3 +   .000   .001   -.001 
    (0.74)   (1.16)   (-0.74) 
Firm controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered (firm)  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R²  .3162 .3220 .3219 .3180 .3209 .3213 .3699 .3966 .3962 
Sample Size  2086 2086 2086 1677 1677 1677 409 409 409 
Notes: The underlying regression models are: Qit = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐺𝑄it + ∑𝛾CONTROLit + ∑𝛿𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 +∑𝜑𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡+ 𝜀, 
and Qit = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐺𝐼it + 𝛽2𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻𝑁𝑂𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑌it +∑𝛾CONTROLit + ∑𝛿𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 +∑𝜑𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡+ 𝜀, where 𝛼 represents 
the constant term, 𝛽1,𝛽2, 𝛾, 𝛿, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜑 are the coefficients of the explanatory variables, 𝜀 is the error term. The 
sample contains both UK and GER firms. Q stands for the valuation measure Tobin’s Q (Q is winsorized at 1% 
level and is used in log form).CGQ / CGI (as CGI1 /CGI1/CGI1) stands for the employed governance rating. CGI1 
is a relative CG rating which measures on a yearly base the firm’s governance quality with respect to the firm’s 
compliance with the underlying ISS CGQ rating criteria. CGI2 is a CG rating which is estimated on six CGI sub-
ratings (board, audit, charter, compensation, progressive practice, and director ownership) via Principal 
Component Analysis. CGI3 is a CG rating which is estimated directly on all 47 / 41 ISS CGQ rating criteria via 
Principal Component Analysis. CONTROL is a set of control variables (Size is log of total assets, Leverage is 
total debt to total assets, Growth is 3 years average growth in net sales, free float is number of shares as free float 
to total shares outstanding, Capital-Intensity is PPE to total assets, Index Membership indicates blue chip firms 
based on FTSE100 for UK firms and DAX30 for GER firms, UK dummy indicates UK firms). TECHNOLOGY 
(TECH) is the residuals from cross sectional OLS regressions with the following format: CGQi = α + βCGIi + ε, 
and represents the incremental usefulness of the CGQ (through superior weighting technology and / or private 






information) relative to our naïve CGI rating. The regression models contain year- and industry-fixed effects 
(based on first-digit SIC industry codes), and have standard errors which are heteroskedasticity robust (White, 
1980) and one-way clustered at firm level (Gow et al., 2010; Petersen, 2009). Reported values: coefficient (t-


































Appendix 3 - 6: Basic OLS Model with additional Control Variables 




Firm Value Measure: Tobin’s Q (dependent variable) 
Independent VAR UK & GER Sample (M1-M3) UK Sample (M4-M6) GER Sample (M7-M9) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
CGQ + .001**   .001**   .001   
  (2.58)   (2.15)   (1.63)   
CGI +  .002*** .002***  .003*** .003***  .001* .001* 
   (4.34) (4.26)  (3.60) (3.54)  (1.69) (1.74) 
TECH +   -.000   -.001   .000 
    (-0.55)   (-0.67)   (0.18) 
Firm controls (extended set) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered (firm)  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R²  .4468 .4571 .4567 .4101 .4239 .4235 .5590 .5615 .5594 
Sample Size  832 832 832 597 597 597 235 235 235 




Firm Value Measure: Tobin’s Q (dependent variable) 
Independent VAR UK & GER Sample (M1-M3) UK Sample (M4-M6) GER Sample (M7-M9) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
CGQ + .001**   .002**   .001   
  (2.54)   (2.36)   (1.22)   
CGI +  .002*** .002***  .003*** .003***  .001** .001** 
   (4.19) (4.09)  (3.87) (3.79)  (2.02) (2.00) 
TECH +   -.000   -.001   -.000 
    (-0.64)   (-0.59)   (-0.43) 
Firm controls (selected set) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered (firm)  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R²  .4481 .4579 .4576 .4082 .4237 .4232 .4640 .4697 .4685 
Sample Size  888 888 888 618 618 618 354 354 354 
Notes: The underlying regression models are: Qit = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐺𝑄it + ∑𝛾CONTROLit + ∑𝛿𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 +∑𝜑𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡+ 𝜀, 
and Qit = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐺𝐼it + 𝛽2𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻𝑁𝑂𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑌it +∑𝛾CONTROLit + ∑𝛿𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 +∑𝜑𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡+ 𝜀, where 𝛼 represents 
the constant term, 𝛽1,𝛽2, 𝛾, 𝛿, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜑 are the coefficients of the explanatory variables, 𝜀 is the error term. The 
sample contains both UK and GER firms. Q stands for the valuation measure Tobin’s Q (Q is winsorized at 1% 
level and is used in log form).CGQ / CGI stands for the employed governance rating. For Panel A, CONTROL is 
an extended set of control variables (Size is log of total assets, Leverage is total debt to total assets, Growth is 3 
years average growth in net sales, Freefloat is number of shares as free float to total shares outstanding, Capital-
Intensity is PPE to total assets, Index Membership indicates blue chip firms based on FTSE100 for UK firms and 
DAX30 for GER firms, UK dummy indicates UK firms – if applicable, log of firm age based on date of 
incorporation for UK firms and company founded date for GER firms, risk as yearly average standard deviation 
based on monthly stock returns, R&D expenditures to total assets, capital expenditures to total assets, cash from 
operations to total assets, current and past ROA, loss as indicator variable of negative net income, IFRS / US-
GAAP as indicator variables of respective accounting standard application). For Panel B, CONTROL is a 
selective set of control variables which are selected by four versions of stepwise regression technique separately 
for each of the three sample compositions. (1) Combined UK and GER sample controls: size is log of total 
assets, Growth is 3 years average growth in net sales, Capital-Intensity is PPE to total assets, Index Membership 
indicates blue chip firms based on FTSE100 for UK firms and DAX30 for GER firms, UK dummy indicates UK 
firms, R&D expenditures to total assets, cash to total assets, current and past ROA. (2) UK sample controls: size 
is log of total assets, Growth is 3 years average growth in net sales, Freefloat is number of shares as free float to 
total shares outstanding, Capital-Intensity is PPE to total assets, Index Membership indicates blue chip firms 
based on FTSE100 for UK firms and DAX30 for GER firms, R&D expenditures to total assets, cash to total 
assets, current and past ROA. (3) German sample controls: Capital-Intensity is PPE to total assets, current and 
past ROA, Leverage is total debt to total assets, Growth is 3 years average growth in net sales, Freefloat is 
number of shares as free float to total shares outstanding, and cash from operations to total assets. 
TECHNOLOGY (TECH) is the residuals from cross sectional OLS regressions with the following format: CGQi 
= α + βCGIi + ε, and represents the incremental usefulness of the CGQ (through superior weighting technology 
and/or private information) relative to our naïve CGI rating. The regression models contain year and industry-
fixed effects (based on first-digit SIC industry codes), and have standard errors which are heteroskedasticity 






robust (White, 1980) and one-way clustered at firm level (Gow et al., 2010; Petersen, 2009). Reported values: 



































Appendix 3 - 7: Economic Significance 
Panel A. Economic significance for combined UK & GER sample 
Variables Effect of one-
percent change on 
Q 
Effect of one-sigma 
change on Q 
Effect of min-max 
change on Q 
Additional variance 
explained 
CGQ 0.12% 3.39% 11.67% - 
CGI 0.16% 4.72% 16.27% 1.43% 
Panel B. Economic significance for UK sample 
Variables Effect of one-
percent change on 
Q 
Effect of one-sigma 
change on Q 
Effect of min-max 
change on Q 
Additional variance 
explained 
CGQ 0.13% 3.76% 12.97% - 
CGI 0.19% 5.34% 18.54% 1.71% 
Panel C. Economic significance for GER sample 
Variables Effect of one-
percent change on 
Q 
Effect of one-sigma 
change on Q 
Effect of min-max 
change on Q 
Additional variance 
explained 
CGQ 0.09% 2.64% 8.87% - 
CGI 0.15% 4.45% 14.86% 2.00% 
Notes: Q is Tobin’s Q. CGQ stands for ISS’s Corporate Governance Quotient and CGI stands for our naïve 
corporate governance rating based on the raw dataset of the CGQ rating. Effect of one-percent-change, for 
example, stands for the valuation effect which results from one percent change of the governance variable in the 
valuation variable. The additional variance explained equals the decrease or increase of explained sum of 
































Appendix 3 - 8: GOV Ratings and CGQ Subcategories 
Panel A. UK sample (CGQ rating) 
 Dependent Variable: CGQ Rating 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Panel 
Board .5248*** .4917*** .4927*** .4300*** .4049*** .4708*** 
Audit .3554*** .2963*** .2036*** .2501*** .2494*** .2585*** 
Charter .1910*** -.0380*** .1286*** .2599*** -.0167** .0056 
Compensation .1255*** .2213*** .2934*** .2733*** .2617*** .2562*** 
Prog. Practice .1041*** .0824* .1772*** .1102*** .1777*** .1346*** 
Ownership .1887*** .1553*** .2154*** .1931*** .2463*** .2030*** 
Year fe No No No No No Yes 
R² .7455 .6909 .7087 .6178 .5629 .6098 
Sample Size 190 195 499 482 432 1798 
Panel B. UK sample (CGI rating) 
 Dependent Variable: CGI Rating 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Panel 
Board .5537*** .4785*** .4712*** .5190*** .4907*** .5002*** 
Audit .2262*** .1392*** .2559*** .2815*** .3243*** .2737*** 
Charter .0638*** -.0212*** .0292*** .0707*** .0434*** .0179* 
Compensation .4167*** .2763*** .2543*** .3274*** .2677*** .2983*** 
Prog. Practice .2067*** .3877*** .4059*** .3220*** .3413*** .3442*** 
Ownership .3196*** .2540*** .2697*** .3079*** .3283*** .2979*** 
Year fe No No No No No Yes 
R² .9290 .9649 .9644 .9438 .9423 .9419 
Sample Size 190 195 499 482 432 1798 
Panel C. GER sample (CGQ rating) 
 Dependent Variable: CGQ Rating 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Panel 
Board .2698*** .3951*** .5717*** .4852*** .2580*** .3927*** 
Audit -.0191 -.0755 .1634** .1429*** .1028** .0828*** 
Charter .2102*** .0663 -.1078 .0817*** .0395 .0419 
Compensation .6374*** .5759*** .4648*** .5218*** .4028*** .5150*** 
Prog. Practice .1339* .1299 -.0610 .0862 .2021** .1326*** 
Ownership .2408*** -.0117 -.0448 .0110 .1644* .0603* 
Year fe No No No No No Yes 
R² .6788 .7860 .6201 .6287 .4226 .5793 
Sample Size 88 83 82 88 86 427 
Panel D. GER sample (CGI rating) 
 Dependent Variable: CGI Rating 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Panel 
Board .3622*** .4330*** .4498*** .5456*** .4059*** .4298*** 
Audit .2619*** .1024*** .1796*** .1322*** .0730* .1639*** 
Charter .1633*** .0562* .0770** .0133*** -.0071 .0609*** 
Compensation .7060*** .5873*** .4564*** .3418*** .6247*** .5417*** 
Prog. Practice .1188* .2505*** .2328*** .3143*** .2115*** .2229*** 
Ownership .2393*** .1468*** .2410*** .2408*** .3045*** .2426*** 
Year fe No No No No No Yes 
R² .8707 .9700 .9228 .9597 .9356 .8949 
Sample Size 88 83 82 88 86 427 
Notes: The underlying regression model is: 𝐺𝑂𝑉it = 𝛼 + ∑𝛾CGQsubcategoriesit + 𝜀, where 𝛼 represents the 
constant term, ∑ 𝛾 are the coefficients of the explanatory variables, 𝜀 is the error term. The sample contains 
either UK (Panel A and B) or GER firms (Panel C and D). GOV stands for the employed governance rating 
(either CGQ or CGI). CGQsubcategories are equally weighted measures of board, audit, charter, compensation, 
progressive practice, and ownership based on the respective CGQ provisions depicted in Table 3 - 2. The 
regression models contain year-fixed effects (as indicated with ‘year fe’), and have standard errors which are 






heteroskedasticity robust (White, 1980). Reported values: standardized (beta) coefficient (t-stat). *** (**) (*) 
indicates significance at 1% (5%) (10%), two-tailed level. 
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information provided by governance analysts when preparing analyst reports or setting investment 
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Using a quasi-natural experiment, this paper investigates potential economic consequences of 
governance analyst coverage. Similar to financial analysts or the business press, governance 
analysts represent information intermediaries on capital markets. From an economic 
perspective, information intermediaries process, enhance, and disseminate information to 
capital market participants in order to alleviate transaction costs (Healy and Palepu, 2002). 
The core business of governance analysts consists of governance consultancy and risk 
assessments via, e.g., commercial corporate governance ratings or proxy voting recommen-
dations to institutional shareholders or other capital market participants. To the extent that 
governance analysts are able to reduce the capital market participants’ costs of making 
informed decisions (i.e., transaction costs), e.g., by providing more accurate or less expensive 
evaluations of governance quality, information provided by these analysts is valuable for 
capital market participants (Ertimur et al., 2013; Hitz and Lehmann, 2013). 
Prior literature on analysts has primarily focused on the role of sell-side equity analysts 
examining, among other things, the determinants and consequences of financial analyst 
coverage (e.g., Yu, 2008; Jiraporn et al., 2012a; Degeorge et al., 2013a; Irani and Oesch, 
2013; Chen et al., 2013). Although this has contributed much to our understanding of 
financial analysts, so far only little attention has been paid to the role of ‘other’ types of 
analysts and their interactions with, for example, sell-side equity analysts. In a recent related 
literature survey, Beyer et al. (2010, p. 336) pose that “other information intermediaries [like, 
e.g., rating agencies and debt analysts] are important in understanding the development of the 
overall corporate information environment” and that “more research in this area is warranted”.   
Besides having first empirical evidence on buy-side analysts and bond analysts (Cheng 
et al., 2006; De Franco et al., 2009), as well as on the (non-financial) information processing 
of financial analysts (Orens and Lybaert, 2010; Bhat et al., 2006; Byard et al., 2006; Asare et 
al., 2011), previous literature has been silent on the actual role of governance analysts as 
information intermediaries and their potential interactions with financial analysts, investors, 
or managers. This is surprising given the increasing importance and popularity of proxy 
voting advisory and commercial corporate governance ratings among capital market 
participants (Larcker et al., 2013; Daines et al., 2010). Accordingly, the main purpose of this 
study is to fill this research gap and to shed light on the role and relevance of non-financial 
corporate governance analysts. To that end, this paper examines potential economic 






consequences of governance analyst coverage. To glean first empirical insights into the 
coverage effects of governance analysts, I focus on two different groups as well as on two 
firm-level mechanisms which are potentially affected by the presence of governance analysts: 
(1) financial analysts, (2) investors, (3) corporate governance quality, and (4) earnings 
management. 
Based on data from Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), I measure governance 
analysts’ coverage on the dimension of whether or not ISS provides governance reports and 
commercial corporate governance ratings (CGQ ratings). Similar to financial analysts, the 
decision of ISS analysts to cover a firm depends on firm characteristics, i.e., index 
membership and institutional ownership, and is thus endogenous in nature (e.g., Irani and 
Oesch, 2013, p. 399). As these firm characteristics are in turn most likely related to my 
outcome variables, i.e., analyst following, free float, governance quality, and accounting 
quality, ordinary OLS results will be potentially biased.  
To address these concerns, I exploit an exogenous shock to the coverage by ISS 
corporate governance analysts. From 2004 to 2005, ISS coverage in the UK exhibited an 
unusual and strong increase of almost 154%. A similar shock is not observable in any of the 
other countries ISS operated in at that time. In 2005, ISS together with FTSE developed 
different governance-related stock indices, with one of them explicitly focusing on UK firms. 
To construct the UK specific stock index with a sufficient firm base, ISS decided to enlarge 
the UK coverage in 2005 from 209 to 530 firms. From an econometrician’s perspective, the 
observed increase in UK ISS coverage is exogenously caused by the joint stock indices 
project, and not endogenously determined by a change of certain firm characteristics like 
institutional ownership structure or index membership. Thus, by exploiting the exogenous 
shock setting as a quasi-natural experiment, the UK sample provides a useful setting to 
investigate the effects of ISS governance analyst coverage as well as to draw causal 
inferences. 
Employing a twofold difference-in-difference research design with one treatment and 
two natural control groups, I find evidence that the exogenous increase in ISS analyst 
coverage results (1) in increasing analyst following, (2) weakly in increasing free float, (3) in 
improvements of firm-level corporate governance, and (4) weakly in decreasing accruals 
manipulations. These findings are robust to endogeneity concerns. Consistent with the paper's 
predictions, they suggest that financial analysts, investors, and managers respond to changes 






in governance analyst coverage. Specifically, the findings imply that financial analysts and 
investors potentially consider governance information provided by governance analysts when 
preparing analyst reports or setting investment strategies, respectively. Moreover, they further 
indicate that both, financial analysts and investors, are potentially able to reduce their costs of 
making informed decisions when relying on information provided by governance analysts. In 
addition, the findings also suggest that managers and directors feel potentially pressured by 
the presence of governance analysts to improve governance quality, if necessary. Overall, the 
paper's findings are consistent with the notion that governance analysts represent 
economically important information intermediaries who enhance the firm’s information 
environment and promote external monitoring to managers. 
Taken together, the findings of this paper contribute to the extant literature in several 
ways. First, this is to my knowledge the first paper to provide evidence on the coverage 
effects of corporate governance analysts. In doing so, it extends research on analysts by 
introducing ‘another’ type of analysts, i.e., non-financial corporate governance analysts, and 
by providing evidence on the interrelations of governance analysts and financial analysts.  
By investigating the role of governance analysts as information intermediaries, my 
paper additionally contributes to at least two related streams of literature; the literature on 
commercial corporate governance ratings and proxy voting advisory, and the literature on the 
governance role of institutional investors. The former stream of literature addresses issues like 
the growth and impact of commercial corporate governance rating vendors (e.g., Rose, 2007), 
the role and regulation as well as the usefulness of proxy advisors (e.g., Ertimur et al., 2013; 
Larcker et al., 2013), or the usefulness of commercial corporate governance ratings to 
investors (e.g., Daines et al., 2010; Hitz and Lehmann, 2013). The majority of prior findings 
on the question of whether proxy advisors or governance rating vendors are valuable for 
investors, however, does not provide evidence in favor of the governance industry (e.g., 
Daines et al., 2010). Thus, the economic vindication of these information intermediaries is 
still a question of debate. Extending this stream of literature, evidence on the coverage effects 
of governance analysts provides additional insights into the usefulness of governance 
advisory on capital markets.  
Prior research on the governance role of institutional investors, for example, 
investigates whether these investors shape the firm’s reporting behavior (e.g., Chung et al., 
2002) or whether they enhance the firm's overall corporate governance structure (e.g., 






Aggarwal et al., 2011). Since governance agencies are primarily paid by institutional 
investors, e.g., mutual funds or public pension funds, in order to enhance the firm’s 
informational environment with respect to governance issues, my paper adds to this research 
by providing evidence on a potential channel in which the presence of such investors might 
affect the firm’s information environment. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 4.2, I provide background 
information pertaining to the corporate governance business. Section 4.3 presents the paper’s 
empirical predictions. Section 4.4 introduces the identification strategy and describes the 
empirical setup. In Section 4.5, I present empirical findings and discuss potential implications 
and additional tests. The last section concludes. 
 
4.2 Background 
Similar to financial analysts or the business press, governance rating vendors and proxy 
advisors represent information intermediaries on capital markets. From an economic 
perspective, information intermediaries “reduce transaction costs in the capital market by 
providing specialized services and gathering and disseminating information” (Healy and 
Palepu, 2002, p. 4). To the extent that governance advisors are able to reduce transaction 
costs, e.g., by providing more accurate or less expensive evaluations of governance quality, 
information provided by these advisors is valuable for capital market participants (Hitz and 
Lehmann, 2013). In a similar vein but based on a specific setting of ‘say on pay’ proxy voting 
recommendations, Ertimur et al. (2013, p. 5) describe the economic role of proxy advisors as 
information intermediaries which process and organize “a substantial amount of executive 
pay information for institutional investors, reducing their cost of making informed decisions”. 
Three prominent governance rating agencies exist internationally: Institutional 
Shareholder Services (ISS), Governance Metrics International (GMI), and The Corporate 
Library (TCL) (e.g., Larcker and Tayan, 2011, p. 437).78
                                                 
78 Based on 600 underlying governance provisions (and seven overall governance categories), GMI provides a 
scoring between one to ten and covers almost 3,400 U.S. and wide range of international firms (Derwall and 
Verwijmeren, 2007). The TCL rating covers over 2,000 U.S. companies and provides letter scoring ranging from 
A to F by using 120 variables based on six categories. In 2010, GMI and TCL announced their merger, and have 
since then combined their products and services (Marketwire, 2010). Audit Integrity, who provided Accounting 
and Governance Risk ratings, is also a part of GMI Ratings. In addition to ISS, GMI, TCL, S&P provides – since 
2007 – the Standard & Poor’s Governance, Accountability, Management Metrics & Analysis’ (GAMMA) score, 
which also picks up - besides governance issues - risk and strategy issues (S&P, 2008). 
 In terms of worldwide coverage, ISS 
is “the most visible governance rating” vendor (Daines et al., 2010, p. 440). It markets 






commercial corporate governance ratings for more than 8,000 firms across 31 countries since 
2002.79
In comparison to the most visible and researched analyst group, namely sell-side equity 
analysts, governance analysts working for governance rating vendors and proxy voting 
advisors are different on several dimensions. They sell different products, deal with a 
different market structure (only few global governance rating vendors operating on an 
effectively unregulated playing field), have different conflicts of interest (e.g., institutional 
investors or other capital market participants hire and pay these analysts but firms are directly 
consulted by them as well), and are rather less involved in direct dealing with firms' 
management (e.g., at analyst conferences or during conference calls). Nevertheless, 
executives and directors perceive both analyst groups as influential. A recent survey based on 
more than 1,000 directors serving on U.S. boards, for example, suggests that survey 
participants perceive governance advisors like ISS as the third most important group 
influencing their boards, after (1) institutional investors and (2) financial analysts, and 
followed by (4) plaintiff’s bar, (5) the media, and (6) activist hedge funds (CBM PwC, 2008). 
 These commercial corporate governance ratings – based on over 60 single governance 
provisions – are commonly available to institutional shareholders or other capital market 
participants via subscription packages which can result in fees of up to $ 100,000 per year 
(Coffin and Collinson, 2005, p. 3). In addition, ISS provides proxy advisory services, i.e., 
governance-related advisory on how to vote on annual general meetings, for over 1,700 
institutional investors managing $ 26 trillion in assets, including 24 of the top 25 mutual 
funds, 25 of the top 25 assets managers, and 17 of the top 25 public pension funds (Daines et 
al., 2010, p. 439). However, the fact that governance advisors like ISS also provide 
governance advisory directly to firms raises concerns about their independence (e.g., Koeng 
and Ueng, 2007, p. 61; Rose, 2007, pp. 891, 906; Vo, 2008, p. 17). In two recent initiatives, 
the European Securities and Markets Authority (2012) and the European Commission (2011, 
p. 15) have shared these concerns outlining potential conflicts of interest in situations “when 
proxy advisors also act as corporate governance consultants to investee companies”.  
 
4.3 Empirical Predictions 
To shed light on the role of governance analysts and their relevance to the capital market, I 
                                                 
79 ISS revised its rating (CGQ) in 2010 and introduced the Governance Risk Indicator (GRId). However, in most 
points the CGQ is not materially different to its successor the GRId rating (Larcker and Tayan, 2011, p. 440). 






investigate potential economic consequences of governance analyst coverage. In particular, I 
focus on two different groups, i.e., (1) financial analysts, (2) investors, as well as on two firm-
level mechanisms, i.e., (3) corporate governance quality, and (4) earnings management, which 
are potentially affected by the presence of governance analysts. 
 
Governance Analysts and Financial Analysts 
Prior literature documents that the number of financial analysts following a firm is increasing 
with the quality of the firm’s information environment (e.g., Bushman et al., 2004, p. 244; 
Lang et al., 2004, p. 589; Baik et al., 2010, p. 170). Jiraporn et al. (2012a, p. 3091-3092), for 
example, predict and find evidence that a “more transparent information environment 
facilitates the analyst’s job” and in turn attracts larger analyst following.80
In particular, transaction cost savings for financial analysts due to governance analyst 
coverage might explain the expected positive relationship between financial analyst following 
and the coverage by governance analysts. As outlined in section 4.2, transaction cost savings 
for financial analysts might appear in the process of gathering governance information and / 
or in the process of enhancing governance information (Healy and Palepu, 2002). This, 
however, implies two points: (1) financial analysts consider governance information when 
preparing analyst reports, and (2) financial analysts are able to reduce their costs of making 
informed decisions (i.e., coverage costs) when relying on governance information produced 
by governance analysts. 
 Thus, to the extent 
that governance analysts are able to enhance the firm’s information environment, the number 
of financial analysts following a firm should increase. 
With respect to the former point, prior literature indeed suggests that financial analysts 
consider governance information when preparing analyst reports or forecasts. Bhat et al. 
(2006, p. 719) predict and find evidence that “analysts who are aware of the effects of the 
weak governance on reporting quality might rely less on the reported financial figures and 
instead use other sources of information” to generate analyst reports and forecasts for weakly 
                                                 
80 However, the relation between analyst following and transparency depends substantially upon the role of 
financial analysts: information intermediary vs. information provider (Lobo et al., 2012, p. 498, 499). The former 
role is consistent with a positive relationship between analyst following and the quality of firms’ information 
environment whereas the latter role implies the opposite. Based on different settings, prior finance and 
accounting literature provides evidence for both (e.g., Lobo et al., 2012, p. 499; Barth et al., 2001, p. 4; Lang et 
al., 2004, p. 589). As my setting is characterized by an exogenous shock in the information environment (i.e., an 
exogenous increase in governance information), I rather expect a positive relationship between financial analyst 
following and firms’ transparency. 






governed firms. Evidence from a recent experiment based on 19 buy-side analysts from the 
U.S. and 17 from the UK underscores the potential effect of governance information on 
financial analysts. Asare et al. (2011, p. 1) show, among other things, that “analysts exhibit 
more certainty in their range forecast when the corporate governance rating is above average, 
relative to below average”. However, it is still unclear whether financial analysts produce 
such governance information ‘in-house’ or whether they actually rely on other information 
intermediaries like, e.g., governance analysts. To the extent that governance analysts provide 
more accurate (in the process of enhancing governance information) and / or less expensive 
(in the process of gathering governance information) evaluations of governance quality, it 
would be rational for financial analysts to rely on governance analysts. Thus, assuming that 
financial analysts directly process information produced by governance analysts, the increase 
in governance analyst coverage potentially affects the financial analysts’ costs to cover a firm, 
holding everything else constant (e.g., market size, firm disclosure, etc.). In particular, it is 
plausible to assume that the marginal costs to cover a firm are decreasing with the financial 
analysts’ ability to efficiently allocate monitoring resources based on information which is 
indicative of firms’ governance deficiencies.81
Consequently, evidence on whether or not governance analysts contribute to the quality 
of firms’ information environment is reflected in changes of financial analyst following due to 
the increase in governance analyst coverage. I thus predict that governance analyst coverage 
is positively associated with the number of financial analysts following a firm (Prediction I). 
 Decreasing marginal coverage costs might in 
turn increase the number of firms covered by financial analysts. This would be consistent 
again with the aforementioned argument that improvements in the quality of firm’s 
(governance related) information environment attract larger financial analyst followings.   
 
Governance Analysts and Investors 
Assuming that institutional investors base (at least partly) investment decisions on third-party 
governance evaluations (e.g., Rose, 2007, p. 898), an increase in governance analyst coverage 
should affect the ownership structure of the respective firms. For one reason, institutional 
                                                 
81 This is consistent with Mohanram and Sunder (2006), who predict and find evidence that the introduction of 
Regulation FD in the U.S. results in decreasing financial analyst coverage (i.e., declining number of financial 
analysts following a firm) due to detrimental effects on the financial analysts’ information processing costs. 
Specifically, Mohanram and Sunder (2006, p. 498) argue that Regulation FD leads to a higher workload of 
analysts per covered firm and thus promotes declining analyst coverage. 






investors are potentially more willing to invest in these firms due to an increase in the firm’s 
information environment. In terms of monitoring, investors might find it less costly to 
monitor firms due to a more efficient allocation of monitoring resources based on information 
which is indicative of firms’ governance deficiencies.  
Consequently, holding smaller investments and owning less control rights might 
become less expensive due to decreasing marginal monitoring costs which in turn potentially 
promote investments by institutional shareholders and other investors. Therefore, more 
favorable investment opportunities together with an increasing coverage by financial analysts 
should result in increasing free float (respectively in decreasing shares of block holders). 
Alternatively, increasing coverage by governance analysts might simply attract the attention 
of institutional investors which subsequently invest in these newly covered firms. Rose (2007, 
p. 130), for example, notes that governance advisory services potentially play a role in the 
investment managers’ diligence process when setting investment strategies. In any event, both 
rationales lead to the conclusion that governance analyst coverage potentially promotes 
investment opportunities and thus increases free float. Consequently, I conjecture that 
governance analyst coverage is positively associated with a firm’s free float (Prediction II). 
 
Governance Analysts and Governance Quality 
In the course of governance analyst coverage, firms are most likely aware of the presence of 
such analysts. Within the data collection process ISS, for example, provides all covered firms 
with a unique account number and password to check and review the collected ISS 
governance data. This in turn allows these firms to comment on the coding of the single 
governance provisions. ISS “will [then] review the comments, fact check each requested data 
point change [and] correct/update the profile as necessary” (RiskMetrics, 2007, p. 3). In 
addition, ISS offers all covered firms access to a fee-based governance service (e.g., Rose, 
2007, p. 902). This service provides tools to illustrate how changes in the firm’s governance 
structure affect the respective CGQ rating. Moreover, it enables firms to perform benchmark 
and peer-group analyses. 
Furthermore, board members are potentially responsive to third-party governance 
evaluations. Evidence from a recent survey based on more than 1,000 directors serving on 
U.S. boards conducted by Corporate Board Member and PricewaterhouseCoopers in 2008 
underscores this. As outlined in section 4.2, the survey participants perceive governance 






advisors like ISS as the third most important group influencing their boards, after (1) 
institutional investors and (2) financial analysts, and followed by (4) plaintiff’s bar, (5) the 
media, and (6) activist hedge funds (CBM PwC, 2008, p. 11). In a supplement study 
conducted in 2009, 62% of the interviewed directors state that “published governance ratings 
will increase a board member’s focus and 45% say [that] positive governance ratings help [to] 
attract investors” (CBM PwC, 2009, p. 7). In a similar vein, Larcker and Tayan (2011, p. 433) 
note that “interviews with firms suggest that both executives and board members feel 
pressured to change their policies to increase their governance ratings”. Even though these 
findings are based on U.S. executives and directors, it is plausible to assume that the coverage 
by governance analysts might induce pressure on UK executives to improve the firm’s 
governance quality, if necessary. Moreover, increasing investments by institutional investors 
– as predicted above (Prediction II) – might put pressure on the firm’s management as well to 
improve governance quality, if necessary. Based on an international sample of firms from 23 
countries between the years 2003 and 2008, Aggarwal et al. (2011), for example, show that 
institutional shareholders actively promote firm-level corporate governance quality. I thus 
conjecture that governance analyst coverage is positively associated with the quality of a 
firm’s governance structures (Prediction III).  
 
Governance Analysts and Earnings Management 
Finally, I investigate whether improvements in outside monitoring (as potentially reflected in 
increasing financial analyst following and increasing institutional holdings) and firm-level 
corporate governance structures due to the coverage by governance analysts are reflected in 
increasing accounting quality (respectively decreasing earnings management).  
Prior literature on corporate governance and earnings management assumes almost 
unanimously a constraining role of corporate governance. Following Dechow et al. (1996, p. 
4), the rationale behind this is that “[i]nternal governance processes are established to 
maintain the credibility of firms’ financial statements and safeguard against such behavior as 
earnings manipulation”. However, the empirical findings are rather mixed (e.g., Klein, 2002; 
Brown et al., 2011, p. 151; Dechow et al., 2010, p. 382; Larcker et al., 2007). In contrast, 
prior studies on financial analysts suggest that external monitors – like financial analysts – are 
potentially more effective in constraining earnings management than internal governance 
mechanisms (Yu, 2008, p. 248; Bolton et al., 2005, p. 7). These studies argue that in most 






cases earnings management is rather driven by an agency conflict between current and future 
shareholders and not between managers and shareholders.82
 
 Empirical evidence appears to be 
consistent with that. Prior literature documents a negative relationship between the number of 
financial analysts following a firm as well as the coverage by these analysts and earnings 
management (e.g., Yu, 2008; Degeorge et al., 2013a). Recent studies employing natural 
experiments based on brokerage house mergers and closures provide evidence for a causal 
relationship between financial analyst coverage and the firm’s extent of earnings management 
(e.g., Irani and Oesch, 2013; Chen et al., 2013). In addition, research on the role of 
institutional investors suggests that these investors are potentially able to shape the firm’s 
reporting behavior. Chung et al. (2002), for example, predict and find evidence that the 
presence of large institutional shareholdings constrains managers to engage in opportunis-
tically driven earnings management. Since governance analysts presumably affect financial 
analysts, investors, and governance quality (Predictions I, II, and III), I finally expect that 
governance analyst coverage is negatively associated with the extent of a firm’s earnings 
management (Prediction IV). 
4.4 Research Design 
4.4.1 Identification Strategy 
Based on ISS’s UK data, I measure the coverage by governance analysts on the dimension of 
whether or not ISS provides governance reports and commercial corporate governance ratings 
(CGQ ratings) to UK firms. It is plausible to assume, however, that ISS’s decision to cover a 
firm, i.e., to provide the CGQ rating, depends on firm characteristics like institutional 
ownership or index membership and is thus endogenous in nature. ISS states that, in 
particular, index membership – MSCI EAFE for non-US companies as well as FTSE All 
Share Index for UK firms – is an important criterion of coverage (RiskMetrics, 2007, p. 4; 
RiskMetrics, 2009, p. 1; Aggarwal et al., 2009, pp. 3140-3141). As these firm characteristics 
are in turn most likely related to my outcome variables, i.e., analyst following, free float, 
governance quality, and accounting quality, ordinary OLS results are potentially biased. 
                                                 
82 Yu (2008, p. 248) notes that “current shareholders could choose to incentivize management for short-term 
stock performance, even with the understanding that this creates incentives […] to manipulate earnings”. 






To address this problem and to provide inferences beyond mere descriptions83, I exploit 
the unique data structure of ISS coverage in the UK. From 2004 to 2005, ISS coverage in the 
UK exhibits an unusual and strong increase of almost 154%. In comparison, the average 
absolute change of the remaining top five “ISS coverage countries” was around 20% between 
these two years whereas the average absolute change of all remaining 15 European “ISS 
coverage countries” was even lower with around 13%. At the end of 2004, ISS together with 
FTSE developed different governance-related stock indices, with one of them explicitly 
focusing on the UK market (besides indices for the Japanese and the U.S. markets84).85 
However, in order to construct the UK specific stock index with a sufficient firm base, ISS 
decided to enlarge the UK ISS coverage in 2005 from 209 to 530 firms (FTSE ISS CGI, 2005, 
pp. 4, 21; Beckley et al., 2005, p. 15).86
From an econometrician’s perspective, this in turn implies that the increase of ISS 
coverage in the UK between the years 2004 and 2005 is exogenously caused by the joint stock 
indices project between ISS and FTSE, and not endogenously determined by a change in 
certain firm characteristics such as index membership or institutional holdings. Thus, by 
exploiting the exogenous shock setting, the UK sample provides a useful setting to investigate 
the effects of ISS governance analyst coverage. 
  
Table 4 - 1 provides an overview of the ISS 
coverage rates across the top five countries ISS is covering (Panel A and B) as well as 
detailed information on the paper's identification strategy (Panel C and D).    
To exploit the exogenous shock setting, I employ a twofold difference-in-difference 
(DiD) design based on one treatment and two natural control groups. First, I use all sample 
firms which are not followed by ISS analysts as my first control sample (this control group 
contains on average the smallest firms in the market). Additionally, I use all firm-year 
                                                 
83 In a recent survey paper on “Causal Inference in Empirical Archival Financial Accounting Research”, Gassen 
(2013, p. 3) states that “positivistic empirical studies that aim beyond description should allow the reader to 
conclude whether the observed effect is likely to be caused by the mechanism proposed by the study, or, in short: 
they should allow for causal inference […]”. 
84 On the aggregated level, the joint project considered the FTSE ISS Developed CGI, the FTSE ISS Europe 
CGI, and the FTSE ISS Euro CGI (FTSE ISS CGI, 2005, p. 21). In addition, the joint project explicitly focused 
on the UK market, the US market, and the Japanese market to release single market indices. 
85 In May 2005, ISS acquired the European governance advisory firm Deminor Ratings. However, the coverage 
of Deminor ratings was even smaller or in some instances identical to the coverage of ISS before 2005. Thus, the 
increase of ISS coverage after 2005 in the UK is not an outcome of a mere addition of both coverage levels.  
86 I am grateful to Paul Wanner (former Director of Corporate Governance Ratings at RiskMetrics / ISS) and 
Mark Brockway (Director of ISS Corporate Services at MSCI / ISS) for comments on the ISS coverage and the 
final clarification of the respective increase in UK coverage between 2004 and 2005. According to both of them, 
ISS’s engagement in a “joint global corporate governance ratings and index project” with the explicit focus on 
the UK market was the primary catalyst for the unusual and strong increase in ISS coverage in the UK between 
2004 and 2005. 






observations which were constantly covered after the exogenous shock event in 2005, but not 
in the period before as my treatment sample. My indicator variable measuring ISS coverage 
(POST×TREATED) takes the value of one if the firm belongs to the treatment group in the 
period after 2005, and zero otherwise. Empirically implemented in a regression model, the 
DiD design underlying my indicator variable (POST×TREATED) combined with a 
comprehensive set of fixed-effects and firm control variables assures a proper identification. 
Second, corresponding to the approach described above, I use the identical treatment 
sample. In contrast to the previous approach, my indicator variable measuring ISS coverage 
(ANTE×TREATED) takes the value of one if the firm belongs to the treatment group prior to 
the year 2005, and zero otherwise. Consequently, my control group differs from the previous 
approach as well. I use all sample firms which were constantly covered by ISS analysts as my 
second control sample (this control group contains on average the largest firms in the market). 
Therefore, ANTE×TREATED indicates – in contrast to the previously defined indicator 
variable – the non-coverage by governance analysts. Similar to the first approach, the DiD 
design underlying my second indicator variable (ANTE×TREATED) efficiently addresses 
endogeneity concerns in a regression framework as well. 
In terms of treatment assignments, this setting, however, constitutes a quasi-natural 
experiment rather than a pure natural experiment. Specifically, it is most likely that the 
treatment assignments are not random. Similar to other natural experimental settings, like, for 
example, brokerage house mergers or closures exploited by recent studies on sell-side equity 
analysts (Irani and Oesch, 2013; Chen et al., 2013; Degeorge et al., 2013b), it is plausible to 
assume that the treatment assignments are to some extent size related. In the current research 
design as outlined below, I mitigate a potential size effect by using two different control 
groups (a first control group with smaller firms and a second control group with larger firms), 
treatment and firm-fixed effects, as well as size related firm control variables within the DiD 
regressions. As the UK specific governance-related stock index was maintained until January 
2008, regressions based on the second control group further rule out that my findings are 
driven by the exogenous event (i.e., joint index project) itself. As the firms of the second 
control group (i.e., the largest firms in the market) become also eligible to the UK joint stock 
index project, results based on this second control group are robust to potential effects of the 
joint index project on my outcome variables and thus assure the exogeneity of my quasi-
natural experimental setting. 






Table 4 - 1: Identification Strategy and Regression Samples 
Panel A. ISS Coverage 
ISS Firm coverage 







U.S.87 1  4,776 5,202 5,152 4,853 4,624 24,607 9,175 50.40% 
Abs. change (|%|)   8.92% 0.96% 5.80% 4.72% 20.40%   
ISS Firm coverage 







Japan 2 501 510 589 600 600 2,800 3,668 16.36% 
Abs. change (|%|)   1.80% 15.49% 1.87% 0.00% 19.15%   
UK 3 205 209 530 525 526 1,995 1,890 27.83% 
Abs. change (|%|)   1.95% 153.59% 0.94% 0.19% 156.67%   
Canada 4 199 186 168 194 196 943 3,364 5.83% 
Abs. change (|%|)   6.53% 9.68% 15.48% 1.03% 32.72%   
Australia 5 86 83 119 120 119 527 1,957 6.08% 
Abs. change (|%|)   3.49% 43.37% 0.84% 0.83% 48.54%   
Panel B. Sample Distribution & ISS Coverage (based on sample as outlined in Table 4 - 2) 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 ∑ (’04-’06) 
Sample 418 441 470 486 488 1,397 
ISS Coverage (abs) 93 90 251 237 220 578 
ISS Coverage (%) 22.25 20.41 53.40 48.77 45.08 41.37 
Delta in ISS Coverage (|%|) 3.22 178.89 5.58 7.17  
Panel C. Sample Partitioning to Separate the ISS Coverage Effect: DiD-Model (1)   
   
Sample Period between 2004 and 2006 




CONTROL Group (1):  
Benchmark firms which are not covered by ISS during the sample period  
(firm-year N=701) 
 
     
ISS Coverage 




2005 and 2007) 
 
Firms that got treated in 2005  
(firm-year obs. for ‘04: N=118) 
 
 (POST×TREATED): 
Firms that got treated in 2005  
(firm-year obs. for ‘05 and ‘06: N=248) 
 Yes Constantly Firms which are constantly covered by ISS between 2004 and 2006 (firm-year N=192) 
     
Panel D. Sample Partitioning to Separate the ISS Coverage Effect: DiD-Model (2)  
   
Sample Period between 2004 and 2006 
  2004 2005 2006 
 No - Benchmark firms which are not covered by ISS during the sample period  (firm-year N=701) 
     
ISS Coverage 




2005 and 2007) 
 
 (ANTE×TREATED):  
Firms that got treated in 2005  
(firm-year obs. for ‘04: N=118) 
Firms that got treated in 2005 




CONTROL Group (2):  
Benchmark firms which are constantly covered by ISS between 2004 and 2006 
(firm-year N=192) 
 
     
Notes: The “wscope sample” numbers are based on the “Worldscope Coverage” Guide as of February 2013 
                                                 
87 U.S. CGQ coverage data is inferred from the CGQ data provided by Aggarwal et al. (2011). 






(available online from the Datastream Extranet) and represent the total number of active firms in the 
respective country Worldscope Universe. Identification strategy to exploit the exogenous shock in the UK 
ISS coverage is based on a twofold difference-in-difference (DiD) research design (with one treatment and 
two natural control groups). 
 
4.4.2 Regression Models 
To empirically implement the twofold DiD approach as outlined in section 4.4.1, I use the 
following regression design: 
VIit =  γ1 + γ2TREATEDit + γ3POST × TREATEDit + � γ4FIRM_CONTROLit + � γ5YEARit
+ � γ6INDUSTRYit + ε 
(1) 
VIit =  γ1 + γ2TREATEDit + γ3ANTE × TREATEDit + � γ4FIRM_CONTROLit + � γ5YEARit
+ � γ6INDUSTRYit + ε 
(2) 
The idea behind both regression models is to compare for a given variable of interest 
(VI) the changes in the treatment group around the exogenous event to the corresponding 
changes in the non-treated control group (e.g., Irani and Oesch, 2013, p. 402). As outlined in 
section 4.3, I employ different variables of interest (VI) as my left-hand side variables (i.e., 
proxies of financial analyst following, free float, governance quality, and earnings 
management). Furthermore, and as described in section 4.4.1, both regression models are 
based on the same treatment group (i.e., all firm-year observations which were constantly 
covered after 2005, but not in the period before), but differ in the underlying control group. 
Regression model (1) uses all sample firms which are not followed by ISS analysts as the 
underlying control group, whereas model (2) uses firms constantly covered by ISS as control 
firms. Evidence on whether or not the exogenous shock in ISS coverage results in certain 
differences (similarities) between the treatment firms and the constantly non-covered 
(constantly covered) firms, is reflected in the variable POST×TREATED 
(ANTE×TREATED), which indicates all firms in the treatment group after (before) 2005. 
This twofold DiD design combined with firm controls and fixed-effect structures efficiently 
addresses endogeneity concerns and allows for causal inferences. 
In each regression model, TREATED is a dummy variable indicating the treatment 
group. Depending on the underlying control group, the coefficient estimates on the variables 
POST×TREATED and ANTE×TREATED capture the DiD effect. Consistent with the first, 
second, and third prediction, I expect that the coefficient estimate on POST×TREATED 






(ANTE×TREATED) obtains a positive (negative) sign and becomes significant at 
conventional levels in the respective regression model. In line with the fourth prediction, I 
expect a significantly negative (positive) coefficient estimate on POST×TREATED 
(ANTE×TREATED) in the earnings management regressions. FIRM_CONTROL is a 
regression model specific vector of firm characteristics which potentially affect the respective 
left-hand side variable. To control for year- and industry-fixed effects, I include dummies for 
different years and different first-digit SIC industry sectors. Alternatively to industry-fixed 
effects and the inclusion of TREATED, I additionally estimate the regressions with firm-fixed 
effects (e.g., Irani and Oesch, 2013, p. 402). In all regression models, the standard errors are 
heteroskedasticity robust (White, 1980) and one-way clustered at the firm level (Gow et al., 
2010; Petersen 2009). 
 
4.4.3 Variables Measurement 
Analogous to the stated predictions in section 4.3, I use the following variables of interest 
(VI) as my left-hand side variables: number of analysts following a firm (AF), free float of a 
firm (FF), corporate governance quality score (GOV) provided by ASSET488
In line with prior literature (e.g., Bhushan, 1989, p. 268; O’Brien and Bhushan, 1990, 
pp. 59-62; Lang et al., 2004, pp. 605-606; Jiraporn et al., 2012a, p. 3095), I consider a variety 
of firm control variables in the financial analyst following (AF) regression: blue chip index 
membership (FTSE100), availability of alternative governance information (asset4 coverage), 
capital intensity (property, plant, and equipment to total assets), volatility of business 
(standard deviation of cash from operations), stock price volatility (standard deviation of 
monthly stock returns), brokerage commission (inverse stock price), accounting performance 
(ROA), growth (book-to-market ratio), institutional investors (pension funds holdings), 
ownership concentration (closely held shares), size (log of total assets), and leverage (total 
debt to total assets).  
, and absolute 
discretionary accruals (ADAC) measuring earnings management (respectively accounting 
quality) as outlined in section 4.4.4. 
                                                 
88 I use the ASSET4 governance score to evaluate the governance quality of the treatment group before and after 
the coverage by ISS analysts (for more information on ASSET4, see, e.g., Mackenzie et al., 2013, p. 502; Lys et 
al., 2012, p. 9). However, due to data restrictions in the ASSET4 database I run the governance regression only 
on a subsample (with respect to treatment and control group) and only on the second DiD model (with 
ANTE×TREATED as the main interest variable). 






In the free float (FF) regression model, I follow the first (AF) regression specification, 
but replace closely held shares, pension funds holding, book-to-market ratio, capital intensity, 
standard deviation of cash from operations, and brokerage commission with analyst following 
and dividends per share (e.g., Van der Elst, 2004, pp. 427, 438; Richter and Weiss, 2013, pp. 
6-7).  
To specify the governance (GOV) regression model, I follow Beiner et al. (2006, pp. 
253-254) and control for size (log of total assets), growth (one-year change in net sales), 
accounting performance (return-on-assets), blue chip index membership (FTSE100), and firm 
valuation (Tobin’s Q). In addition, I consider analyst following, institutional investments 
(pension funds holdings), ownership concentration (closely held shares), and leverage (total 
debt to total assets). 
In line with prior earnings management studies (e.g., Klein, 2002, p. 388; Koh et al., 
2007, pp. 318-319; Bowen et al., 2009, pp. 367-371), I include the following control variables 
in the discretionary accruals (ADAC) regression: size (log of total assets), blue chip index 
membership (FTSE100), analyst following, availability of alternative governance information 
(asset4 coverage), institutional investments (pension funds holdings), ownership 
concentration (closely held shares), loss reporting, cash from operations, and leverage (total 
debt to total assets).89
 
  
4.4.4 Discretionary Accruals 
Discretionary accruals are estimated on an extended cross-sectional modified Jones model 
based on the cash flow approach and total accruals (e.g., Garcia Lara et al., 2012, p. 12; 
Botsari and Meeks, 2008; Hribar and Collins, 2002). To control for growth characteristics 
(Collins et al., 2012) and firm performance (Kothari et al., 2005), I include growth and one-
year lagged ROA as additional explanatory variables in the model. Overall, I estimate 
discretionary accruals for each two-digit SIC industry group and year by the following 
regression model based on all available non-financial UK Worldscope firms (with at least 15 
observations per industry-year group): 
                                                 
89 Consistent with Larcker et al. (2007, p. 987), I do not control for growth opportunities and performance within 
the ADAC regression model since my ADACs are orthogonal to growth and performance due to the applied 
estimation model. However, when considering additionally ROA and growth in the basic regression model the 
main inferences remain unaffected. For detailed information and definitions of all variables used in this study, 
see Appendix 4 - 1. 






TACit TAit−1⁄ = β1 + β2(1 TAit−1⁄ ) + β3[(ΔREVit TAit−1⁄ ) − (ΔRECit TAit−1⁄ )]
+ β4(PPEit/TAit−1) + β4(GROWTHit) + β5(ROAit−1) + εi 
(3) 
The dependent variable TAC stands for total accruals and is obtained directly from the 
cash flow statement (total accruals as net income minus cash from operations). ΔREV stands 
for changes in revenues, ΔREC represents changes in receivables, PPE is property, plant and 
equipment, GROWTH measures current one-year growth in sales, ROA stands for return-on-
assets. The residuals of regression model (3) are the discretionary accruals (DAC). 
 
4.5 Results  
4.5.1 Sample Selection 
The sample covers – with the UK market – the largest European and worldwide – after the 
U.S. and Japan – the third largest country90 in which ISS offers commercial corporate 
governance ratings and proxy voting advisory. Therefore, the initial sample is based on all 
listed firms available in the UK Worldscope database. The sample period covers the years 
between 2004 and 2006.91
Table 4 - 2
 After applying certain selection criteria (e.g., dropping firms with 
missing accounting data, or firms from financial industry, or firms with no financial analyst 
following), the sample consists of 1,397 firm-year observations with an ISS coverage quote of 
41.37%.  summarizes the sample selection procedure and provides further details 
on the sample composition. 
Table 4 - 2: Sample Selection 
Panel A. Selection Criteria   
Selection Criteria  Observations 
Start (Worldscope UK Universe from 2004-2006)  7,413 
Firms in financial industry (SIC 60-69) -2,235 5,178 
Datastream / Worldscope data unavailable (to estimate DAC)  -1,058 4,120 
Two-digit SIC-year-country min. requirement: >15 obs. (to estimate DAC) -951 3,169 
Datastream / Worldscope / IBES data unavailable (to specify control VAR) -1,138 2,031 
Firms without at least one financial analyst following -634 1,397 
Final Sample (firm-year observations between 2004-2006):  1,397 
 
 
                                                 
90 In terms of number of firms covered by ISS (see Table 4 - 1). 
91 Using alternative sample periods, e.g., without the exogenous shock year (sample is based on 2004 and 2006 
only), or without the year after the exogenous shock (sample is based on 2004 and 2005 only) does not alter my 
main inferences. 






4.5.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4 - 3 presents descriptive statistics of all variables used in this study based on different 
subsamples. Panel A (Panel B) of Table 4 - 3 covers separately the samples of the treatment 
group and both control groups before (after) the exogenous shock in ISS coverage in 2005. 
Consistent with the paper’s identification strategy, firms in both groups – the treatment and 
the first control group – are not covered by ISS analysts before 2005. In addition, firms 
belonging to the second control group are constantly covered by ISS analysts over the whole 
sample period from 2004 to 2006. Reflecting the exogenous shock in ISS coverage, firms in 
the treatment group are not covered before 2005 but constantly afterwards. Overall, firms 
across all three subsamples (treatment, control 1, and control 2) differ on various dimensions. 
In contrast to the first (second) control group, firms in the treatment sample, for example, 
have, on average, higher (lower) analyst following, higher free float, higher absolute 
discretionary accruals, higher (lower) pension funds holdings, lower (higher) ownership 
concentration, and higher (lower) total assets in the year prior to the exogenous shock (Panel 
A of Table 4 - 3). 
Table 4 - 3: Descriptive Analysis 
Panel A: Sample Period: 2004 (prior to the exogenous shock in ISS coverage) 
Variables 
Treatment Group (N=118) 
(No ISS coverage prior to 
2005 but constant coverage 
afterwards) 
Control Group 1 (N=233) 
(No ISS coverage at all) 
Control Group 2 (N=64) 
(Constant ISS coverage) 
Mean Min (Max) Mean Min (Max) Mean Min (Max) 
ISS Coverage 0 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 1 1 (1) 
Dependent Variables 
Analyst Following (AF) 4.06 1 (12) 2.53 1 (19) 11.75 1 (34) 
Free Float (FF) 54.09 7 (97) 54.96 8 (100) 60.76 30 (90) 
ASSET4 GOV Score (GOV)* 54.20 18 (91) - - 75.12 31 (96) 
Disc. Accruals (ADAC) .0703 0 (.25) .0668 0 (.54) .0666 0 (.27) 
Independent Variables 
Index Membership (FTSE100) .0254 0 (1) .0042 0 (1) .3906 0 (1) 
ASSET4_COV .4406 0 (1) .0386 0 (1) .6250 0 (1) 
Pension Funds (PF) 2.88 0 (15) 1.71 0 (19) 3.32 1 (9) 
Ownership (OWNER) 22.36 .08 (79) 32.73 .06 (88) 11.51 .02 (56) 
Log Total Assets (SIZE) 12.44 9.27 (14.9) 11.11 7.49 (15) 14.60 11.3 (19.2) 
Delta Sales (GROWTH) .1306 -.55 (.88) .1416 -1 (8.67) .0565 -.39 (.54) 
Leverage (LEV) .1506 0 (.47) .1608 0 (.81) .2515 0 (.58) 
Cash from Operations (CFO) .0884 -.77 (.37) .0354 -1.35 (.95) .0967 -.12 (.32) 
Capital Intensity (PPE_TA) .2621 .01 (.94) .2433 0 (2.55) .2834 .01 (.85) 
Return-on-Assets (ROA) .0670 -.89 (.38) .0019 -1.32 (.35) .0684 -.30 (.32) 
Book-to-Market (BTM) .6457 -1.2 (5.6) .5515 -4.6 (3.4) .4387 -.35 (2.8) 
Log Tobin’s Q (Q) .5684 -.29 (2.4) .4589 -.57 (2.4) .5186 -.28 (1.9) 
Volatility of CFO (SD_CFO) .0629 .01 (.28) .0938 0 (.77) .0384 .01 (.14) 
Volatility of SR (SD_STOCK) .1092 .02 (.31) .1354 .03 (.54) .1203 .03 (.62) 
Inverse Stock Price (BC) -11.55 -1005 (-.14) -2.20 -96 (-.02) -4.12 -18 (-.52) 
Dividend per Shares (DPS) .3199 0 (29) .0617 0 (4.3) .1224 0 (.71) 










Table 4 - 3: Descriptive Analysis (continued) 
Panel B: Sample Period: 2005-2006 (after the exogenous shock in ISS coverage) 
Variables 
Treatment Group (N=248) 
(No ISS coverage prior to 
2005 but constant coverage 
afterwards) 
Control Group 1 (N=468) 
(No ISS coverage at all) 
Control Group 2 (N=128) 
(Constant ISS coverage) 
Mean Min (Max) Mean Min (Max) Mean Min (Max) 
ISS Coverage 1 1 (1) 0 0 (0) 1 1 (1) 
Dependent Variables 
Analyst Following (AF) 5.47 1 (24) 1.82 1 (16) 11.74 1 (42) 
Free Float (FF) 58.78 12 (100) 55.48 6 (100) 61.66 21 (100) 
ASSET4 GOV Score (GOV)* 58.86 10 (92) - - 70.31 26 (96) 
Disc. Accruals (ADAC) .0556 0 (.51) .0952 0 (.55) .0514 0 (.19) 
Independent Variables 
Index Membership (FTSE100) .0403 0 (1) .0064 0 (1) .3828 0 (1) 
ASSET4_COV .4556 0 (1) .0235 0 (1) .7812 0 (1) 
Pension Funds (PF) 1.55 0 (71) .5662 0 (20) 1.32 0 (6) 
Ownership (OWNER) 21.20 1 (89) 35.52 .02 (98) 14.42 .01 (56) 
Log Total Assets (SIZE) 12.57 9.2 (19) 10.44 6.7 (15.3) 14.58 10.9 (19.1) 
Delta Sales (GROWTH) .1703 -.74 (5.8) .2413 -.78 (12.1) .0460 -.91 (1.51) 
Leverage (LEV) .1759 0 (1.33) .1429 0 (1.60) .2516 0 (1.17) 
Cash from Operations (CFO) .0901 -.66 (.37) .0146 -1.8 (.34) .0849 -.35 (.29) 
Capital Intensity (PPE_TA) .2401 0 (.94) .1803 0 (.96) .2586 0 (.92) 
Return-on-Assets (ROA) .0792 -1.09 (.48) -.0280 -2.5 (.71) .0834 -.42 (.38) 
Book-to-Market (BTM) .4932 -4.5 (4.9) .6181 -1.2 (11.7) .3775 -.42 (2.1) 
Log Tobin’s Q (Q) .6572 -.32 (2.41) .5623 -.59 (2.41) .5754 -.36 (1.55) 
Volatility of CFO (SD_CFO) .0629 .01 (.29) .1514 0 (9.6) .0390 0 (.14) 
Volatility of SR (SD_STOCK) .0857 .03 (.32) .1239 .02 (1.0) .0738 .02 (.19) 
Inverse Stock Price (BC) -16.86 -1777 (-.06) -2.73 -445 (-.01) -4.93 -28.2 (-.28) 
Dividend per Shares (DPS) .3621 0 (36) .0251 0 (.46) .1405 0 (.9) 
Loss reporting (LOSS) .1814 0 (1) .3846 0 (1) .1953 0 (1) 
Notes: *The sample size w.r.t. ASSET4 GOV score is restricted (Panel A: Treatment sample N = 40 & 
Control Group 2 sample N = 52; Panel B: Treatment sample N = 113 & Control Group 2 sample N = 100). 
This table displays the descriptive statistics of all variables used on this study. For details on the sample 
selection process, see Table 4 - 2. For variable definition, see Appendix 4 - 1. 
 
Comparisons of the differences in the differences across the treatment and both control 
groups before and after the exogenous shock event allow for first descriptive evidence on the 
role of governance analysts. In particular, for firms in the treatment group, mean values for 
analyst following (+1.41 analyst), for free float (+4.69 percentage points), and for governance 
quality (+4.66 percentage points), are increasing after the exogenous shock, whereas the 
average absolute discretionary accruals (-1.47 percentage points) is decreasing.92 In line with 
the paper’s first three predictions, firms in both control groups do not experience, on average, 
a similar increase in analyst following, free float and governance quality.93
                                                 
92 Control Group 1: analyst following (-0.71 analyst), for free float (+0.52 percentage points), and discretionary 
accruals (+2.84 percentage points). Control Group 2: analyst following (-0.01 analyst), for free float (+0.90 
percentage points), for governance quality (-4.81 percentage points), and absolute discretionary accruals (-1.52 
percentage points). 
 Changes in 
absolute discretionary accruals across both control groups, however, reveal a mixed picture. 
Firms in the first control group exhibit an increase in absolute discretionary accruals (+2.84 
percentage points), whereas firms in the second control group experience a similar decrease in 
93 Owing to data restrictions in the ASSET4 database, differences in differences on the governance dimension 
are only observable between the treatment group and the second control group (i.e., constantly covered firms). 






absolute discretionary accruals (-1.52 percentage points) as the treated firms after the 
exogenous shock. However, since these results do not consider the DiD design in a frame-
work with fixed-effects and firm controls, the above stated inferences are only tentative.      
Table 4 - 4: Correlation Analysis 
Sample  
(N=1,397) 
Non-parametric Spearman Correlations 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
ISS_COV 1 1           
              
AF 2 0.619 1          
   (0.00)           
FF 3 0.083 0.035 1         
   (0.00) (0.19)          
GOV* 4 0.239 0.358 0.031 1        
   (0.00) (0.00) (0.54)         
ADAC 5 -0.151 -0.197 -0.036 -0.035 1       
   (0.00) (0.00) (0.17) (0.50)        
FSTE100 6 0.314 0.421 0.069 0.313 -0.125 1      
   (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)       
ASSET4_COV 7 0.503 0.627 0.112 - -0.160 0.424 1     
   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) - (0.00) (0.00)      
PF 8 0.132 0.348 -0.289 0.116 -0.057 0.122 0.190 1    
   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00)     
OWNER 9 -0.367 -0.442 -0.363 -0.195 0.104 -0.239 -0.409 -0.274 1   
   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
SIZE 10 0.641 0.813 0.107 0.442 -0.212 0.443 0.658 0.365 -0.462 1  
   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   
LEV 11 0.226 0.304 0.031 0.066 -0.143 0.193 0.238 0.130 -0.170 0.430 1 
   (0.00) (0.00) (0.25) (0.20) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
ROA 12 0.226 0.295 -0.019 -0.011 -0.171 0.164 0.288 0.060 -0.076 0.246 -0.018 
   (0.00) (0.00) (0.47) (0.83) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.51) 
Notes: *The sample size w.r.t. ASSET4 GOV score is restricted (N = 387). This table reports non-parametric 
Spearman correlation coefficients. For detailed information and definitions of the variables, see Appendix 4 - 1. 
Reported values: coefficients (p-values). 
 
Complementing the descriptive statistics, Table 4 - 4 provides non-parametric Spearman 
correlation coefficients based on the initial sample of 1,397 firm-year observations. In the 
absence of any subsample and DiD analyses, I observe that the coverage by ISS governance 
analysts (ISS_COV) is significantly and positively (negatively) correlated with analyst 
following, and free float, governance quality (absolute discretionary accruals). In addition, 
analyst following, free float, and governance quality are likewise negatively correlated with 
absolute discretionary accruals, yet, not in all cases on a statistically meaningful level.94
 
  
4.5.3 Regression Results 
Table 4 - 5 presents the main regression results along the paper’s predictions. Consistent with 
                                                 
94 In response to some high correlation coefficients (e.g., between SIZE and AF), I perform multicollinearity 
tests for all explanatory variables used in the regression models. In particular, the Variance Inflation Factors 
(VIF) do not exceed 3.27 in the DiD regressions implying that my inferences are not affected by 
multicollinearity concerns (e.g., Gujarati, 2003, p. 362). 






the first prediction that the exogenous shock in ISS coverage causes an increase in analyst 
following, the coefficient estimates on POST×TREATED (ANTE×TREATED) obtain a 
positive (negative) sign and become significant at conventional levels in both specifications, 
with and without firm fixed effects (Panel A, Table 4 - 5). Prediction 2, in contrast, is 
supported only by the first DiD regression model (‘Treatment & Control 1’). Although both 
coefficient estimates reflecting the DiD effect, POST×TREATED and ANTE×TREATED, 
obtain the expected sign in the free float regression, only the former becomes significant at 
conventional levels (Panel B, Table 4 - 5). Since the coverage of ASSET4 governance data is 
limited, Prediction 3 is only tested on the second DiD regression model (‘Treatment & 
Control 2’) with a restricted sample size. In line with the third prediction that the exogenous 
shock in ISS coverage causes improvements in firm-level governance quality, the coefficient 
estimates on ANTE×TREATED obtain a negative sign and become significant at 
conventional levels in both specifications, with and without firm-fixed effects (Panel C, Table 
4 - 5). Finally, Panel D presents the corresponding results for the earnings management DiD 
regressions. Similar to the free float findings, Prediction 4 is only supported by the first DiD 
regression model (‘Treatment & Control 1’). Again, both coefficient estimates reflecting the 
DiD effect obtain the expected sign in the earnings management regression. However, only 
the coefficient estimates on POST×TREATED become significant at conventional levels 
(Panel B, Table 4 - 5).  
In sum, the results so far show that the exogenous increase in ISS analyst coverage 
results (1) in increasing analyst following (on average by one analyst), (2) weakly in 
increasing free float (on average by 4.2 percentage points), (3) in improvements of firm-level 
corporate governance quality (on average by 7.4 percentage points), and (4) weakly in 
decreasing accruals manipulations (on average by 1.8 percentage points). Consistent with the 
paper’s predictions, these findings suggest that financial analysts, investors, and managers 
respond to changes in governance analyst coverage. Specifically, they imply – in line with the 
paper’s first and second prediction – that financial analysts and investors potentially consider 
governance information provided by governance analysts when preparing analyst reports or 
setting investment strategies, respectively. Moreover, the findings further indicate that both, 
financial analysts and investors, are potentially able to reduce their costs of making informed 
decisions when relying on information provided by governance analysts. In addition and 
consistent with the paper’s third prediction, the findings also suggest that managers and directors 
feel potentially pressured by the presence of governance analyst to improve governance quality, if 






necessary. Overall, the paper’s findings are consistent with the notion that governance analysts 
represent economically important information intermediaries who enhance the firm’s information 
environment and promote external monitoring to managers.95
Table 4 - 5: DiD Regression Analyses 
 
Panel A. Prediction 1: Governance Analysts and Financial Analysts 
 Pred. 
Sign 
Dependent variable: Analyst Following 
Sample consists of 
Treatment & Control 1 
Sample consists of 
Treatment & Control 2 
Sample consists of 
Control 1 & Control 2 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
POST_TREATED + 1.1508*** .8814***     
  (5.10) (3.23)     
ANTE_TREATED -   -.9619** -.9789*   
    (-2.04) (-1.73)   
SPILLOVER      -.6826 -.4693 
      (-1.55) (-0.82) 
FIRM CONTROL VARs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
YEAR fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
IND fixed effect Yes No Yes No Yes No 
FIRM fixed effect No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Sample Size 1067 1067 558 558 1031 1031 
Adj. R² .5496 .8400 .6987 .9013 .7089 .9085 
Panel B. Prediction 2: Governance Analysts and Investors 
 Pred. 
Sign 
Dependent variable: Free Float 
Treatment & Control 1 Treatment & Control 2 Control 1 & Control 2 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
POST_TREATED + 4.7748** 5.2970*     
  (2.22) (1.72)     
ANTE_TREATED -   -3.7783 -3.2452   
    (-1.48) (-1.01)   
SPILLOVER      .6500 -.1377 
      (0.29) (-0.04) 
FIRM CONTROL VARs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
YEAR fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
IND fixed effect Yes No Yes No Yes No 
FIRM fixed effect No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Sample Size 1067 1067 558 558 1031 1031 
Adj. R² .2472 .5790 .4962 .6676 .2707 .5878 
Panel C. Prediction 3: Governance Analysts and Corporate Governance 
 Pred. 
Sign 
Dependent variable: Corporate Governance Quality (ASSET4) 
Treatment & Control 1 Treatment & Control 2 Control 1 & Control 2 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
POST_TREATED +       
        
ANTE_TREATED -   -9.0381*** -5.9503*   
    (-3.17) (-1.82)   
SPILLOVER        
        
FIRM CONTROL VARs   Yes Yes   
YEAR fixed effect   Yes Yes   
IND fixed effect   Yes No   
FIRM fixed effect   No Yes   
Sample Size   305 305   
Adj. R²   .2791 .6936   
 
                                                 
95 Alternatively, the paper’s findings might be also consistent with an “attention” story (instead of an 
“information” story). Without any information enhancing activities by governance analysts, the coverage by 
these analysts might simply attract the attention of institutional investors which subsequently invest in these 
newly covered firms (e.g., because governance ratings might serve as a tool to vindicate the funds manager’s 
investment strategies). This in turn might attract financial analysts and might promote monitoring to the firm’s 
management.   






Table 4 - 5: DiD Regression Analyses (continued) 
Panel D. Prediction 4: Governance Analysts and Earnings Management 
 Pred. 
Sign 
Dependent variable: Absolute Discretionary Accruals 
Treatment & Control 1 Treatment & Control 2 Control 1 & Control 2 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
POST_TREATED - -.0361*** -.0344***     
  (-3.83) (-2.61)     
ANTE_TREATED +   .0009 .0020   
    (0.09) (0.15)   
SPILLOVER      -.0271*** -.0291** 
      (-2.88) (-2.12) 
FIRM CONTROL VARs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
YEAR fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
IND fixed effect Yes No Yes No Yes No 
FIRM fixed effect No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Sample Size 1067 1067 558 558 1031 1031 
Adj. R² .1183 .4082 .0719 .1804 .1432 .4530 
The underlying basic regression model is:  
VIit =  α + γ1TREATEDit + γ2POST × TREATEDit[γ2ANTE × TREATEDit] + � γ2FIRM_CONTROLit
+ � γ3YEARit + � γ4INDUSTRYit + ε 
TREATED is a dummy variable indicating the treatment group. Depending on the underlying control group, the 
coefficient estimates on the variables POST×TREATED and ANTE×TREATED capture the difference-in-
difference effect (for definitions of treatment and control group, see Table 4 - 1). Firm control for analyst 
following (AF) regression (Panel A): blue chip index membership (FTSE100), alternative governance 
information (asset4 coverage), capital intensity (PPE to total assets), volatility of business (StD of cash from 
operations), stock price volatility (StD of monthly stock returns), brokerage commission (inverse stock price), 
accounting performance (ROA), growth (book-to-market ratio), institutional investors (pension funds holdings), 
ownership concentration (closely held shares), size (log of total assets), and leverage (total debt to total assets). 
Firm control for free float (FF) regression (Panel B): blue chip index membership (FTSE100), alternative 
governance information (asset4 coverage), stock price volatility (StD of monthly stock returns), accounting 
performance (ROA), size (log of total assets), leverage (total debt to total assets), analyst following, and 
dividends per share. Firm control for governance (GOV) regression (Panel C): size (log of total assets), growth 
(one-year change in net sales), accounting performance (ROA), blue chip index membership (FTSE100), firm 
valuation (Tobin’s Q), analyst following, institutional investments (pension funds holdings), ownership 
concentration (closely held shares), and leverage (total debt to total assets). Firm control for absolute 
Discretionary Accruals (ADAC) regression (Panel D): size (log of total assets), blue chip index membership 
(FTSE100), analyst following, institutional investments (pension funds holdings), ownership concentration 
(closely held shares), loss reporting, cash from operations, and leverage (total debt to total assets). For detailed 
information and definitions of the variables, see Appendix 4 - 1. In each Panel, Model 5 and 6 simulate the 
exogenous shock design based on a sample without the treatment group but including both control groups. In 
these models, SPILLOVER is identical to POST×TREATED in terms of construction (with Control Group 2 as 
simulated Treatment Group and Control Group 1 as the simulated Control Group). Thus, the coefficient estimate 
on SPILLOVER captures any spillover effects on the second original control group (constantly covered firms) 
due to the exogenous shock in the original treatment group. The regression models contain industry- and year-
fixed effects, and have standard errors which are heteroskedasticity robust and one-way clustered at firm level. 
Alternatively to industry-fixed effects and the inclusion of TREATED, I additionally estimate the regression 
with firm-fixed (as indicated in Table 4 - 5). Detailed results of the estimated regressions are provided in 
Appendix 4 - 5. Reported values: coefficient (t-value) *** (**) (*) indicates significance levels at 1% (5%) 
(10%), two-tailed. 
 
4.5.4 Additional Analyses  
Spillover Effects 
Table 4 - 5 provides additional auxiliary regressions on both control groups (‘Control 1 & 
Control 2’). The rationale behind that is to examine any spillover effects on the second control 






group (i.e., constantly covered firms) due to the exogenous increase in ISS coverage. 
Analogous to possible spillover effects for voluntary IFRS adopters after mandatory IFRS 
adoption due to increased comparability (e.g., Daske et al., 2008, pp. 1088-1089), constantly 
covered firms might be likewise affected by an increase in ISS coverage. An extended ISS 
coverage, for example, might be beneficial for any governance-related benchmark and peer-
group analysis due to increased sample size power. Based on a sample of all control firms, the 
variable SPILLOVER takes the value of one if the firm belongs to the second control group in 
the period after 2005, and zero otherwise. Thus, the coefficient estimate on SPILLOVER 
captures any spillover effects on the second control group (i.e., constantly covered firms) due 
to the exogenous shock in the original treatment group. Although insignificant in the analyst 
following and free float regressions (Panel A and B, Table 4 - 5), the coefficient estimates on 
SPILLOVER in the earnings management regression become significant at conventional 
levels and obtain negative signs (Panel D, Table 4 - 5). These findings might indicate some 
spillover effects with respect to changes in earnings management and potentially explain the 
insignificant findings of the second DiD regression model in the earnings management 
specification (‘Treatment & Control 2’, Panel D, Table 4 - 5).    
 
Validity of Exogenous Shock Event 
Following Irani and Oesch (2013), I challenge the validity of the quasi-natural experiment by 
re-estimating the main DiD regressions (Table 4 - 5) based on a restricted sample covering 
only the two years prior to the original exogenous shock in 2005 (restricted sample from 2003 
to 2004). Depending on the underlying control group, the variables POST×TREATED and 
ANTE×TREATED in the re-estimated DiD regressions simulate an exogenous shock in 2004. 
Given that the parallel trends assumption holds between the treatment and the control group 
for the period prior to the original exogenous shock in 2005, I do not expect the coefficient 
estimates on POST×TREATED and ANTE×TREATED to become significant in the re-
estimated DiD regressions. In particular, the parallel trends assumption demands that my 
outcome variables (i.e., analyst following, free float, governance quality, and earnings 
management) remain parallel and constant across the treatment and the control group prior to 
the original exogenous shock in 2005. Consistent with the validity of the exogenous shock 
event, untabulated results reveal that in the re-estimated analyst following (AF), governance 
(GOV), and earnings management (ADAC) DiD regressions, the respective coefficient 






estimates remain insignificant. However, the findings for the free float (FF) regressions are 
mixed (POST×TREATED becomes significant at a 5% level). Thus, the free float regression 
results have to be interpreted with caution (Table 4 - 5, Panel B).96
 
       
Real Earnings Management 
To extend the scope of my earnings management proxy, I re-estimate the earnings 
management DiD regressions (Table 4 - 5, Panel D) based on a measure of real earnings 
management. Alternatively to the employed discretionary accrual proxy (ADAC), I use a 
summary measure based on abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses 
to assess real earnings management activities (Roychowdhury, 2006; Garcia Lara et al., 
2012).97
Whether the coverage by governance analysts ultimately affects both accrual-based and 
real earnings management is a priori unclear. Prior earnings management studies, for 
example, document that managers have started to substitute accruals manipulation by real 
earnings management activities after the introduction of the Sarbanes Oxley Act (Cohen et al., 
2008; Roychowdhury, 2006). In a recent study, Garcia Lara et al. (2012) show that – given 
constant incentives to engage in earnings management – firms shift from accrual-based to 
(potentially more costly) real earnings management if accounting conservatism constrains the 
extent of accruals manipulation. Consistent with that, Zang (2012) documents that firms 
choose the level of accruals manipulation in accordance to the realized manipulation of real 
activities. 
  
Untabulated results reveal that across all model specifications (‘Treatment & Control 1’, 
‘Treatment & Control 2’, with and without firm-fixed effects) the coefficient estimates 
capturing the DiD effect (POST×TREATED and ANTE×TREATED) remain insignificant. 
Thus, these findings do not suggest that real earnings management – compared to accrual-
based earnings management – is likewise affected by the exogenous increase in governance 
analyst coverage.98
 
    
 
                                                 
96 See Appendix 4 - 2. 
97 See Appendix 4 - 3, Panel A for details on the estimation process of real earnings management. 
98 See Appendix 4 - 3. 






OLS Regression and Two-Stage Heckman Modeling 
Finally, I estimate ordinary OLS regressions for comparability reasons. To address the self-
selection (endogeneity) bias in the OLS regression model, I follow the two-stage Heckman 
procedure (e.g., Lennox et al., 2012, p. 591-592) and include the inverse Mills (MILLS) ratio 
from a first-stage probit regression into the main OLS regression model as an additional 
explanatory variable.99
VIit =  α + γ1ISS_COVit + γ2MILLSit + � γ2FIRM_CONTROLit + � γ3YEARit + ε 
 Thus, I estimate the following model:  
(4) 
The OLS regressions employ the same set of dependent variables (the same variables of 
interests - VI) as well as firm control variables as the original DiD models (Table 4 - 5). They 
further contain year- and firm-fixed effects as well as heteroskedasticity-robust and firm-level 
clustered standard errors. ISS_COV is the model’s main interest variable and indicates 
whether or not a firm is covered by ISS governance analysts (CGQ ratings). Following the 
first three predictions (the last prediction) and employing the respective dependent variable in 
the OLS model, I expect positive (negative) and significant coefficient estimates on 
ISS_COV.  
Untabulated results appear to be in line with my original DiD findings. In particular, the 
coverage by ISS analysts is significantly and positively (negatively) associated with analyst 
following, free float, and governance quality (earnings management).100
Nevertheless, as outlined in section 4.4.2, these OLS results are difficult to interpret due 
to the potential endogenous relationship between governance analyst coverage and various 
firm characteristics, e.g., index membership and institutional investments. As these firm 
characteristics are in turn most likely related to my dependent variables, i.e., analyst 
 Likewise, OLS 
results do not suggest that ISS coverage is correlated with real earnings management. 
Compared to the DiD findings, the OLS results, however, overestimate (underestimate) the 
governance analyst coverage effect on accrual-based earnings management (analyst following 
and governance quality).  
                                                 
99 I use index membership (FTSE All Share Index) and dividend yield (DIV_YIELD) as exclusion restrictions 
and expect that these variables have no first-order effect on my dependent variables, but rather serve as good 
predictors of ISS coverage. I acknowledge, however, that the quality (respectively the fully exogenous nature) of 
my selected exclusion restrictions is potentially weak. Partially (or even fully) endogenous exclusion restrictions 
are an issue that plagues virtually all empirical accounting studies employing selection models (e.g., Boersch-
Supan and Koeke, 2002; Beiner et al., 2006). See Appendix 4 - 4, Panel A for details on the two-stage Heckman 
procedure. 
100 However, the coefficient estimate on ISS_COV in the governance regression remains insignificant when 
including the MILLS ratio from the first-stage Heckman Model. See Appendix 4 - 4. 






following, free float, governance quality, and accounting quality, OLS results are prone to 
endogeneity concerns. IV methods – like two-stage Heckman modeling with exclusion 
restrictions as instruments in the first stage – are potentially able to address these concerns. 
However, it is difficult to find appropriate instruments in most empirical setups (e.g., Larcker 
and Rusticus, 2010, pp. 187, 196, 201; Ertugrul and Hegde, 2009, pp. 157-158; Boersch-
Supan and Koeke, 2002, p. 321). In a recent literature survey, Lennox et al. (2012, p. 590) 
criticize the inflationary use of IV models in empirical accounting research by stating that “[a] 
surprising number of studies (14 of 75) fail to have any exclusions, and other studies (7 out of 
75) do not report the first stage model, making it impossible to determine if they imposed 
exclusion restrictions. Moreover, very few studies provide any theoretical or economic 
justification for their chosen restrictions.”  
 
4.6 Conclusion 
Using a quasi-natural experiment that exploits an exogenous shock in the UK ISS governance 
analyst coverage, I provide evidence on the role of non-financial governance analysts and 
their relevance to the capital market. Specifically, I examine potential economic consequences 
of governance analyst coverage by focusing on two different groups (financial analysts and 
investors) as well as on two firm-level mechanisms (corporate governance quality and 
earnings management) which are potentially affected by the presence of governance analysts. 
Overall, my results – based on a twofold DiD regression design – suggest that the 
exogenous increase in ISS analyst coverage results (1) in increasing analyst following, (2) 
weakly in increasing free float, (3) in improvements in firm-level corporate governance, and 
(4) weakly in decreasing accruals manipulations. These findings are robust to endogeneity 
concerns. In line with the paper’s predictions, they suggest that financial analysts, investors, 
and managers respond to changes in governance analyst coverage. Specifically, the findings 
are consistent with the notion that the financial analysts’ marginal costs to cover a firm 
decrease after the exogenous increase in ISS coverage. They imply further that executives and 
board members feel potentially pressured by the presence of governance analysts to improve 
firm-level governance quality, if necessary. Overall, my results suggest that governance 
analysts might serve as economically meaningful information intermediaries by enhancing a 
firm’s information environment and by promoting external monitoring to managers.  
The paper’s findings contribute to the extant literature in several ways. First, this is to 






my knowledge the first paper which provides evidence on the coverage effects of governance 
analysts. In doing so, it extends research on financial analysts by introducing ‘another’ type of 
analysts, i.e., non-financial corporate governance analysts, and by providing evidence on 
potential consequences of governance analyst coverage (including interrelations between 
governance analysts and financial analysts). These insights are potentially important as prior 
research on analysts has primarily focused on the role of sell-side equity analysts. By 
examining the coverage effects of governance analysts, my paper additionally contributes to 
the limited but growing research addressing issues like the growth and impact of commercial 
corporate governance rating vendors, the role and regulation as well as the usefulness of 
proxy advisors, or the usefulness of commercial governance ratings to investors. Since these 
studies particularly argue about the economic vindication (or usefulness) of proxy advisors 
and governance rating vendors (and their ratings), empirical evidence on potential 
consequences of governance analyst coverage provides additional insights into the usefulness 
of governance advisory on capital markets. Finally, my findings potentially contribute to the 
literature on the governance role of institutional investors. Since governance agencies are 
primarily paid by institutional investors in order to enhance the firm’s information 
environment with respect to governance issues, my paper adds to this research by providing 
evidence on a potential channel in which the presence of such investors might affect the 
firm’s information environment. 
My findings, however, are subject to several limitations. Owing to the exogenous shock 
setting, I only investigate the coverage effects of one particular governance agency (namely 
ISS), for one particular market (the UK), and for a specific time period (2004 to 2006). With 
the paper’s quasi-natural experimental setting, internal validity increases at the expense of 
external validity. As in most empirical studies, the findings of this paper further depend on the 
validity of the employed empirical proxies. Prior studies, for example, discuss the construct 
validity of discretionary accruals (e.g., Collins et al., 2012) and corporate governance ratings 
(e.g., Larcker et al., 2007), and point out that prior findings are sensitive to the chosen 
measurement approach. In addition, my findings depend on the extent to which my affected 
outcome variables are able to respond in a timely manner to the exogenous shock in 2005. 
However, potential stickiness concerns (e.g., with respect to governance choices or 
accounting choices) work against the probability to find any effects and thus rather strengthen 
the robustness of the paper’s findings.        






Overall, my findings create various research opportunities. Future work may consider 
governance analysts from different agencies, for different markets, and different time periods. 
In the absence of any natural experiments (i.e., exogenous shock in coverage), it might be 
worth to study first-time coverage effects for firms in a particular market. Likewise, evidence 
from a cross-country setting might provide additional insights. It is plausible to assume that 
institutional features, like enforcement strength or investor protection standards, affect the 





























Appendix 4 - 1: Definition of Variables 
SHORT CUT VARIABLE DEFINITION 
Earnings Management Proxy 
ADAC* Absolute discretionary 
accruals 
 
ADAC are the absolute residuals from an extended (performance & 
growth adj.) cross-sectional modified Jones model (CMJM) based 
on the cash flow approach and total accruals  
TAC* Total accruals TAC is total accruals = net income (wc01751) – cash from 
operations (wc04860) 
REV* Revenues REV is net sales of revenues (wc01001) 
REC* Receivables REC is receivables (wc02051) 
PPE PPE PPE is property, plant & equipment (wc02301) 
ROA* Return-on-assets ROA is return-on-assets as EBIT (wc18191) scaled by total assets 
(wc02999) 
GROWTH Growth in net sales GROWTH is change in net sales ((wc01001t-wc01001t-1) / 
wc01001t-1) 
TA Total assets TA is total assets (wc02999) 
Coverage by Governance Analysts 
ISS_COV Coverage by 
Governance Agency 
ISS_COV is a dummy variable indicating whether a firm is covered 
by ISS, or not.  
Dependent Variables (excluding DAC) 
AF Analyst following AF is the number of analyst following (f1ne) 
FF Free float FF measures free float of outstanding shares (noshff). 
GOV Governance Score GOV is a corporate governance score provided by ASSET4 
(cgvscore) 
Firm Control Variables 
PENSION Pension funds 
holdings 
Pension is number of shares hold by pension funds (noshpf) 
LOSS Loss reporting LOSS stands for loss reporting and indicates as a dummy variable 
with 1 if the firm reports a loss in year t-1 (wc01751t-1<0) 
SIZE Log of market value 
of equity 
SIZE if the natural logarithm of market value of equity (EURO) 
(xmve) 
LEV Leverage LEV is the accounting leverage as total liabilities (wc03351) to 
fiscal years average total assets (dwta) 
CFO Cash from 
operations1 
CFO1 = net cash flow – operating activities (wc04860) deflated by 
total assets (wc02999) 
OWNER Ownership Owner as ownership – closely held shares (wc08021) 
SD_CFO Volatility of 
business 
SD_CFO is volatility of business as the standard deviation of cash 
from operations (wc04860) over the sample period (2003 to 2007) 
FTSE100 Index membership FTSE100 indicates FTSE100 index membership (wc05661) 
Q Tobin’s Q Q measures firm value and equals the book value of total assets 
(dwta) + market value of common shares (mv) - book value of 
common shares (dwse) divided by book value of total assets (dwta). 
CAP_INT PPE to total assets CAP_INT (capital intensity) is property, plant & equipment 
(wc02501) to total assets (wc02999). 
ASSET4_COV ASSET4 coverage ASSET4_COV is a dummy variable indicating with 1 and 0 whether 
a firm is covered by ASSET4 governance score 
GROWTH Change in net sales GROWTH is one-year change in net sales (wc01001) 




BTM is defined as common equity (wc03501) deflated by market 
capitalization (wc05001*nosh) 
SD_STOCK Stock volatility SD_STOCK is the yearly average standard deviation of monthly 
stock returns (based on wc05015 – wc05070)  
BC Brokerage 
commission 
BC stands for brokerage commission and is defined as the firm’s 
inverse stock price (-1*wc05001) 
DPS Dividend per share DPS is dividends per share (wc05101) 
* Winsorized by extreme percentiles (1% level) to control for outliers (yearly based). 






Appendix 4 - 2: Validity of Natural Experiment 
 Sample: 2003 to 2004 (without the original exogenous shock) 
Analyst Following Free Float GOV ADAC 
Treatment  
& Control 1 
Treatment  
& Control 2 
Treatment  
& Control 1 
Treatment  
& Control 2 
Treatment  
& Control 2 
Treatment  
& Control 1 
Treatment  
& Control 2 
P_TREATED -.2091  11.45**   .0006  
 (-0.62)  (2.05)   (0.03)  
A_TREATED  .6067  7.49 6.65  .0057 
  (0.79)  (1.56) (0.61)  (0.29) 
F. CONTROL  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
YEAR fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
IND fe No No No No No No No 
FIRM fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample Size 677 349 702 351 127 763 354 
Adj. R² .8301 .8991 .2876 .3935 .7117 .5002 .3215 
Notes: The sample period is between 2003 and 2004 (without the original exogenous shock in ISS coverage). 
The underlying basic regression model is: 
VIit =  α + γ1TREATEDit + γ2POST × TREATEDit[γ2ANTE × TREATEDit] + � γ2FIRM_CONTROLit
+ � γ3YEARit + � γ4INDUSTRYit + ε 
TREATED is a dummy variable indicating the treatment group. Depending on the underlying control group, the 
coefficient estimates on the variables POST×TREATED and ANTE×TREATED capture the difference-in-
difference effect (for definitions of treatment and control group, see Table 4 - 1). Firm control for analyst 
following (AF) regression: blue chip index membership (FTSE100), alternative governance information (asset4 
coverage), capital intensity (PPE to total assets), volatility of business (StD of cash from operations), stock price 
volatility (StD of monthly stock returns), brokerage commission (inverse stock price), accounting performance 
(ROA), growth (book-to-market ratio), institutional investors (pension funds holdings), ownership concentration 
(closely held shares), size (log of total assets), and leverage (total debt to total assets). Firm control for free float 
(FF) regression: blue chip index membership (FTSE100), alternative governance information (asset4 coverage), 
stock price volatility (StD of monthly stock returns), accounting performance (ROA), size (log of total assets), 
leverage (total debt to total assets), analyst following, and dividends per share. Firm control for governance 
(GOV) regression: size (log of total assets), growth (one-year change in net sales), accounting performance 
(ROA), blue chip index membership (FTSE100), firm valuation (Tobin’s Q), analyst following, institutional 
investments (pension funds holdings), ownership concentration (closely held shares), and leverage (total debt to 
total assets). Firm control for absolute Discretionary Accruals (ADAC) regression: size (log of total assets), blue 
chip index membership (FTSE100), analyst following, institutional investments (pension funds holdings), 
ownership concentration (closely held shares), loss reporting, cash from operations, and leverage (total debt to 
total assets). For detailed information and definitions of the variables, see Appendix 4 - 1. The regression models 
contain industry- and year-fixed effects (as indicated with YEAR FE and IND FE), and have standard errors 
which are heteroskedasticity robust and one-way clustered at firm level. Alternatively to industry-fixed effects 
and the inclusion of TREATED, I additionally estimate the regression with firm-fixed effects (as indicated in 
Table 4 - 5 with FIRM fe). Reported values: coefficient (t-value) *** (**) (*) indicates significance levels at 1% 




























Appendix 4 - 3: Real Earnings Management 
Panel A. Estimation of Real Earnings Management  
Following Roychowdhury (2006) and Garcia Lara et al. (2012), I use a summary measure based on abnormal 
production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses to assess real earnings management activities. Both 
measures are adjusted by one-year lagged ROA and sales growth in the estimation process to control for firm 
performance and growth (Garcia Lara et al., 2012, pp. 13-14). To estimate abnormal production costs, I use 
the following regression model for each two-digit SIC industry group and year (with at least 15 observations): 
PRODit TAit−1 =⁄ δ1 + δ2(1 TAit−1⁄ ) + δ3(SALESit TAit−1⁄ ) + δ4(Δ SALESit TAit−1⁄ )
+ δ5(Δ SALESit−1 TAit−1⁄ ) + δ6(ROAit−1) + δ7(GROWTH) + εi 
(i) 
The dependent variable PROD stands for production costs and is measured as the sum of costs of 
goods sold and the change in inventory during the respective year. SALES stands for firm's net sales, 
GROWTH measures current one-year growth in sales, and ROA is return-on-assets. The residuals of 
regression model (i) are the abnormal production costs (APROD) with higher values indicating more real 
earnings management. 
To estimate abnormal discretionary expenses, I use the following regression model for each two-digit SIC 
industry group and year (with at least 15 observations): 
DEXPit TAit−1 =⁄ φ1 + φ2(1 TAit−1⁄ ) + φ3(SALESit−1 TAit−1⁄ ) + φ6(ROAit−1) + φ7(GROWTH)
+ εi 
(ii) 
The dependent variable DEXP represents discretionary expenses and is defined as the sum of selling, 
general & administrative (SG&A) expenses, R&D expenses, and advertising expenses. SALES, ROA, and 
GROWTH are defined as for model (4). The residuals of regression model (ii) are the abnormal discretionary 
expenses (ADEXP) with lower values indicating more income increasing real earnings management. 
Following prior literature, I aggregate the two variables into one proxy (REM) to measure real earnings 
management activities (e.g., Garcia Lara et al., 2012, p. 14; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010, p. 9). In doing so, I 
define REM as the sum of APROD and (-1*ADEXP). Thus, higher values of REM indicate more real 
earnings management. 
Panel B. DiD Regression Results 
 Pred. 
Sign 
Dependent variable: Real Earnings Management 
Treatment & Control 1 Treatment & Control 2 Control 1 & Control 2 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
POST_TREATED - -.0742 .0006     
  (-1.42) (0.01)     
ANTE_TREATED +   .0022 -.0008   
    (0.05) (-0.02)   
SPILLOVER      -.0230 .0105 
      (-0.49) (0.19) 
FIRM CONTROL VARs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
YEAR fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
IND fixed effect Yes No Yes No Yes No 
FIRM fixed effect No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Sample Size 870 870 451 451 781 781 
Adj. R² .1056 .8127 .1745 .8547 .0671 .7923 
Notes: The underlying basic regression model is:  
REMit =  α + γ1TREATEDit + γ2POST × TREATEDit[γ2ANTE × TREATEDit] + � γ2FIRM_CONTROLit
+ � γ3YEARit + � γ4INDUSTRYit + ε 
TREATED is a dummy variable indicating the treatment group. Depending on the underlying control group, the 
coefficient estimates on the variables POST×TREATED and ANTE×TREATED capture the difference-in-
difference effect (for definitions of treatment and control group, see Table 4 - 1). REM (real earnings 
management) is a proxy based on abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses (Garcia Lara 
et al., 2012; Roychowdhury, 2006). Firm control includes: size (log of total assets), blue chip index membership 
(FTSE100), analyst following, institutional investments (pension funds holdings), ownership concentration 
(closely held shares), loss reporting, cash from operations, and leverage (total debt to total assets). For detailed 
information and definitions of the variables, see Appendix 4 - 1. Model 5 and 6 simulate the exogenous shock 
design based on a sample without the treatment group but including both control groups. In these models, 
SPILLOVER is identical to POST×TREATED in terms of construction (with Control Group 2 as simulated 
Treatment Group and Control Group 1 as the simulated Control Group). Thus, the coefficient estimate on 
SPILLOVER captures any spillover effects on the second original control group (constantly covered firms) due 
to the exogenous shock in the original treatment group. The regression models contain industry- and year-fixed 






effects, and have standard errors which are heteroskedasticity robust and one-way clustered at firm level. 
Alternatively to industry-fixed effects and the inclusion of TREATED, I additionally estimate the regression 
with firm-fixed effects (as indicated). Reported values: coefficient (t-value) *** (**) (*) indicates significance 






































Appendix 4 - 4: Naïve OLS Regressions (with and without Heckman Modeling) 
Panel A. Two-Stage Heckman Modeling 
To address a potential self-selection (endogeneity) bias in the basic OLS regression model, I follow the two-
stage Heckman procedure (e.g., Lennox et al., 2012, p. 591-592) and include the inverse Mills ratio from a 
first-stage probit regression into the main OLS regression model as an additional explanatory variable. In 
doing so, I use the following first-stage probit regression model: 
Probit(ISS_COVERAGE)it = α1 + � α2EXCLUSIONit + � α3FIRM_CONTROLit
= +� α4YEARit + � α5INDUSTRYit + ε 
(iii) 
ISS_COVERAGE is a dummy variable indicating whether or not a firm is covered by ISS (CGQ 
rating). The vector of firm characteristics, the year and industry-fixed effects, and the standard errors are 
defined as for regression models 3 to 6. EXCLUSION represents a vector of exclusion restrictions to specify 
the first-stage probit regression. Lennox et al. (2012, p. 592) state that “the choice of exclusion restriction is 
vital for implementing the selection model in a way that convincingly controls for endogeneity” in the second 
stage of the Heckman procedure. I use index membership (FTSE All Share Index) and dividend yield 
(DIV_YIELD) as my exclusion restrictions, and expect that these variables criteria have no first-order effect 
on my dependent variables, but rather serve as good predictors of ISS coverage. However, I acknowledge that 
the quality (respectively the fully exogenous nature) of my selected exclusion restrictions is potentially weak. 
Partially (or even fully) endogenous exclusion restrictions are an issue that plagues virtually all empirical 
accounting studies employing selection models (e.g., Boersch-Supan and Koeke, 2002; Beiner et al., 2006). 
In a recent survey of prior empirical accounting studies using selection models, Lennox et al. (2012, p. 590) 
note that “[a] surprising number of studies (14 of 75) fail to have any exclusions, and other studies (7 out of 
75) do not report the first stage model, making it impossible to determine if they imposed exclusion 
restrictions. Moreover, very few studies provide any theoretical or economic justification for their chosen 
restrictions.” 
Panel B. Analyst Following, Free Float, and Governance Quality 
  Sample: 2004 to 2006 (with an exogenous shock) 
Analyst Following Free Float ASSET4 GOV 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
ISS_COV  .6915** .7063** 4.4390* 4.4927* 4.6403* 1.6259 
  (2.42) (2.51) (1.88) (1.90) (1.69) (0.56) 
MILLS   .0552  1.6107  -5.035 
   (0.18)  (0.87)  (-1.62) 
FIRM CONTROL VARs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
YEAR fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
IND fixed effect No No No No No No 
FIRM fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample Size 1397 1395 1397 1395 378 378 
Adj. R² .9002 .9002 .5972 .5967 .6784 .6811 
Panel C. Accrual-based and real earnings management 
  Sample: 2004 to 2006 (with an exogenous shock) 
Accrual-based EM Real EM  
Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10   
ISS COVERAGE  -.0205** -.0197** -.0137 -.0170   
  (-2.14) (-2.13) (-0.34) (-0.42)   
MILLS   -.0205**  -.0239   
   (-2.58)  (-0.62)   
FIRM CONTROL VARs Yes Yes Yes Yes   
YEAR fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes   
IND fixed effect No No No No   
FIRM fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes   
Sample Size 1397 1395 1103 1101   
Adj. R² .4069 .4071 .8152 .8153   
Notes: The underlying basic regression model is:  
VIit =  α + γ1ISS COVERAGEit + γ2MILLSit + � γ2FIRM_CONTROLit + � γ3YEARit + � γ4INDit + ε 
ISS_COV is a dummy variable indicating whether or not a firm is covered by ISS (CGQ rating). MILLS is the 
inverse mills ratio from a first stage Heckman regression with the following two exclusion restrictions: dividend 
yield and FTSE ALL Share Index Membership. Firm control for analyst following (AF) regression: blue chip 
index membership (FTSE100), alternative governance information (asset4 coverage), capital intensity (PPE to 
total assets), volatility of business (StD of cash from operations), stock price volatility (StD of monthly stock 






returns), brokerage commission (inverse stock price), accounting performance (ROA), growth (book-to-market 
ratio), institutional investors (pension funds holdings), ownership concentration (closely held shares), size (log of 
total assets), and leverage (total debt to total assets). Firm control for free float (FF) regression: blue chip index 
membership (FTSE100), alternative governance information (asset4 coverage), stock price volatility (StD of 
monthly stock returns), accounting performance (ROA), size (log of total assets), leverage (total debt to total 
assets), analyst following, and dividends per share. Firm control for governance (GOV) regression: size (log of 
total assets), growth (one-year change in net sales), accounting performance (ROA), blue chip index membership 
(FTSE100), firm valuation (Tobin’s Q), analyst following, institutional investments (pension funds holdings), 
ownership concentration (closely held shares), and leverage (total debt to total assets). Firm control for absolute 
Discretionary Accruals (ADAC) regression: size (log of total assets), blue chip index membership (FTSE100), 
analyst following, institutional investments (pension funds holdings), ownership concentration (closely held 
shares), loss reporting, cash from operations, and leverage (total debt to total assets). For detailed information 
and definitions of the variables, see Appendix 4 - 1. The regression models contain year- and firm-fixed effects, 
and have standard errors which are heteroskedasticity robust and one-way clustered at firm level. Reported 





























































Appendix 4 - 5: Detailed DiD Regression Analyses (w.r.t. Table 4 - 5) 




Dependent variable: Analyst Following 
 Treatment Group & Control Group 1 Treatment Group & Control Group 2 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Intercept  2.532*** 2.629*** -8.829*** -9.358 11.742*** 7.607*** -33.023*** -11.775 
  (13.97) (31.45) (-6.65) (-1.20) (13.34) (109.89) (-7.26) (-0.76) 
POST  -0.707*** 0.363** (omitted) (omitted)     
  (-3.82) (2.51)       
ANTE      0.008 -0.110 (omitted) (omitted) 
      (0.02) (-0.24)   
TREATED  1.536*** (omitted) -0.701** (omitted) -6.270*** (omitted) -0.540 (omitted) 
  (4.82)  (-2.40)  (-6.68)  (-0.90)  
POST_TREATED + 2.111*** 0.872*** 1.151*** 0.881***     
  (7.47) (3.17) (5.10) (3.23)     
ANTE_TREATED -     -1.412*** -1.125** -0.962** -0.979* 
      (-2.99) (-2.20) (-2.04) (-1.73) 
FTSE100    3.148** (omitted)   1.448* (omitted) 
    (2.61)    (1.73)  
ASSET4_COV    2.282*** (omitted)   0.739 -0.290 
    (5.27)    (1.35) (-0.27) 
PPE_TA    0.216 -1.395   0.208 -2.608 
    (0.44) (-0.52)   (0.20) (-0.76) 
BTM    -0.148 -0.047   0.125 -0.243 
    (-0.82) (-0.35)   (0.32) (-0.63) 
PF    -0.007 0.001   0.022 -0.002 
    (-0.43) (0.06)   (1.30) (-0.13) 
SD_STOCK    0.388 1.162   3.063 2.213 
    (0.34) (0.82)   (1.01) (0.66) 
BC    -0.000 -0.000   -0.001* -0.001 
    (-0.53) (-0.16)   (-1.91) (-0.80) 
OWNER    -0.009* -0.007   -0.029*** 0.006 
    (-1.90) (-1.03)   (-2.97) (0.48) 
SIZE    0.964*** 1.100   2.779*** 1.451 
    (8.99) (1.59)   (8.96) (1.27) 
LEV    -0.344 0.158   -0.357 0.067 
    (-0.66) (0.21)   (-0.22) (0.04) 
SD_CFO    0.260 (omitted)   16.922*** (omitted) 
    (1.19)    (3.42)  
ROA    -0.155 0.288   3.529* -0.843 
    (-0.48) (0.46)   (1.86) (-0.54) 
YEAR fixed effect  No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
IND fixed effect  No No Yes No No No Yes No 
FIRM fixed effect  No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Sample Size  1067 1067 1067 1067 558 558 558 558 



























Appendix 4 - 5: Detailed DiD Regression Analyses (w.r.t. Table 4 - 5) (continued) 




Dependent variable: Free Float 
 Treatment Group & Control Group 1 Treatment Group & Control Group 2 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Intercept  54.97*** 55.94*** 44.07*** 1.829 61.66*** 59.66*** 60.18*** 68.229 
  (45.61) (55.11) (5.02) (0.03) (42.19) (119.72) (4.48) (0.63) 
POST  0.513 -2.218 (omitted) (omitted)   (omitted) (omitted) 
  (0.37) (-1.12)       
ANTE      -0.898 -0.602   
      (-0.48) (-0.26)   
TREATED  -0.877 (omitted) -3.354 (omitted) -2.882 (omitted) 0.496 (omitted) 
  (-0.44)  (-1.45)  (-1.51)  (0.22)  
POST_TREATED + 4.176** 6.555** 4.775** 5.297*     
  (1.98) (2.18) (2.22) (1.72)     
ANTE_TREATED -     -3.791 -3.735 -3.778 -3.245 
      (-1.54) (-1.23) (-1.48) (-1.01) 
AF    -0.195 -0.482   0.356* 0.311 
    (-0.69) (-0.67)   (1.70) (0.81) 
FTSE100    -0.923 (omitted)   -1.867 (omitted) 
    (-0.21)    (-0.77)  
ASSET4_COV    3.103 (omitted)   0.971 -1.127 
    (1.30)    (0.46) (-0.19) 
SIZE    1.299* 4.742   0.297 -2.074 
    (1.88) (0.90)   (0.31) (-0.25) 
LEV    -1.837 1.940   -5.541 -3.027 
    (-0.45) (0.29)   (-1.34) (-0.46) 
ROA    -6.948** -4.006   -9.154 -3.896 
    (-2.58) (-0.45)   (-1.42) (-0.34) 
SD_STOCK    6.007 3.619   -21.536 6.837 
    (0.66) (0.21)   (-1.63) (0.30) 
DPS    0.550*** 0.289   0.450*** -0.756 
    (5.50) (0.17)   (4.54) (-0.53) 
YEAR fixed effect  No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
IND fixed effect  No No Yes No No No Yes No 
FIRM fixed effect  No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Sample Size  1067 1067 1067 1067 558 558 558 558 
























Appendix 4 - 5: Detailed DiD Regression Analyses (w.r.t. Table 4 - 5) (continued) 




Dependent variable: Corporate Governance Quality (ASSET4) 
 Treatment Group & Control Group 1 Treatment Group & Control Group 2 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Intercept      70.31*** 63.99*** -13.500 -157.905 
      (36.47) (136.11) (-0.46) (-1.41) 
POST          
          
ANTE      4.814** 4.118 (omitted) (omitted) 
      (2.17) (1.61)   
TREATED      -11.442*** (omitted) -2.779 (omitted) 
      (-3.89)  (-0.81)  
POST_TREATED +         
          
ANTE_TREATED -     -9.480*** -7.506** -9.038*** -5.950* 
      (-3.39) (-2.34) (-3.17) (-1.82) 
AF        -0.477 0.746 
        (-1.46) (1.48) 
FTSE100        0.475 (omitted) 
        (0.11)  
PF        -0.284*** -0.033 
        (-2.79) (-0.35) 
Q        -0.015 -3.407 
        (-0.00) (-0.42) 
OWNER        -0.125 -0.021 
        (-1.46) (-0.20) 
SIZE        6.554*** 15.859** 
        (3.22) (1.97) 
ROA        12.983 14.110 
        (1.26) (1.39) 
LEV        -12.585** -12.849 
        (-1.96) (-1.52) 
GROWTH        -3.237 -5.551 
        (-0.83) (-1.33) 
YEAR fixed effect      No No Yes Yes 
IND fixed effect      No No Yes No 
FIRM fixed effect      No Yes No Yes 
Sample Size      305 305 305 305 































Appendix 4 - 5: Detailed DiD Regression Analyses (w.r.t. Table 4 - 5) (continued) 




Dependent variable: Absolute Discretionary Accruals 
 Treatment Group & Control Group 1 Treatment Group & Control Group 2 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Intercept  0.06*** 0.07*** 0.17*** 0.53* 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.19*** -0.060 
  (13.33) (15.12) (4.62) (1.69) (12.18) (26.74) (4.62) (-0.16) 
POST  0.028*** 0.020** (omitted) (omitted)   (omitted) (omitted) 
  (4.36) (2.02)       
ANTE      0.015* 0.017*   
      (1.90) (1.78)   
TREATED  0.003 (omitted) 0.023*** (omitted) 0.004 (omitted) -0.012 (omitted) 
  (0.47)  (2.84)  (0.70)  (-1.56)  
POST_TREATED - -0.043*** -0.034** -0.036*** -0.034**     
  (-4.68) (-2.53) (-3.83) (-2.61)     
ANTE_TREATED +     -0.001 -0.003 0.001 0.002 
      (-0.05) (-0.26) (0.09) (0.15) 
AF    0.001 -0.001   -0.000 0.000 
    (0.90) (-0.46)   (-0.24) (0.08) 
LOSS    0.016** 0.017   0.022** 0.020 
    (2.07) (1.26)   (2.49) (1.33) 
FTSE100    -0.010 (omitted)   0.005 (omitted) 
    (-0.68)    (0.56)  
ASSET4_COV    0.000 (omitted)   -0.004 -0.012 
    (0.06)    (-0.66) (-0.60) 
PF    -0.000 0.000   -0.001*** -0.001** 
    (-0.03) (0.03)   (-2.73) (-2.27) 
OWNER    0.000 0.000   0.000 -0.000 
    (0.34) (0.28)   (0.70) (-0.69) 
SIZE    -0.009*** -0.043   -0.008** 0.009 
    (-2.90) (-1.52)   (-2.48) (0.34) 
LEV    0.052** 0.058   0.014 0.004 
    (2.13) (0.82)   (0.66) (0.07) 
CFO    -0.069** -0.027   0.025 -0.009 
    (-2.41) (-0.36)   (0.69) (-0.08) 
YEAR fixed effect  No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
IND fixed effect  No No Yes No No No Yes No 
FIRM fixed effect  No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Sample Size  1067 1067 1067 1067 558 558 558 558 
Adj. R²  0.035 0.393 0.118 0.408 0.010 0.185 0.072 0.180 
Notes: The underlying basic regression model is:  
VIit =  α + γ1TREATEDit + γ2POST × TREATEDit[γ2ANTE × TREATEDit] + � γ2FIRM_CONTROLit
+ � γ3YEARit + � γ4INDUSTRYit + ε 
TREATED is a dummy variable indicating the treatment group. Depending on the underlying control group, the 
coefficient estimates on the variables POST×TREATED and ANTE×TREATED capture the DiD effect (for 
definitions of treatment and control group, see Table 4 - 1). Firm controls for analyst following (AF) regression 
(Panel A) are: blue chip index membership (FTSE100), alternative CG information (asset4 coverage), capital 
intensity (PPE to total assets), volatility of business (StD of cash from operations), stock price volatility (StD of 
monthly stock returns), brokerage commission (inverse stock price), accounting performance (ROA), growth 
(book-to-market ratio), institutional investors (pension funds holdings), ownership concentration (closely held 
shares), size (log of total assets), and leverage (total debt to total assets). Firm controls for free float (FF) 
regression (Panel B) are: blue chip index membership (FTSE100), alternative CG information (asset4 coverage), 
stock price volatility (StD of monthly stock returns), accounting performance (ROA), size (log of total assets), 
leverage (total debt to total assets), analyst following, and dividends per share. Firm controls for governance 
(GOV) regression (Panel C) are: size (log of total assets), growth (one-year change in net sales), accounting 
performance (ROA), blue chip index membership (FTSE100), firm valuation (Tobin’s Q), analyst following, 
institutional investments (pension funds holdings), ownership concentration (closely held shares), and leverage 
(total debt to total assets). Firm controls for absolute Discretionary Accruals (ADAC) regression (Panel D) are: 
size (log of total assets), blue chip index membership (FTSE100), analyst following, institutional investments 
(pension funds holdings), ownership concentration (closely held shares), loss reporting, cash from operations, 
and leverage (total debt to total assets). For variable definition, see Appendix 4 - 1. In each Panel, Model 5 and 6 
simulate the exogenous shock based on a sample without the treatment group but including both control groups. 
In these models, SPILLOVER is identical to POST×TREATED in terms of construction (with Control Group 2 
as the simulated treatment group and Control Group 1 as the simulated control group). The coefficient estimate 
on SPILLOVER captures any spillover effects on the second original control group due to the exogenous shock 
in the original treatment group. The regression models contain industry- and year-fixed effects, and have robust 
standard errors which are one-way clustered at firm level. Alternatively to industry-fixed effects and the 






inclusion of TREATED, I additionally estimate the regression with firm-fixed effects (as indicated in Table 4 - 
5). Reported values: coefficient (t-value) *** (**) (*) indicates significance levels at 1% (5%) (10%), two-tailed. 
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This paper investigates the role of corporate governance in shaping accrual-based earnings 
management prior to acquisitions. In doing so, we address and extend two related literature 
streams, the stream on earnings management prior to M&A transactions (e.g., Erickson and 
Wang, 1999), and the stream on earnings management and corporate governance (e.g., Klein, 
2002). Prior research predicts and finds evidence that acquiring firms manage earnings 
upward prior to share-based M&A transactions (Erickson and Wang, 1999; Louis, 2004; 
Botsari and Meeks, 2008). Two recent studies, however, argue that these results are 
potentially biased due to the absence of growth adjustments in the estimation process of 
discretionary accruals (Pungaliya and Vijh, 2009; Collins et al., 2012). While the average 
effect of earnings management prior to stock swap deals as well as the sensitivity of the 
applied accrual measures have been addressed, so far only little attention has been paid to 
potential determinants of accruals manipulation in this specific setting (e.g., Young 2008, p. 
673). 
Although prior accounting research assumes a constraining role of corporate 
governance on accruals manipulation (e.g., Dechow et al., 1996), empirical evidence so far is 
rather mixed (e.g., Brown et al., 2011; Dechow et al., 2010; Larcker et al., 2007). We propose 
three non-exclusive explanations for this inconclusive evidence. First, prior evidence, which 
is based on settings that are unspecific to managerial incentives to manipulate accruals, might 
be affected by multiple and potentially conflicting earnings management motivations. 
Consequently, such evidence might be prone to a simultaneous aggregation of different types 
of earnings management, e.g., income-increasing, income-decreasing, or income-smoothing 
accruals manipulation. Second, accrual-based earnings management might not always be a 
signal of managerial opportunism contrasting the interests of firms’ shareholders. In 
situations, for example, where managers manipulate accruals to avoid recontracting costs 
(Christi and Zimmerman, 1994) or to convey private information to the market (Healy and 
Wahlen, 1999), firms’ shareholders might benefit from accruals manipulation. Third, 
conditional on the aforementioned point, corporate governance might affect earnings 
management in different ways. 
To combine both streams of literature and to address the above stated points, we 
examine whether the acquirer’s corporate governance quality affects the acquirer’s earnings 
management behavior prior to share-based M&A transactions. Our approach exploits a 
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specific setting in which prior literature documents income-increasing accruals manipulation. 
More importantly, as accruals manipulation prior to share deals is potentially in the interests 
of the acquirer’s invested shareholders, this setting offers an alternative perspective on the 
relationship between governance and earnings management. In line with the classical 
Principal-Agent-Theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), which suggests that corporate 
governance serves primarily the interests of firms’ shareholders, good governance is expected 
to negotiate the lowest target price for the acquirer’s shareholders, and hence promotes 
income-increasing accruals manipulation prior to the deal negotiation. Specifically, 
shareholders of the acquiring firm prefer lower target prices to minimize any dilution effects 
due to the stock swap component of the deal structure. 
Using stock swap transactions with public acquirers originating from the UK between 
the years 1998 and 2011, our results confirm recent findings of Botsari and Meeks (2008) that 
acquirers on average manipulate accruals upward in the period leading up to the transactions. 
However, and contrary to common claims that strong corporate governance constrains 
accruals manipulation, our analyses of the period specific earnings management behavior 
prior to share deals suggest that acquirers with strong governance engage more aggressively 
in income-increasing accruals manipulation than those with weak governance. This finding is 
consistent with the role of corporate governance which incentivizes managerial actions in the 
interests of firms’ shareholders. It is further robust to different discretionary accrual models, 
to differences in the firm’s growth structure, to M&A control variables, and to a control group 
of 100% cash acquirers. In addition, analyses of acquirers’ long-term buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns (BHAR) surrounding the deal announcement support our findings. Specifically, they 
suggest that acquirers potentially succeed in inflating their stocks’ purchasing power prior to 
the deal announcement and that – consistent with the predicted role of corporate governance – 
well governed acquirers with more pronounced accruals manipulation are potentially more 
successful in inflating stock prices to reduce the costs of buying the target. 
This paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, this is to our knowledge 
the first paper to shed light on the relationship between corporate governance and earnings 
management in a setting in which prior literature documents income-increasing accruals 
manipulation. Thus, it adds to research on earnings management and governance by 
controlling for potentially conflicting earnings management incentives as well as conflicting 
objectives, like income-smoothing, income-increasing, or income-decreasing accruals 
manipulation. More importantly, this paper exploits a specific setting in which we expect to 
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find a promoting role of corporate governance on earnings management. To that end, it is the 
first paper that highlights the setting-specific nature of the earnings management and 
corporate governance relationship. Second, this paper extends research on accrual-based 
earnings management prior to M&A transactions by considering the acquirer’s governance 
quality, different firm and M&A related characteristics, and by controlling for differences in 
firm’s growth structures via growth adjustments in the estimation process of discretionary 
accruals.  
Our findings are important for investors and other users of financial reporting. For one 
reason, they shed light on the endogenous nature of earnings quality, i.e., accrual-based 
earnings management, as well as on the role of corporate governance with its respective 
beneficial or detrimental outcomes for current as well as potential shareholders and other 
stakeholders. Specifically, in situations, like stock swap M&A transactions, our results are 
consistent with the notion that corporate governance potentially promotes accruals 
manipulation in the interests of firms’ current investors but at the expense of future (target) 
investors.   
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 5.2 provides a brief review of related 
literature. Section 5.3 discusses the hypothesis development. Section 5.4 gives an overview of 
the research design. Section 5.5 presents the results and discusses the implications of the main 
findings. The last section concludes. 
 
5.2 Prior Literature 
This paper speaks basically to two related streams of literature, the governance and accrual-
based earnings management literature, as well as the accrual-based earnings management and 
M&A literature. Table 5 - 1 presents an overview. 
 
Corporate Governance and Earnings Management 
Based on U.S. firms for the years 1992 and 1993, Klein (2002) finds evidence that internal 
governance structures (e.g., audit committee and board independence) constrain accruals 
manipulation. Davidson et al. (2005) partly support these findings. They find evidence for 
Australian firms that some internal governance structures (e.g., board and audit committee 
independence) reduce the extent of accruals manipulation, whereas others (like auditor choice 
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and the firm’s voluntary establishment of an internal audit function) do not. Larcker et al. 
(2007) examine the relationship between various governance measures and different 
accounting and financial outcomes in a U.S. setting. Overall, they find mixed evidence of a 
link between governance quality and abnormal accruals, little evidence of a relation between 
governance and accounting restatements, and some evidence of a positive effect of 
governance quality on future operating performance. They argue that the mixed results are 
partly due to the lack of consistent and reliable measures of broad corporate governance 
structures. A recent study for Europe was conducted by Renders and Vandenbogaerde (2008). 
For a sample period between 1999 and 2003, they find a negative relationship between 
different governance mechanisms (e.g., shareholder rights, anti-takeover provisions, and 
board characteristics) and income-increasing accruals manipulation. Moreover, they indicate 
that firm-level governance constrains more effectively the use of discretionary accruals in 
countries with higher quality (country-level) governance standards and they show that their 
results are mainly driven by code law countries. To our knowledge, only Cormier and 
Martinez (2006) consider governance-related structures and earnings management in a 
specific setting. They find evidence for French IPO firms that managers’ leeway to 
manipulate accruals in order to reduce their earnings forecast errors in the post IPO period is 
limited by audit quality and ownership concentration. However, they do not find similar 
evidence for board independence or compliance with IFRS. 
Overall, the majority of prior studies examines the relationship between single 
governance mechanisms and accruals manipulation and finds some evidence for board 
characteristics and weak or even mixed evidence for further internal governance mechanisms 
(for a comprehensive overview, see Garcia-Meca and Sanchez-Ballesta 2009, pp. 600-601). 
However, as to our knowledge, none of the previous studies examines the link between firm-
level corporate governance mechanisms and accruals manipulation in a setting – like stock 
swap M&A transactions – in which specific incentives to manipulate earnings upward are 
expected to be dominant. 
 
Earnings Management prior to share-based M&A Transactions 
Based on a U.S. sample of 55 stock swap transactions between the years 1985 and 1990, 
Erickson and Wang (1999) examine whether acquiring firms manage earnings upward prior to 
M&A transactions. Their results suggest that acquirers in such transactions engage in income-
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increasing accruals manipulation to reduce the purchase costs of the target firms. Consistent 
with that, Louis (2004) finds evidence for 236 U.S. transactions between the years 1992 and 
2000 that acquirers manipulate quarterly earnings via discretionary accruals prior to the stock 
swap announcement. Botsari and Meeks (2008) provide the first non-U.S. evidence. They 
examine the acquirer's discretionary accruals for 48 UK share-based M&A transactions for 
the period between 1997 and 2001. Consistent with the findings of Erickson and Wang (1999) 
and Louis (2004), they show that acquiring firms engage in accruals manipulation in the 
periods (one and two years) prior to the announcement of the transactions. 
Table 5 - 1: Prior Literature on Corporate Governance and Earnings Management 
Panel A. Corporate Governance and accrual-based Earnings Management 
Authors Sample Main Findings 
Davidson et al. (2005) • 434 Australian firms 
• For the year 2000 
• Internal CG (majority of NED on board & audit 
committee) reduces accrual-based EM (no effect for 
auditor choice) 
Klein (2002) • U.S. sample with 692 
firm-years (‘92-‘93) 
• Internal CG (audit committee and board independence) 
reduces the extent of accrual-based EM 
Larcker et al. (2007) • U.S. sample with 
2,106 firms (for the 
year 2003) 
• Mixed evidence of a link between accrual-based EM 
and CG (aggregated measure of 14 CG dimensions) 
Renders and Vanden-
bogaerde (2008) 
• European firms with 
655 firm-year obs. 
(from ’99-’03) 
• Negative link between accrual-based EM and CG 
quality (firm-level CG and institutional characteristics 
appear to be complementary) 
Cormier and Martinez 
(2006) 
• 118 French IPO firms 
(from 2000-2002) 
• Negative link between accrual-based EM and CG 
(audit quality, ownership concentration) in post IPO 
period (no evidence of board independence) 
Panel B. Accrual-based Earnings Management prior to share-based M&A Transactions 
Authors Sample Main Findings 
Erickson and Wang 
(1999) 
• 55 U.S. transactions 
(from 1985-1990) 
• Evidence of accrual-based EM prior to share-based 
M&A (based on quarterly data) 
Heron and Lie (2002) • 427 U.S. transactions 
(from 1985-1997) 
• No evidence of accrual-based EM prior to share-based 
mergers (based on yearly data) 
Louis (2004) • 236 U.S. transactions 
(from 1992-2000) 
• Evidence of accrual-based EM prior to share-based 
transactions (based on quarterly data) 
Baik et al. (2007) • 1,507 U.S. mergers 
(from 1990-1998) 
• Evidence that higher pricing uncertainty for acquirer 
(measured by target public status, target size, industrial 
relatedness) promotes accruals manipulation   
Botsari and Meeks 
(2008) 
• 48 UK transactions 
(from 1997-2001) 
• Support the findings of Erickson and Wang (1999) and 
Louis (2004), but with yearly UK data  
Pungaliya and Vijh 
(2009) 
• 895 U.S. transactions 
(from 1989-2005) 
• No evidence of EM prior to share-based M&A 
They control for growth differences in the estimation 
process of discretionary accruals 
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 In contrast, Heron and Lie (2002) examine acquirers’ discretionary accruals for 859 
U.S. transactions (including 427 share deals) in a period between 1985 and 1997 and do not 
find evidence supporting accruals manipulation prior to share-based deals. Moreover, two 
recent studies present opposing results as well and argue that prior findings are potentially 
biased due to the absence of growth adjustments in the estimation process of discretionary 
accruals (Pungaliya and Vijh, 2009; Collins et al., 2012). Collins et al. (2012) point out that 
when using standard Jones-type discretionary accrual models it is likely to overestimate the 
likelihood of accruals manipulation in quarterly settings where firms with high or low growth 
characteristics are overrepresented.  
Although prior literature scrutinizes the average effect of accruals manipulation prior to 
share deals, so far potential determinants of accruals manipulation in this setting remain 
largely unresearched (e.g., Young, 2008, p. 673). As to our knowledge, only Baik et al. (2007) 
address explicitly determinants of earnings management in a setting of M&A transactions.103
 
 
They predict that the acquirer’s pricing uncertainty promotes accruals manipulation prior to 
share deals. Using target public status, target size, and industrial relatedness between acquirer 
and target as proxies for acquirer’s pricing uncertainty, they find evidence in support of their 
prediction.  
5.3 Hypothesis Development 
Earnings management prior to M&A transactions 
While empirical evidence suggests that managers engage in income-increasing accruals 
manipulation prior to share-based M&A transactions, academic literature remains surprisingly 
silent on the manager’s actual incentive to do so and the potential determinants that shape 
earnings management prior to such deals (Young, 2008; Baik et al., 2007). On a more general 
level, Erickson and Wang (1999) and Botsari and Meeks (2008) argue that managers of 
acquiring firms try to minimize the target price by income-increasing earnings manipulation. 
In share-based deals, the exchange ratio of the transactions – the amount of shares of the 
acquiring firm designated for one share of the target firm – plays an important role and 
allocates the wealth of the respective shareholders. Accruals manipulation prior to stock swap 
deals is thus consistent with the notion that managers of acquiring firms manage earnings 
                                                 
103 In addition, Erickson and Wang (1999) examine whether the deal ratio and ownership serve as additional 
economic incentives to engage in earnings management prior to share deals. Moreover, Pungaliya and Vijh 
(2009) examine whether acquirers strategically time their deal announcements.  
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upward prior to share deals in order to temporarily inflate their share prices, and thus to 




Corporate governance and earnings management 
In the context of this paper, the term corporate governance denotes firm-level control and 
incentive mechanisms which address agency costs within a firm.105 Based on the classical 
Principal-Agent-Theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), agency costs result from interest 
divergences and information asymmetries between shareholders (principal) and management 
(agent) in firms with separated ownership and control.106 Following this shareholder value 
perspective, the core task of corporate governance is to overcome the agency conflict and thus 
to serve the interests of the shareholders (principal).107
Among the various governance mechanisms, the financial reporting process in general, 
and the accounting quality in particular, constitutes a specific governance mechanism. The 
quality of the financial reporting process can be seen both as an input as well as an output 
factor of the governance process (e.g., Sloan, 2001). High quality financial reporting, for 
example, promotes the governance process by reducing information asymmetries between the 
 Prior research on corporate governance 
has focused on various governance mechanisms such as shareholder rights, the structure and 
the composition of boards (and board committees), executive compensation contracts, block 
holders, institutional investors, disclosure, transparency, or the financial reporting system 
(e.g., Bebchuk and Weisbach, 2010; Becht et al., 2005; for an overview, see Schillhofer, 
2003, pp. 25-59). 
                                                 
104 Erickson and Wang (1999, p. 154) acknowledge disincentives for earnings management as well. Since target 
firms and their M&A consultancies (e.g., investment banks) appear to be sophisticated financial statement users 
there is a potential threat that earnings management might be detected. It remains, however, difficult to fully 
disentangle the effects of accounting discretion since earnings management occurs within the boundaries of 
accounting principles. 
105 Following Jensen and Meckling (1976), agency costs are divided into three components: residual costs, 
monitoring costs, and bonding costs. Monitoring costs are essentially control and incentive expenditures borne 
by the principal. Bonding costs serve as signaling costs occurring when the agent signals his or her stewardship 
qualities. Given optimal monitoring and bonding, the residual costs occur as a (residual) loss in welfare because 
interest divergence between both parties will lead at best to a second-best optimum. 
106 Ideally, both contracting parties could negotiate a complete contract settling all tasks and duties of the agent, 
e.g., the allocation of profits, to solve the agency conflict (e.g., Hart, 1995). Since real world contracts are 
incomplete, e.g., owing to transaction costs, the principal has to delegate residual control rights to the agent 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In addition, in firms where ownership and control are separated, the principal is not 
able to fully oversee the actions of the agent, e.g., the agent’s discretionary allocation of the firm’s profit, due to 
information asymmetries. 
107 Besides this traditional, Anglo-Saxon ‘shareholder value’ perspective, the agency relationship might differ 
across jurisdictions depending on the respective institutional arrangements (e.g., Schillhofer, 2003, p. 7; or more 
generally with respect to the ‘stakeholder value’ perspective, see, Schmidt and Weiß, 2003, pp. 115-118). 
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principals and the agents. In addition, corporate governance in turn is expected to increase the 
integrity and the reliability of the financial reporting process by implementing control and 
incentive mechanisms to mitigate opportunistic behavior. Specifically, corporate governance 
is expected to improve the financial reporting quality by constraining, among other things, 
earnings management (Dechow et al., 1996, p. 4). Earnings management can be described as 
the managers’ opportunistic use of accounting discretion in the financial reporting process. 
Managers may have incentives to alter reporting outcomes to mislead stakeholders about the 
firms’ underlying performance or to influence contractual outcomes (Healy and Wahlen, 
1999). Since earnings management activities potentially contrast the interests of the principal, 
e.g., in situations where the profit allocation between the principal and the agent is influenced 
by earnings manipulations, earnings management induces agency costs. As governance 
mechanisms are designed to alleviate agency costs within a firm, they are also expected to 
constrain the opportunistic use of accounting discretion. 
 
Corporate governance and earnings management prior to M&A transactions 
In settings where managers engage in earnings management to increase managerial wealth at 
the expense of the firm’s shareholders, e.g., in fraud settings (Farber, 2005), corporate 
governance is expected to constrain managerial opportunism. In those settings, high 
accounting quality, e.g., in terms of low discretionary accruals, serves the interests of 
shareholders by mitigating information asymmetries, and agency costs. However, in situations 
where managers manipulate earnings in the interests of the firm’s shareholders, the role of 
corporate governance might differ. Christie and Zimmerman (1994, p. 542), for example, note 
that in situations of financial distress income-increasing accruals manipulation might 
“increase firm value by reducing recontracting costs with debtholders”. Thus, earnings 
management is not per se a signal of managerial opportunism opposing the interests of the 
firm’s shareholders.  
 Likewise, in stock swap M&A transactions, it is plausible to assume that the 
shareholders of the acquiring firm potentially benefit from income-increasing accruals 
manipulation prior to the deal negotiation (Dechow et al., 1996; Erickson and Wang, 1999; 
Young, 2008). In particular, Erickson and Wang (1999, p. 150) suggest that managers’ 
incentives to manipulate earnings prior to share-based M&A transactions are stimulated by 
the preferences of existing shareholders. Existing or current shareholders of the acquiring 
firms prefer lower target prices in order to minimize any earnings and control right dilutions 
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due to the stock swap component of the deal structure. In the absence of managerial 
opportunism, accruals manipulation prior to stock swap deals might be driven by an agency 
conflict between current and future shareholders rather than between managers and 
shareholders.108 Thus, consistent with the classical agency theory, one might expect that 
strong corporate governance negotiates the best acquisition price – the most favorable 
exchange ratio – for the shareholders of the acquiring firm. Put differently, it is plausible to 
assume that strong corporate governance promotes income-increasing earnings management 
prior to stock swap deals.109
 
 Therefore, we state our hypothesis as follows: 
H1: Well governed acquirers engage more strongly in income-increasing earnings 
management prior to share-based M&A transactions compared to poorly governed acquirers. 
 
5.4 Research Design 
5.4.1 Sample Selection 
The sample consists of stock swap M&A transactions with acquirers originating from the UK 
between the years 1998 to 2011. We analyze the UK market due to the following reasons. We 
directly build on a recent earnings management study conducted by Botsari and Meeks (2008) 
and extend their UK findings in sample size, growth adjustment in the estimation process of 
discretionary accruals, and analysis of determinants of accruals manipulation preceding the 
stock swap transactions. Moreover, we focus on the UK setting because it offers the most 
vital non-U.S. M&A market (Botsari and Meeks, 2008, p. 633) and provides a single country 
setting with sufficient transactions for statistical analyses. 
The M&A sample is drawn from the database SDC Platinum after applying the 
following selection criteria: (1) the announcement date of the transaction falls in the period 
                                                 
108 Consistent with that, prior studies on financial analysts suggest that – compared to internal governance 
mechanisms – external monitors (like financial analysts or high quality auditors) are superior in constraining 
earnings management in situations where agency conflicts between current and future shareholders prevail (Yu, 
2008; Bolton et al., 2005). Yu (2008, p. 248), for example, argues that “current shareholders could choose to 
incentivize management for short-term stock performance, even with the understanding that this creates 
incentives for management to manipulate earnings”. 
109 Given the overvaluation or rational expectation theory as an alternative explanation for increasing 
discretionary accruals prior to stock swap transactions, the role of governance in promoting earnings 
management is unlikely to change. Following the overvaluation or rational market expectation theory, market 
participants potentially expect the stock swap acquirer’s equity to be overvalued at the announcement of the 
stock financed deal and thus discount the acquirer’s stock prices at the announcement date regardless of any 
specific earnings management indications (Shivakumar, 2000, pp. 339-344; Heron and Lie, 2002, p. 137; Louis, 
2004, p. 122; Erickson and Wang, 1999, pp. 154). Consequently, acquiring firms potentially manipulate accruals 
prior to share deals in order to mask the equity’s overvaluation as well as to respond rationally to the anticipated 
market reaction. Since these earnings manipulations are not contrasting the interest of current shareholders, we 
do not expect that internal governance mechanisms constrain such use of accounting discretion. 
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between 01/01/1998 and 31/12/2011, (2) the acquirer’s domicile country is the United 
Kingdom, (3) the acquirer is a public firm, (4) the target is a public firm110, (5) the acquisition 
technique is stock swap (either pure stock swap or mixed with explicitly identifiable share 
element, SDC code 32; see Botsari and Meeks, 2008, p. 640), (6) the acquirer is a non-
financial firm (SIC codes 60 to 69 are excluded), (7) in cases of multiple stock swap 
transactions per firm, the first transaction remains in the sample to avoid overlapping data111
Table 5 - 2
 
(Botsari and Meeks, 2008, p. 640), (8) all relevant data is available in SDC and Datastream / 
Worldscope, and (9) governance data is available for the acquirer. As a result of these 
selection criteria, the final sample consists of 70 deals.  gives an overview of the 
sample selection and the sample distribution.  
Table 5 - 2: Sample Selection 
Panel A. SDC Platinum – International Mergers (IMA): Start Parameter 
• Date announced: 01/01/1998 to 31/12/2011 
• Acquirer Nation: UK 
• Acquirer Public Status: P (public) 
• Target Public Status: P (public) 
• Acquisition Technique: 32 (stock swap) 
Panel B. Sample Selection    No. of deals 
Initial Sample (with ISIN available)  352 
Financial acquirer -106 246 
Duplicate acquisitions (first deal remains in sample) -72 174 
Datastream / Worldscope data unavailable -45 129 
Governance data unavailable -59 70 
Final Sample  70 
Panel C. Sample Distribution       
Years 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
No. of Transactions 8 14 13 4 3 5 4 
Years 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
No. of Transactions 6 5 3 1 1 2 1 
 
In line with prior studies on earnings management preceding M&A transactions, we 
consider a multi-period setting by investigating different periods prior to and after the deal 
announcement. Specifically, Botsari and Meeks (2008) find evidence that accruals 
manipulation starts already in the second year prior to the announcement of the actual deal. 
They argue that – even without having specific targets in mind – firms may set up acquisition 
                                                 
110 Botsari and Meeks (2008), for example, allow for different target public statuses in their sample selection 
process but do not report results separately, whereas Erickson and Wang (1999) only consider public targets in 
their analyses. Nevertheless, consistent with Capron and Shen (2007), we assume that acquirers in transactions 
with public targets exhibit potentially greater incentives and greater opportunities to engage in accruals 
manipulation due to higher valuation uncertainty, higher degree of dispersed ownership and potentially weaker 
ties between managers and owners in public targets. In the robustness section, we address this issue by 
considering additionally private and subsidiary targets in order to assess the sensitivity of our sample selection 
choice. 
111 Using the last occurrence in cases of multiple transactions does not alter our main inferences. 
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strategies several years prior to specific deal announcements. Moreover, assuming that our 
discretionary accrual measure is not affected by the actual deal, we expect to find on average 
a reversal in discretionary accruals in the years after the deal announcement. Overall, multi-
period analyses increase the sample size power. In the course of our analyses, we thus 
consider different periods prior to the deal announcement, i.e., TRANS-1, TRANS-1 to 
TRANS-2, TRANS-1 to TRANS-3, the period with the deal announcement, i.e., TRANS0, 
and different periods after the deal announcement, i.e., TRANS+1, TRANS+1 to TRANS+2, 
TRANS+1 to TRANS+3. For example, TRANS-1 (TRANS-2) indicates the acquirer’s first 
(second) year with an earnings release preceding the announcement of the stock swap, 
whereas TRANS0 (TRANS+1) indicates the year with the acquirer’s first (second) earnings 
release following the announcement of the stock swap. Figure 5 - 1 visualizes the underlying 
time structure with time periods (years) surrounding the announcement of the stock swap 
transactions.112
Figure 5 - 1: Time Structure of M&A Transactions 
 
EM-Period (Post) M&A-Period 
   Announcement  
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Notes: This table presents the time structure, and the periods around the stock swap announcement. TRANS 
indicates the different periods (years) prior to and after the stock swap announcement. TRANS-1 (TRANS-2) 
[TRANS-3] presents the acquirer’s first (second) [third] year with an earnings release preceding the stock swap 
announcement, whereas TRANS0 (TRANS+1) [TRANS+2] {TRANS+3} presents the year with the acquirer’s 
first (second) [third] {fourth}earnings release following the stock swap announcement. 
 
5.4.2 Regression Model 
We address our hypothesis using the following regression model: 
DACit =  α + γ1GOVit + � γ2M&A_CONTROLit + � γ3FIRM_CONTROLit + ε (1) 
                                                 
112 To identify the underlying time structure (periods surrounding the stock swap announcement), we measure 
the earnings release date by using the Worldscope item Earnings Announcement Date (wc05905). Alternative 
methods to identify the earnings release date do not alter our main findings. We add alternatively four months 
(three months) to a firm’s fiscal year. The earnings release time lag (earnings release minus fiscal year end) for 
the UK acquirers in the Botsari and Meeks (2008) sample varies between two and four months.  
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The dependent variable DAC stands for discretionary accruals obtained from an 
extended cross-sectional modified Jones model and measures accrual-based earnings 
management. GOV represents the main test variable and measures governance quality using a 
self-constructed score. Based on a sample of all acquirer-year observations corresponding to 
the period(s) with an earnings release preceding the announcement of the stock swap (i.e., 
TRANS-1 with N = 66, TRANS-1 to TRANS-2 with N = 128, TRANS-1 to TRANS-3 with N 
= 188), we assume consistent with our hypothesis that the coefficient estimate on 𝛾1 obtains a 
positive sign and becomes significant at conventional levels. M&A_CONTROL represents a 
vector of M&A characteristics which – motivated by prior literature (e.g., Baik et al., 2007; 
Erickson and Wang, 1999) – potentially affects discretionary accruals prior to the stock swap 
transaction (relative deal size, industrial relatedness between acquirer and target, and 
percentage of stock financing). Following prior earnings management literature (e.g., Koh et 
al., 2007; Bowen et al., 2008), FIRM_CONTROL is a vector of firm control variables 
including size, leverage, ownership, and audit quality. To address heteroskedasticity as well 
as cross-sectional and time-series dependence in the dataset, we use standard errors which are 
robust (White, 1980) and two-way clustered at firm and year level (Gow et al., 2010; 
Petersen, 2009).  
 
5.4.3 Discretionary Accruals 
Prior literature points out that the cross-sectional modified Jones model based on the cash 
flow approach is preferable in M&A settings (Botsari and Meeks, 2008; Hribar and Collins, 
2002). Two recent studies, however, argue that prior results on accruals manipulation 
preceding share deals are biased due to misspecified discretionary accruals (Pungaliya and 
Vijh, 2009; Collins et al., 2012). To address this possibility, we additionally adjust for growth 
in the estimation process of discretionary accruals. Consistent with Collins et al. (2012), we 
include a set of dummy variables indicating growth deciles to control for growth in our cross-
sectional modified Jones model.113
                                                 
113 In the robustness section, we show that a ROA and growth matching procedure as suggested in Collins et al. 
(2012) yields similar results. Since our yearly-based UK earnings management sample is substantially smaller 
compared to the quarterly-based U.S. sample used by Collins et al. (2012), we, however, favor the growth 
deciles approach described in section 5.4.3.  
 Following Ball and Shivakumar (2006, 2008), who stress 
the importance of incorporating timelier loss recognition in accrual models (and applying it to 
a UK IPO setting), we finally control for the potential non-linear relationship between 
accruals and cash flows by including CFO adjustments. Taken together, we measure 
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discretionary accruals separately for each two-digit SIC industry group and year by the 
following model based on all available non-financial UK Worldscope firms (excluding the 
stock swap acquirers):114
CACit TAit−1⁄ = α + β[(ΔREVit TAit−1⁄ ) − (ΔRECit TAit−1⁄ )] + � γnGROWTHnit
N
n=1
+ δ(CFOit/TAit−1) + φDCFOit + ω(CFOit/TAit−1) × DCFOit + εi 
 
(2) 
The dependent variable CAC stands for current (working capital) accruals and is 
obtained directly from the cash flow statement (current accruals as net income minus cash 
from operations minus depreciation / amortization). ΔREV stands for changes in revenues, 
ΔREC stands for changes in receivables, GROWTHn represents n dummy variables indicating 
different growth deciles (based on the percentage change in sales), CFO stands for cash flows 
from operations, DCFO is a dummy variable indicating whether the CFO is smaller than zero, 
and TA stands for total assets. The residuals of regression equation 2 represent the unexpected 
(discretionary) accruals (DAC). In the robustness section, we repeat the main regression 
analysis by using alternative discretionary accrual types (DAC based on total accruals and 
with and without controlling for growth and CFO adjustments and DAC based on ROA and 
growth matching).  
 
5.4.4 Corporate Governance Proxy 
Our corporate governance proxy (GOV) measures the quality of internal corporate 
governance mechanisms (i.e., internal control and incentive mechanisms). Specifically, GOV 
is constructed as follows: In a first step, we construct a naïve corporate governance score 
(GOVISS) based on all UK Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) Corporate Governance 
Quotient (CGQ) raw data for the years between 2003 and 2007. In doing so, we employ the 
CGQ raw dataset provided by ISS and the latest Corporate Governance Quotient Indicator 
Definition published by ISS in 2007 (RiskMetrics Group 2007). The UK CGQ rating relies on 
47 single rating criteria and is organized into eight categories (board, audit, charter, anti-
takeover provisions, compensation, progressive practice, executive ownership, and 
                                                 
114 The constant term is not suppressed and thus the regression equations are not constructed through its origin 
(Botsari and Meeks, 2008, p. 637). Peasnell et al. (2000, p. 316), for example, state that there is no theoretical 
reason to suppress the constant term. In total, we run 784 industry-year regressions each – consistent with 
Botsari and Meeks (2008, p. 643) – with at least six observations. In particular, the distribution parameters of the 
corresponding sample sizes are as follows: mean value of sample size = 72, median value of sample size = 42, 
min value of sample size = 6, max value of sample size = 293, and total number of firm-year observations = 
21,253. 
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education). According to our GOVISS, each rating criterion takes the value of one if the firm’s 
corporate governance standards are acceptable (based on the CGQ indicator definition), and 
zero otherwise (for a similar approach and an overview about UK ISS criteria, see Hitz and 
Lehmann, 2013). 
In a second step, we take the firm’s average value of GOVISS in order to measure 
governance quality (GOV) for the M&A sample period (1998 to 2011). This approach has its 
own merits and drawbacks. Using the CGQ raw dataset, we are able to measure internal 
corporate governance quality on a multi-dimensional level. However, to obtain a valid 
governance proxy, the approach relies on sticky governance structures. Based on year-to-year 
correlation coefficients between consecutive governance scores (GOVISS), the stickiness level 
in the governance data is fairly high.115
 
 In the robustness section, we run several tests to 
ensure the robustness of our governance proxy and to account for potential sample selection 
problems due to the availability of ISS data.  
5.4.5 Firm and M&A Control Variables 
In line with prior literature, we use several variables to control for transaction-related earnings 
management incentives (M&A_CONTROL) as well as for firm characteristics (FIRM_CON-
TROL) to ensure the specification power of our main regression model. 
In particular, we control for the acquirer’s pricing uncertainty by using relative deal size 
(DEAL SIZE) as transaction value deflated by acquirers’ market value of equity as well as 
industrial relatedness between the acquirer and the target (IND RELATEDNESS) as a dummy 
variable indicating whether the four-digit SIC code of the acquirer and the target is identical 
(Baik et al., 2007; Erickson and Wang, 1999), and deal financing (STOCK) by using a 
variable indicating the percentage of stock of the deal financing (Baik et al., 2007). 
As firm control variables, we consider additionally firm size (SIZE) by using the natural 
logarithm of firms’ total assets (e.g., Klein, 2002), potential agency costs of debt (LEV) by 
using the relation of total debt to total assets (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994), ownership 
                                                 
115 Prior literature commonly assumes stickiness in firm-level corporate governance. Brown et al. (2011), for 
example, provide year-to-year correlation coefficients for Australian governance rankings over eight years from 
2002 to 2009 which ranges on a relatively high level between 0.72 and 0.89. Likewise, Daines et al. (2010) 
report – with a correlation coefficient of 0.85 between two consecutive US CGQ ratings – a relatively high 
stickiness level of governance. Following the notion of sticky governance structures, prior governance studies 
extend their sample backwards and assume constant governance quality over time (Bauer et al., 2004; Drobetz et 
al., 2004). The stickiness level in our dataset (expressed by year-to-year correlation coefficients based on a 
balanced panel sample) is similar to Brown et al. (2011) and Daines et al. (2010) on a comparably high level, 
ranging from 0.45 to 0.93 with an average value of 0.67. 
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(OWNER) by using a summary measure of closely held shares (Koh et al., 2007), and audit 
quality (BIG FIVE) by using a dummy variable indicating whether the firm is audited by one 
of the Big Five auditors or their predecessors (Lennox and Pittman, 2010).116
 
 In the 
robustness section, we show that our main findings are unaffected by the inclusion of 
additional (M&A and firm) control variables and by using stepwise regression techniques to 
statistically select the control variables.  
5.5 Results 
5.5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5 - 3 presents descriptive statistics for the respective year of the stock swap announce-
ment (TRANS0) for all variables used in this study. In particular, discretionary accruals are 
on average -0.42% (discretionary accruals to lagged total assets) and range on a scale between 
-53.45% and 43.06% at the time of the stock swap announcement. Governance quality 
measured by GOV – with a theoretical range between 0 (worst) and 100 (best governance 
quality) – provides sufficient dispersion for further analyses with a standard deviation of 
24.98% around the mean of 45.09%. The relative deal size distribution is slightly right-
skewed with a mean value of 102.47% and a median value of 58.32% (with relative deal size 
as deal value deflated by acquirer’s market value). All transactions are either pure stock swaps 
or mixed deals with explicitly identifiable share elements. Specifically, the percentage of 
stock financing ranges between 8.22% and 100% with a mean (median) value of 80.69% 
(98.28%). 
Table 5 - 4 reports non-parametric Spearman and Pearson correlation coefficients 
between the main interest variables (DAC and GOV) and all test variables as well as control 
variables. In contrast to the descriptive statistics, the correlations are based on the acquirer’s 
first year with an earnings release preceding the announcement of the stock swap (TRANS-1). 
In line with our hypothesis, governance quality is positively correlated with discretionary 
accruals in the period prior to the announcement of the stock swap transactions, yet, not on a 
statistically meaningful level. In addition, all remaining correlations between discretionary 
                                                 
116 As our proxy of internal governance (GOV) does not incorporate any external audit quality measures, we 
control for audit quality separately. Following Larcker et al. (2007, p. 987), we do not control for growth and/or 
performance in our final regression model. To the extent that our abnormal accruals are orthogonal to growth 
and performance due to the applied discretionary accrual model, we do not consider such variables in our final 
setup. However, within the robustness section, we test among other things whether additional (firm and M&A) 
control variables affect our main findings. In addition, Appendix 5 - 14 provides an overview of all variables 
used in our study. 
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accruals and firm as well as M&A control variables remain insignificant in the period leading 
up to the stock swap announcement. 
Table 5 - 3: Descriptive Analysis 
Descriptive values  
(TRANS0) 
Sample 
(N=70) Mean Median St.Dev. Min. Max. 
EARNINGS MANAGEMENT & GOVERNANCE       
Acquirer’s Discretionary Accruals (DAC in %) -0.42 -0.69 17.08 -53.45 43.06 
Acquirer’s Governance Quality (GOV in %) 45.09 44.96 24.98 2.37 88.66 
FIRM CONTROLS       
Acquirer’s Total Assets (in € Mill.) 3,315 817 5,821 7.5 28,400 
Acquirer’s Market Value (in € Mill.) 6,758 821 22,111 10.65 153,404 
Acquirer’s Leverage (LEV in %) 22.17 20.52 18.28 0 75.58 
Acquirer’s Ownership (OWNER in %) 13.73 10.08 15.62 .01 64.22 
Acquirer’s Audit Quality (BIG FIVE) .9571 1 .2039 0 1 
M&A CONTROLS       
Deal-Value (in € Mill.) 5,508 328 25,994 3.25 204,792 
Relative Deal Value (DEAL SIZE in %) 102.47 58.32 267.16 1.21 2,226 
Industrial Relatedness (IND RELATEDNESS) .6428 1 .4826 0 1 
Percentage of Stock (STOCK) 80.69 98.28 23.71 8.22 100 
Notes: This table displays the descriptive statistics of all variables used on this study. The sample consists of 70 
stock swap transactions. For details on the sample selection process, see Table 5 - 2. For detailed information 
and definitions of the variables, see Appendix 5 - 14. 
Table 5 - 4: Correlation Analysis 
TRANS-1 
(N=66) 
 Correlations (Spearman & Pearson) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
DAC 1  .155 -.101 -.135 .057 -.100 -.099 -.127 .203 
   (0.22) (0.42) (0.28) (0.65) (0.42) (0.43) (0.31) (0.10) 
GOV 2 .096  .037 .035 -.062 .175 -.3*** .50*** .175 
  (0.44)  (0.77) (0.78) (0.62) (0.16) (0.00) (0.00) (0.16) 
DEAL SIZE 3 -.089 .087  -.112 -.032 .029 .080 -.229* .004 
  (0.48) (0.49)  (0.37) (0.80) (0.82) (0.53) (0.06) (0.97) 
IND RELATEDNESS 4 -.090 .033 .104  .015 -.134 -.072 .292** .030 
  (0.47) (0.79) (0.41)  (0.90) (0.28) (0.57) (0.02) (0.81) 
STOCK 5 .061 -.048 .095 .015  -.148 -.169 -.039 -.22* 
  (0.63) (0.70) (0.45) (0.91)  (0.24) (0.18) (0.75) (0.08) 
BIG FIVE 6 -.084 .181 .019 -.134 -.168  -0.108 .267** .207 
  (0.51) (0.15) (0.88) (0.28) (0.18)  (0.39) (0.03) (0.10) 
OWNER 7 -.089 -.25** .049 -.046 -.193 -.116  -.5*** -.079 
  (0.48) (0.04) (0.69) (0.72) (0.12) (0.35)  (0.00) (0.53) 
SIZE 8 -.099 .49*** -.067 .281** -.070 .269** -.33**  .25** 
  (0.43) (0.00) (0.59) (0.02) (0.57) (0.03) (0.01)  (0.04) 
LEV 9 .181 .191 -.025 -.005 -.27** .251** -.196 .314**  
  (0.15) (0.12) (0.84) (0.97) (0.03) (0.04) (0.11) (0.01)  
Notes: This table reports Pearson correlation coefficients (above the diagonal) and non-parametric Spearman 
correlation coefficients (below the diagonal). For detailed information and definitions of the variables, see 
Appendix 5 - 14. Reported values: coefficients (p-values), *** (**) (*) indicates significance levels at 1% (5%) 
(10%), two-tailed level. 
 
Table 5 - 5 presents distribution characteristics of the acquirer’s discretionary accruals 
in the periods surrounding the stock swap transactions, and provides significance tests of the 
mean (t-test) and the median (Wilcoxon signed-ranks test) values (e.g., Botsari and Meeks, 
2008, p. 649). Consistent with prior findings, our results suggest that acquirers on average 
manipulate accruals upward prior to stock swap transactions. Specifically, the mean and 
THE ROLE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN SHAPING ACCRUALS 





median discretionary accrual values in the first year preceding the stock swap announcement 
(TRANS-1) are positive and significant at conventional levels (Table 5 - 5, Panel A). 
Moreover, we find evidence of the reversion of accruals manipulation in the year of the 
acquirer’s second earnings release following the stock swap announcement (TRANS+1) 
(Table 5 - 5, Panel A).117
Table 5 - 5
 Consistent with our hypothesis, we find evidence suggesting that 
acquirers with strong governance engage more aggressively in income-increasing accruals 
manipulation than those with weak governance do ( , Panel B and C). Well 
governed acquirers exhibit on average 3.4% discretionary accruals to firm’s total assets in the 
first year prior to the deal announcement (Table 5 - 5, Panel B), whereas acquirers with weak 
governance exhibit on average only 1.8% discretionary accruals to firm’s total assets in the 
same period (Table 5 - 5, Panel C). 
Table 5 - 5: Mean and Median DAC Analyses 
Panel A. Mean / Median DAC around Stock Swaps: full sample (all GOV rated stock swaps) 
Time / Var Mean Median SD Min. Max. N 
TRANS-3 0.0219 0.0000 0.0886 -0.1737 0.4307 60 
TRANS-2 0.0150 0.0071 0.1276 -0.5345 0.4307 62 
TRANS-1 0.0260*** 0.0179*** 0.0727 -0.1885 0.2539 66 
TRANS0 -0.0042 -0.0069 0.1708 -0.5345 0.4307 70 
TRANS+1 -0.0161* 0.0000 0.0957 -0.5345 0.1720 68 
TRANS+2 -0.0138 0.0001 0.0946 -0.4644 0.1558 64 
TRANS+3 0.0072 0.0039 0.0819 -0.3979 0.1479 60 
Panel B. Mean / Median DAC around Stock Swaps: above mean GOV rated stock swaps  
Time / Var Mean Median SD Min. Max. N 
TRANS-3 0.0196 0.0003 0.0717 -0.1737 0.1913 29 
TRANS-2 0.0388** 0.0109** 0.1059 -0.1455 0.4307 31 
TRANS-1 0.0344*** 0.0249** 0.0744 -0.0765 0.2539 33 
TRANS0 0.0362 0.0000 0.1545 -0.2029 0.4307 36 
TRANS+1 -0.0235 0.0000 0.1132 -0.5345 0.1232 35 
TRANS+2 -0.0128 0.0000 0.1091 -0.4644 0.1558 33 
TRANS+3 0.0140 0.0087 0.0591 -0.1195 0.1465 32 
Panel C. Mean / Median DAC around Stock Swaps: below mean GOV rated stock swaps 
Time / Var Mean Median SD Min. Max. N 
TRANS-3 0.0241 0.0000 0.1031 -0.1487 0.4307 31 
TRANS-2 -0.0089 0.0000 0.1439 -0.5345 0.2641 31 
TRANS-1 0.0177* 0.0163* 0.0711 -0.1885 0.1406 33 
TRANS0 -0.0471* -0.0110 0.1789 -0.5345 0.1600 34 
TRANS+1 -0.0084 -0.0039 0.0738 -0.1830 0.1720 33 
TRANS+2 -0.0148 0.0051 0.0781 -0.1924 0.1085 31 
TRANS+3 -0.0005 0.0018 0.1026 -0.3979 0.1479 28 
Notes: This table presents distribution characteristics of acquirer’s discretionary accruals in the periods around 
the stock swap announcement (for different samples). TRANS indicates the different periods (years) prior to and 
after the stock swap announcement. TRANS-1 (TRANS-2) [TRANS-3] presents the acquirer’s first (second) 
[third] year with an earnings release preceding the stock swap announcement, whereas TRANS0 (TRANS+1) 
[TRANS+2] {TRANS+3} presents the year with the acquirer’s first (second) [third] {fourth} earnings release 
following the stock swap announcement. The significance tests are based on t-test statistics (for the mean values) 
and Wilcoxon signed-ranks test statistics (for the median values). *** (**) (*) indicates significance levels at 1% 
(5%) (10%), one-tailed. 
                                                 
117 However, as Louis (2004) and Botsari and Meeks (2008) point out, discretionary accruals after the transaction 
(TRANS+1) have to be carefully interpreted since M&A deals affect the acquirers’ balance sheet in complex 
ways so that changes in accruals in this period are rather difficult to compare. 
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Figure 5 - 2 visualizes the accruals manipulation separately for acquirers with strong 
and weak governance around the stock swap announcements (the median values are taken 
from Table 5 - 5, Panel A, B, and C). In the period leading up to the announcement date (i.e., 
TRANS-2 and TRANS-1), acquirers with strong governance exhibit on average higher 
discretionary accruals than their counterparts with weak governance do. 
Figure 5 - 2: Distribution of Median DAC around UK Stock Swap Transactions 
 
Notes: This figure presents the distribution of the acquirer’s median discretionary accruals (DAC) in the periods 
around the stock swap announcements. For details on the sample selection process, see Table 5 - 2. The DAC 
median values are taken from Table 5 - 5. TRANS indicates the different periods (years) prior to and after the 
stock swap announcement. TRANS-1 (TRANS-2) [TRANS-3] presents the acquirer’s first (second) [third] year 
with an earnings release preceding the stock swap announcement, whereas TRANS0 (TRANS+1) [TRANS+2] 
{TRANS+3} presents the year with the acquirer’s first (second) [third] {fourth} earnings release following the 
stock swap announcement. 
 
5.5.2 Regression Results 
Table 5 - 6 presents the regression results. Model 1 to 3 investigate the relationship between 
corporate governance and discretionary accruals in the period(s) prior to the stock swap 
announcement, with Model 1 addressing the first period (TRANS-1), Model 2 the first and 
second period (TRANS-1 to TRANS-2), and Model 3 the first, second, and third period 
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Median DAC of GOV rated acquirers (N=70) Median DAC of above mean GOV rated acquirers (N=36)
Median DAC of below mean GOV rated acquirers (N=34)
Stock swap transactions take place in TRANS0; the latest financial statements prior to the transactions are published in TRANS-1.
UK stock swap transactions between the years 1998 and 2011
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to 6 address the relationship between governance and earnings management in the period(s) 
after the stock swap announcement. In particular, all governance coefficients in the first three 
models obtain a positive sign and become significant at conventional levels (at the 5% and 
1% level). We therefore find evidence in line with our hypothesis that good corporate 
governance promotes income-increasing, accrual-based earnings management in the period(s) 
prior to the announcement of the stock swap. According to the results of the period(s) after 
the stock swap announcement (and completion), the governance coefficients become 
insignificant and obtain a negative sign in one out of three models (Table 5 - 6, Model 4 and 
6). These findings even underline the economic implications of the governance results across 
the periods prior to the deal, since the observed governance-accruals relationship appears to 
be period specific and does not follow any systematic pattern across the whole sample. 
Table 5 - 6: Regression Analyses: Governance Role 
Variables 
Dependent variable: Discretionary Accruals (CMJM with CFO & Growth adj./ CAC) 













Intercept .2251** .2550*** .2617*** -.1097* -.0284 -.0375 
 (2.79) (2.63) (2.67) (-1.84) (-0.70) (-0.54) 
GOV .0843** .1213** .1058*** -.0152 .0157 .0226 
 (2.28) (2.44) (2.81) (-0.28) (0.25) (0.53) 
DEAL SIZE -.0001*** -.0000 -.0000 -.0000 -.0000** -.0000 
 (-5.86) (-1.37) (-1.08) (-0.02) (-2.42) (-0.82) 
IND RELATEDNESS -.0127 .0083 .0069 .0128 .0296 .0218 
 (-0.66) (0.41) (0.44) (0.32) (1.23) (1.08) 
STOCK .0002 -.0001 .0001 .0001 -.0001 -.0000 
 (0.71) (-0.27) (0.43) (0.12) (-0.14) (-0.01) 
BIG FIVE -.0474 -.1663*** -.1740** .0323 .0087 .0456 
 (-0.67) (-3.57) (-2.40) (1.65) (0.29) (0.82) 
OWNER -.0047* -.0026 -.0027 .0018 -.0019 -.0008 
 (-2.15) (-0.57) (-0.92) (0.47) (-0.39) (-0.21) 
SIZE -.0160*** -.0103* -.0107** .0025 -.0014 -.0032 
 (-4.87) (-1.78) (-2.12) (0.30) (-0.30) (-0.91) 
LEV .1068** .0755 .0623 .0742* .0411 .0378 
 (2.19) (1.18) (1.40) (1.80) (0.67) (1.01) 
Clustered se (1w) Yes No No Yes No No 
Clustered se (2w) No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Adj. R² .1073 .0937 .1213 -.0966 -.0215 -.0060 
Sample Size 66 128 188 67 130 189 
Notes: The underlying regression model is:  
DACit =  α + γ1GOVit + � γ2M&A_CONTROLit + � γ3FIRM_CONTROLit + ε 
Where α represents the constant term, γ1 − ∑ γ3 are the coefficients of the explanatory variables, and ε is the 
error term. The dependent variable DAC represents discretionary accruals obtained from an extended (CFO and 
growth adjusted) cross-sectional modified Jones model and measures accrual-based earnings management. GOV 
proxies firm-level governance quality. M&A_CONTROL represents a vector of M&A characteristics (relative 
deal size, industrial relatedness, and percentage of stock financing). FIRM_CONTROL represents a vector of 
firm characteristics (size, leverage, ownership concentration, and big five auditor). For detailed information and 
definitions of the variables, see Appendix 5 - 14. The regression models have standard errors which are 
heteroskedasticity robust and – as indicated – one-way clustered at year level or two-way clustered at firm and 
year level. Reported values: coefficient (t-value) *** (**) (*) indicates significance levels at 1% (5%) (10%), 
two-tailed. 
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With respect to our control variables, we find in the first period prior to the deal 
announcement (TRANS-1) that relative deal size (at the 1% level), acquirer’s firm size (at a 
1% level), acquirer’s leverage (at a 5% level), and the acquirer’s ownership structure (at a 
10% level) are significantly associated with acquirer’s discretionary accruals (Table 5 - 6, 
Model 1). The signs of the three latter control variables are in line with prior literature on 
earnings management and governance (e.g., Klein, 2002). The sign of relative deal size 
confirms the results of Baik et al. (2007) that acquirer’s pricing uncertainty might induce 
incentives for earnings management.118 However, this in turn contradicts Erickson and Wang 
(1999) who argue that with increasing deal ratios higher economic benefits trigger accruals 
manipulation prior to the deal.119
In addition, across both panels covering the first two and three periods prior to the deal 
announcement (TRANS-1 to TRANS-2 and TRANS-1 to TRANS-3), we find evidence that 
acquirer’s audit quality (at a 5% and 1% level) is significantly and negatively associated with 
accruals manipulation (
 
Table 5 - 6, Model 2 and 3). This finding might be surprising since the 
results suggest that strong internal governance promotes accruals manipulation, while external 
audit quality measured by the presence of one of the big five audit firms constrains the same. 
Consistent with our hypothesis, we take this as evidence of the complexity of governance 
structures, especially with respect to internal and external governance provisions and with the 
ability of these provisions to primarily solve conflicts between ownership and control or 
conflicts between current and future shareholders.120
 
 Overall, our findings suggest that – in 
line with our hypothesis – well governed acquirers engage more aggressively in income-
increasing accruals manipulation than those with weak governance prior to the deal 
announcement.   
                                                 
118 Using log of offer price instead of relative deal size does not alter our governance results. 
119 Incentives to manipulate earnings might be an increasing function of lower reputational risk, lower litigation 
risk, and the decreasing probability that earnings management is detected. Assuming that reputational and 
litigation risk as well as the probability of earnings management detection is increasing with the deal ratio (due 
to more consultancy resource employed by the target and a potentially higher media and analyst coverage), we 
would in turn expect lower incentives to engage in accruals manipulation prior to transactions with higher deal 
ratios. 
120 Our corporate governance proxy does not incorporate any external audit quality measures. The ISS raw data 
only contains information on three related internal audit quality measures: (1) audit committee composition is 
100% independent, (2) policy disclosed regarding auditor rotation, and (3) consulting fees are less than audit fees 
(for details on the UK ISS rating criteria, see Hitz and Lehmann, 2013, p. 38). 
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5.5.3 Additional Analyses and Robustness Tests 
Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns 
We perform several analyses to test the robustness of our findings. First, following Botsari 
and Meeks (2008), we investigate abnormal returns around the deal announcement and 
thereby address an implicit assumption of our setting; acquirers engage in income-increasing 
accruals manipulation to temporarily inflate their stock prices prior to the deal announcement. 
We thus estimate (long-term) buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) for our sample firms 
(Barber and Lyon, 1997; Lyon et al., 1999; Louis, 2004; Kothari and Warner, 2006; Botsari 
and Meeks, 2008). In particular, we follow the approach proposed by Barber and Lyon (1997, 
pp. 344, 355) and estimate the BHARs as follows:  
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑇 = � [1 + 𝑅𝑖𝑡]
𝑇
𝑡=1




BHARiT is the buy-and-hold abnormal return of firm i over a period of T months. Rit – 
as the firm’s simple return (Barber and Lyon, 1997, p. 349) – is defined as the change in stock 
prices plus dividends divided by last year’s stock price. E(Rit) is the expected return of firm i 
at month t measured as the simple return of a control firm at month t. Following Barber and 
Lyon (1997, p. 355), we choose the control firms as follows: (1) we identify all non-stock 
acquirers with a market value of equity between 70% and 130% of the market value of equity 
of each acquirer (yearly-based); (2) from the acquirer’s individual matching portfolio, we 
select the non-stock acquirer with the book-to-market ratio closest to that of the acquirer. In 
line with the implicit assumption of inflating stocks’ purchasing power (Heron and Lie, 2002, 
p. 137), we expect to find positive BHARs for acquiring firms in the period leading up to the 
deal announcements. 
Untabulated results reveal that acquirers earn on average significantly positive abnormal 
returns in the period (TRANS-1) prior to the deal announcement. Moreover, we see that 
acquirers with above average governance quality earn higher BHARs in that specific period 
(TRANS-1) compared to those with below mean governance quality. We further see that 
acquirers earn abnormal returns in different periods (12 months, 24 months, and 36 months) 
prior to the deal announcement month, and that acquirers with above average accruals 
manipulation (and higher governance quality) earn higher abnormal returns in these periods 
compared to those with lower level of discretionary accruals (and governance quality).121
                                                 
121 See 
 Our 
Appendix 5 - 1. 
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BHAR analyses thus suggest that acquirers potentially succeed in inflating stock prices prior 
to share deals and that – consistent with our hypothesis – well governed acquirers are even 
more successful in inflating their stocks’ purchasing power. 
 
Cash Acquirers 
Second, in line with Erickson and Wang (1999) and Botsari and Meeks (2008), we challenge 
the overall robustness of our findings and the theoretical underpinning of our setting by 
replicating the main analyses for cash acquirers. Since cash transactions differ to stock swap 
deals in that they do not rely on exchange ratios, inflated share prices (e.g., due to accruals 
manipulation) should not directly affect target prices in cash transactions. Moreover, cash 
transactions do not create any earnings or control right dilutions for the acquirer’s existing 
shareholders. Consequently, we neither expect managerial incentives to engage in accruals 
manipulation prior to cash transactions nor shareholder incentives to incentivize management 
for short-term stock performance, and accruals manipulation. Using the SDC database and 
applying the same selection procedure as reported in section 5.4.1 – with the only exception 
being that only 100% cash acquisitions are considered – we obtain a final sample of 64 cash 
acquirers. Untabulated results reveal that cash acquirers do not engage in income-increasing 
accruals manipulation in the period prior to the announcement of the cash deal. The results 
further suggest that governance quality does not systematically explain the variation in the 
acquirer’s discretionary accruals in the periods surrounding the announcement date. In 
addition, analyses of cash acquirers’ buy-and-hold abnormal returns do not reveal positive 
and significant abnormal returns in the period prior to the deal announcement. Likewise, they 




Sample Selection Bias 
Third, we control for a possible sample selection bias in our regression analysis (Table 5 - 6). 
Since the final sample (N=70) is selected by the availability of ISS data on governance 
quality, we apply a two-stage Heckman procedure to model the selection process based on a 
sample that contains all transactions independently of whether governance data is available or 
                                                 
122 See Appendix 5 - 2 to Appendix 5 - 5. 
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not (N=129). We adjust the regression models from Table 5 - 6 for the selection effect by 
including the inverse Mills ratio from a first stage probit regression. Untabulated results of the 
extended regressions are in line with our original findings. In all regressions addressing the 
period(s) prior to the deal announcement the governance coefficients obtain positive signs and 
remain significant at conventional levels (at a 1% and 5% level). The inverse mills ratio, 
however, remains insignificant across the different regressions.123
    
 
Target Public Status 
Fourth, we additionally consider private and subsidiary targets to assess the sensitivity of our 
sample selection choice. Baik et al. (2007) and Pungaliya and Vijh (2009) examine stock 
swap transactions with private (and subsidiary) targets and argue that the information 
asymmetry risk for bidders might be higher in transactions with non-public targets, and that 
managers of public targets might be more prone to payments of merger bonuses, 
respectively.124 In addition, Capron and Shen (2007) examine the decision to acquire either a 
private or a public target from a strategic management perspective. In contrast to Baik et al. 
(2007), they predict and find evidence that bidders already incorporate differences in the 
information availability into their decisions to buy either private or public targets. Consistent 
with Capron and Shen (2007) and Pungaliya and Vijh (2009), we assume that acquirers in 
transactions with public targets exhibit potentially greater incentives and greater opportunities 
to engage in accruals manipulation due to higher valuation uncertainty, higher degree of 
dispersed ownership and potentially weaker ties between managers and owners in public 
targets than acquirers in transactions with private and / or subsidiary targets. Untabulated 
results of an extended analysis (with public, private, and subsidiary targets) underline our 
assumption.125
                                                 
123 See 
 Although we find significant evidence for earnings management and for a 
promoting role of corporate governance in the period(s) prior to the transaction over all three 
samples – (1) with public targets, (2) with public and private targets, as well as (3) with 
public, private and subsidiary targets – the strength of the results is decreasing when 
considering non-listed targets.  
Appendix 5 - 6. 
124 Other earnings management studies, however, do not address explicitly the different target public statuses. 
Botsari and Meeks (2008), for example, allow implicitly for different target public statuses in their sample 
selection process but do not report results separately, whereas Erickson and Wang (1999) only consider public 
targets in their analyses. 
125 See Appendix 5 - 7 to Appendix 5 - 8. 
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Fifth, we use alternative discretionary accrual proxies to assess the sensitivity of our 
discretionary accrual model choice. With respect to the original model described in section 
5.4.3, we employ discretionary accruals from a cross-sectional modified Jones model 
(CMJM) (1) with CFO and growth adjustments but based on total accruals (TAC), (2) with 
only CFO adjustments and based on total accruals (TAC), (3) with ROA and growth 
matched126 discretionary accruals based on CMJM with CFO adjustments and total accruals 
(TAC), (4) with only CFO adjustments but based on current accruals (CAC), and (5) with 
ROA and growth matched discretionary accruals based on CMJM with CFO adjustments and 
current accruals (CAC). Untabulated results based on the five alternative discretionary accrual 
proxies confirm our original findings. Specifically, we find significant evidence for income-
increasing accruals manipulation in the first period prior to the deal (TRANS-1) across all five 
discretionary accrual proxies. In addition, our results suggesting a promoting role of corporate 
governance on accruals manipulation prior to share deals are likewise unaffected by changes 
in the discretionary accrual model.127
 
 
Corporate Governance Measure 
Sixth, we vary in the governance proxy construction to assess the sensitivity of our approach 
described in section 5.4.4. First, in order to extend the self-constructed governance score 
(GOVISS) over the M&A sample period, we alternatively take the median GOVISS value per 
firm. Second, we employ a dummy variable indicating strong (with 1) and poor (with 0) 
governance quality based on the governance scores (GOVISS) of all UK rated firms. Third, we 
employ a dummy variable indicating with one if the acquirer’s governance measure (GOV) 
belongs to the 10th deciles, and zero otherwise. Fourth, using the ISS raw data as well, we 
alternatively base the final governance proxy on a Principal Component Analysis. In 
particular, we use the averaged principal component with the highest eigenvalue – estimated 
on the six self-constructed sub-scores board, audit, charter & bylaws, compensation, 
                                                 
126 Alternatively to our initial approach to control for growth in the estimation process of discretionary accruals, 
we apply – following Collins et al. (2012), Roychowdhury (2006), and Garcia Lara et al. (2012) – a performance 
matching technique based on ROA and sales growth. We estimate performance- and growth-matched 
discretionary accruals for each acquirer by adjusting the respective estimated discretionary accruals from the 
extended cross-sectional modified Jones model by those of a matching control firm. For each acquirer, we select 
the matching control firm that has the closest sales growth figure based on the same fiscal year, the same two-
digit SIC industry group, and the same ROAt-1 quintile. 
127 See Appendix 5 - 9 to Appendix 5 - 10. 
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progressive practice, and ownership (RiskMetrics, 2007). Finally, we split our original GOV 
measure to aggregate those subcategories which comprise either monitoring or incentive 
provisions.  
Untabulated results based on the different governance proxies confirm our original 
findings. In particular, we find significant evidence across all different governance proxies 
that acquirers with strong governance engage more aggressively in income-increasing 
accruals manipulation in the period(s) preceding the deal announcement than their 
counterparts with weak governance. Moreover, splitting the original GOV measure into 
monitoring and incentive measures suggest that especially incentive provisions (compensation 
and managerial ownership provisions) promote accruals manipulation prior to the deal 
announcement. In line with our hypothesis, the latter finding is particularly consistent with the 
notion that existing shareholders of the acquiring firm incentivize management for short-term 
stock performance and accruals manipulation prior to share deals.128
To address the stickiness of firm-level governance in our setting, we perform 
governance-performance (Tobin’s Q) regressions over (a) all firm-year observations for 
which individual UK governance scores (GOVISS) are available (with years between 2003 and 
2007) and (b) over the whole sample period (with years between 1998 and 2011) with 
averaged governance scores (GOV). In addition, we split the samples for (i) acquirer’s and 
(ii) non-acquirer’s firm-year observations. We conjecture that high (low) governance 
stickiness leads to relatively similar (substantially different) results of GOV and GOVISS 
across the different regression specifications. In favor of sticky firm-level governance, 
untabulated results reveal that in most regression specifications, the sign and the significance 





Additional Control Variables 
Seventh, we assess the sensitivity of our control variable choice. To that end, we employ 
additional M&A as well as firm control variables in our original regression analysis (Table 5 - 
6) and apply a statistical procedure (stepwise regressions) to select our independent variables. 
The stepwise regression technique is executed in two different versions (forward stepwise and 
backward stepwise) to select the independent variables pursuant pre-specified significance 
                                                 
128 See Appendix 5 - 11. 
129 See Appendix 5 - 12. 
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levels for removal (pr = 0.15) and for addition (pe = 0.10). In the absence of prior research 
providing profound theoretical links between M&A related incentives and earnings 
management, we use a broad range of variables on a rather exploratory base.130
Untabulated results reveal that our positive and significant governance and discretionary 
accruals results even hold after the inclusion of all (additional) control variables and remain 
unaffected by the statistical selection of control variables via stepwise regressions. In 
addition, acquirers’ size and leverage as well as the relative deal size are consistently related 
to accruals manipulation across the models. Moreover, we find weak evidence for a 
constraining role of analyst coverage on earnings management in the period prior to the deal 
announcement.
 In particular, 
as additional M&A control variables, we consider whether the target is a non-UK firm (cross-
border deals), whether the deal is completed, whether majority voting rights are transferred, 
whether the acquirers are serial bidders (M&A activity), whether the deal announcement is 
strategically timed, whether the deal is structured as a tender offer, whether the transactions 
take place in M&A waves, and the duration of deal negotiation. As additional firm control 
variables, we consider acquirer’s book-to-market of equity, cash from operations, fees paid 





Using stock swap transactions with public acquirers originating from the UK between the 
years 1998 and 2011, we find that acquirers with strong corporate governance engage more 
aggressively in income-increasing accruals manipulation than those with weak governance 
prior to the stock swap announcement. This finding is robust to different discretionary accrual 
models, to M&A control variables, to a control group of 100% cash acquirers, to potential 
sample selection problems, and is further consistent with the notion that corporate governance 
incentivizes managerial actions in the interests of firms’ shareholders. In addition, analyses of 
acquirers’ long term buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) surrounding the deal 
announcement support our earnings management and governance findings. 
This paper makes several contributions to the literature. As to our knowledge this is the 
first paper to shed light on the role of corporate governance in shaping earnings management 
                                                 
130 Prior literature examining determinants on share price performance around M&A transactions provides 
insights into potential determinants of accruals manipulation (e.g., Amar et al., 2011, pp. 484-485).  
131 See Appendix 5 - 13. 
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in a setting in which prior literature has demonstrated to be characterized by income-
increasing accruals manipulation. More importantly, we exploit a setting in which we expect 
to find a promoting role of corporate governance on earnings management. To that end, we 
contribute to prior research on the relationship between governance and earnings management 
by highlighting the setting-specific nature of this relationship. Second, we extend research on 
earnings management prior to stock swap transactions by assessing the acquirer’s governance 
quality and by considering growth adjustments in the estimation process of discretionary 
accruals. Overall, our findings are important as they shed light on the endogenous nature of 
accruals quality as well as on the role of corporate governance with its respective beneficial or 
detrimental outcomes for shareholders and other stakeholders.  
Our findings are subject to several limitations. As most earnings management studies, 
we employ the Worldscope’s standardized financial statement data to estimate discretionary 
accruals. As Young (2008, p. 674) notes, this might induce an estimation bias since the 
financial data underlying our accrual models contains both, the adjustments made by 
Worldscope analysts as well as accounting choices made by management. Even though we 
challenge the findings with different discretionary accrual proxies and incorporate growth 
adjustments in the initial proxy (Collins et al., 2012), the robustness of the findings depends 
substantially on the perceived specification power of our discretionary accrual models. Owing 
to our specific research question, we do not address other forms of earnings management 
(e.g., real earnings management) which might become more important over time as 
substitutes of accrual-based earnings management (e.g., Roychowdhury, 2006).  
Therefore, our findings create various research opportunities. Future work may address 
the M&A-related determinants of accruals manipulation in more detail in order to gain a more 
comprehensive understanding of the underlying economic incentives of earnings management 
prior to stock swap transactions. Extending our study, future work may also examine other 
types of earnings management and their interrelations with governance quality prior to stock 
swap deals. Moreover, future research may challenge our study by comparing the UK 
findings with those from different institutional settings. It is reasonable to assume that the role 
of corporate governance varies across different corporate governance systems (continental 
Europe vs. Anglo-Saxon), and the respective governance perceptions (shareholder vs. 
stakeholder orientation). 
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Appendix 5 - 1: BHARs surrounding the Deal Announcement 
Panel A. Mean / Median BHARs around Stock Swaps: all GOV rated stock swaps 
Time / Var Mean Median SD Min. Max. N 
TRANS-2 0.2886 0.0487 1.9131 -1.6412 12.5981 47 
TRANS-1 0.1211* 0.1255** 0.6717 -2.2678 2.0697 54 
TRANS0 0.0226 -0.0342 0.5447 -1.2123 1.7429 61 
TRANS+1 -0.1269* -0.0850* 0.6257 -1.3283 1.3874 63 
TRANS+2 -0.0695 -0.1224 0.4522 -1.1947 1.1721 62 
Panel B. Mean / Median BHARs around Stock Swaps: above mean GOV rated stock swaps  
Time / Var Mean Median SD Min. Max. N 
TRANS-2 0.1251* 0.0983 0.4158 -0.8868 0.9340 24 
TRANS-1 0.2413** 0.2324** 0.5547 -0.7353 2.0697 25 
TRANS0 0.0310 0.0319 0.4204 -0.7482 1.0552 30 
TRANS+1 -0.1168 -0.1068 0.6379 -1.3114 1.3874 31 
TRANS+2 -0.0489 -0.0576 0.4642 -1.1947 0.8971 31 
Panel C. Mean / Median BHARs around Stock Swaps: below mean GOV rated stock swaps 
Time / Var Mean Median SD Min. Max. N 
TRANS-2 0.4591 -0.1010 2.7226 -1.6412 12.5981 23 
TRANS-1 0.0174 0.0122 0.7524 -2.2678 2.0474 29 
TRANS0 0.0145 -0.1334 0.6500 -1.2123 1.7429 31 
TRANS+1 -0.1367 -0.0663 0.6237 -1.3283 1.0978 32 
TRANS+2 -0.0902 -0.1895* 0.4465 -0.7861 1.1721 31 
Panel D: BHARs relative to the Deal Announcement Month: all GOV rated stock swaps 







returns (BHAR) (%) 
N Av. BHAR of 
EM Quartiles  
Q1 & Q2 (%) 
N Av. BHAR of 
EM Quartiles 
Q3 & Q4 (%) 
N 
-36 to -1 222.56*** 63.56*** 44 40.91* 23 88.35** 21 
-24 to -1 188.47*** 32.88** 53 11.80 28 56.49** 25 
-12 to -1 141.63*** 20.53* 58 8.37 30 33.56 28 
-6 to -1 119.70*** 6.75 62 3.90 30 12.69 30 
+1 to +6 100.48 -1.82 64 0.51 30 -4.42 31 
+1 to +12 110.23* -1.21 64 -11.36 30 6.77 31 
+1 to +24 111.80 -11.79 59 -24.16 29 -9.81 27 
+1 to +36 79.31** -27.84** 55 -42.13*** 27 -13.04 25 
Mean GOV in % (in TRANS-1) 45.38 62 42.75 31 48.02 31 
Mean DAC in % (in TRANS-1) 2.84 62 -1.56 31 7.25 31 
Notes: We follow the approach proposed by Barber and Lyon (1997, pp. 344, 355) and estimate the BHARs as 
follows:  
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑇 = ∏ [1 + 𝑅𝑖𝑡]𝑇𝑡=1 − ∏ [1 + 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡)]𝑇𝑡=1 .  
BHARiT is the buy-and-hold abnormal return of firm i over a period of T months. Rit – as the firm’s simple 
return (Barber and Lyon 1997, p. 349) – is defined as the change in stock prices plus dividends divided by last 
year’s stock price. E(Rit) is the expected return of firm i at month t measured as the simple return of a control 
firm at month t. Following Barber and Lyon (1997, p. 355), we choose the control firms as follows: (1) we 
identify all non-stock acquirers with a market value of equity between 70% and 130% of the market value of 
equity of each acquirer (yearly-based); (2) from the acquirer’s individual matching portfolio, we select the non-
stock acquirer with the book-to-market ratio closest to that of the acquirer. 
Notes [Panel A-C]: These panels present distribution characteristics of acquirer’s buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns (BHARs) in the periods surrounding the stock swap announcement (for different samples). TRANS 
indicates the different periods (years) prior to and after the stock swap announcement. TRANS-1 (TRANS-2) 
presents the acquirer’s first (second) year with an earnings release preceding the stock swap announcement, 
whereas TRANS0 (TRANS+1) presents the year with the acquirer’s first (second) earnings release following the 
stock swap announcement. The significance tests are based on t-test statistics (for mean values) and Wilcoxon 
signed-ranks test statistics (for median values). *** (**) (*) indicates significance levels at 1% (5%) (10%), one-
tailed. 
Notes [Panel D]: This panel presents mean values of acquirer’s raw buy-and-hold returns and buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns (BHARs) over different periods (months) relative to the respective deal announcement month 
of the stock swap transactions. Average BHARs of EM Quartiles Q1 & Q2 (Q3 & Q4) are mean values of the 
acquirer’s buy-and-hold abnormal returns for a portfolio of acquirers with below median (above median) 
discretionary accruals based on TRANS-1. The significance tests are based on t-test statistics (for mean values) 
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and Wilcoxon signed-ranks test statistics (for median values), whereas mean raw buy-and-hold returns (mean 
buy-and-hold abnormal returns) are tested against 100 (against 0). *** (**) (*) indicates significance levels at 
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Appendix 5 - 2: Sample Selection - Cash Acquirer 
Panel A. SDC Platinum - International Mergers (IMA): Start Parameter 
• Date announced: 01/01/1998 to 31/12/2011 
• Acquirer Nation: UK 
• Acquirer Public Status: P (public) 
• Target Public Status: P (public) 
• Acquisition Technique: - 
Panel B. Sample Selection    No. of deals 
Initial Sample (with ISIN available)  750 
Financial acquirer -180 570 
Non-100%-Cash Acquirer -344 226 
No M&A Deal -54 172 
Duplicate acquisitions (first deal remains in sample) -45 127 
Datastream / Worldscope data unavailable -25 102 
Governance data unavailable -38 64 
Final Sample  64 
Panel C. Sample Distribution       
Years 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
No. of Transactions 7 12 9 4 4 1 5 
Years 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
No. of Transactions 2 13 2 1 1 2 1 
 
Appendix 5 - 3: Descriptive Analyses - Cash Acquirer 
Panel A. Descriptive Analysis       
Descriptive values (TRANS0) Sample Size = 64 Mean Median St.Dev. Min. Max. 
EARNINGS MANAGEMENT & GOVERNANCE       
Acquirer’s Discretionary Accruals - (DAC)  2.14 0.31 16.64 -43.52 42.63 
Acquirer’s Governance Quality - (GOV)  49.93 50.75 23.33 4.35 94.41 
FIRM CONTROLS       
Acquirer’s Total Assets (in € Mill.)  9,666 1,806 33,900 31.56 265,000 
Acquirer’s Market Value (in € Mill.)  9,612 1,767 27,189 53,51 200,110 
Acquirer’s Leverage (LEV)  .2189 .2043 .1293 0 .5253 
Acquirer’s Ownership (OWNER)  15.21 11.78 17.89 0.02 85.04 
Acquirer’s Audit (BIG_FIVE)  1 1 0 1 1 
M&A CONTROLS       
Deal-Value (in € Mill.)  635.77 101.06 3,167 0.29 31,005 
Relative Deal Value (Rel. Deal Size, %)  31.79 17.83 51.99 0 439.48 
Industrial Relatedness (Ind_Relatedness)  .3846 0 .4903 0 1 
Percentage of Stock (Stock)  0 0 0 0 0 
Panel B. Mean / Median DAC around Stock Swaps: all GOV rated cash transactions 
Time / Var Mean Median SD Min. Max. N 
TRANS-2 -0.0011 0.0000 0.0550 -0.1367 0.1722 62 
TRANS-1 0.0050 0.0000 0.0764 -0.3406 0.1471 63 
TRANS0 0.0214 0.0032 0.1664 -0.4353 0.4263 64 
TRANS+1 0.0108 0.0002 0.0839 -0.2071 0.2489 60 
TRANS+2 0.0067 0.0000* 0.0965 -0.5130 0.1868 56 
Notes: For detailed information and definitions of the variables, see Appendix 5 - 14. The significance tests are 
based on t-test statistics (for the mean values) and Wilcoxon signed-ranks test statistics (for the median values). 
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Appendix 5 - 4: Governance Role - Cash Acquirer 
Variables 
Dependent variable: Discretionary Accruals (CMJM with CFO & Growth adj./ CAC) 













Intercept .0692 -.0154 -.0106 .1538 -.0046 -.0725 
 (1.05) (-0.37) (-0.47) (0.93) (-0.03) (-0.52) 
GOV .0786* .0138 .0202 .0979** .0622 .0597 
 (1.77) (0.36) (0.62) (2.23) (1.09) (1.17) 
DEAL SIZE .0000 .0000 .0000 -.0001 -.0000 .0000 
 (0.48) (0.69) (0.04) (-1.35) (-0.47) (0.17) 
IND RELATEDNESS -.0129 -.0046 -.0048 .0263 .0221 .0183 
 (-0.72) (-0.38) (-0.42) (1.37) (1.17) (1.63) 
STOCK (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
       
BIG FIVE (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
       
OWNER -.0057 .0004 .0009 .0026 .0043 .0031 
 (-0.99) (0.10) (0.28) (0.88) (1.39) (0.93) 
SIZE -.0072 .0006 .0001 -.0141 -.0026 .0028 
 (-1.59) (0.16) (0.02) (-1.26) (-0.28) (0.34) 
LEV .0553 .0127 .0355 .0194 .0270 -.0231 
 (0.96) (0.34) (0.86) (0.28) (0.54) (-0.58) 
Clustered se (1w) Yes No No Yes No No 
Clustered se (2w) No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Adj. R² -.0093 -.0443 -0.0218 -0.0262 -0.0226 -0.0017 
Sample Size 63 125 183 60 116 167 
Notes: The underlying regression model is:  
DACit =  α + γ1GOVit + � γ2M&A_CONTROLit + � γ3FIRM_CONTROLit + ε 
Where α represents the constant term, γ1 − ∑ γ3 are the coefficients of the explanatory variables, and ε is the 
error term. The dependent variable DAC represents discretionary accruals obtained from an extended (by CFO 
and growth adjustments) cross-sectional modified Jones model and measures accrual-based earnings 
management. GOV proxies firm-level governance quality. M&A_CONTROL represents a vector of M&A 
characteristics (relative deal size, industrial relatedness, and percentage of stock financing). FIRM_CONTROL 
represents a vector of firm characteristics (size, leverage, ownership concentration, and big five auditor). For 
detailed information and definitions of the variables, see Appendix 5 - 14. The regression models have standard 
errors which are heteroskedasticity robust and – as indicated – one-way clustered at year level or two-way 
clustered at firm and year level. Reported values: coefficient (t-value) *** (**) (*) indicates significance levels 
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Appendix 5 - 5: BHARs surrounding the Deal Announcement – Cash Acquirer 
Panel A. Mean / Median BHARs around Cash Transactions: all GOV rated deals 
Time / Var Mean Median SD Min. Max. N 
TRANS-2 0.1152 0.0658 0.6599 -1.7063 2.9992 54 
TRANS-1 -0.0670 -0.0073 0.5144 -2.2257 1.1253 56 
TRANS0 0.0723 0.0544 0.4661 -1.1249 1.0798 59 
TRANS+1 -0.0827 -0.0090 0.5583 -2.8941 0.9077 57 
TRANS+2 0.0468 0.0430 0.4447 -0.9558 0.8980 54 
Panel B. Mean / Median BHARs around Cash Transactions: all above mean GOV rated deals 
Time / Var Mean Median SD Min. Max. N 
TRANS-2 0.0667 0.0162 0.7129 -1.7063 2.9992 33 
TRANS-1 -0.0299 -0.0073 0.4741 -1.7936 1.1253 34 
TRANS0 0.0699 0.0843 0.4922 -1.1249 0.9323 36 
TRANS+1 -0.2196** -0.1634* 0.6332 -2.8941 0.5451 34 
TRANS+2 0.0973 0.1487 0.4984 -0.9558 0.8980 32 
Panel C. Mean / Median BHARs around Cash Transactions: all below mean GOV rated deals 
Time / Var Mean Median SD Min. Max. N 
TRANS-2 0.1914* 0.2449 0.5751 -0.8864 1.6288 21 
TRANS-1 -0.1243 -0.0291 0.5780 -2.2257 0.5220 22 
TRANS0 0.0760 -0.0165 0.4328 -0.8517 1.0798 23 
TRANS+1 0.1197* 0.1234 0.3468 -0.3565 0.9077 23 
TRANS+2 -0.0267 0.0335 0.3505 -0.9130 0.4974 22 
Panel D: BHARs relative to the Deal Announcement Month: all GOV rated cash transactions 







returns (BHAR) (%) 
N Av. BHAR of 
EM Quartiles  
Q1 & Q2 (%) 
N Av. BHAR of 
EM Quartiles 
Q3 & Q4 (%) 
N 
-36 to -1 163.66*** 11.19 52 29.45* 26 -7.24 25 
-24 to -1 132.15*** 8.86 56 19.48* 27 -2.01 28 
-12 to -1 138.30** 6.28 59 22.07* 30 -12.18 28 
-6 to -1 114.15** -7.68 61 -10.71 30 -7.78 29 
+1 to +6 104.65* 1.00 60 1.20 31 2.74 28 
+1 to +12 101.28 -6.00 57 -2.94 30 -8.43 26 
+1 to +24 102.52 -10.86 54 -6.97 28 -17.08 25 
+1 to +36 83.31** -11.64 49 -10.39 27 -13.18 22 
Mean GOV in % (in TRANS-1) 48.95 61 44.71 31 53.34 30 
Mean DAC in % (in TRANS-1) 0.46 61 -4.34 31 5.44 30 
Notes [Panel A-C]: These panels present distribution characteristics of acquirer’s buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns (BHARs) in the periods surrounding the cash deal announcement (for different samples). TRANS 
indicates the different periods (years) prior to and after the cash deal announcement. TRANS-1 (TRANS-2) 
presents the acquirer’s first (second) year with an earnings release preceding the cash deal announcement, 
whereas TRANS0 (TRANS+1) presents the year with the acquirer’s first (second) earnings release following the 
cash deal announcement. The significance tests are based on t-test statistics (for mean values) and Wilcoxon 
signed-ranks test statistics (for median values). *** (**) (*) indicates significance levels at 1% (5%) (10%), one-
tailed. 
Notes [Panel D]: This panel presents mean values of acquirer’s raw buy-and-hold returns and buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns (BHARs) over different periods (months) relative to the respective deal announcement month 
of the covered cash transactions. Average BHARs of EM Quartiles Q1 & Q2 (Q3 & Q4) are mean values of the 
acquirer’s buy-and-hold abnormal returns for a portfolio of acquirers with below median (above median) 
discretionary accruals based on TRANS-1. The significance tests are based on t-test statistics (for the mean 
values) and Wilcoxon signed-ranks test statistics (for the median values), whereas mean raw buy-and-hold 
returns (mean buy-and-hold abnormal returns) are set against 100 (against 0). *** (**) (*) indicates significance 
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Appendix 5 - 6: Sample Selection Bias 
Variables 
Dependent variable: Discretionary Accruals (CMJM with CFO & Growth adj./ CAC) 













Intercept .1019 .3308 .2283 -.1330 -.0619 .0134 
 (0.31) (1.30) (1.15) (-0.76) (-0.61) (0.23) 
GOV .0862** .1202** .1101*** -.0148 .0159 .0148 
 (2.44) (2.47) (2.99) (-0.27) (0.25) (0.30) 
MILLS .0416 -.0269 .0128 .0091 .0134 -.0229 
 (0.44) (-0.33) (0.24) (0.18) (0.38) (-0.62) 
DEAL SIZE -.0001*** -.0000 -.0000 -.0000 -.0000** -.0000 
 (-5.20) (-0.53) (-1.02) (-0.04) (-2.09) (-0.39) 
IND RELATEDNESS -.0097 .0070 .0086 .0129 .0296 .0238 
 (-0.41) (0.35) (0.54) (0.32) (1.23) (1.14) 
STOCK .0000 .0000 .0001 .0000 -.0001 .0000 
 (0.22) (0.00) (0.30) (0.05) (-0.23) (0.10) 
BIG FIVE -.0080 -.1896** -.1641* .0357** .0144 .0369 
 (-0.06) (-2.20) (-1.77) (2.41) (0.59) (0.81) 
OWNER -.0053** -.0019 -.0028 .0017 -.0022 -.0004 
 (-2.34) (-0.39) (-0.98) (0.48) (-0.51) (-0.12) 
SIZE -.0103 -.0139 -.0096 .0039 .0007 -.0058 
 (-0.73) (-1.10) (-1.05) (0.26) (0.10) (-1.22) 
LEV .1222** .0679 .0811* .0726* .0390 .0351 
 (2.77) (0.92) (1.81) (1.76) (0.67) (0.90) 
Clustered se (1w) Yes No No Yes No No 
Clustered se (2w) No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Adj. R² .0947 .0866 .1245 -.1156 -.0293 -.0092 
Sample Size 66 128 186 67 130 188 
Notes: The first stage (Probit) regression model is: 
Probit(GOVavail)it =  α1 + � α2EXCit + � α3FIRM_CONTROLit + � α4M&𝐴_𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿it + ε 
With GOVavail as the dependent variable indicating (with one and zero) whether the acquiring firm receives a 
GOV score or not (GOV score sample: N=70, and whole stock swap sample: N=129; for details on sample 
selection, see Table 5 - 2). EXCL represents the exclusion restriction (dividends per share; with a spearman 
correlation between dividends per share and GOVavail of 0.42 [p-value: 0.000]) in order to specify the first 
stage. For the remaining variables, see the information given below. For each model in the table above, I 
estimate the first stage based on the respective sample size with robust and two-way clustered standard errors at 
firm and year level. 
The underlying regression model is:  
DACit =  α + γ1GOVit + γ2MILLSit + � γ3M&A_CONTROLit + � γ4FIRM_CONTROLit + ε 
Where α represents the constant term, γ1 − ∑ γ4 are the coefficients of the explanatory variables, and ε is the 
error term. The dependent variable DAC represents discretionary accruals obtained from an extended (CFO and 
growth adjusted) cross-sectional modified Jones model and measures accrual-based earnings management. GOV 
proxies firm-level governance quality. MILLS is the inverse mills ratio from the first stage (Probit) regression. 
M&A_CONTROL represents a vector of M&A characteristics (relative deal size, industrial relatedness, and 
percentage of stock financing). FIRM_CONTROL represents a vector of firm characteristics (size, leverage, 
ownership concentration, and big five auditor). For detailed information and definitions of the variables, see 
Appendix 5 - 14. The regression models have standard errors which are heteroskedasticity robust and – as 
indicated – one-way clustered at year level or two-way clustered at firm and year level. Reported values: 
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Appendix 5 - 7: Mean and Median DAC Analyses: Public Target Status 
Panel A. Mean / Median DAC: all GOV rated stock swaps with Public & Private Targets  
Time / Var Mean Median SD Min. Max. N 
TRANS-2 0.0096 0.0071 0.1194 -0.5345 0.4307 77 
TRANS-1 0.0215** 0.0161** 0.0917 -0.2278 0.4307 82 
TRANS0 0.0016 0.0000 0.1805 -0.5345 0.4307 87 
TRANS+1 -0.0161 0.0000 0.1188 -0.5345 0.1720 85 
TRANS+2 -0.0063 0.0001 0.0978 -0.4644 0.2299 80 
Panel B. Mean / Median DAC: all GOV rated stock swaps with Public, Private & Subsidiary Targets 
Time / Var Mean Median SD Min. Max. N 
TRANS-2 0.0085 0.0069 0.1163 -0.5345 0.4307 83 
TRANS-1 0.0150* 0.0135* 0.0940 -0.2278 0.4307 88 
TRANS0 0.0021 0.0000 0.1756 -0.5345 0.4307 93 
TRANS+1 -0.0155 0.0000 0.1194 -0.5345 0.1720 91 
TRANS+2 -0.0044 0.0004 0.0981 -0.4644 0.2299 86 
Notes: This table presents distribution characteristics of acquirer’s discretionary accruals in the periods around 
the stock swap announcement (for different samples). TRANS indicates the different periods (years) prior to and 
after the stock swap announcement. TRANS-1 (TRANS-2) presents the acquirer’s first (second) year with an 
earnings release preceding the stock swap announcement, whereas TRANS0 (TRANS+1) presents the year with 
the acquirer’s first (second) earnings release following the stock swap announcement. The significance tests are 
based on t-test statistics (for the mean values) and Wilcoxon signed-ranks test statistics (for the median values). 
*** (**) (*) indicates significance levels at 1% (5%) (10%), two-tailed. 
 
Appendix 5 - 8: Governance Role - Public Target Status 
Variables 
Dependent variable: Discretionary Accruals (CMJM with CFO & Growth adj./ CAC) 













Intercept .3199** .3030*** .2712*** .2830** .2816*** .2587*** 
 (2.70) (3.82) (2.75) (2.38) (3.57) (2.75) 
GOV .1055* .1222** .1018** .0864** .1069** .0923** 
 (2.13) (2.13) (2.29) (2.29) (2.04) (2.16) 
PUBLIC TARGET .0466* .0198 .0279 .0614*** .0291 .0346* 
 (2.04) (0.94) (1.22) (3.49) (1.39) (1.68) 
DEAL SIZE -.0001*** -.0000 -.0000 -.0001*** -.0000 -.0000 
 (-3.04) (-1.00) (-0.65) (-3.15) (-0.79) (-0.56) 
IND RELATEDNESS .0068 .0175 .0107 -.0050 .0062 .0026 
 (0.24) (0.71) (0.61) (-0.18) (0.28) (0.15) 
STOCK -.0004 -.0005 -.0002 -.0002 -.0004 -.0002 
 (-1.13) (-1.32) (-0.64) (-0.71) (-1.13) (-0.59) 
BIG FIVE -.0206 -.1569*** -.1711** -.0280 -.1626*** -.1736** 
 (-0.31) (-3.52) (-2.40) (-0.42) (-3.60) (-2.41) 
OWNER -.0070** -.0030 -.0024 -.0080** -.0033 -.0027 
 (-2.24) (-0.82) (-0.89) (-2.38) (-0.88) (-0.96) 
SIZE -.0253** -.0138** -.0117** -.0226** -.0117** -.0103** 
 (-2.58) (-2.46) (-2.14) (-2.45) (-2.21) (-1.98) 
LEV .0509 .0501 .0486 .0543 .0495 .0423 
 (0.77) (0.79) (1.16) (0.95) (0.83) (1.03) 
Clustered se (1w) Yes No No Yes No No 
Clustered se (2w) No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Adj. R² .0849 .0811 .1025 .0888 .0772 .1044 
Sample Size 82 159 232 88 171 249 
Notes: The underlying regression model is:  
DACit =  α + γ1GOVit + � γ2M&A_CONTROLit + � γ3FIRM_CONTROLit + ε 
Where α represents the constant term, γ1 − ∑ γ3 are the coefficients of the explanatory variables, and ε is the 
error term. The dependent variable DAC represents discretionary accruals obtained from an extended (CFO and 
growth adjusted) cross-sectional modified Jones model and measures accrual-based earnings management. GOV 
proxies firm-level governance quality. M&A_CONTROL represents a vector of M&A characteristics (public 
target status, relative deal size, industrial relatedness, and percentage of stock financing). FIRM_CONTROL 
represents a vector of firm characteristics (size, leverage, ownership concentration, and big five auditor). For 
detailed information and definitions of the variables, see Appendix 5 - 14. The regression models have standard 
errors which are heteroskedasticity robust and – as indicated – one-way clustered at year level or two-way 
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clustered at firm and year level. Reported values: coefficient (t-value) *** (**) (*) indicates significance levels 
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Appendix 5 - 9: Mean and Median DAC Analysis: Different DAC Measures 
Sample: All GOV rated stock swaps (Sample Size = 70) 
Time / Var 
DAC2 
(CMJM with CFO 
&Growth adj./TAC) 
DAC3 
(CMJM with CFO 
adj. / TAC) 
DAC4 
(ROA & Growth 
Matching on DAC3) 
DAC5 
(CMJM with CFO 
adj. / CAC) 
DAC6 
(ROA & Growth 
Matching on DAC5) 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
TRANS-2 .016 .001* .009 .003 -.004 -.001 .012 .009 -.000 .001 
TRANS-1 .022*** .012** .024*** .012*** .026** .009 .028*** .023*** .030** .006 
TRANS0 -.005 .006 .001 .008 -.020 -.011 -.003 .009 -.031* -.004 
TRANS+1 -.015* .000 -.016 .000 -.030** -.013** -.017 -.002 -.021 .000 
TRANS+2 -.016* .000 -.011 .002 -.022* -.004 -.010 .008 -.021 .006 
Notes: This table presents mean and median distributions of acquirer’s discretionary accruals in the periods 
around the stock swap announcement (for different samples and for different DAC measures). TRANS indicates 
the different periods (years) prior to and after the stock swap announcement. TRANS-1 (TRANS-2) presents the 
acquirer’s first (second) year with an earnings release preceding the stock swap announcement, whereas 
TRANS0 (TRANS+1) presents the year with the acquirer’s first (second) earnings release following the stock 
swap announcement. DAC2 (CMJM with CFO & Growth adj. / TAC) stands for discretionary accruals (based on 
total accruals - TAC) from a cross-sectional modified Jones model with CFO and growth adjustments in the 
estimation process. DAC3 (CMJM with CFO adj. / TAC) stands for discretionary accruals (based on total 
accruals - TAC) from a cross-sectional modified Jones model with only CFO adjustments in the estimation 
process. DAC4 stands for performance and growth matched discretionary accruals from a cross-sectional 
modified Jones model with only CFO adjustments in the estimation process and based on total accruals – TAC 
(DAC3). DAC5 (CMJM with CFO adj. / CAC) stands for discretionary accruals (based on current accruals - 
CAC) from a cross-sectional modified Jones model with only CFO adjustments in the estimation process. DAC6 
stands for performance and growth matched discretionary accruals from a cross-sectional modified Jones model 
with only CFO adjustments in the estimation process and based on current accruals – CAC (DAC5). For detailed 
information and definitions of the variables, see Appendix 5 - 14. The significance tests are based on t-test 
statistics (for the mean values) and Wilcoxon signed-ranks test statistics (for the median values). *** (**) (*) 
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Appendix 5 - 10: Governance Role - Different DAC Measures 
Panel A. Cross-sectional modified Jones Model (CMJM) with CFO & growth adjustments / TAC (DAC2) 
Dependent variable: 
DAC2 
Periods prior to the Stock Swap Transaction Periods after the Stock Swap Transaction 
TRANS-1 TRANS-1/-2 TRANS-1/-3 TRANS+1 TRANS+1/+2 TRANS+1/+3 
GOV .0895** .0948** .0786*** -.0223 .0049 -.0038 
 (2.27) (2.19) (2.81) (-0.45) (0.09) (-0.10) 
M&A Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered se (1w) Yes No No Yes No No 
Clustered se (2w) No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Adj. R² .0521 .0770 .0940 -.0966 -.0297 -.0169 
Sample Size 66 128 188 67 130 189 
Panel B. Cross-sectional modified Jones Model (CMJM) with CFO adjustments / TAC (DAC3) 
Dependent variable: 
DAC3 
Periods prior to the Stock Swap Transaction Periods after the Stock Swap Transaction 
TRANS-1 TRANS-1/-2 TRANS-1/-3 TRANS+1 TRANS+1/+2 TRANS+1/+3 
GOV .0869** .0798 .0806** .0198 .0336 .0699 
 (2.70) (1.59) (2.31) (0.25) (0.47) (1.15) 
M&A Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered se (1w) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered se (2w) No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Adj. R² .1464 .1350 .1292 -.0461 -.0253 .0057 
Sample Size 66 128 188 67 130 189 
Panel C. ROA & Growth matched discretionary accruals based on DAC3 
Dependent variable: 
DAC4 
Periods prior to the Stock Swap Transaction Periods after the Stock Swap Transaction 
TRANS-1 TRANS-1/-2 TRANS-1/-3 TRANS+1 TRANS+1/+2 TRANS+1/+3 
GOV .0545 .0103 -.0059 -.0667 .0037 .0263 
 (1.10) (0.22) (-0.19) (-0.64) (0.04) (0.37) 
[GOV_dummy] [.0449*] [.0178] [.0105] [-.0153] [-.0059] [.0124] 
 [(1.98)] [(1.04)] [(0.52)] [(-0.30)] [(-0.15)] [(0.38)] 
M&A Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered se (1w) Yes No No Yes No No 
Clustered se (2w) No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Adj. R² .0819 .0129 .0046 -.0090 -.0106 .0104 
[Adj. R²] [.1063] [.0165] [.0057] [-.0199] [-.0101] [.0102] 
Sample Size 60 115 160 64 119 175 
Panel D. Cross-sectional modified Jones Model (CMJM) with CFO adjustments / CAC (DAC5) 
Dependent variable: 
DAC5 
Periods prior to the Stock Swap Transaction Periods after the Stock Swap Transaction 
TRANS-1 TRANS-1/-2 TRANS-1/-3 TRANS+1 TRANS+1/+2 TRANS+1/+3 
GOV .1009*** .1110* .1134** .0583 .0699 .0993 
 (3.07) (1.93) (2.26) (0.67) (0.87) (1.49) 
M&A Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered se (1w) Yes No No Yes No No 
Clustered se (2w) No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Adj. R² .2461 .1951 .1794 -.0276 -.0107 .0143 
Sample Size 66 128 188 67 130 189 
Panel E. ROA & Growth matched discretionary accruals based on DAC5 
Dependent variable: 
DAC6 
Periods prior to the Stock Swap Transaction Periods after the Stock Swap Transaction 
TRANS-1 TRANS-1/-2 TRANS-1/-3 TRANS+1 TRANS+1/+2 TRANS+1/+3 
GOV .0870* .0534 .0256 -.0607 .0428 .0663 
 (1.96) (0.81) (0.47) (-0.53) (0.40) (0.79) 
M&A Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered se (1w) Yes No No Yes No No 
Clustered se (2w) No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Adj. R² .0783 .0100 .0073 .0518 .0194 .0121 
Sample Size 60 115 160 64 120 177 
Notes: The underlying regression model is:  
DACadjit =  α + γ1GOVit + � γ2M&A_CONTROLit + � γ3FIRM_CONTROLit + ε 
Where α represents the constant term, γ1 − ∑ γ3 are the coefficients of the explanatory variables, and ε is the 
error term. The dependent variable DACadj represents discretionary accruals obtained from an extended cross-
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sectional modified Jones model and measures accrual-based earnings management. In particular, DAC2 (CMJM 
with CFO & Growth adj. / TAC) stands for discretionary accruals (based on total accruals - TAC) from a cross-
sectional modified Jones model with CFO and growth adjustments in the estimation process. DAC3 (CMJM with 
CFO adj. / TAC) stands for discretionary accruals (based on total accruals - TAC) from a cross-sectional 
modified Jones model with only CFO adjustments in the estimation process. DAC4 stands for performance and 
growth matched discretionary accruals from a cross-sectional modified Jones model with only CFO adjustments 
in the estimation process and based on total accruals – TAC (DAC3). DAC5 (CMJM with CFO adj. / CAC) 
stands for discretionary accruals (based on current accruals - CAC) from a cross-sectional modified Jones model 
with only CFO adjustments in the estimation process. DAC6 stands for performance and growth matched 
discretionary accruals from a cross-sectional modified Jones model with only CFO adjustments in the estimation 
process and based on current accruals – CAC (DAC5). M&A_CONTROL represents a vector of M&A 
characteristics (relative deal size, industrial relatedness, and percentage of stock financing). FIRM_CONTROL 
represents a vector of firm characteristics (size as log of market value/log of total assets, leverage, ownership 
concentration, and big five auditor). For detailed information and definitions of the variables, see Appendix 5 - 
14. The regression models have standard errors which are heteroskedasticity robust and – as indicated – one-way 
clustered at year level or two-way clustered at firm and year level. Reported values: coefficient (t-value) *** 
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Appendix 5 - 11: Governance Role - Different Governance Proxies 
Panel A. Dummy variable based on all GOVISS rated UK firms (GOV_dummy) 
Dependent variable: 
DAC 
Periods prior to the Stock Swap Transaction Periods after the Stock Swap Transaction 
TRANS-1 TRANS-1/-2 TRANS-1/-3 TRANS+1 TRANS+1/+2 TRANS+1/+3 
GOV_dummy .0413* .0509*** .0430** -.0344 -.0197 -.0089 
 (2.02) (3.02) (2.41) (-1.02) (-0.65) (-0.42) 
M&A Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered se (1w) Yes No No Yes No No 
Clustered se (2w) No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Adj. R² .0995 .0748 .1043 -.0745 -.0149 -.0070 
Sample Size 66 128 188 67 130 189 
Panel B. GOV score based on median GOVISS scores (GOV_median) 
Dependent variable: 
DAC 
Periods prior to the Stock Swap Transaction Periods after the Stock Swap Transaction 
TRANS-1 TRANS-1/-2 TRANS-1/-3 TRANS+1 TRANS+1/+2 TRANS+1/+3 
GOV_median .0691** .0971** .0849*** -.0290 .0005 .0079 
 (2.35) (2.36) (2.60) (-0.83) (0.01) (0.24) 
M&A Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered se (1w) Yes No No Yes No No 
Clustered se (2w) No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Adj. R² .0989 .0840 .1138 -.0922 -.0227 -.0083 
Sample Size 66 128 188 67 130 189 
Panel C. GOV score based on the TOP 10 % governed firms based on GOV (GOV_Top10%) 
Dependent variable: 
DAC 
Periods prior to the Stock Swap Transaction Periods after the Stock Swap Transaction 
TRANS-1 TRANS-1/-2 TRANS-1/-3 TRANS+1 TRANS+1/+2 TRANS+1/+3 
GOV_Top10% .0744*** .0577* .0586** .0623* .0708*** .0514** 
 (3.41) (1.75) (1.99) (1.80) (2.85) (2.57) 
M&A Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered se (1w) Yes No No Yes No No 
Clustered se (2w) No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Adj. R² .1446 .0612 .1033 -.0605 .0216 .0151 
Sample Size 66 128 188 67 130 189 
Panel D. GOV score based on Principal Component Analysis (GOV_pca) 
Dependent variable: 
DAC 
Periods prior to the Stock Swap Transaction Periods after the Stock Swap Transaction 
TRANS-1 TRANS-1/-2 TRANS-1/-3 TRANS+1 TRANS+1/+2 TRANS+1/+3 
GOV_pca .0164** .0223** .0184*** -.0057 -.0014 .0010 
 (2.23) (2.36) (2.72) (-0.63) (-0.12) (0.14) 
M&A Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered se (1w) Yes No No Yes No No 
Clustered se (2w) No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Adj. R² .1207 .0982 .1199 -.0925 -.0224 -.0086 
Sample Size 66 128 188 67 130 189 




Periods prior to the Stock Swap Transaction Periods after the Stock Swap Transaction 
TRANS-1 TRANS-1/-2 TRANS-1/-3 TRANS+1 TRANS+1/+2 TRANS+1/+3 
GOV_monitor .0161 .0393 .0309 -.0150 -.0058 .0059 
 (0.87) (1.62) (1.65) (-0.59) (-0.17) (0.28) 
GOV_incentives .0744*** .0583** .0567*** .0220 .0323 .0161 
 (3.80) (2.45) (3.09) (0.52) (1.43) (0.80) 
M&A Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered se (1w) Yes No No Yes No No 
Clustered se (2w) No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Adj. R² .1455 .0824 .1147 -.1104 -.0212 -.0101 
Sample Size 66 128 188 67 130 189 
Notes: The underlying regression model is:  
DACit =  α + γ1CGit + � γ2M&A_CONTROLit + � γ3FIRM_CONTROLit + ε 
Where α represents the constant term, γ1 − ∑ γ3 are the coefficients of the explanatory variables, and ε is the 
error term. The dependent variable DAC represents discretionary accruals obtained from an extended (CFO and 
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growth adjusted) cross-sectional modified Jones model. CG stands for different scores to proxy firm-level 
governance quality. In particular, GOV_dummy is a dummy variables indicating strong (with 1) and poor (with 
0) governance quality based on the distribution of all available UK governance scores (GOV). GOV_median is 
based on a self-constructed governance rating (GOVISS) using ISS CGQ raw data from 2003 to 2007, and 
averaged (taking median instead of mean values of GOVISS) for our sample period. GOV_Top10% is a dummy 
variable taking the value of one if the acquirer’s governance measure (GOV) belongs to the 10th deciles, and zero 
otherwise. GOV_pca is a governance score based on Principal Component Analysis where the averaged 
principal component - estimated on six sub-scores which are based on UK firm-level ISS rating data from the 
years 2003 to 2007 - with the highest eigenvalue is used to proxy governance for our sample period (1998 to 
2011). GOV_monitor (GOV_incentives) is a governance score based on the GOVISS subcategories: board, audit, 
charter, anti-takeover, and progressive practice (compensation and managerial ownership) and is based on the 
individual firm governance data (GOVISS) from 2003 to 2007 and is averaged for the M&A sample period. 
M&A_CONTROL represents a vector of M&A characteristics (relative deal size, industrial relatedness, and 
percentage of stock financing). FIRM_CONTROL represents a vector of firm characteristics (size, leverage, 
ownership concentration, and big five auditor). For detailed information and definitions of the variables, see 
Appendix 5 - 14. The regression models have standard errors which are heteroskedasticity robust and – as 
indicated – one-way clustered at year level or two-way clustered at firm and year level. Reported values: 
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Appendix 5 - 12: Governance-Performance: Stickiness of Governance 
Panel A: Holistic Approach: Governance-Performance Regression (sample: 1998 to 2011) 
Variables Pred. Sign 
Dependent variable: Tobin’s Q 
All Firms Stock Acquirers Non (Stock) Acquirers 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
GOV + .255***   .3041   .256***   
  (3.01)   (1.62)   (2.69)   
GOV_dummy +  .0716*   .0540   .0808*  
   (1.91)   (0.65)   (1.96)  
GOVISS +   -   -   - 
           
Firm control  Yes Yes - Yes Yes - Yes Yes - 
Year fe  Yes Yes - Yes Yes - Yes Yes - 
Industry fe  Yes Yes - Yes Yes - Yes Yes - 
Clustered se  Yes Yes - Yes Yes - Yes Yes - 
Adj. R²  .2582 .2533 - .3374 .3300 - .2485 .2442 - 
Sample Size  3913 3913 - 835 835 - 3078 3078 - 
Panel B: Holistic Approach: Governance-Performance Regression (sample: 2003 to 2007) 
Variables Pred. Sign 
Dependent variable: Tobin’s Q 
All Firms Stock Acquirers Non (Stock) Acquirers 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
GOV + .274***   .3844*   .2308**   
  (2.94)   (1.74)   (2.21)   
GOV_dummy +  .0710*   .0868   .0592  
   (1.72)   (0.86)   (1.30)  
GOVISS +   .164***   .2478*   .1402** 
    (2.94)   (1.81)   (2.34) 
Firm control  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fe  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fe  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered se  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R²  .2641 .2564 .2599 .2501 .2342 .2453 .2897 .2842 .2868 
Sample Size  1239 1239 1239 272 272 272 967 967 967 
Notes: The underlying pooled regression model is:  
VALit =  α + β1GGit + � β2FIRM_CONTROL1it + � β3YEARit + � β4INDUSTRYit + ε 
Where α represents the constant term, β1 − ∑ β4 are the coefficients of the explanatory variables, and ε is the 
error term. The dependent variable VAL stands for Tobin’s Q. Tobin’s Q measures firm valuation by market 
value deflated by total assets. CG stands for different scores to proxy firm-level governance quality. In 
particular, GOV is based on a self-constructed governance rating (GOVISS) using ISS CGQ raw data from 2003 
to 2007, and averaged (taking mean values from GOVISS) for our sample period (1998 to 2011). GOV_dummy is 
the corresponding dummy variable taking the value of one if the firm’s governance measure (GOV) is above its 
mean value, and zero otherwise (based on total UK ISS population). GOVISS is a self-constructed governance 
score based on UK ISS CGQ raw data and is only available from 2003 to 2007. FIRM_CONTROL1 represents a 
vector of firm characteristics (size, leverage, past average three-year growth in net sales, capital-intensity, and 
blue chip index membership). For detailed information and definitions of the variables, see Appendix 5 - 14. The 
regression models contain year- and industry-fixed effects, and have standard errors which are heteroskedasticity 
robust and one-way clustered at firm level. Reported values: coefficient (t-value) *** (**) (*) indicates 
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Appendix 5 - 13: Governance Role - Additional Control Variables 
Variables 
Dependent variable: Discretionary Accruals (CMJM with CFO & Growth adj./ CAC) 
















Intercept .1555* .2944* .3063** .1478** .1737** .1490*** 
 (1.93) (1.95) (2.30) (3.19) (2.77) (4.02) 
GOV .0733*** .1366*** .1022*** .0881*** .0582** .0943** 
 (3.67) (2.87) (4.73) (3.37) (2.50) (2.98) 
DEAL SIZE -.0001 -.0000 -.0000* -.0001*** -.0001*** -.0001*** 
 (-1.32) (-1.37) (-1.85) (-4.14) (-3.23) (-3.53) 
IND RELATEDNESS -.0428** .0065 .0166  -.0293**  
 (-2.39) (0.21) (0.89)  (-2.58)  
STOCK .0003 -.0004 -.0002    
 (0.62) (-1.04) (-0.58)    
BIG FIVE -.0562 -.1816*** -.1564**    
 (-1.26) (-2.64) (-2.10)    
OWNER .0011 .0016 -.0014    
 (0.24) (0.37) (-0.54)    
SIZE -.0070 -.0014 -.0041 -.0088** -.0096** -.0144*** 
 (-1.20) (-0.21) (-0.76) (-2.74) (-2.54) (-6.82) 
LEV .0892* .0111 .0494 .0702* .1059** .0793* 
 (2.10) (0.20) (1.60) (1.88) (2.78) (1.95) 
Cross-border -.0377 -.0751*** -.0546*** -.0374* -.0481*** -.0292 
 (-1.72) (-3.91) (-3.61) (-2.09) (-3.64) (-1.67) 
Completed -.0224 .0122 .0001    
 (-1.07) (0.61) (0.01)    
Voting Rights .0112 .0844 .0386    
 (0.20) (1.30) (0.78)    
M&A Activity -.0195 .0064 -.0048  -.0246**  
 (-0.98) (0.31) (-0.37)  (-2.43)  
Deal Timing .0048 .0043 .0007    
 (1.34) (1.23) (0.22)    
Deal Duration -.0026 -.0019 .0012    
 (-1.27) (-1.28) (1.20)    
Tender Offer .0083 -.0214 -.0206    
 (0.51) (-1.24) (-1.72)    
Analyst REC .0538*** .0383*** .0139 .0569*** .0481*** .0457*** 
 (4.74) (3.79) (1.41) (4.18) (5.63) (3.96) 
Analyst COV -.0110 -.0046 -.0151 -.0580**   
 (-0.46) (-0.12) (-0.45) (-2.75)   
M&A Waves -.0318 -.0208 -.0145  -.0296  
 (-1.14) (-0.79) (-1.04)  (-1.57)  
IFRS -.0300 -.0112 -.0213  -.0229  
 (-1.03) (-0.40) (-0.84)  (-1.61)  
BTM -.0040 -.0790 -.0621 -.0378***   
 (-0.16) (-1.08) (-1.28) (-3.34)   
CFO .1626 .0364 -.0652    
 (1.76) (0.40) (-0.68)    
Audit Fees .0323 -.0344 -.0497 -.2436***   
 (0.22) (-0.19) (-0.42) (-4.67)   
Industry fe Yes Yes Yes [Yes] [Yes] [Yes] 
Clustered se (1w) Yes No No Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered se (2w) No Yes Yes No No No 
pe() - - - 0.10 0.10 0.10 
pr() - - - 0.15 0.15 0.15 
Adj. R² 0.2196 0.1818 0.1723 0.2666 0.3455 0.2236 
Sample Size 66 128 186 66 66 66 
Notes: The underlying regression model is:  
DACit =  α + γ1GOVit + � γ2M&A_CONTROLit + � γ3FIRM_CONTROLit + � γ4INDUSTRYit + ε 
The dependent variable DAC represents discretionary accruals obtained from an cross-sectional modified Jones 
model. GOV measures CG quality. M&A_CONTROL represents a vector of M&A characteristics (relative deal 
size, industrial relatedness, percentage of stock financing, cross-border deal, deal completed, majority voting 
rights transferred, M&A activity, strategic deal timing, duration of the deal negotiation, tender offer, M&A 
waves). FIRM_CONTROL represents a vector of firm characteristics (size, leverage, book-to-market of equity, 
cash from operations, ownership concentration, big five auditor, fees paid for auditing, analyst recommendation, 
analyst coverage, and IFRS reporting). Stepwise regressions (Model 4 and 5) are executed in two versions 
(forward and backward stepwise) to select the independent variables pursuant pre-specified significance levels 
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for removal (pr=0.15) and for addition (pe=0.10). Since firm size plays a crucial role in our setting (it is 
negatively correlated with earnings management but positively with governance quality; see Table 5 - 4), we 
include jointly CG quality and firm size in the stepwise regressions. For variable definition, see Appendix 5 - 14. 
The regressions contain industry-fixed effects, and have robust standard errors which are as indicated one-way 
clustered at year level or two-way clustered at firm and year level. Reported values: coefficient (t-value) *** 
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Appendix 5 - 14: Definition of Variables 
SHORT CUT VARIABLE DEFINITION 
Discretionary Accruals (Source: Worldscope database) 
DAC* Discretionary accruals 
(specification 1) 
DAC are the residuals from an extended (growth & CFO adj.) cross-
sectional modified Jones model (CMJM) based on the cash flow approach 
and current (working capital) accruals (CAC) 
DAC2* Discretionary accruals 
(specification 2) 
DAC2 are the residuals from an extended (growth & CFO adj.) cross-






DAC3 are the residuals from an extended (CFO adj.) cross-sectional 






DAC4 are DAC3 adjusted by matching control firms based on fiscal year, 
two-digit industry group, ROA and growth  
DAC5* Discretionary accruals 
(specification 3) 
DAC5 are the residuals from an extended (CFO adj.) cross-sectional 
modified Jones model (CMJM) based on the cash flow approach and 
current (working capital
DAC6* 
) accruals (CAC) 
Discretionary accruals 
(specification 4) 
DAC6 are DAC5 adjusted by matching control firms based on fiscal year, 
two-digit industry group, ROA and growth 
CAC*# Current (working 
capital) accruals 
CAC is current accruals = net income (wc01751) – cash from operations 
(wc04860) – depreciation, depletion & amortization (wc01151) 
TAC*# Total accruals TAC is total accruals = net income (wc01751) – cash from operations 
(wc04860) 
REV* Revenues REV is net sales of revenues (wc01001) 
REC* Receivables REC is receivables (wc02051) 
GROWTH Growth deciles GROWTH is (10%) deciles of growth (change in net sales or revenues, 
wc01001) per year 
CFO Cash from operations CFO is net cash flow – operating activities (wc04860) 
DCFO Dummy of cash from 
operations 
DCFO is a dummy variable indicating with one whether the CFO is 
smaller than zero 
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Appendix 5 - 14: Definition of Variables (continued) 
SHORT CUT VARIABLE DEFINITION 
Corporate Governance Measures (Source: proprietary data from Institutional Shareholder Services) 
GOV Corporate governance 
measure 
 
GOV is based on a self-constructed governance rating (GOVISS) using ISS 
CGQ raw data from 2003 to 2007, and averaged (taking mean values from 
GOVISS) for our sample period (1998 to 2011) 
GOV_dummy Corporate governance 
measure (dummy) 
 
GOV_dummy is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the firm’s 
governance measure (GOV) is above its mean value, and zero otherwise  
GOV_median Corporate governance 
measure 
 
GOV_median is based on a self-constructed governance rating (GOVISS) 
using ISS CGQ raw data from ‘03 to ‘07, and averaged (taking median
GOV_Top10% 
 




GOV_Top10% is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the firm’s 
governance measure (GOV) belongs to the 10th deciles, and zero otherwise  
GOV_pca Corporate governance 
measure 
 
GOV_pca is a governance score based on Principal Component Analysis 
(PCA) where the averaged (taking mean
GOV_monitor 
 values) principal component - 
estimated on six sub-scores which are based on UK firm-level ISS rating 
data from the years 2003 to 2007 - with the highest eigenvalue is used to 




GOV_monitor is a governance score based on the GOVISS sub-categories: 
board, audit, charter, anti-takeover, and progressive practice (it is based on 
the individual firm data from 2003 to 2007 and is averaged for the M&A 
sample period) 
GOV_incentives Corporate governance 
measure  
GOV_incentives is a governance score based on the GOVISS sub-
categories: compensation and managerial ownership (it is based on the 
individual firm data from 2003 to 2007 and is averaged for the M&A 
sample period) 
GOVISS Corporate governance 
measure 
 
GOVISS is a self-constructed governance score based on UK ISS CGQ raw 
data from 2003 to 2007. The UK CGQ rating relies on 47 criteria and is 
organised into eight categories: board, audit, charter, anti-takeover 
provisions, compensation, progressive practice, exc. ownership, and 
education (see Hitz and Lehmann 2013). 
Firm Control Variables (Source: Worldscope database) 
SIZE Log of total assets SIZE if the natural logarithm of total assets (EURO) (xwc02999e) 
LEV Leverage LEV is the accounting leverage as total debt (wc03255) to total assets 
(wc02999) 
OWNER** Log of ownership Owner as ownership – closely held shares (wc08021) 
BIG FIVE Audit quality by Big 
Five Auditors 
BIG_FIVE is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the firm is 
audited by PwC, KPMG, E&Y, Deloitte, Arthur Andersen, or by one of 
their predecessors, and zero otherwise (based on wc07800) 
M&A Control Variables (Source: SDC Platinum & Datastream database) 
DEAL SIZE Relative deal size Rel. Deal Size is deal size (transaction value) deflated by acquirers’ 
average fiscal year’s market value of equity (mv) 
IND 
RELATEDNESS 
Industrial relatedness Ind_Relatedness is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the four-
digit SIC code of the acquirer and the target is identical, and zero 
otherwise 
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Appendix 5 - 14: Definition of Variables (continued) 
SHORT CUT VARIABLE DEFINITION 







TRANS-1 (TRANS-2) [TRANS-3] is a dummy variable taking the value of 
one for the acquirer’s first (second) [third] year with an earnings release 









TRANS0 (TRANS+1) [TRANS+2] { TRANS+3} is a dummy variable 
taking the value of one in the year with the acquirer’s first (second) [third] 
{fourth} earnings release following the announcement of the stock swap, 
and zero otherwise 
Robustness Section: Exclusion Restrictions & Add. Variables (Source: Datastream & Worldscope database) 
DPS Dividend per share DPS as dividends per share (wc05101)  
MILLS Inverse Mills ratio MILLS is the inverse mills ratio from the first stage regression (selection 
equation) included in the second stage regression of the two-stage 
Heckman procedure 
BHAR Buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns 
BHAR are based on the methodology proposed by Barber and Lyon (1997) 
with matching firms based on size and book-to-market 
Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q measures firm valuation by average fiscal year’s market value 
(dwta+mv-dwse) deflated by average fiscal year’s total assets (dwta) 
Growth3 3 years average change 
in sales 
Growth3 is the past average three-years growth in net sales (wc01001) 
Growth Change in sales Growth is one-year growth in net sales (wc01001) 
ROA Return on assets ROA is calculated as net income available to common shareholders 
(wc01751) divided by total assets (wc02999)  




Blue chip index 
membership 
Index Membership is blue chip index membership based on FTSE100 
(wc05661) 
Robustness Section: Additional DAC Control Variables (Source: SDC Platinum & Worldscope database) 
M&A Activity Stock swap M&A 
activity 
M&A Activity measures the number of stock swap transactions per firm in 
the period between 1998 and 2011 
Cross-border Cross-border transaction Cross-border is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the stock 
swap transactions take place as a cross-border transactions (with non-UK 
targets), and zero otherwise 
Tender Tender offer Tender is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the stock swap deal 
is structured as a tender offer, and zero otherwise 
Completed Deal completed Completed is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the stock swap 
deal is completed, and zero otherwise 
Voting Rights Majority voting rights 
transferred  
Majority voting rights is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the 
majority voting rights of the target are transferred to the acquirer after the 
deal is completed, and zero otherwise 
Deal Timing Strategic timing of the 
deal announcement 
Deal Timing is measured as the difference between the deal announcement 
date and the earnings release date (in months) 
Deal Duration Deal duration Deal Duration is measured as the time length of the deal negotiation as the 
difference between the deal announcement date and the deal completed 












THE ROLE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN SHAPING ACCRUALS 





Appendix 5 - 14: Definition of Variables (continued) 
SHORT CUT VARIABLE DEFINITION 
Robustness Section: Additional DAC Control Variables (Source: Worldscope & IBES database) 
Analyst REC Analyst recommendation 
HOLD 
Analyst REC is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the stock swap 
acquirer receives a HOLD recommendation, and zero otherwise (BUY & 
STRONG BUY recommendation) (based on reccon) 
Analyst COV Analyst coverage Analyst COV is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the stock 
swap acquirer is covered by analysts, and zero otherwise (based on recno) 
M&A Waves M&A specific time 
periods 
M&A Waves a dummy variable taking the value of one if the fiscal year 
has above average stock returns (based on my whole UK Worldscope 
population), and zero otherwise 
IFRS IFRS reporting IFRS is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the firm reports 
accounting numbers pursuant IFRS, and zero otherwise (based on 
wc07536) 
BTM Book-to-market of 
equity ratio 
BTM = common equity (wc03501) deflated by market capitalization 
(wc05001*nosh) 
CFO1 Cash from operations1 CFO1 = net cash flow – operating activities (wc04860) deflated by total 
assets (wc02999) 
Audit Fees Fees paid for auditing Audit Fees is measured as the fees paid for auditing (wc01801) scaled by 
firm’s total assets (wc02999) 
* Winsorized by extreme percentiles (1% level) to control for outliers. 
# Applying an alternative method following Botsari (2010) to calculate cash from operations (CFO) for our total 
accruals and working capital accruals measure does not alter our main results. Botsari (2010, p. 17) defines total 
accruals as NI (wc04001) - CFO (wc04201+wc04831), and working capital accruals
** Since we expect decreasing marginal effects in additional blockholdings, we apply the log transformation on 
ownership concentration (e.g., Larcker et al., 2011, p. 439). 
 as NI (wc04001) – CFO 








6.1 Summary of the Results 
Based on four empirical studies, this thesis addresses and extends two general literature 
streams; the stream on corporate governance advisory (e.g., Daines et al., 2010; Ertimur et al., 
2013), and the stream on accrual-based earnings management and corporate governance 
quality (e.g., Klein, 2002; Larcker et al., 2007).  
Pertaining to the former literature stream, the first objective of this thesis is to contrast 
the usefulness of governance advisory on capital markets (Study 1 and Study 2). Based on 
proxy voting recommendations issued by ISS for the German proxy season 2010, the thesis 
complements the discussion initiated by ESMA about the role of proxy advisors at European 
shareholder meetings and provides empirical evidence on the influence and method 
consistency of these advisors for a major European market (Study 1). In particular, the results 
suggest that “vote against” recommendations issued by ISS significantly correlate with 8.5% 
less supportive shareholder votes. This correlation is even more pronounced for firms with 
high free float, low voting turnout, and high ISS client base. However, in comparison to prior 
U.S. evidence, negative ISS voting recommendations affect in economic terms voting 
outcomes at a lower level. In addition, a second set of analyses suggests that ISS 
recommendations significantly correlate with ISS’s commercially available corporate 
governance ratings. In contrast to recent U.S. findings, this result suggests an economically 
meaningful degree of method consistency with respect to ISS’s employed governance 
perceptions. Overall, the findings highlight the potential influence as well as the consistency 
of ISS proxy voting recommendations at German shareholder meetings. Specifically, they 
suggest that – despite differences in the institutional set up between the U.S. and Germany – 
proxy voting advisors seem to play an influential role at German shareholder meetings as 
well. 
To glean additional insights into the usefulness of governance advisory, the thesis 
provides empirical evidence on the incremental usefulness of commercial governance ratings 
to investors (Study 2). Based on governance rating data provided by ISS for the UK and the 
German markets, it investigates in detail the incremental value created by the rating agency’s 
activities of translating public and private information into commercial ratings. The findings 






value. However, isolating the incremental contribution of the rating agency, the thesis finds 
no additional explanatory power relative to a naïve rating that is constructed from the 
observable, publicly available inputs which ISS uses. This suggests that the rating agency 
does not create value in the process of converting public data into aggregated ratings. Overall, 
these findings put into question the incremental usefulness of the rating agencies’ information 
processing activities. 
Addressing both literature streams, the stream on governance advisory and the stream 
on earnings management and governance quality, the second objective of this thesis is to 
highlight the role of (non-financial) corporate governance analysts (Study 3). To that end, the 
thesis provides empirical evidence on the potential economic consequences of governance 
analyst coverage. Based on a quasi-natural experimental setting, that exploits an exogenous 
shock in the UK governance analyst coverage, this thesis finds that an increase in governance 
analyst coverage results in increasing analyst following, weakly in increasing free float, in 
improvements in firm-level corporate governance, and weakly in decreasing earnings 
management. These findings suggest that financial analysts, investors, and managers respond 
to changes in governance analyst coverage. Overall, the findings are consistent with the 
notion that governance analysts improve firm-level information environments and promote 
external monitoring to managers. 
Drawing on research on corporate governance and earnings management, the third 
objective of this thesis is to highlight the setting specific-nature of the relationship between 
governance and earnings management (Study 4). In doing so, the thesis provides empirical 
evidence on the link between accruals manipulation and corporate governance in a specific 
setting, i.e., stock swap M&A transactions. As accruals manipulation prior to share deals is 
potentially in the interests of the acquirer’s invested shareholders, this setting offers an 
alternative perspective on the link between governance and earnings management. 
Specifically, it is plausible to assume that good governance negotiates the lowest target price 
for the acquirer’s shareholders, and hence promotes income-increasing accruals manipulation 
prior to the deal negotiation. Using stock swap transactions with public acquirers originating 
from the UK between the years 1998 and 2011, the results contrast common claims that 
strong governance constrains accruals manipulation, and suggest that acquirers with strong 
governance engage more aggressively in income-increasing accruals manipulation than those 
with weak governance. This finding is consistent with the notion that corporate governance 






highlights the setting specific-nature of the earnings management and corporate governance 
relationship and thus suggests a possible explanation for the inconclusive evidence provided 
by prior literature on the link between governance and earnings management. 
 
6.2 Main Limitations of the Thesis 
In sum, the findings of this thesis – based on four empirical studies – shed light on essentially 
two points: (1) the economic role of corporate governance advisory as well as (2) potentially 
competing roles of corporate governance in shaping accrual-based earnings management. 
However, as outlined in the respective chapters and as summarized in Table 6 - 1, the findings 
of this thesis are subject to several limitations. For one reason, research design issues might 
affect the thesis’ findings. Boersch-Supan and Koeke (2002), for example, present a list of 
common problems of empirical corporate governance studies – e.g., endogeneity (i.e., reverse 
causality and omitted variables), sample selectivity, and measurement errors in the variables – 
which likewise affect the thesis’ findings at different levels.  
For example, the studies’ findings rely on the robustness of the empirical proxies used 
in the analyses. Previous accounting research discusses the construct validity of discretionary 
accruals (e.g., Collins et al., 2012) and corporate governance ratings (e.g., Larcker et al., 
2007) and points out that prior findings are sensitive to the chosen measurement approach. As 
most earnings management studies, the third and fourth study of this thesis employ the 
Worldscope’s standardized financial statement data to estimate discretionary accruals. As 
Young (2008, p. 674) notes, this might induce an estimation bias since the financial data 
underlying the accrual models contains both, the adjustments made by Worldscope analysts as 
well as accounting choices made by management. Even though the thesis challenges the 
findings with different discretionary accrual proxies and incorporates growth adjustments in 
the initial proxy (Collins et al., 2012), the robustness of the respective findings depends 
substantially on the perceived specification power of the discretionary accrual models. In 
addition, endogeneity (i.e., omitted variables) concerns might arise especially in the context of 
the first study on proxy voting recommendations and voting outcomes. As outlined in the 
respective section of the first study, a potential problem when analyzing the effects of these 
recommendations on voting outcomes is the distinction between correlation and causation. 
Correlation rather than causation occurs if proxy advisors simply anticipate shareholders’ 
voting behavior due to a similar underlying information set. Although the thesis employs a 






driven by a mere correlation between proxy recommendations and shareholders’ voting 
behavior. Stickiness concerns – especially in the context of the third and fourth study – might 
affect the robustness of the respective findings as well. Specifically, research design choices 
of the third study demand a rather low time-series stickiness in the four dependent variables 
(i.e., analyst following, free float, governance quality, and discretionary accruals). Put 
differently, the employed research design assumes that the respective outcome variables are 
able to respond in a timely manner to the exogenous shock in governance analyst coverage. In 
addition, the research design of the fourth study – especially the data constrains with respect 
to the employed governance proxy – requires a rather high relative stickiness in governance 
quality. In other words, the fourth study relies on the notion that the relative governance 
quality across firms in the cross section remains rather sticky over the sample period. Both 
stickiness assumptions, however, might be debatable in the light of prior research (e.g., 
Brown et al., 2011).   
Table 6 - 1: Limitations and Avenues for Future Research 
 MAIN LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY  MAIN AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
 Chapter 2: DOES PROXY VOTING ADVISORY MATTER IN A EUROPEAN CONTEXT? 
EVIDENCE FROM GERMAN ANNUAL MEETINGS (STUDY 1) 
 
• Endogeneity (omitted variable) concerns: the 
study cannot distinguish between correlation 
and causation in the context of proxy 
recommendations and voting results 
• Limited generalizability and data constrains: the 
study considers the role and influence of one 
particular proxy advisor (ISS) for a specific 
time frame (proxy season 2010) and market 
(Germany) 
 • Comparative differences in the role of 
(European vs. U.S.) proxy advisors at 
European shareholder meetings (e.g., Do local 
proxy advisors differ to non-local advisors in 
the way of incorporating institutional 
peculiarities?) 
• Replication with alternative time frames and 
different European settings 
• Interrelations of proxy advisors and other 
information intermediaries (e.g., Do financial 
analysts react on the release of proxy advisory 
reports?) 
     
 Chapter 3: THE USEFULNESS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE RATINGS – INSIGHTS 
FROM EUROPEAN SETTINGS (STUDY 2) 
 
• Endogeneity concerns: governance quality, 
measured by the governance rating, is most 
likely endogenous - although applying IV re-
gressions, the study cannot rule out that reverse 
causality as well as omitted variable problems 
affect the findings with respect to the relation-
ship between governance and performance 
• Limited generalizability and data constrains: the 
study considers the incremental value 
generation of one particular governance rating 
vendor (ISS) for a specific time frame (2003-
2007) and markets (UK & Germany) 
 • Comparative differences in how rating 
agencies create (incremental) value (e.g., Do 
rating agencies create value differently in the 
process of gathering, processing, and 
disseminating governance information to the 
market?) 
• Usefulness of commercial corporate 
governance ratings in a different context (e.g., 
Do governance ratings serve as a mean to 
justify investment decisions by investment 
managers?) 






Table 6 - 1: Limitations and Avenues for Future Research (continued) 
 Chapter 4: DO CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ANALYSTS MATTER? EVIDENCE FROM A 
QUASI-NATURAL EXPERIMENT (STUDY 3) 
 
• Concerns of construct validity: the validity of 
discretionary accruals is especially sensitive to 
the chosen measurement approach 
• Stickiness concerns: research design demands a 
low time-series stickiness in the four outcome 
variable; analyst following, free float, 
governance quality, and discretionary accruals 
(this requires that the outcome variables are 
able to respond in a timely manner to the 
exogenous shock) 
• Limited generalizability and data constrains: the 
study considers only one particular governance 
agency (ISS) for a specific time frame (2004-
2006) and market (UK) 
 • Replication with alternative time frames and 
different institutional settings (however, 
identification might be a problem) 
• First-time coverage effects in a cross-country 
setting (e.g., Do institutional features – like 
investor protection standards and the strength 
of alternative information intermediaries – 
moderate the coverage effects of governance 
analysts?) 
• Interrelation of governance analysts and other 
information intermediaries in more detail 
(e.g., Does the coverage by governance 
analysts affect financial analysts’ forecasts 
properties?) 
     
 Chapter 5: THE ROLE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN SHAPING ACCRUALS 
MANIPULATION PRIOR TO ACQUISITIONS (STUDY 4) 
 
• Concerns of construct validity: the validity of 
discretionary accruals is especially sensitive to 
the chosen measurement approach 
• Stickiness concerns: research design demands a 
high relative stickiness in governance quality 
(this requires that the relative governance 
quality across firms in the cross-section remains 
sticky over the sample period) 
• Limited generalizability and data constrains: the 
study is based on a rather small sample and 
considers only one particular market (UK)  
 • Interrelation of different governance 
mechanisms (e.g., incentive vs. monitoring 
mechanisms) and different earnings 
management tools prior to stock swap deals 
(e.g., accrual-based, formal, and real earnings 
management activities) 
• Replication with different institutional 
settings (e.g., Do institutional features – like 
investor protection standards – moderate the 
earnings management mix and the respective 
governance role?) 
• Role of governance in shaping earnings 
management in a setting with no explicit 
benefits for current or future shareholders 
(e.g., Does corporate governance constrains 
income-decreasing earnings management 
prior to management buyouts?) 
     
 
6.3 Avenues for Future Research 
The thesis’ findings create various research opportunities. As reflected in Table 6 - 1, future 
research may extend the first and the second study of the thesis by investigating the 
comparative differences in how rating agencies create value or proxy advisors affect voting 
outcomes. Complementing the fourth study, future research might examine the interrelation of 
different governance mechanisms and different earnings management activities prior to stock 
swap deals. It is plausible to assume that the relationship between governance and earnings 
management is determined not only by the setting itself but also by the plurality of 
governance mechanisms (e.g., incentive vs. control mechanisms or external vs. internal 






earnings management). Another path would be to challenge the robustness of the findings by 
conducting the analyses of the studies for alternative time frames and different institutional 
settings. With respect to the third study, it is plausible to assume, for example, that 
institutional features, like enforcement strength or investor protection standards, affect the 
economic role of governance analysts and the respective coverage effects. In addition, future 
research might highlight in more detail the interrelation of governance advisory firms and 
other information intermediaries. With respect to the first study, it would be worth to examine 
whether financial analysts react to the release of proxy advisory reports (e.g., whether forecast 
revisions, for example, increase around the release of proxy voting reports). Prior literature, 
so far, only provides evidence that the capital market reacts on the release of proxy reports 
(e.g., Ertimur et al., 2013), without examining, however, potential channels which might 
facilitate the information flow to the market. Overall, the growing literature on the 
interrelation of corporate governance, information intermediation, and earnings management 




“If applied econometrics were easy, theorists would 
do it. But it’s not as hard as the dense pages of 
Econometrica might lead you to believe. Carefully 
applied to coherent causal questions, regression and 
2SLS almost make sense. Your standard errors 
probably won’t be quite right, but they rarely are. 
Avoid embarrassment by being your own best 
skeptic, and especially, DON’T PANIC!”  
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